Hello David, here is the latest Stratfor assessment of what is, and as I suspected, indicative of reactive stance of Israel, minus any strategy, facing bad choices, with no surprise in sight ... should Israel fail to reach overarching war objectives (as opposed to battle aims) via war or politics, then oil price may in deed go to 100/b for a lot of reasons, and gold would be well supported
Special Report: State of the War
The Israeli-Hezbollah war has become routinized. Israeli aircraft fly daily air strikes in Lebanon. Hezbollah rockets strike at Israel. Ground combat takes place among small units just north of the Israeli-Lebanese border. It is a situation that appears, on the surface, to have settled into a sustainable routine. Neither side is clearly making military progress; neither side is under military compulsion to end hostilities; neither side appears to be changing the military equation. Such a war can continue for a long time from a military standpoint. The political dimension determines what happens next. That can range from indefinite continuation of the current pattern of conflict, to an attempt by one side to change the pattern in some decisive way, or the suspension of conflict by means of a political resolution.
Let's begin by considering the war from Hezbollah's point of view. To this point, the war has gone better than the militants could possibly have hoped. First, although they have undoubtedly been hurt by the Israeli air campaign, Hezbollah's operational infrastructure appears intact. The militants continue to fire rockets into Israel, although one gets the sense that the rate of fire is decreasing somewhat. Most important, their forces in south Lebanon appear to have offered significant resistance to elite Israeli units.
In other words, Hezbollah has done what no other Arab fighting force has done. It has not cracked under Israeli air-land attack. This has set in motion an important political process in the Islamic world. At the beginning of the war, the response of Sunni countries like Saudi Arabia was to condemn Hezbollah for starting a war that could only bring ruin to Lebanon. By extension, the Saudis were attacking Iran for once again generating a conflict in which Tehran took no risks and in which the force it was backing could not prevail.
Hezbollah's ability to resist Israel has shifted that political dynamic. Hezbollah is achieving its strategic political goal. Simply by resisting and not collapsing, it is establishing itself as the most effective fighting force yet to engage the Israelis. Expectations of disaster confounded, the Islamic opponents of Hezbollah -- as well as secular opponents -- are now trapped in Hezbollah's apparent success. They must close ranks and support them.
Hezbollah can't do better than it is doing now. It is not going to invade Israel and at some point, Israeli air force attacks and the sheer passage of time will undermine its ability to resist. At the very least, the militants are not likely in the course of this fighting to be in a better position than they are today. It is, therefore, in their interest that a cease-fire be declared as soon as possible. If the war ended today, Israel would have achieved nothing definitive in its attacks. Rockets would still be available for attacks on Israel. Israel would not have room to maneuver in south Lebanon. A peacekeeping force would stand between the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and Hezbollah as equals. It follows that Hezbollah should want an unconditional cease-fire right now.
Turn to Israel's view of the war. Certainly, none of its strategic objectives have been achieved. Hezbollah has not been shattered. Rocket attacks continue. The Israelis have not routed Hezbollah infantry in their probing attacks but have chosen to retreat after suffering casualties. Most important, they have suffered a political defeat. Hezbollah's credibility and standing have been enhanced. More than two weeks into this war, Israel has not achieved its political objectives and is further from its political objectives than when it began.
Most important -- and this is both a military and political evolution -- Israel is in the process of degrading its single most important asset, which is the idee fixe in the Middle East that the IDF is an irresistible force. This perception has shaped military and political thinking in and about the region since 1956, when Israel defeated the Egyptian army in the Sinai, and was reinforced in 1967. There has been an assumption that any Arab force that engaged the IDF on the battlefield would be defeated quickly and devastatingly. If that perception is lost, then Israel has in fact suffered a significant military defeat that will have resounding political consequences.
Obviously, nothing we have said here is not thoroughly known to the Israelis. Therefore, the question that needs to be answered is: What exactly they are doing? In particular, this question must be answered: Given that the Israelis have not achieved their goals using the air campaign, why are they choosing to continue it? It is interesting to note that this is not only our question. It is a question that we have had expressed to us by Israelis and Arabs, including those in Lebanon. The perception is that Israel could defeat Hezbollah if it chooses. That view persists. The question is why they have not yet done so. Some potential explanations:
1.The air campaign is actually proceeding as expected. This is on an accelerating curve in which little progress will be apparent until a threshold is reached, at which point Hezbollah's infrastructure will suddenly crumble.
2. Israel has had a massive intelligence failure, deeper than the one that happened in 1973. Israeli intelligence underestimated the maturity of Hezbollah and the robustness of its command and control. The Israelis failed to understand the militants' rocketry capabilities or the sophistication of their defensive positions in south Lebanon. They made assumptions about Hezbollah's capabilities that were simply wrong.
3. Israel knew of Hezbollah's capabilities. They understood that a broad ground attack on Hezbollah would involve massive Israeli casualties. They saw the rocket attacks as less costly than a major ground offensive and therefore went to an air campaign to inflict as much damage possible without incurring unacceptable losses.
4. Israel could defeat Hezbollah but is concerned that the costs of an occupation would outweigh the strategic benefits. Therefore, they are not taking ground that they would have to hold in counterinsurgency operations.
5. Israel has tried the air campaign, hoping that it would work. However, Israel has a plan B standing by that would involve a conventional assault along the lines we have discussed before.
6. Israel intends to broaden the war beyond Hezbollah, toward its patrons in Syria and Iran, and is biding its time in doing this.
All of these are plausible explanations. In figuring out which is most plausible, we must begin with a core premise: From the Israeli point of view the current situation, which leaves Hezbollah in a military draw and a political victory, is unacceptable. There are many reasons for this but for Israel, retaining the IDF's reputation for invincibility is an absolute requirement. Ending the war with the perception that a subnational organization can fight the IDF to a draw is not acceptable, regardless of the level of exertion required.
Seen through this lens, which we are confident shows Israeli thinking, the air campaign can be allowed to continue by itself only if battle damage assessment (BDA) shows that it will shortly prove fruitful. We do not have access to Israeli BDA, and we have heard that there is serious debate among Israel's military leaders over the status of the war, with the army questioning air force estimates. However, in our view, there is nothing that is likely to happen in the next few days that will change Hezbollah's operational capabilities.
Whether this was the result of an intelligence failure or of concern about Hezbollah's capabilities, at this point, the Israelis have little choice but to accept the reality and the casualties. They have mobilized a substantial force, clearly in anticipation that it might be needed for offensive operations. Whether Israel is drawn into counterinsurgency or not, retaining the perception of military supremacy supersedes all other considerations. We expect that a Plan B ground offensive was always present as an option, but whether it was hardwired into the plan or not is no longer an issue. Unless the Israelis plan to come out of the war with Hezbollah more powerful than ever, and if the air campaign doesn't suddenly work, they must go in on the ground.
Israel does not have the reach for Iran. The Israelis could launch nuclear weapons, but that simply isn't an option politically. As for Syria, if Israel toppled al Assad, his successor regime would be worse unless Israel would want to occupy Syria. The United States cannot pacify Iraq with 135,000 troops; Israel doesn't have that many to devote to an occupation. Plus, the IDF has never captured a major enemy city in its history, declining to go into Beirut. If attritional warfare bothers Israel, taking Damascus is not an option. The invasion of Syria is not on the table, although selective air attacks are possible.
The widening of the war is not a serious military option. A cease-fire at this time would be politically disastrous for Israel. It must, given its options, try to inflict a decisive defeat on Hezbollah, and a cease-fire would deny Israel that opportunity. The political effect on the region would be dramatic. It may well be that the Israelis have no appetite for casualties or counterinsurgency. It may be that their view of Hezbollah is that it is more an irritant than a threat. Nevertheless, the current evolution of this conflict forces them to make some dramatic decisions.
We note that the war is routinized. That should not be taken as proof that more dramatic events are not being planned. If it turns out that Israel declines major ground operations and accepts a cease-fire, the political map of the region -- geographically and psychologically -- would change decisively and to Israel's massive disadvantage. Thus we must assume that with cease-fires approaching and no decision on the ground, Israel will shift its strategy. |
