At the same time outfits such as Stratfor either forget or never read the thoughts of the Chairman named Mao, "when the enemy attacks, we withdraw; when he rests, we harass; when he tires, we attack; and when he withdraws, we give chase"
Stratfor thinks this is a good idea and a healthy development ...
stratfor.com
Iraq: The Drawdown and Repositioning of U.S. Forces
July 08, 2005 2121 GMT
Summary
The United States will be compelled to significantly reduce the size of its military presence in Iraq starting in 2006. Recruiting shortfalls and the strain of the Iraq campaign on U.S. military operations in the rest of the world will have a serious impact on the ability of the United States to respond to threats elsewhere. To compensate for this and still be able to have an effective military presence in Iraq, the U.S. military in will reorganize its forces in the country, causing them to look very different than they do now.
Analysis
The United States military will be unable to maintain its current force size (17 brigades totaling about 138,000 troops) in Iraq over the long term and still maintain an ability to respond to a contingency or threat in another part of the world. Therefore, Washington will seek to reduce troop levels in Iraq in the near future, leaving a dramatically different military and security situation in the country. The U.S. military presence in Iraq will look very different at the end of 2006 than it does now.
The withdrawal of a significant portion of the U.S. force from Iraq is a question of when, not if. The strain that the commitment to Iraq is placing on the U.S. military has hampered its ability to react to other threats. Gen. Richard Meyers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, admitted in May 2005 that with its commitment in Iraq, the U.S. military could not respond quickly to a war in another theatre. The United States would eventually prevail, Meyers said, but it would take longer and there would be more collateral damage. Meyers did not say if it would be three months longer or three years longer.
Although Washington will not specify an actual timetable for withdrawal, the general consensus in the U.S. Army is that a significant reduction of troop levels will have to take place between 2006 and 2007. On June 21, Lt. Gen. John Vines, the second-in-command of U.S. forces in Iraq, said that as many as four or five brigades, numbering 3,000 troops each, could be withdrawn from Iraq in 2006.
U.S. generals have talked about reducing troop levels in Iraq, but their statements have been incongruent with the military situation in the country. This talk was loudest in March 2005, when insurgent activity was at a six-month low. Since then, however, the insurgents have increased their activity in order to disrupt the political process and in response to increasing U.S. pressure.
Any significant U.S. withdrawal would depend on the ability of Iraqi security forces to control the country. Thus far, they have given little indication that they can do that. Although Iraqi forces have conducted more operations since the Jan. 30 elections, there are still serious problems that must be resolved before they can have a realistic chance of effectively combating the insurgency. Currently, the U.S. military's top priority in Iraq is to train and equip the Iraqi forces to a point where they can adequately fend for themselves.
At that point, the United States will likely deploy its troops in Iraq in a configuration similar to U.S. troop deployment in Afghanistan. The United States is planning to relocate to 14 major bases located around Baghdad, Balad, Kirkuk, Mosul, Taji, An Nasiriyah, Tikrit and Al Fallujah and between Arbil and Kirkuk. These installations will include former Iraqi military bases such as Tallil Air Base in Southern Iraq, Balad Air Base in Eastern Iraq, Al Asad Air Base in Western Iraq and Qayyarah Air Base in Northern Iraq. The U.S. will also maintain a significant presence at Baghdad International Airport.
The main benefit of this plan is that it would leave a smaller U.S. footprint in the county and expose fewer troops and facilities to attack. Consolidated bases would also simplify logistical support. This is the mode of deployment that U.S. and coalition forces use in Afghanistan. Stratfor has speculated that U.S. forces would withdraw to these bases in order to minimize the exposure of its troops to urban areas and still maintain an effective military and political presence in the region.
Built during Saddam Hussein's regime, each of the large former Iraqi Air Force bases possesses long, wide runways capable of accommodating large cargo aircraft, as well as hardened aircraft shelters to protect fighter-bombers and helicopters (these bases already host several major U.S. and coalition ground units). Since the fall of Baghdad, the United States has been steadily improving these bases, making them compatible with U.S. logistical and operational requirements.
The consolidated base plan means that the bulk of the responsibility for securing the country would go to Iraqi security forces. This would reduce the number of U.S. troops needed in the country, but the move will be viewed (by the Iraqis, insurgents and civilians alike) as an attempt to establish a permanent U.S. presence and is likely to invite criticism (or worse) from several sectors of the Iraqi population. Given the unlikelihood that the Iraqis will be capable of completely controlling their country in the near future, the U.S. bases would still be vulnerable to attack -- especially Balad, which is located in a heavily populated and predominantly Sunni part of the country.
Plans call for the Iraqi security forces eventually to number about 200,000 -- a number supposedly big enough to provide for Iraq's internal security but not big enough to be a threat to Iraq's neighbors. In May 2005, only about 65,000 out of 160,000 Iraqi troops were considered properly equipped and trained. Desertion and poor combat performance continue to plague the Iraqi forces. Although they reportedly conduct themselves well in operations with U.S. troops, there have been reports of Iraqi forces performing poorly on their own and, in some cases, being unwilling to go into combat against Sunni nationalist insurgents.
To facilitate its force restructuring in Iraq, one of the primary U.S. goals is to damage the jihadist insurgency to the point that it can no longer effectively operate in Iraq, and to do so before turning the bulk of security responsibilities over to the Iraq security forces. Currently, the United States is engaged in a war of attrition with the jihadists that involves a series of offensive operations in Anbar province. Beginning in March 2004 with Operation River Blitz, U.S.-led coalition troops have kept the pressure on the jihadists in an effort to deprive them of the opportunity and safe havens they need to regroup and mount further attacks. The jihadists are responding by escalating their operations in an effort to instigate a sectarian war in Iraq and create an environment of chaos in which they can thrive.
Even after U.S. forces in Iraq reorganize themselves on a few large bases, the political situation in Iraq will have a significant influence on U.S. policy in the country. Future Iraqi governments will have to reckon with the U.S. troop presence and, over time, may become hostile to it. Even if Washington can control the Iraqi government, it is unlikely that the new bases will ever be completely secure. |
