Silicon Investor (SI) -- The First Internet Community

STOCKTALK

We've detected that you're using an ad content blocking browser plug-in or feature. Ads provide a critical source of revenue to the continued operation of Silicon Investor. We ask that you disable ad blocking while on Silicon Investor in the best interests of our community. If you are not using an ad blocker but are still receiving this message, make sure your browser's tracking protection is set to the 'standard' level.

Strategies & Market Trends : Booms, Busts, and Recoveries -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: ild who wrote (59405)	1/25/2005 8:59:11 PM
From: TobagoJack	Read Replies (5) \| Respond to of 74559

Stratfor seems to believe that the US troops can be stationed in the middle of the desert, away from Iraqi population centers, leave the municipal securities to the Iraqis, and leaving the US troops free to carry out missions in Iran and Syria, and guard against the predictable in Saudi Arabia. And funnily, Stratfor believes their scenario with all seriousness. Stratfor supposedly represents top shelf thinking available commercially, and their net is supposedly wide and far. If so, the officialdom scenario planning must be seriously ridiculous. Stratfor's scenario reminds me of various tales of stranded Roman legions, left to wander and die in the hot sun. Stratfor also believes Rumsfeld is toast, and will be replaced by somebody who can do better. Chugs, Jay

To: ild who wrote (59405)	1/27/2005 9:07:26 AM
From: TobagoJack	Read Replies (2) \| Respond to of 74559

<<what does Stratfor think about Iraq?>> Geopolitical Diary: Thursday, Jan. 27, 2005 Jan 27, 2005 stratfor.biz Wednesday was the bloodiest single day for the United States in Iraq. Thirty-six Americans were killed, the largest group in the crash of a helicopter. Helicopters can carry a relatively large number of troops, so that any incident involving a chopper skews the numbers. Still, we are now four days before the elections and the guerrillas are going to inflict the maximum amount of damage; therefore, we can expect some fairly extreme numbers in the coming days. The violence is unlikely to end with the election. After that, the new government will be forming and the guerrillas will be doing everything they can to disrupt it and mobilize the Sunni population to resist. Therefore, from a political point of view, the election will serve as a comma, not a period. The issue is, of course, not the intentions of the guerrillas but their capabilities. Just how large are their numbers and what resources do they have available? According to Gen. George Casey, commander of U.S. forces in Iraq, the United States has killed or captured around 15,000 Iraqis as part of the counterinsurgency effort. The insurgency is still going strong. That raises an interesting question: Just how large is the insurgency if taking out 15,000 people doesn't cause it to pause? Obviously, not all of those 15,000 casualties or captures were active insurgents. Some were supporters who intermittently aided the guerrillas. An unknown number of others were not involved in the guerrilla movement at all. Counterinsurgency is not a surgical procedure to say the least. Nevertheless, if only one-third of those cited were involved in the insurgency, there is a real problem. Original estimates of the size of the insurgency were in the 5,000 to 10,000 range. If we accept this estimate, then somewhere between all and half of the guerrillas have been taken out. That can't be right. That means that either the original numbers for the guerrilla force were wildly underestimated or that the number of effective guerrillas is far above the original estimates. Casey said another interesting thing on Wednesday: In the past month, about 60 key members of the Abu Musab al-Zarqawi network have been captured. If 60 key members have been taken out and al-Zarqawi is still launching attacks unabated, how big is his network? The guerrilla movement hasn't been dented. Fifteen thousand have been taken out of action. Al-Zarqawi has lost 60 key men but remains fully operational. Even allowing for substantial exaggeration of the numbers, if just a fraction of what Casey said on Wednesday is true, the insurgency has grown completely out of control. The guerrilla force could not have been very large in the beginning because it would have been much easier to penetrate. This means that, at least in the four provinces where the insurgency is concentrated, a Herculean process of recruitment, training and deployment of forces has taken place. And it has taken place while these provinces have been under American occupation. The alternative explanation -- that the guerrilla movement numbered in the tens or hundreds of thousands at the beginning of occupation, but its size was not detected by U.S. intelligence, is beyond belief. We literally don't believe that to be possible. It is easier to believe fantastic growth. But then the question becomes: How could it grow this fast? Training a guerrilla, like training any soldier, takes time. A suicide bomber has to be psychologically managed. An infantryman has to learn to use his weapons and employ tactics. Commanders need to be taught to communicate securely and so on. It takes a few months and it takes secure facilities to bring up the kind of numbers that would permit these kinds of casualties. How could they have done it under the noses of U.S. forces? It comes down to the inappropriate use of forces. Using U.S. forces to occupy provinces in full revolt creates a situation in which the occupier is blind to the enemy, but the enemy sees the occupier. Officials of Prime Minister Iyad Allawi's government said Wednesday that they hoped U.S. forces could be confined to two or three major bases, giving up security responsibilities, by the end of the year. That's a better idea than what is being done now, but we don't see how to get there. Withdrawal and containment make more sense if the United States must take responsibility for the insurrection. Only four provinces are seriously involved. Containment is not impossible. Suppression appears to be. [EDIT by Jay from the peanut gallery: If "Containment is not impossible. Suppression appears to be" ... then the next question is a natural one, aas in "containment for how long a period of time". The answer is then of course, "until utter exhaustion, or until the electorates get fed up"] Copyright 2004 Strategic Forecasting Inc. All rights reserved. Reprint Rights: Articles from Stratfor may not be reproduced in multiple copies, in either print or electronic form, without the express written permission of Strategic Forecasting, Inc. For mass reprint permission or content licensing, please e-mail marketing@stratfor.com for more information.