To: epicure who wrote (11117 ) 2/10/2006 9:20:37 AM From: Hawkmoon Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 541478 After all, Saddam was exactly the kind of secularist autocrat that al Qaeda despised. Eleutheria, I spent 1 1/2 years in Iraq. I saw quite a bit of the documentation from Saddam's regime showing his Intelligence Service was involved in some kind of relationship with Al Qai'da members (whether to support them, or merely to infiltrate remains a question). I saw documents (billing receipts) where his intelligence service purchased vehicles to be turned into car bombs to be sent to Saudi Arabia. Also, with regard to the the current Al Qai'da in Iraq (AQIZ)presence currently in Iraq, and inordinate number of former Fidayin Saddam, Special Republican Guard, Special Security Organization, and Iraqi Intelligence Service personnel are involved. The 'Umar Brigade, a counter to the Shi'a Badr Corps, was created SPECIFICALLY to enlist former regime (FRE) soldiers in support of Al Qai'da efforts, but specifically to target Badr Corps members. Furthermore, the level of organization by Al Qai'da networks (which require years to develop) clearly existed PRIOR to the regime's fall. Certainly the religious philosophy (salafist/takfirist) existed in Iraq prior to Saddam's fall and it has formed a base of support for AQIZ. Saddam was a secularist.. But he ALSO saw himself as the next Saladin, with the mission of creating a new Arab empire under his rule. Now we can ask whether the Salafist/Takfirists had been intensely infiltrating their members into FRE security organizations prior to Saddam's fall, or has their presence come subsequent as the result of some "deal with the devil" between the FRE leadership and Zarqawi to regain power in Iraq. But it's clear that many of these supposedly "vetted" secular Arab nationalists, who should be opposed to Jihadism, are in fact, willing to involved themselves with the Jihadist movement. Btw, I agree that the administration has done a relatively POOR job is making these connections and linkages clear. The Public Affairs effort is a very weak link in our total efforts, IMO. Maybe some of it has to do with the manner in which the counter-terrorist effort is being conducted, most of which is done out of the limelight. One of the strategies, in my opinion, that been, and is currently being, pursued is finding a Sunni tribal leader who can rally the Sunni tribes against the predominant tribes who were the base of FRE (and consequently AQIZ) support. Some of the fighting we saw in Al Qa'im (near Syrian border) was tribe on tribe fighting between groups that were loyal to AQIZ and other Sunni tribes who had been victimized by them. It's get complicated to explain the tribal dynamics, and I don't pretend to fully understand them all, since tribes shift loyalty as often as the wind changes directions. But the general trend over the past year has been that Sunni tribal leaders are recognizing that Al Qai'da/FRE forces are not providing them the economic or physical security that they expected. In fact, some Sunni tribes have taken to ambushing and killing AQIZ leadership in towns such as Ramadi and Fallujah. I think the closest analogy I was able to arrive at was "Gangs of New York" or the Mafia Wars earlier in this century. But in sum, my tiime in Iraq left me with little doubt that FRE support of AQIZ is a reality and one of the key elements that facilitates their current operations. Btw, notice the general lack of news related to terrorist attacks in Mosul? That's because we literally devastated that terrorist network after the capture of Abu Talha last June. Hawk