Hi twfowler; I agree with you, that it took Italian errors (as well as US errors or at least inefficiencies) to get that hostage car shot up. This is from a US military report detailing how we came to shoot up the car containing the Italian hostage, wounding her and killing one of her guards. Also, the basic problem, according to this quite believable report, was that the Italian driver was talking on the cell phone (and probably driving in the usual Italian manner), and failed to inform the US that they intended on moving through a battle zone patrolled by our forces at night:
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(U) As the car approached the on-ramp to Route Irish, Mr. Carpani was on the cell phone updating Mr. Castilletti on their position and reporting that everything was going fine. (Annexes 104C, 105C). Though not in the habit of checking his speedometer, Mr. Carpani estimated his speed at 70-80 kph as he exited off of Route Vernon, heading toward the on-ramp to Route Irish. (Annex 105C). The courtesy light in the car was on and had been since picking up Ms. Sgrena in the Mansour District of Baghdad. (Annex 104C). Additionally, Mr. Carpani had his side window halfway open to listen for possible threats. (Annex 105C). Ms. Sgrena and Mr. Calipari were in the rear of the car talking to each other. (Annexes 103C, 105C). The atmosphere in the car was a mix of excitement over the recovery of Ms. Sgrena, and tension from the tasks yet to be completed. (Annex 140C).
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(U) Mr. Carpani was driving faster than any other vehicle observed by the Soldiers that evening. He failed to stop for the spotlight since he was not expecting a roadblock. Additionally, he was dealing with multiple distractions including talking on the phone while driving, the conversation in the back seat, trying to listen for threats, driving on a wet road, focusing on tasks to be accomplished, the need to get to the airport, and the excited and tense atmosphere in the car. (Annexes 104C, 105C, 125C, 140C). Any one of these would have affected his reaction time.
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(U) Further recommend a transition to a more driver friendly alert signal by substituting devices such as rotating warning lights and sirens to replace spotlights as early warning tools.
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(U) When moving through another unit’s battlespace in a combat zone, coordination with forces in the area is required for situational awareness, and, more importantly, for deconfliction of unit movements, positioning, and operations.
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(U) No one at the U.S. Embassy, including the Political Military Counselor, knew about the Sgrena operation until after the shooting incident had occurred. (Annex 114C).
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(U) Thus, it can be positively stated that the U.S. military was totally unaware of the recovery and transport of Ms. Sgrena on 4 March 2005 until after the shooting incident had occurred.
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(U) No U.S. military personnel within MNF-I, MNC-I (to include Captain Green), or subordinate units were informed by the Government of Italy of the hostage rescue mission that occurred on 4 March 2005. (Annexes 1C to 56C, 58C to 63C, 65C to 72C, 76C, 78C, 80C, 82C, 84C, 86C, 88C, 90C, 92C, 96C to 99C, 110C, 114C, 126C, 7M).
(U) Not coordinating with U.S. personnel was a conscious decision on the part of the Italians as they considered the hostage recovery an Intelligence mission and a national issue. (Annex 100C).
(U) Based upon previous successful coordination efforts by 3ID and 2/10 MTN working with organizations from various agencies outside their chain of command, it is clear that, while the hostage recovery operation may have otherwise been a success, prior coordination might have prevented this tragedy. Iraq is still a hostile environment, i.e, a combat zone, and the more coordination that can be done to increase situational awareness of those operating within the battlespace, the better it is for all involved. (Annex 65C)
globalsecurity.org
-- Carl
P.S. The report also acknowledges that the resistance is growing, at least in terms of the number of IEDs they are throwing at us:
4. (U) Effectiveness of Attacks (U) The number of IED detonations from 15 June 2003 through 4 March 2005 (the date of the incident), has steadily increased. Although the effectiveness of those detonations has decreased over that timeframe, the overall average number of casualties during that period is nearly one per IED detonation. (Annex 4E).
(S//NF) The week of the incident saw 166 IED incidents, with 131 detonations and 35 IEDs rendered safe. There were 82 casualties from those incidents. (Annex 4E). (U) The number of VBIED detonations from 15 June 2003 through 4 March 2005 has also seen a relatively steady increase. Similar to the decrease in the effectiveness of IEDs, the effectiveness of VBIEDs has also decreased over that period, but there have been spikes for particular VBIED events that have produced large numbers of casualties. (Annex 4E).
(S//NF) There were 17 VBIEDs detonated during the week of the incident with five rendered safe. The average casualty per VBIED detonation that week was 23 due to the large number of casualties that resulted from a VBIED detonation in Al Hillah. The Al Hillah attack was widely publicized and caused all Coalition Forces concern as they patrolled Baghdad and its environs. Any intelligence gained on potential VBIEDs was passed in the form of a BOLO (Be On the Look Out) message to units on patrol via FM radio. (Annex 4E).
This is the kind of thing that happens in a battle zone. You try to minimize them, to learn from them and avoid them, but these sorts of things have been going on since long before Stonewall Jackson was killed by friendly fire. "Let us cross the river and rest in the shades of the trees." |
