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Politics : Formerly About Advanced Micro Devices -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: tejek who wrote (289170)5/25/2006 7:43:16 AM
From: Road Walker  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 1572094
 
The Persian Complex
By ABBAS AMANAT
New Haven

IT is easy to label Iran's quest for nuclear energy a dangerous adventure with grave regional and international repercussions. It is also comforting to heap scorn on President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad for his earlier denial of the Holocaust and his odious call for the obliteration of the state of Israel. The rambling intransigence expressed in his recent letter to President Bush offers ample insight into this twisted mindset. Yet there is something deeper in Iran's story than the extremist utterances of a messianic president and the calculated maneuvering of the hard-line clerical leadership that stands behind him.

We tend to forget that Iran's insistence on its sovereign right to develop nuclear power is in effect a national pursuit for empowerment, a pursuit informed by at least two centuries of military aggression, domestic meddling, skullduggery and, not least, technological denial by the West. Every schoolchild in Iran knows about the C.I.A.-sponsored 1953 coup that toppled Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh. Even an Iranian with little interest in his or her past is conscious of how Iran throughout the 19th and 20th centuries served as a playground for the Great Game.

Iranians also know that, hard as it may be for latter-day Americans and Europeans to believe, from the 1870's to the 1920's Russia and Britain deprived Iran of even basic technology like the railroad, which was then a key to economic development. At various times, both powers jealously opposed a trans-Iranian railroad because they thought it would threaten their ever-expanding imperial frontiers. When it was finally built, the British, Russian (and American) occupying forces during the Second World War made full use of it (free of charge), calling Iran a "bridge of victory" over Nazi Germany. They did so, of course, after Winston Churchill forced the man who built the railroad, Reza Shah Pahlavi, to abdicate and unceremoniously kicked him out of the country.

Not long after, a similar Western denial of Iran's economic sovereignty resulted in a dramatic showdown that had fatal consequences for the country's fragile democracy and left lasting scars on its national consciousness. The oil nationalization movement of 1951 to 1953 under Mossadegh was opposed by Britain, and eventually by its partner in profit, the United States, with the same self-righteousness that today colors their views of the Iranian yearning for nuclear energy.

Mossadegh was tried and sent into internal exile and Mohammed Reza Shah was reinstalled largely to safeguard American geopolitical interests and with little regard for the wishes of the Iranian people. A quarter-century later, Americans were "taken by surprise" when an Islamic revolution toppled the shah and transformed a country that seemed so friendly to the United States. But if Americans suffered from historical amnesia, for many Iranians, among them Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the thread of memory led clearly from the Great Game to the Great Satan.

For a country like the United States that is built on paradigms of progress and pragmatism, grasping the mythical and psychological dimensions of defeat and deprivation at the hands of foreigners is difficult. Yet the Iranian collective memory is infused with such themes. Since the early 18th century, Iran has been involved in four devastating civil wars. America's own highly traumatic Civil War was, notwithstanding Britain's sympathy for the South, a largely domestic affair. In the civil wars that Iran endured, however, the Turks, Afghans, Russians and British played major parts. And before the arrival of Western powers, Iranians held bitter memories of the Ottomans, the Mongols and the Arabs.

These intrusions punctuated the Iranians' modern historical narrative with conspiratorial fears and have helped to nurture a cult of the fallen hero, from the 1910's guerrilla leader Mirza Kuchak Khan to Amir Kabir, a 19th-century reformist prime minister, and later Mossadegh. Such painful collective memories have made Iran's pursuit of nuclear energy a national symbol of defiance that has transcended the motives of the current Islamic regime.

If the United States resorts to sanctions, or worse, to some military response, the outcome would be not only disastrous but, in the long run, transient. Just as the West did with Iran's railroad and oil industry, it can for a time deny Iran nuclear technology, but it cannot wipe out Iranians' haunting memories. And no doubt the Islamic regime will amply exploit these collective memories to advance its nuclear program even as it stifles voices of domestic dissent. Even more than before, Iranians will blame outside powers for their misfortunes and choose not to focus on their own troubled road to modernity.

If that course continues, Iran will most likely succeed, for ill or for good, in finding its own nuclear holy grail. Legend has it that the Persian king Hushang, an equivalent of Prometheus, introduced fire to the Iranians. But unlike his Greek mythological counterpart, who stole it from gods, he accidentally discovered it while fighting with a dragon.

Abbas Amanat is a professor of history at Yale and author of the forthcoming "In Search of Modern Iran."



To: tejek who wrote (289170)5/25/2006 10:32:25 AM
From: longnshort  Respond to of 1572094
 
Too much
"I have been reminded of legendary union leader John L. Lewis, who was once asked what his miners were after. His answer? 'More.'
"It was a funny answer, and perhaps it was honest, too. But these days, it's not a very effective strategy, and we are seeing some unfortunate and unintended consequences of Lewis' 'more' philosophy.
"Delphi Corp., the biggest auto-parts supplier in the country and the employer of 34,000 hourly workers, is bankrupt. One big reason is that the company's unionized workers earn $64 an hour in wages and benefits -- more than twice what some of its competitors pay.
"General Motors and Ford -- the companies that have epitomized high-paying unionized jobs over the last several decades -- have stated that they will lay off 30,000 workers each.
"The bankruptcy stories ... are driven in large part by the compensation packages and work rules that unions have won for their members, which are too expensive compared to more recent entrants such as Southwest. 'More' has, unfortunately, become 'too much' in a global and far more competitive economy.
"Many of my friends will consider this view heretical. But it is based on stark reality."
-- Former Sen. George McGovern, South Dakota Democrat and 1972 presidential candidate, writing on "The end of 'more,'?" Monday in the Los Angeles Times



To: tejek who wrote (289170)5/25/2006 10:38:31 AM
From: bentway  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 1572094
 
Japanese Cars, American Retirees

By EDUARDO PORTER
The New York Times
nytimes.com

GEORGETOWN, Ky. — For the last quarter-century, Toyota, Honda and Nissan have strived to appear to American consumers like homegrown companies.

They built a string of manufacturing plants in the South, employing tens of thousands of local workers. They hired American designers. They spent millions on ads to trumpet their growing roots in communities across the country.

"Being a good corporate citizen starts with hiring lots of good citizens," one Toyota ad says.

Yet as they built up their operations, the Japanese "transplants" have worked hard not to resemble an American car company in one vital respect: how they treat their retirees.

"We want to avoid commitments when we have no control over their costs," said Pete Gritton, the head of human resources for Toyota's United States manufacturing operations. "We can't build in things in such a way that we won't be able to keep our commitments later."

Until recently, the issue has mostly been academic for the Japanese car companies. Most of the American factory workers they started hiring in the mid-1980's are still working.

But age is creeping up on them. All three Japanese companies are anticipating that the ranks of retirees will swell over the next several years. Toyota's American arm, for example, has just 258 retired production workers (G.M., by contrast, has more than 400,000 retirees).

But things will change over the next five years. In 2011 and 2012, a combined 1,700 workers will be eligible for retirement at Toyota — about 6 percent of its current labor force.

Their retirement will contrast in a crucial way with their counterparts who have retired from the Big Three auto companies in that they will bear much more of the costs and the risks of retirement on their own.

This difference adds up to an important cost disadvantage for the Big Three as they fight to regain market share.

The benefit packages offered by Detroit's three carmakers to its blue-collar workers, negotiated over time with the United Automobile Workers union, pretty much fit a standard model. Retirees receive a pension check every month, which varies with the number of years served.

An average worker who reaches retirement age at G.M. will get a monthly pension check worth about $50 for every year of service, up to a maximum of about $1,500 a month, which accrues after 30 years of service, according to a G.M. spokesman, Jerry Dubrowski. Retirees with 30 years of service get a supplement that brings their monthly check up to about $3,000 until they reach 62.

Moreover, until last year, when General Motors and the union cut a deal for retirees to cover co-pays and deductibles, G.M. covered retirees' health care expenses.

With benefits like these, it's no wonder that G.M. was once known as "Generous Motors."

But these days, health care costs are causing enormous financial headaches for the Big Three. G.M. has an unfunded liability of $85 billion in today's money to cover future health care costs for workers and retirees. That is seven to eight times the market value of the whole company.

General Motors estimates that health care costs add about $1,500 to the cost of each vehicle it makes in the United States. Chrysler claims a health care cost of $1,400 per vehicle. Ford says its burden is $1,100.

G.M.'s pension plan has also been a drain. Since 1992, G.M. has plowed $56 billion in stock and cash into it. It is hoping to reduce its burden by offering all of its 105,000 U.A.W. workers buyout packages worth up to $140,000. It is still unclear how many plan to accept the offer.

"The higher legacy costs are reflected in a less modern product," said George E. Hoffer, a professor of economics at Virginia Commonwealth University who has studied the auto industry. "They had to cut costs somewhere else and they cut costs in retooling."

Japanese companies face little of this burden in Japan, where the government covers retirees' health care and pays a bigger share of workers' pensions.

Toyota expected to pay out about $700 million in pension benefits in fiscal year 2006, which ended in March. That's less than a tenth of what G.M. expects to pay on its pensions this year.

In the United States, retirees of the Japanese companies pay part of their health care costs. And the Japanese companies' pension obligations are a fraction of that of the American carmakers.

While G.M. paid $5.4 billion last year for the health care of its 141,000 workers, 449,000 retirees and their dependents, Toyota said in its 2005 annual report that its obligations to cover the health care expenses for its retirees "are not material."

At Honda, a 60-year-old retiree with 10 years of service would typically pay $345 a month for health care; a 62-year-old retiree with 25 years at the company would pay $70. Toyota also requires retirees to pay part of their premiums, based on years of service.

In general, these retirees are cut off from the company health plan when they turn 65, and receive instead a lump sum with which they can buy supplementary insurance to Medicare. Honda is alone among the big three Japanese carmakers to still offer a defined-benefit pension guaranteeing a monthly check to newly retired workers in the United States.

At Toyota, a worker's pension consists of an investment account in which the company deposits the equivalent of 5 percent of a worker's earnings each year, typically around $3,000 to $3,500. An employee can supplement that with a 401(k) plan, and the company matches contributions up to a maximum of 4 percent of the worker's income.

For the company, these retirement packages carry no uncertainty. But they do for workers, whose nest eggs depend on their contributions and the financial markets.

Consider Richard Baugh. The 61-year-old worker, who applies sealant on Camrys, Solaras and Avalons in the paint room, is planning to retire next January after 17 years at Toyota's factory here, to tend his horses and teach at his local church in nearby Cynthiana.

His wife, Ruth, 58, will also retire after 14 years at the plant. With total savings of some $700,000, the Baughs feel ready for retirement. They were thrifty, plowing at least 12 percent of their wages into their 401(k)'s.

"After the stock market crash we stayed invested and kept buying, and our 401(k) roared back," Mr. Baugh said.

With less than 25 years at the company, they will have to pay a portion of their health insurance premium, which Mr. Baugh said would amount to some $300 a month.

Tim Garrett, vice president of administration at Honda Manufacturing of America, says talk of the Big Three's "legacy" problem is overblown. Had they set enough money aside when the workers were active, their retirement would not be costing them anything today. "Depending on your decisions you will have legacy costs or you will not have legacy costs," Mr. Garrett said. "We have no legacy costs."

To be fair, Detroit's car companies were no more shortsighted than many companies in other industries. From steelmakers to telephone companies, free health and defined pension checks were a staple of the retirement packages negotiated between America's industrial titans and their unions half a century ago.

When these companies were growing quickly, providing generous retirement benefits seemed cheaper than offering better pay, a future cost that often did not even have to be accounted for on the financial books.

From 1990 to 2005, G.M.'s payroll shrank by two-thirds, and its current work force is now just one-third the number of its retirees and their dependents.

Today, defined-benefit pensions are dwindling across industries, as companies force retirees and active workers to pick up part of their health costs. According to a survey by the Kaiser Family Foundation, only one out of three big companies now provide health care coverage for their retirees, down from two-thirds in 1988.

In 2003, 22 million workers were covered by some sort of defined-benefit pension, 8 million fewer than in 1980, according to the Center for Retirement Research at Boston College. And the number of workers in defined-contribution plans jumped to 52 million, from 14.5 million, over the same period.

Union contracts have limited what Detroit's car companies can do with their blue-collar workers, but they are paring back where they can.

G.M. eliminated health care coverage for its salaried, nonunion retirees hired after 1993. This year, it froze the salaried workers' defined-contribution pension plan. Chrysler made its salaried workers pay more for their health care starting this year.

Under an agreement last year with the autoworkers' union, retirees at G.M. and Ford will start paying part of their health care costs, up to $370 a year for an individual and $752 for a retiree's family.

With Detroit sagging under the burden of these "legacy" costs, it is unsurprising — even to executives at the Big Three — that the Japanese companies arriving in America chose to do things differently.

"These are well-managed companies," said Frederick A. Henderson, G.M.'s chief financial officer. "It is natural that they would look at our experience and say 'I don't want to do that.' "


Copyright 2006 The New York Times Company



To: tejek who wrote (289170)5/25/2006 10:47:27 AM
From: longnshort  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 1572094
 
What 30 years of libdems controlling gov't education has wrought:

The Arrogance Of Ignorance

A new generation of the serenely clueless is ready, willing and able to destroy your company

Jan, 18, 2006

By Mark Gottlieb (INDUSTRY WEEK)

Your livelihood and your future are both in peril. The threat you face derives not from any external factors that may affect your company. Instead, it comes from your own employees.

The deadliest business hazard of our time is the result of a sea change in the American approach to education that occurred early in the 1970s.

Across the United States, conventional educational standards were tossed out the window, replaced with feel-good theories like “whole-language learning” that emphasized personal fulfillment over the accumulation of hard knowledge.

As a result, we now have two generations of men and women who expect gold stars not for succeeding, but simply for trying.

And, sometimes, merely for showing up. In Great Britain, even primary school students can name all the monarchs of England. How many American children can name the capital of their own state? In India, the study of mathematics is practically a religion. In the United States, how many retail clerks can make change without relying on a calculator?

In Germany, vocational education is a rigorous and honorable pursuit, producing highly qualified workers and tradesmen. In the U.S.A., people actually boast about their inability to deal with anything mechanical. But sheer stupidity is not the greatest danger presented by the current crop of blank slates. It is the arrogance bred of ignorance that constitutes an unparalleled descent into goofiness.

In the long-dead past, incompetents generally recognized their own incapacity and behaved accordingly. Today, every jackass sees himself as a genius, and every fool fancies herself a philosopher. Once, a young colleague at a major firm accosted me in tones of confusion and desperation. “Mark! Mark!” she called as I walked past her office door. “When was World War II?”

I thought at first that she was joking, but, alas, she was not. The deadliest global conflict in human history had somehow escaped her notice. Yet if I had asked if she honestly believed she deserved her B.A. and felt qualified to perform her job, she would have been gravely insulted and likely kicked me until I was dead. Like the pod people of Invasion of the Body Snatchers, the arrogantly ignorant appear at first glance as normal as you or me. But beware.

The most profound risk they represent springs not from their cluelessness, but from their inability to recognize their own limitations. Such blind hubris can lead to monumental errors of judgment, grotesque mistakes, and the refusal to accept—despite a mountain of evidence—that the strategy they are pursuing may be leading your organization off a cliff. When people like that are in your employ, it is you, not they, who suffer the consequences.

These days, the arrogance of ignorance is so pervasive that I feel confident in making a small wager: Ten bucks says that the worst offenders will read these words and wonder, “Who is this joker talking about?” If characters like that work for your company—brother, you’re in for a world of hurt.



To: tejek who wrote (289170)5/25/2006 11:02:21 AM
From: TigerPaw  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 1572094
 
And it doesn't help that they consistently have had unappealing cars that breakdown a lot [until recently].

It's not just that the cars are unappealing for their customers. Anyone who drives behind an Excursion or Surburban or heaven forbid, a Hummer, vows never to put another of those monstrosities on the road nor support the company who does. They lose their potential customers too.