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Strategies & Market Trends : 2026 TeoTwawKi ... 2032 Darkest Interregnum -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: TobagoJack who wrote (4919)	3/20/2006 11:18:11 PM
From: energyplay	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 217713

Re: Gold - How did you acquire your interest in, especially considering that most of your friends on Money Rock don't seem to care ?

To: TobagoJack who wrote (4919)	3/21/2006 12:11:00 AM
From: energyplay	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 217713

Hi TJ - I think that India was working on nukes long before Pakistan acquired them, when Pakistan was only a limited conventional threat to India. Based on limited reading, I think Indian decision makers thought there might be a longer term strategic threat from China (not just border conflicts) and possibly the Middle East, and that it may not be able to rely on either Russia or the United States to come to India's aid in the future. India's progress towards the bomb had only occasional evidence of urgency. One could speculate that if India had a tighter alliance with either Russia or the United States, or saw Russia as more reliable, they may not have moved as far down the nuclear path - maybe only a few tests. The Russian alliance was pretty tight, since India was able to acquire Bear bombers. It is possible that some of the impetus for India to acquire thier own nuclear capability was China's experience with Russia n perfidy. I will need to look up the time lines on this. *** The preemptive war doctrine has been effectively tweaked to only apply to threatening states who are moving closer to a serious offensive capablity - only a few steps from the well known "clear and present" danger criteria. ***