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To: LindyBill who wrote (135141)8/30/2005 7:54:18 AM
From: Ilaine  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 793552
 
It's bad. They were congratulating themselves that the hurricane went east instead of doglegging southeast to northwest, which was predicted to be worst case.

But I don't think anybody really expected this. This is about as bad as it can get.

I guess by now everbody knows that New Orleans is bowl-shaped, low ground in the center, high ground around the edges, surrounded by levees, and then outside the levees is water -- the Mississippi River, Lake Pontchartrain, Lake Borgne, the Industrial Canal, the Intercoastal Waterway, and where there isn't water, it's just swamps. No high ground anywhere except the ridges. French Quarter is on naturally high ground and parts of Uptown, Metairie Ridge, Gentilly Ridge, that's about it.

I used to have nightmares about floods, of a crevasse opening in the Mississippi Levee.

This was something I don't think anybody was expecting -- water coming in from Lake Pontchartrain through that canal. That's a drainage canal. I guess those pumps broke down.

Edit: "high ground" means above sea level. Like a few feet above sea level.



To: LindyBill who wrote (135141)8/30/2005 9:46:42 AM
From: MulhollandDrive  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 793552
 
"Looks like the levee break is causing a real problem"

sooner or later, that's what levees do

pbs.org

10,000 River Commissions, with the mines of the world at their back, can not tame that lawless stream, cannot curb it or confine it, can not say to it, Go here or Go there, and make it obey.

-- Mark Twain, Life on the Mississippi

Native Americans told the first European explorers to expect the Mississippi River to flood every 14 years. Since then, every generation of settlers to the region has attempted to control the river by building levees, or protective, raised embankments, alongside it. Prior to 1882, Mississippi Delta planters had to rely on their own efforts to build and maintain levees. But local efforts were not always effective. They needed a more advanced levee system, and for that they turned to the federal government.

In 1879 Congress created the Mississippi River Commission to oversee federal funds for flood control. The Commission was a response to the long-standing dispute between James Buchanan Eads, an influential civilian engineer on the Mississippi River, and Andrew Atkinson Humphreys, Chief the U. S. Army Corps of Engineers, over how best to control the river. At the same time, Congress authorized the Army Corps of Engineers to participate in levee building on the Mississippi if matters of navigation were involved. Although the Commission was supposed to combine the ideas of both civilian and military engineers, in practice it was controlled entirely by the Corps.

Up until the 1830s, the only place to receive training in engineering was at West Point, and only the very best cadets were tapped to join the Army Corps of Engineers. In the succeeding decades a cadre of highly trained civilian engineers emerged as well. The Army and civil engineers clashed repeatedly, especially over Mississippi River flood control policy. Although there was extensive scientific debate over flood control policy for the river, and many prominent engineers warned of the dangers of excessive reliance on levees, over time the Mississippi River Commission solidified its commitment to levees.

In 1885 the Mississippi River Commission adopted a "levees only" policy. This policy was based on the theory that by containing the river with levees, the force of the high water would scour out the floor of the river, deepening the channel sufficiently to carry any flood water straight out to the sea. The use of manmade reservoirs, outlets and cutoffs for runoff were rejected time and time again. For the next forty years, the River Commission stuck to this policy, not only refusing to build any manmade outlets for flood waters, but also actively sealing up the river from many of its natural outlets.

The Army engineers working on the levees were soldiers, not scientists, and the "levees-only policy" remained uncontested within the Corps of Engineers. In reality, the levees caused the river to rise, requiring higher and higher levees to contain the waters. It was a vicious cycle: levees built in 1850 to a height of 7 feet had to be raised to as much as 38 feet -- the height of a four-story building. With each passing year, as the levees grew taller and stronger, so did the force and volume of the river, and the consequences of a levee break grew ever more dangerous. When levees broke, the Mississippi River Commission and the Army Corps of Engineers blamed flooding on substandard building techniques. They never questioned the "levees only" policy.

The Mississippi River Commission remained confident in their policy, and in 1926, the Army Corps of Engineers asserted that the levees were strong enough to contain the river and prevent any future flooding. One year later, the Great Flood of 1927 would prove just how wrong they were.

On Thursday, April 21, 1927, Army district engineer Major John Lee wired General Edgar Jadwin, the head of the Army Corps of Engineers, this message: "Levee broke at ferry landing Mounds, Mississippi eight a.m. Crevasse will overflow the entire Mississippi Delta." While engineers and Delta planters had long known Mounds Landing was a vulnerable point on the levee system, no one expected a disaster of this magnitude. Of all the breaches along the Mississippi, this would be the worst levee break of the entire flood. In fact, it is still noted as the worst levee break anywhere in the United States.

Four hundred and fifty men had worked through the night in a desperate effort to save the levee, but the river rose too fast. One worker recalled, "It was just boiling up. The levee just started shaking. You could feel it shaking." In the early hours of the morning small breaks started to appear. Fifteen hundred additional men were rushed to the site, but their efforts could not save the levee. What had begun as a small break quickly became a raging river. Guards forced the African American laborers to keep filling sandbags at gunpoint, but everyone there could feel that the levee was about to collapse under their feet. Sandbags started to wash away, the river ran over the top of the levee, and men took off as fast as they could run. As the levee collapsed, many of the workers were swept away. Soon every fire whistle, church bell and mill whistle rang out to warn the county.

The force of the torrent was unstoppable, scouring out the land and uprooting everything in its path. Trees, buildings, and even railroad embankments were washed away in moments. Even Egypt Ridge, so named because no flood had ever reached it before, was soon engulfed. For 60 miles east of the crevasse and ninety miles south there was nothing but water. Where farms and towns had been, it looked like an ocean. Seventy-five miles away, in Yazoo City, the water was high enough to cover the roofs of homes. In a matter of days, 10 million acres of land would be under 10 feet of water.

In a flash, the break at Mounds Landing left tens of thousands of people homeless. Almost the entire population of the county, 185,000 residents, was forced to evacuate. People stranded on rooftops or in treetops waited for boats to find them, praying they would be rescued before their building collapsed or tree was uprooted. But the water wasn't the only mortal danger they faced. With storms continuing to pound the region and bring unseasonably cold temperatures, some died of exposure.

Any boat in the area was immediately pressed into service. Motor boats were best for the job, but they were rare in the region. The rescue workers raced against time, but they had one secret weapon - the bootleggers. They came down from Arkansas with the fastest and most powerful boats and joined the effort to save lives. It was 36 hours of sheer terror, and order was not always easy to maintain. In some cases, rescuers needed guns to prevent anxious flood victims from overcrowding a boat, which could cause it to sink or capsize.

It would take months for the water to recede. ...........