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Politics : View from the Center and Left -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: epicure who wrote (15994)	4/4/2006 3:31:54 PM
From: epicure	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 541799

From the Us army- must admit, if this is the way our armed forces are putting things, it's no wonder we aren't doing so well. I think plain Enlgish might be a nice step forward for the military: How Terrorists and Insurgents Pursue Victory Terrorists and insurgents adopt a much different approach to achieving victory through the use of a complex IO strategy. They develop the IE battlespace because of the benefits gained from its residual effects. In The Terrorist Approach to Information Operations, Norman Emery and Rob Earl say: "Terrorists act in the physical environment not to make tactical gains in the physical environment, but to wage strategic battle in the information environment; therefore the physical environment enables many of the activities in the information environment to occur."22 Figure 1 shows the model nearly all terrorists follow to achieve objectives by indirectly influencing a decisionmaker.23 The process applies to select insurgencies. The model's four steps and three orders of effects begin with a bombing or attack in the physical environment that the media or members of a population report. The interpretations can shape perceptions of a populace or government in the information environment. Terrorists then determine follow- on actions in the physical environment depending on the measure of success in the information environment. Perceptions once developed can endure for days, months, or decades and are difficult to change. The model demonstrates that a specific act in the physical environment produces residual effects and offers an approach for U.S. forces to interdict the adversary's information environment to reduce or reverse the effectiveness of PE actions. Therefore, any operation to eliminate nonstate actors and their influence must also employ forces operationally to counter the potential strategic effect and results of previous nonstate operations. Having effective counteroperations to current and previous acts in the information environment, not just attrition warfare in the physical environment, is important. Shaping the information environment is not merely denying information to adversary decisionmakers; it is denying them results from their actions. The big difference between what current U.S. doctrine is and should be is in its approach to conflict. As long as U.S. forces are denying a state foe his ability to make a decision, they are shaping his information environment. The United States might not be able to affect a nonstate foe's ability to make a decision if he maintains an information advantage, but it can affect his results in the information environment, his chosen battlespace. As long as the United States conceptualizes all victories in the physical environment through decisive engagement rather than more lengthy action in the information environment, it might not succeed as quickly. If the United States adjusts its approach to nonstate conflict, it can beat insurgents and terrorists at their own game in their own battlespace, which requires a new approach to modern conflict. army.mil