SI
SI
discoversearch

We've detected that you're using an ad content blocking browser plug-in or feature. Ads provide a critical source of revenue to the continued operation of Silicon Investor.  We ask that you disable ad blocking while on Silicon Investor in the best interests of our community.  If you are not using an ad blocker but are still receiving this message, make sure your browser's tracking protection is set to the 'standard' level.
Politics : I Will Continue to Continue, to Pretend.... -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: Sully- who wrote (7506)2/3/2005 9:14:08 PM
From: Sully-  Respond to of 35834
 
The 'Exit Strategy' Democrats

The only thing they can't image is success in Iraq

Message 20991983

Message 20976524

Message 21004508



To: Sully- who wrote (7506)2/3/2005 9:20:30 PM
From: Sully-  Respond to of 35834
 
Democrats Look Weak Calling For Iraq 'Exit'

By Mort Kondracke

It's hard to see how the Democratic Party gains on the Republicans when, one after the other, its leaders call for exiting Iraq rather than winning the conflict.

The insistent Democratic demand for an "exit strategy" is particularly ill-timed in view of last Sunday's dramatic demonstration of the Iraq people's willingness to risk death for freedom.

Terrorists warned in leaflets that they would "wash the streets in blood" of those who tried to vote. Some 8 million did, many waving fingers marked with indelible ink in an act of defiance against those who would kill or oppress them.

After the voting, all of Iraq's highest-ranking interim leaders - the president, prime minister, defense minister and army commander - declared it would be "complete nonsense" and "very dangerous" for U.S. forces to leave Iraq in the foreseeable future, because it would leave "chaos" behind.

And yet, the Democratic Party's most visible leaders - Senate Minority Leader Harry Reid (Nev.), House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi (Calif.), 2004 presidential nominee Sen. John Kerry (Mass.) and Sen. Edward Kennedy (Mass.) - all are emphasizing withdrawal of U.S. forces, instead of staying until democracy and security are stable.

It's little wonder that on national security issues, American voters consistently trust Republicans over Democrats. In the latest poll by Democracy Corps, run by Democrats, the GOP enjoys a 25-point lead over Democrats on the measure "protecting America against any threat" and a 27-point edge on "strength."

It's a longstanding Democratic Party problem, dating back to the aftermath of Vietnam and persisting through to the 2004 election: Democrats look weak in the face of enemies, whether it's the Soviet Union, Saddam Hussein or Islamic terrorists.

Historically, the two parties have earned their reputations: Ronald Reagan took on the "evil empire" as Democrats favored a nuclear freeze. President Bush's father waged war to oust Hussein from Kuwait, over Democratic opposition. Bush favors unilateral "pre-emption" against potential terrorists, while Democrats want an "imminent threat" and multinational support before acting.

And now, in the wake of a presidential defeat that was heavily due to a lack of voter trust on security issues, the party is about to select the single most vociferous dove among its 2004 presidential candidates, former Vermont Gov. Howard Dean, as party chairman.

Prior to last Sunday's voting, a Fox News poll showed that the U.S. public was split on whether U.S. forces should start coming home immediately or should stay until Iraq was stabilized.

Since the overwhelming demonstration of Iraqi determination, those numbers surely will shift. President Bush, despite rumors to the contrary, seems determined to stay and produce a stable Iraq. The elections surely were a victory for his policies.

Democrats could hardly disparage the Iraqis' show of courage, but their leaders' statements certainly weren't as full of joy as their condemnations of Bush would have been had the elections turned into a fiasco.

Democrats' tributes to the Iraqis had a distinctly "yes, but" flavor, as in Reid's statement that "millions of Iraqi citizens risked bloodshed in order to raise their ink-stained fingers in a powerful symbol of democracy. But we all know that these brave men and women will never be truly free until they can walk through their cities without fear."

Reid called on Bush to "spell out a real and understandable plan for the unfinished work ahead." He included in the work "defeat the growing insurgency," but "most of all, we need an exit strategy and how we can get there."

The election, he said, "was the first step in helping figure out a way that the United States can get out of Iraq. I truly believe that the problem in Iraq is our policies. It's our presence that's also a problem. We're an occupying force ... and we have to figure out a way to remove ourselves with dignity."

At least Reid cares about "dignity" and trying to defeat the insurgency. Kennedy, in a well-publicized speech prior to the election, basically declared that all is lost and called for U.S. forces to start leaving right away.

Kerry, on NBC's "Meet the Press," didn't endorse an immediate pullout, but he repeated what's become Democratic logic: The main problem in Iraq is not the brutal insurgency, it's the presence of U.S. forces.

Kennedy, reiterating his refrain that Iraq is "Bush's Vietnam" - a "quagmire," a "black hole," a "shame and stain on America's good name" - said that "we must recognize what a large and growing number of Iraqis now believe. The war in Iraq has become a war against the American occupation."

Kennedy went so far as to say that "our military and the insurgents are fighting for the same thing - the hearts and minds of the Iraqi people." And, he strongly implied, the insurgents are winning.

It's shocking that a distinguished Senator could imply a moral equivalency between U.S. forces working for democracy and hideous killers trying to destroy it. Kennedy does not speak for the Democratic Party, but neither is anyone repudiating him
.

Kerry, on "Meet the Press" last Sunday, said he didn't agree with Kennedy's call for immediate withdrawal of 12,000 U.S. troops or the setting of a timetable for full withdrawal.

But Kerry, characteristically trying to have it both ways, added, "I understand what Sen. Kennedy is saying and I agree with Sen. Kennedy's perceptions of the problem. ... I agree with Sen. Kennedy that we have become the target and part of the problem today, if not the problem.

"I wouldn't do a specific timetable, but I certainly agree with him that the goal must be to withdraw American troops."

No, the goal should not be to withdraw American troops. The goal should be to produce a stable democracy in Iraq that can defend itself and then to withdraw on a timetable agreed to with the Iraqis.

Bush insists that this is his goal, though Kerry implied chicanery. "I wouldn't be surprised if the administration privately, behind closed doors, asked them to ask us to leave."

This suggests what Kerry would be doing if he were president: arranging a withdrawal whether it was militarily advisable or not. It's not precisely the reason a majority of voters chose Bush over him, but it's part of the reason.

Voters smell weakness in Democrats. It's no accident. It's there.


Mort Kondracke is the Executive Editor of Roll Call.



To: Sully- who wrote (7506)2/11/2005 4:02:45 AM
From: Sully-  Respond to of 35834
 
Choosing between a strategy for victory -- or for defeat

Clifford D. May
February 10, 2005
townhall.com

When a politician or a journalist talks about an “exit strategy” from Iraq, there is only one appropriate response: Roll your eyes and leave the room.

Imagine some senator or reporter during World War II asking Roosevelt and Churchill to define their “exit strategy” from Europe and the Pacific. They probably would not have dignified the question with an answer. Or, if they had, they might have said: “We have a strategy for victory. The alternative would be a strategy for defeat. Do we look like defeatists to you?”

Indeed, the leaders of the Anglo-American alliance made no attempt to find a formula that would bring troops home early at the price of, say, leaving Hitler in command of just a few central European countries.

On the contrary, the price that Germany and Japan paid for having become America's enemies was that they had to choose between “unconditional surrender” and catastrophic destruction.

But a few years later, we did accept a substitute for victory in the Korean War. The consequence: More than half a century later we are menaced by a second generation despot in Pyongyang, heading a regime that has been building nuclear weapons and exporting nuclear technology to those who despise us.

In Vietnam, we also had an exit strategy – the image that comes to mind is of helicopters frantically evacuating Americans from the roof of our besieged embassy in Saigon. After we left, millions of Vietnamese exited, too -- using not helicopters but ramshackle boats. An unknown number perished in shark-infested seas.

The Cold War – World War III – we won, despite that fact that much of the Washington foreign policy Establishment wanted to back away from any serious confrontation with Communism. But others – Sen. Henry “Scoop” Jackson and President Reagan, for example – preferred to push until the Soviet Union fell.

In Iraq today, America and its allies are fighting two enemies. The first are the remnants of Saddam Hussein's Ba'athist regime, those who were neither “shocked” nor “awed” by the invasion of 2003. It is clear that we erred by permitting them to flee and reorganize, apparently utilizing neighboring Syria, another Ba'athist regime, as a safe haven.

If, thanks to a premature exit, these butchers (of Iraqis, Iranians, Kuwaitis, Israelis and Americans), were to return to power in Baghdad, it would be a significant defeat for the U.S. and for the Free World.

We also are fighting the forces of Abu Musab al Zarqawi, designated by Osama bin Laden as the top al Qaeda general in Iraq. Were Americans to depart Iraq while Zarqawi remained, it would represent nothing short of our Waterloo in the War on Terrorism.

All this seems fairly self-evident, yet it is not just Senator Ted Kennedy, film-maker Michael Moore and other “blame-America-firsters” who are demanding an exit strategy. A Lexis/Nexis search finds the term used more than a thousand times in the last month alone.

Is it possible -- despite everything that has happened – that there are still those who are not convinced that America must fight those who have declared war on America and who have attacked America repeatedly and viciously?


Richard Clarke, the former White House terrorism advisor to Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, has just inaugurated a column for The New York Times Magazine. In his first contribution, Clarke argues that the Bush policy of “more democracy won't mean less terrorism.” And he's right – if promoting democracy is all there is to the policy. But coupled with a serious effort to undermine terrorist-sponsoring regimes, humble terrorist masters and kill or capture individual terrorists there is at least a chance for success.

Regarding the necessity for such warfare, Clarke has nothing to say in this column – except, oh yes, he does note that, “for many in the Islamic world, the United States is still associated with such acts as having made the 250,000 person city of Fallujah uninhabitable.”

You read that right. Clarke has not an unkind word to say for the terrorists who seized Fallujah, set up torture chambers and summarily executed those who might oppose them. No, to Clarke, the mistake was that American troops fought the terrorists in Fallujah, thus causing what Clarke calls “enormous resentment
.”

In the 20th century, the United States won its wars against European and Asian fascism – partly because there was no exit strategy. In fact, decades later, American troops remain both in Europe and in Asia. If America is to win the 21st century war against Islamist fascism, armed forces may need to remain in Iraq, Afghanistan and other places. For how long? I think Roosevelt and Churchill would say: “For the duration.” Or, as Churchill did indeed say: “No compromise with the main purpose, no peace till victory, no pact with unrepentant wrong.”

If you agree, the next time anyone talks about an “exit strategy,” head for the exit.


Clifford D. May is the president of the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, a policy institute focusing on terrorism and a Townhall.com member group.

©2005 Scripps Howard News Service

townhall.com



To: Sully- who wrote (7506)2/22/2005 9:43:45 PM
From: Sully-  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 35834
 
Speaking of "Exit Strategies", the utter failure of the UN,
Clinton getting a pass for going to war without UN approval,
etc., etc. (can libs say we are hypocrites?)........

The War We Haven't Finished

By FRANK C. CARLUCCI
The New York Times
February 22, 2005
OP-ED CONTRIBUTOR
Washington

WASHINGTON isn't exactly short of foreign policy priorities these days, but before rushing into a list of new tasks for the president's second term, I would like to suggest sorting out an old one: Kosovo.

The world reacted in horror six years ago when the Serbian regime of Slobodan Milosevic embarked on an ethnic cleansing operation against Kosovo's Albanians, forcing 700,000 people, nearly half the population, to flee the province. Reports of massacres and images of mileslong lines of refugees fleeing into neighboring Albania and Macedonia compelled the world to act. The NATO air campaign against Serbia that followed convinced Belgrade to give up its brutal assault, and Kosovo was put under United Nations administration.

And so it remains to this day: an international protectorate, legally part of Serbia, but with a 90 percent ethnic Albanian population that would sooner go to war than submit to Belgrade's rule. Kosovars seek an independent state, and the seemingly endless delays over final-status talks are only causing deep frustration and resentment.

Their discontent is not simply a matter of hurt pride over national sovereignty; Kosovo's unsettled international status has serious repercussions for daily life. Because it is under United Nations administration, Kosovo is in economic limbo: it cannot be part of the international bank transfer system, it is ineligible for sovereign lending from development banks, and it can attract few foreign investors. With 70 percent unemployment, the province is being starved of the commerce it badly needs.

Perhaps most important, the continuing uncertainty creates widespread insecurity among Kosovo's ethnic Albanians, who live with a constant sense of dread that they could return to Serb rule. It is essentially a siege mentality, and it could explode into violence at any time.

This is what happened last March, when Albanians rioted, killing at least 20 and destroying hundreds of Serbian houses and churches. Of course, mounting frustration cannot excuse or justify such a rampage, but the events clearly demonstrated that United Nations administration is not working.

With spring approaching, a repeat performance looks increasingly likely. But this time it would probably be far worse: Kosovo's Serbs may well ask Belgrade to intervene to protect them, which could result in a return to open war in the Balkans. Under these circumstances, the United Nations mission would probably evacuate, leaving behind the remnants of the NATO-led military force and the Kosovo Police Service to maintain security. These forces are not up to the job, and the chaos would be horrible.

How can we avoid such a nightmare? The only solution that makes long-term sense is full independence for Kosovo, and the only question that remains is how to get there.

The best approach would be for Washington and its five partners in the so-called Contact Group - Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Russia - to initiate a process for a final settlement, or Kosovo Accord. (Something along these lines was proposed last month by the International Crisis Group, an independent conflict prevention organization.)

First the powers would have to establish a timeline and some ground rules. The goal would have to be independence for the entire province, and all other options - partition, or union with Albania or slivers of other neighboring states where ethnic Albanians live - would be off the table from the outset. Given the events of last March, the Kosovo Albanians would be informed that that the pace of their progress toward independence will be set by their treatment of Serbs and other minorities.

The drafting process could begin as soon as the United Nations completes its assessment of the Kosovo government this year. Then the Kosovars could start writing a constitution. The new state would have to agree to a few strong guarantees to protect the rights of its minorities - including the presence of international judges on its higher courts and a multinational monitoring presence. Eventually, an international conference and a referendum within Kosovo would add the final stamps of approval. If all goes well, this could be wrapped up by mid-2006.

Getting Security Council approval, or even unanimity within the Contact Group, for this approach could prove tough. Russia sees itself as a protector of Serbia, and could thwart the process. The United States should counter by bringing along as many countries in the European Union as are willing to join us in formally recognizing an independent Kosovo, and hope the Russians accede to the majority will.

It's understandable, considering the events of the last four years, that Kosovo has been left hanging. But the situation is simply too tense to wait around forever.

Frank C. Carlucci, secretary of defense from 1987 to 1989, is chairman emeritus of the Carlyle Group, an investment firm.

Copyright 2005 The New York Times Company



To: Sully- who wrote (7506)6/25/2005 1:18:36 PM
From: Sully-  Respond to of 35834
 
Resolute Leadership

By Alexander K. McClure
PoliPundit.com

President Bush insists that there will be no schedule for withdrawing American military forces in Iraq.

polipundit.com

nytimes.com
hp&ex=1119672000&en=75d5bd90a145c5e9&ei=5094&partner=homepage



To: Sully- who wrote (7506)6/25/2005 2:45:28 PM
From: Sully-  Respond to of 35834
 
Bush to Negotiate with Zarqawi on Troop Pullout

Satire from ScrappleFace
by Scott Ott

(2005-06-25) -- In a surprising change of heart, President George Bush today called on al-Qaeda deputy Abu Musab al-Zarqawi to "come to the table" to negotiate the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq.

Although the president had been steadfast in asserting that he had no timetable for quitting Iraq and that freedom and democracy would prevail, today's statement was tantamount to an admission of defeat.

"We gave it the old college try," said Mr. Bush, in a news conference with Iraqi Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jafaari. "But our opponents in the Democrat party were right. It's a quagmire. We can't beat the insurgents, and our shameless treatment of prisoners at Abu Ghraib and Gitmo have killed any chance we had at winning hearts and minds on the Arab street."

Mr. Bush said he would dispatch a U.S. envoy to the al-Qaeda embassy in Baghdad with an invitation to Mr. Zarqawi to come to Camp David and work out terms of peace, and the withdrawal timetable.

"I kind of hoped that Iraq's 25 million people would experience the blessings of freedom," Mr. Bush said, "but with mid-term elections coming up here in the states, Republicans need to show the American people that we're as sensitive to media polling data as our Democrat opponents."

Upon hearing the news of the Bush-Zarqawi peace talks, Sen. Hillary Clinton, D-NY, immediately filed papers forming a 2008 presidential exploratory committee.

scrappleface.com



To: Sully- who wrote (7506)7/3/2005 10:33:06 PM
From: Sully-  Read Replies (38) | Respond to of 35834
 
What Is Our Kosovo Exit Strategy?

-- Lorie Byrd
PoliPundit.com

I am pretty sure that this is all Bush’s fault.

<< Breaking: Kosovo Explosions - Three blasts rock Kosovo capital >>

littlegreenfootballs.com

polipundit.com



To: Sully- who wrote (7506)11/29/2005 2:56:25 PM
From: Sully-  Respond to of 35834
 
"Exit Strategy" libs - AKA "Immediate Withdrawal" - AKA "Cut & Run"
AKA - Regaining power "By Any Means Necessary"

Stand with the Iraqis

     "As Iraqis stand up, we'll stand down," the president
said. "And over time, as Iraqi forces stand up, American
forces will stand down," repeated the vice president.
8/11/05

Message 21625545

Well said, Mr. President. - 8/23/2005
Message 21629627

More bias from the mainstream media
Message 21632836

President Addresses Military Families, Discusses War on Terror - August 24, 2005
     As Iraqis stand up, we will stand down. And when the
Iraqi forces can defend their freedom by taking more and
more of the fight to the enemy, our troops will come home
with the honor they have earned.
http://www.siliconinvestor.com/readmsg.aspx?msgid=21636121

Democrats Keep Shifting Towards Surrender
Message 21899091

Let's Take A Vote
Message 21899963
Message 21898573

Abandoning Iraq
Message 21901455



To: Sully- who wrote (7506)11/29/2005 3:03:21 PM
From: Sully-  Respond to of 35834
 
THE TIMETABLE IS UNCHANGED

By AMIR TAHERI
NEW YORK Post Opinion
November 29, 2005

IN the circles opposed to the toppling of Saddam Hussein, one word is making the rounds these days: timetable. Having failed to stop the war that liberated Iraq, and with their hopes of an insurgent triumph dashed, they are now focusing on one issue: the withdrawal of the U.S.-led Coalition forces.

The truth, however, is that a timetable has been in place from the first day of the war that ended the Ba'athist tyranny in 2003. In that timetable, the Coalition's military presence in Iraq is linked, as it should be, to the program for the nation's political reconstruction.

In other words, the Coalition forces are in Iraq to accomplish a precise political task, and not to provide the United States or any other foreign power with a forward base in the Middle East.

The goal was to take power away from a small clique led by Saddam Hussein and hand it back to the people of Iraq. The idea was not to impose democracy on Iraq, as some anti-liberation circles claim. The idea was to remove impediments to democratization.

Today, the Iraqis are not forced to create a democracy. But they have a chance to do so, if they so wish. The Coalition's task was to get them that chance. And in that sense, the Iraq project has been a tremendous success.

The task consists of a series of objectives — many already attained, often in the teeth of diplomatic chicanery by the anti-liberation powers and a nihilistic insurgency by the largest coalition of terrorists in the region's recent history.

Any checklist would show that the Iraq project has been more successful than Saddam nostalgics claim:


* The first objective, to bring down Saddam, was achieved in three weeks.

* The next objective was to break the apparatus of oppression created by the Ba'ath. Despite some residual problems, this, too, has been achieved.

* Another objective: Break Saddam's war machine, which had been used against Iraq's neighbors as well as Iraq's Kurds and Shiites. After just three years, nothing is left of that infernal machine.

* The formation of the Governing Council represented the first step toward restoring Iraqi sovereignty. Next came the transfer of sovereignty to the Iraqis, in June 2004.

* That was followed by the formation of an interim government, a series of municipal elections, a general election leading to the formation of Iraq's first pluralist government, the writing of a new constitution and a referendum to get it approved.

* The next item on the checklist is the general election set for Dec. 15.

The checklist clearly shows that every objective included in the political program has been achieved within the exact timeframe fixed by the new Iraqi leadership and its Coalition allies. The terrorists and the anti-liberation circles in the Middle East and the West have failed to stop or even delay the program's implementation.

A key element in all this has been the explicit understanding by both Iraq's leaders and the Coalition that no foreign troops will remain on Iraqi soil without the express agreement of the nation's elected representatives.

In other words, the timetable for withdrawal already exists.

In fact, the first item on the agenda of the next elected government (to be formed by February at the latest) consists of a decision on the presence of Coalition troops in Iraq.

The United States and all its Coalition allies are equally committed to withdrawing their troops if that is the express wish of the next elected parliament and government in Baghdad.

Iraqis of all backgrounds are unanimous in their desire to see foreign forces leave their country as soon as possible. The question that divides them is the timeframe for withdrawal.

With the exception of the Zarqawi gang and its residual Ba'athist allies, almost no one in Iraq wants an immediate pullout. Their country is located in a rough region with predatory neighbors; Iraqis see the presence of the Coalition forces as a kind of insurance against even more brutal intervention in their affairs by these neighbors.

The idea of a timetable for withdrawal from Iraq has been built into the entire project from Day One. It was on that understanding that the Iraqi people chose not to fight for Saddam, thus allowing the Coalition to win a rapid military victory. That fact created a moral contract between the people of Iraq and the Coalition as co-liberators.

The Iraqi people's part of the bargain was not to prevent the dismantling of the Ba'athist machinery of repression and war and to welcome the chance to build a new political system. The Coalition's part was to protect Iraq against its internal and external enemies until it was strong enough to look after itself.

In this year's general election and constitutional referendum, the people of Iraq formally endorsed that contract. The Coalition, for its part, must continue to honor it until the new Iraq feels strong enough to bid farewell to its liberators. That could come as early as next spring, or take another year or two.

My understanding of the situation in Iraq today is that the bulk of the Coalition forces could be safely withdrawn within the next year. The insurgency, which has already lost the political battle, is set to peak out in terms of the violence it is still capable of triggering against the Iraqi people. And if the recent performance of Iraq's new armed forces in a series of operations in two Western provinces is an indication, the Iraqis will be able to manage the insurgency on their own for as long as it takes to finish it off.

However, it is up to the people of Iraq and its Coalition allies to decide the moment and the modalities of the withdrawal. It is a judgment that no outsider can make. Those who opposed the liberation and those who have done all they could to undo it have no moral right to join that debate.

Amir Taheri is a member of Benador Associates.

nypost.com



To: Sully- who wrote (7506)11/29/2005 6:48:58 PM
From: Sully-  Respond to of 35834
 
"DON'T PULL OUT"

Kathryn Jean Lopez
The Corner

AP:
    WASHINGTON - Rep. Tim Murphy, one of two members of 
Congress treated at a military hospital after a weekend
accident in Iraq, said Monday that wounded soldiers had
told him the United States should remain in Iraq.
    "Every soldier I talked to said, 'Don't pull out. Do not 
make it so those who have been wounded and those who have
died have done so in vain. We know we can take care of
this cause. We got to finish this,'" said Murphy, R-Pa.,
at a Capitol Hill news conference.
http://corner.nationalreview.com/05_11_27_corner-archive.asp#083397

news.yahoo.com



To: Sully- who wrote (7506)11/30/2005 2:39:01 PM
From: Sully-  Respond to of 35834
 
Overlooked Iraq redeployment

By Donald Devine
The Washington Times
November 30, 2005

Why does no one know 30 U.S. bases in Iraq have been turned over to Iraqis with American forces withdrawn to more remote and defensible fortifications?

In early November, U.S. troops withdrew from the first major installation in the troubled Sunni region, Saddam Hussein's sprawling 18-palace hill compound in his Tikrit hometown, magnificently straddling the Tigris River, that so impressed this visitor then. Gen. Donald Alston offhandedly mentioned this was the 30th U.S. base turned over to Iraq this year. Maj. Gen. Joseph Taluto, 42nd Infantry Division commander, told reporters the move was meant to "reduce the footprint" of U.S. forces in the area to "discourage attacks and prepare the way for eventual reduction" of U.S. troops.

Somehow this crucial fact was missing from the debate in Congress recently on U.S. withdrawal from Iraq.
President George W. Bush was understandably pleased to end with both houses of Congress rejecting resolutions to withdraw U.S. troops immediately. But the fact the Senate voted 79-19 on a Republican chairman's resolution to designate the year 2006 as "a period of significant transition to full Iraqi sovereignty ... thereby creating the conditions for the phased redeployment of United States forces from Iraq" represents a momentous change regarding the war. Polls showed two-thirds of the public also wanted a plan for disengagement, although not necessarily a published one available to the enemy.

It's a shame but President Bush and the American military have had such a plan almost from the start but have allowed idealistic rhetoric to overshadow what is taking place in Iraq.
As a journalist and political science professor, this columnist was invited by the Defense Department to tour the major Iraqi bases in November 2003 and luckily returned to tell the tale.

Political science requires asking questions about idealistic goals such as transforming Iraq into a democracy and spreading democracy through the entire Middle East, especially given Iraq's history and the deep divides between majority Shi'ite, former-ruling Sunni and culturally distinct Kurd peoples, each with separate regional strongholds.

On the ground, it immediately became apparent the actual goals were more modest. American administrator L. Paul Bremer clearly set ethnic peace and local federalism as the goals. Military commanders emphasized turning over authority to the Iraqis and militarily separating U.S. troops from direct policing and insurgency control in more defensible locations.

President Bush even then said that U.S. troops would be drawn down to 100,000 by mid-2004. In a nationally televised April 2004 news conference, the president noted "Iraqis will then elect a permanent government by Dec. 15, 2005 -- an event that will mark the completion of Iraq's transition from dictatorship to freedom," implying U.S. forces would no longer be required for democracy. This rough plan was obscured when he also said troops would stay "as long as necessary" but also added the ambiguous "and not one day more."

Still, with all that has happened since, this general plan is not so far off course. Certainly, the Sunni insurgency has been stronger and more persistent than estimated and the Shi'ites and Kurds have been more interested in building their own regions than defeating the insurgency. Iraqi forces have been increased and U.S. troop levels were only temporarily increased again to 160,000 for the December 2005 election.

In testimony before Congress, military leaders have made it clear troop levels will be reduced substantially in 2006 after the election to 100,000 or fewer, delayed but moving in the planned direction. Iraqi leaders have called for reduced U.S. troop levels too.

In 2003, military leaders told us this was the plan.
Supporters of the military are afraid any news of withdrawal will demonstrate lack of resolve and diminish support for the war while those opposed fear resistance will evaporate if people understand the U.S. presence is being reduced.

However useful this posture might have been in the past, the collapse of poll and Senate support suggests it is time for the administration to let the people in on the real strategy.

At this point, support for the military is essential but must be for the real disengagement strategy, not the rhetorical ideal. There is little time. Congressional elections occur next November. The U.N. mandate for U.S. occupation was recently extended until Dec. 31, 2006. It does not seem international, congressional or public patience will endure longer.

A rational redeployment will require several more months. All of the skill of U.S. military forces will be needed to disengage by then and declare victory on the way out after the election.

Donald Devine, former director of the U.S. Office of Personnel Management, is a professor at Bellevue University, a columnist and editor of ConservativeBattleline.com.


washingtontimes.com