<<<<<<<The problem in my view became critical when the Brits through Stanley Baldwin turned a cold shoulder to the French request for help after the German invasion of the Rhineland.....
In my view, if the Brits and French had showed some gumption...., Hitler could have been stopped cold in his tracks. By any objective measure, he did not then have the means to withstand a combined French/British counterattack after he attacked the Rhineland. I think that even if the French acted independently, they could have taken him on at that point without too much trouble. Thus, an opportunity to eliminate Hitler in the nick of time was tragically lost.>>>>>>>
Carranza,
I once believed the same. I have been persuaded of the opposite, however, by A.J. P. Taylor's analysis.
"It is very hard to remember that events now long in the past were once in the future." (F. W. Maitland)
Hitler ordered the occupation of the Rhineland (an integral part of Germany) on March 7,1936. The date was not an accident: the League of Nations had just declined to take any effective action against Mussolini in Abyssinia and the French national elections were scheduled for that May.
It is very true that the German Army could not have given the French any effective resistance had they resolved to uphold the Treaties of Versailles and Locarno which prescribed that the Rhineland remain de-militarized. Under Versailles, the Germans were limited to an army of 200,000 men, including officers, and were not allowed tanks, heavy artillery or an air force. These latter restrictions were lifted in 1932, but it was only a little more than a year earlier that Hitler had begun to expand it. (I will interject here, that though the German Army of 1939 -1943 was the finest of the 20th Century, and perhaps ever, Hitler did NOT create it; all of the ingredients of the Wehrmacht's future success -its officers, cadres, tactical and strategic doctrines, etc. - were already there in embryo form, put in place by its architect, Hans von Seeckt (1919 -1926))
In any event, Hitler's generals were pulling their hair out when they learned of his plans. To assuage them, he agreed that the Army would immediately retreat if the French Army intervened.
"It was a staggering example of Hitler's strong nerve," but he had judged well. Four French Ministers were for immediate action;"but as often happened with French ministers, these strong men ascertained that they were in a minority before they raised their voices."
Then Gamelin, French Chief of Staff, opined: 'Of course the French Army can advance into the Rhineland and defeat the German forces there.' Then, he unfolded the difficulties: Germany had a population of 70 million vs 40 million in France; Germany had a greater industrial base. It would be a long war and without, at a minimum, the support of Britain and Belgium, France could not hope to win. Also, opined Gamelin, Locarno required "flagrant aggression" for France to act alone. Hitler's action did not threaten France's "national territory" and thus France might even be condemned as the aggressor by the League of Nations.
Belgium was a signatory (and guarantor) to both Versaille and Locarno. Now that the alliance threatened action on their part, they jettisoned it abruptly!
The French President went over to London, ostensibly canvassing for support. "Actually, he was more concerned to take his responsibility across the Channel and to leave it there." Baldwin displayed his usual sympathy and goodwill. With tears in his eyes, he stated that Britain had no forces available and, in any case, British public opinion would not allow it. And this was true; it was the almost unanimous British opinion (shared by Baldwin) that the Germans were just liberating their own territory.
And what if France had gone ahead and occupied the Rhineland? As Taylor points out, what can an army do when there is not another army to defeat? "It can invade the disarmed country; but the national will of the invaded is unshaken. That will can be broken only by terror - the secret police, the torture chamber, the concentration camp. This method is hard to apply in peacetime."
Also, Hitler was still very popular in Germany - and elsewhere - in March of 1936. He had already had one setback - the first Nazi putsch in Austria in 1934 - and had taken this in stride. It is not very likely a setback in the Rhineland would have broken his hold on the German nation.
On paper, it is true that March 7, 1936 was the last chance. The French had a great army, and the Germans could not have withstood them. "Psychologically, it was the reverse of the truth. .. The French Army could march into Germany (and maybe extract promises of good behavior); and then it could go away. The Situation would remain the same as before, or, if anything, even worse."
That is the argument of Taylor with which I agree.
Bruce |
