(Well, at least we don't have to agree to disagree on this anymore. Clarity from the horses's mouth.)
Syria Unlikely to Have Received Iraqi WMD, ISG Says
By David Ruppe
Global Security Newswire
WASHINGTON — U.S. inspectors do not believe that Iraqi weapons of mass destruction or weapons materials were transferred to Syria before the 2003 invasion, according to the final report released yesterday by U.S.-led WMD hunters in Iraq (see GSN, Oct. 7, 2004).
Inspectors concluded last year that Iraq did not possess chemical, biological or nuclear weapons or programs, as had been alleged by U.S. officials prior to the invasion.
The Iraq Survey Group released a nearly complete report in December, and yesterday posted an addendum and an accompanying note from chief weapons inspector Charles Duelfer. The addendum said reports of WMD transfers to Syria had warranted examination, but the investigation — including interviews of former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and detained scientists, engineers and officials — found no evidence of such transfers.
“Based on the evidence available at present, ISG judged that it was unlikely that an official transfer of WMD material from Iraq to Syria took place,” the addendum says.
Duelfer said the group found that Iraq had transferred military and other non-WMD material to Syria in violation of U.N. sanctions prior to the war.
Confidence Despite Uncertainty
The addendum says the group “could not rule out the possibility” of WMD transfers, as it was unable to complete its investigation.
Site visits in Iraq were shut down last November because of security concerns, he said, noting the deaths of two team members from suicide bombings since September.
“For now, this report is the best picture that could be drawn concerning the events, programs, policies, and underlying dynamics of the relationship of the former regime to WMD over the last three decades,” Duelfer wrote.
Furthermore, the report does not rule out the possibility that unofficial transfers of “limited WMD-related materials” might have occurred.
Duelfer nevertheless expressed confidence in the report’s conclusions, saying they are based on extensive interviews of captured Iraqi officials and scientists, none of whom gave information that indicates such transfers took place or even that WMD materials had existed.
“Given the [U.S.] access to individuals involved in these programs, it would seem probable that someone would have given some concrete indication of surviving or undeclared capability” if it existed, he said.
One Iraqi detainee, former Industry Minister Abd al-Tawab al-Mullah Huwaysh, told inspectors he was asked in early 2002 by one of Saddam’s sons to prepare a list of Iraqi biological weapons scientists to give to Syria.
The list was prepared, but Huwaysh said he was not certain it was ever submitted and said no Iraqi WMD scientists were sent to Syria.
Another former official said Syria feared that Iraqi scientists working there would have been discovered by Israeli intelligence.
Residual Threats Ruled Out
Duelfer argued that with the conclusion of the investigation, many of the detainees should be released.
“After 18 months, the WMD investigation and debriefing of the WMD-related detainees has been exhausted. … There is no further purpose in holding many of these detainees.”
The report cites unconfirmed estimates that there were 1,100 scientists in Iraq working on weapons programs, including 600 with core expertise specific on WMD research, development and production.
While their expertise might pose a proliferation risk, it says, their skills probably have deteriorated since the programs were closed in the early 1990s. There is “very little evidence” that jihadists or insurgent groups in the country are attracting the scientists, the report says.
There have been no signs that any Iraqi scientists were recruited to work in WMD programs of other countries, the report says, although there was a report that an Iraqi scientist helped Iraqi insurgents produce chemical mortars (see GSN, April 12).
Duelfer said there continue to be reports of unconventional weapons in Iraq, but that such reports usually are “scams” or result from “misidentification of materials or activities.”
In rare cases, coalition forces found old chemical munitions produced before 1990, he said. Such munitions do not pose a militarily significant threat because of agent deterioration and their small quantity, the report says.
It says any biological agents left over from the former program “probably have significantly decreased pathogenicity because Iraq never successfully formulated its biological agents for long-term storage.”
It concludes further that Iraqi chemical and biological weapons physical infrastructure “does not pose a proliferation concern” nor do Iraq’s remaining dual-use nuclear equipment and materials, as long as the government maintains control over them.
Any “surprise” future discovery of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq would be expected to involve biological weapons, “since the signature and facilities for these efforts are small compared to the other WMD types,” Duelfer wrote in his note.
“ISG disproved much of the prewar reporting from a specific source concerning mobile BW capability (see GSN, April 1), but it is still possible, though I would judge very unlikely, that such a capacity remains undiscovered,” Duelfer wrote.
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