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Politics : Don't Blame Me, I Voted For Kerry -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: Dan B. who wrote (71040)11/27/2005 6:03:45 PM
From: OrcastraiterRead Replies (1) | Respond to of 81568
 
I will say that when you are right. So far you have not been right about anything.

Orca



To: Dan B. who wrote (71040)11/27/2005 7:21:48 PM
From: OrcastraiterRead Replies (1) | Respond to of 81568
 
Iraqi army 'years away' from taking over
Reporter: Tony Jones


TONY JONES: One man who definitely doesn't think Iraqi troops are up to scratch is James Fallows. In a detailed investigation published in this month's Atlantic Monthly, he tries to work out why, after three years of occupation, Iraq still has no army ready to take the place of coalition forces. He's currently in Sydney to speak at a Values and Foreign Policy Conference convened by the Lowy Institute and he joins us now in our Sydney studio. Thanks for being here.

JAMES FALLOWS, AUTHOR AND JOURNALIST: My pleasure, thank you.

TONY JONES: Well, everyone from George Bush to John Howard agrees that the overwhelming priority in Iraq is to train an Iraqi army and a police force to take the place of the coalition forces. Why hasn't that happened?

JAMES FALLOWS: I think there are several reasons. One is the job is fundamentally very hard. Even in countries with advanced military cultures, like Australia or the US, training ordinary foot soldiers is difficult and training officers takes many years of experience and education. And almost every circumstance in Iraq makes this all the heard. The heritage of Saddam Hussein, which was not really a functional army, the regional divisions, all the other things we know about, plus a lack of attention and emphasis by the US for a year or two after the occupation, which is only now being redressed.

TONY JONES: Well, let's look at where we are right now. The Pentagon gives us clues to this because they put in place their own system of ranking the readiness of units in the Iraqi Army and the police force. What do the latest rankings they put together tell us about where we're at?

JAMES FALLOWS: Well, the latest rankings - one thing to say about them is their improvement over the initial ones, which were simply head counts of how many people were in uniform. And now they are measures of unit readiness, and as has been famous in the US, the category one, which is units able to operate independently - there is only one Iraqi battalion of 100-plus which is in this unit, down from three about six months ago. The next...

TONY JONES: It went down from what it was? How did that happen?

JAMES FALLOWS: Yes. Well, it probably is less significant in the fact they're both very low. It's either three or one, it's sort of a technical change. The next level down, the category two, is forces that can fight alongside the US or the others if they're given enough help - and that's about maybe one-third of the units - and the rest are in either categories three or four. Four is no use whatsoever and about half the police are in that category. Category three is the ones who can provide some kind of support to other's operation. So, in short, there's not a lot of independent capacity yet.

TONY JONES: So what does that mean if, for example, a large number of American troops were to withdraw tomorrow? What would happen?

JAMES FALLOWS: Well, if the US were to withdraw tomorrow, essentially there'd be no security force in Iraq. Now, the American commanders will point out to you, and will be right, when they say that things have been getting better in the last six to eight months. There are new training techniques, Iraqis are not defecting in the same way they did a year ago. The problem is the confrontation. The insurgency they need to deal with has been getting worse and getting worse faster than they have been getting better. So the gap is increasing.

TONY JONES: Yes, there's another part of that equation, too, which is the insurgency gets stronger the longer the occupation force is there, because that's one of the other drivers of the insurgency.

JAMES FALLOWS: What makes this so hard for the US and for its allies is the fact that it is a genuine dilemma. American forces can't stay there indefinitely because - not simply political support in the US, but their presence fuels resistance - but they also can't go, because there's nobody to replace them if they were to go suddenly. And, so, for moral and strategic and for other reasons, the US has an almost impossible choice to make.


abc.net.au