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Politics : Foreign Affairs Discussion Group -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: michael97123 who wrote (213675)1/20/2007 11:42:43 AM
From: carranza2  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 281500
 
Well, there is room for argument from the other side, too.

There were a lot of non-intelligentsia right wing sympathizers in the UK and here for Hitler. While right wing Joe Six Pack probably had no idea he existed, our government supported a very bad guy by the name of Anastasio Somoza in Nicaragua. There were lots of others, especially in Latin America.

Left wing Harry the Hippie supported Castro, worked in his cane fields when it was cool and hip to do so. Now, he likes Chavez, that thug, and probably admires Ahamdinejad because A. strokes Harry's antisemitic streak. And Che, oh, Harry just loved Che, and probably still does from the comfort of his Dilbertian cubicle as Harry slaves away for some giant corporation. But Che, for all his idealism, facilitated the subjugation of the Cuban people as much as Castro did. He was a thug, too.

Harry likes hip and cool, whether it is dumb and dumber matters not too much, e.g., the whole global warming thingie, the superiority of organic foods, the political acumen of uneducated Hollywood dumb bunnies, etc. Joe sometimes follows leaders a little too closely. Harry likes pot and other drugs, which make him placid and stupid. Joe drinks beer, which makes him aggressive and obnoxious.

Times have changed, the argumentation is different.

As CB very aptly said, I like anyone who is for democracy and free markets. It seems that the left looks very differently at those two than I do so I am a right-thinking right winger.

And intellectually? Psssh, there is no argument that the right makes far better arguments than the left, as a whole. I mean, just look at the quality of the lefty posts here. Laughable.



To: michael97123 who wrote (213675)1/20/2007 11:49:43 AM
From: Bruce L  Respond to of 281500
 
Stratfor's George Friedman on Division Within Iran

My favorite Quote from Friedman's piece: " Fear and uncertainty are the foundations of international agreement, while hope and confidence fuel war."

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Rhetoric and Reality: The View from Iran
By George Friedman

The Iraq war has turned into a duel between the United States and Iran. For the United States, the goal has been the creation of a generally pro-American coalition government in Baghdad -- representing Iraq's three major ethnic communities. For Iran, the goal has been the creation of either a pro-Iranian government in Baghdad or, alternatively, the division of Iraq into three regions, with Iran dominating the Shiite south.

The United States has encountered serious problems in creating the coalition government. The Iranians have been primarily responsible for that. With the death of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in June, when it appeared that the Sunnis would enter the political process fully, the Iranians used their influence with various Iraqi Shiite factions to disrupt that process by launching attacks on Sunnis and generally destabilizing the situation. Certainly, Sunnis contributed to this, but for much of the past year, it has been the Shia, supported by Iran, that have been the primary destabilizing force.

So long as the Iranians continue to follow this policy, the U.S. strategy cannot succeed. The difficulty of the American plan is that it requires the political participation of three main ethnic groups that are themselves politically fragmented. Virtually any substantial group can block the success of the strategy by undermining the political process. The Iranians, however, appear to be in a more powerful position than the Americans. So long as they continue to support Shiite groups within Iraq, they will be able to block the U.S. plan. Over time, the theory goes, the Americans will recognize the hopelessness of the undertaking and withdraw, leaving Iran to pick up the pieces. In the meantime, the Iranians will increasingly be able to dominate the Shiite community and consolidate their hold over southern Iraq. The game appears to go to Iran.

Americans are extremely sensitive to the difficulties the United States faces in Iraq. Every nation-state has a defining characteristic, and that of the United States is manic-depression, cycling between insanely optimistic plans and total despair. This national characteristic tends to blind Americans to the situation on the other side of the hill. Certainly, the Bush administration vastly underestimated the difficulties of occupying Iraq -- that was the manic phase. But at this point, it could be argued that the administration again is not looking over the other side of the hill at the difficulties the Iranians might be having. And it is useful to consider the world from the Iranian point of view.

The Foundation of Foreign Policy

It is important to distinguish between the rhetoric and the reality of Iranian foreign policy. As a general principle, this should be done with all countries. As in business, rhetoric is used to shape perceptions and attempt to control the behavior of others. It does not necessarily reveal one's true intentions or, more important, one's capabilities. In the classic case of U.S. foreign policy, Franklin Roosevelt publicly insisted that the United States did not intend to get into World War II while U.S. and British officials were planning to do just that. On the other side of the equation, the United States, during the 1950s, kept asserting that its goal was to liberate Eastern Europe from the Soviet Union, when in fact it had no plans, capabilities or expectations of doing so. This does not mean the claims were made frivolously -- both Roosevelt and John Foster Dulles had good reasons for posturing as they did -- but it does mean that rhetoric is not a reliable indicator of actions. Thus, the purple prose of the Iranian leadership cannot be taken at face value.

To get past the rhetoric, let's begin by considering Iran's objective geopolitical position.

Historically, Iran has faced three enemies. Its oldest enemy was to the west: the Arab/Sunni threat, against which it has struggled for millennia. Russia, to the north, emerged as a threat in the late 19th century, occupying northern Iran during and after World War II. The third enemy has worn different faces but has been a recurring threat since the time of Alexander the Great: a distant power that has intruded into Persian affairs. This distant foreign power -- which has at times been embodied by both the British and the Americans -- has posed the greatest threat to Iran. And when the element of a distant power is combined with one of the other two traditional enemies, the result is a great global or regional power whose orbit or influence Iran cannot escape. To put that into real terms, Iran can manage, for example, the chaos called Afghanistan, but it cannot manage a global power that is active in Iraq and Afghanistan simultaneously.

For the moment, Russia is contained. There is a buffer zone of states between Iran and Russia that, at present, prevents Russian probes. But what Iran fears is a united Iraq under the influence or control of a global power like the United States. In 1980, the long western border of Iran was attacked by Iraq, with only marginal support from other states, and the effect on Iran was devastating. Iran harbors a rational fear of attack from that direction, which -- if coupled with American power -- could threaten Iranian survival.

Therefore, Iran sees the American plan to create a pro-U.S. government in Baghdad as a direct threat to its national interests. Now, the Iranians supported the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003; they wanted to see their archenemy, former President Saddam Hussein, deposed. But they did not want to see him replaced by a pro-American regime. Rather, the Iranians wanted one of two outcomes: the creation of a pro-Iranian government dominated by Iraqi Shia (under Iran's control), or the fragmentation of Iraq. A fragmented Iraq would have two virtues. It would prove no danger to Iran, and Iran likely would control or heavily influence southern Iraq, thus projecting its power from there throughout the Persian Gulf.

Viewed this way, Iran's behavior in Iraq is understandable. A stable Iraq under U.S. influence represents a direct threat to Iran, while a fragmented or pro-Iranian Iraq does not. Therefore, the Iranians will do whatever they can to undermine U.S. attempts to create a government in Baghdad. Tehran can use its influence to block a government, but it cannot -- on its own -- create a pro-Iranian one. Therefore, Iran's strategy is to play spoiler and wait for the United States to tire of the unending conflict. Once the Americans leave, the Iranians can pick up the chips on the table. Whether it takes 10 years or 30, the Iranians assume that, in the end, they will win. None of the Arab countries in the region has the power to withstand Iran, and the Turks are unlikely to get into the game.

The Unknown Variables

Logic would seem to favor the Iranians. But in the past, the Iranians have tried to be clever with great powers and, rather than trapping them, have wound up being trapped themselves. Sometimes they have simply missed other dimensions of the situation. For example, when the revolutionaries overthrew the Shah and created the Islamic Republic, the Iranians focused on the threat from the Americans, and another threat from the Soviets and their covert allies in Iran. But they took their eyes off Iraq -- and that miscalculation not only cost them huge casualties and a decade of economic decay, but broke the self-confidence of the Iranian regime.

The Iranians also have miscalculated on the United States. When the Islamic Revolution occurred, the governing assumption -- not only in Iran but also in many parts of the world, including the United States -- was that the United States was a declining power. It had, after all, been defeated in Vietnam and was experiencing declining U.S. military power and severe economic problems. But the Iranians massively miscalculated with regard to the U.S. position: In the end, the United States surged and it was the Soviets who collapsed.

The Iranians do not have a sterling record in managing great powers, and especially in predicting the behavior of the United States. In large and small ways, they have miscalculated on what the United States would do and how it would do it. Therefore, like the Americans, the Iranians are deeply divided. There are those who regard the United States as a bumbling fool, all set to fail in Iraq. There are others who remember equally confident forecasts about other American disasters, and who see the United States as ruthless, cunning and utterly dangerous.

These sentiments, then, divide into two policy factions. On the one side, there are those who see Bush's surge strategy as an empty bluff. They point out that there is no surge, only a gradual buildup of troops, and that the number of troops being added is insignificant. They point to political divisions in Washington and argue that the time is ripe for Iran to go for it all. They want to force a civil war in Iraq, to at least dominate the southern region and take advantage of American weakness to project power in the Persian Gulf.

The other side wonders whether the Americans are as weak as they appear, and also argues that exploiting a success in Iraq would be more dangerous and difficult than it appears. The United States has substantial forces in Iraq, and the response to Shiite uprisings along the western shore of the Persian Gulf would be difficult to predict. The response to any probe into Saudi Arabia certainly would be violent.

We are not referring here to ideological factions, nor to radicals and moderates. Rather, these are two competing visions of the United States. One side wants to exploit American weakness; the other side argues that experience shows that American weakness can reverse itself unexpectedly and trap Iran in a difficult and painful position. It is not a debate about ends or internal dissatisfaction with the regime. Rather, it is a contest between audacity and caution.

The Historical View

Over time -- and this is not apparent from Iranian rhetoric -- caution has tended to prevail. Except during the 1980s, when they supported an aggressive Hezbollah, the Iranians have been quite measured in their international actions. Following the war with Iraq, they avoided overt moves -- and they even were circumspect after the fall of the Soviet Union, when opportunities presented themselves to Iran's north. After 9/11, the Iranians were careful not to provoke the United States: They offered landing rights for damaged U.S. aircraft and helped recruit Shiite tribes for the American effort against the Taliban. The rhetoric alternated between intense and vitriolic; the actions were more cautious. Even with the Iranian nuclear project, the rhetoric has been far more intense than the level of development seems to warrant.

Rhetoric influences perceptions, and perceptions can drive responses. Therefore, the rhetoric should not be discounted as a driving factor in the geopolitical system. But the real debate in Iran is over what to do about Iraq. No one in Iran wants a pro-U.S. government in Baghdad, and blocking the emergence of such a government has a general consensus. But how far to go in trying to divide Iraq, creating a pro-Iranian government in Baghdad and projecting power in the region is a matter of intense debate. In fact, cautious behavior combined with extreme rhetoric still appears to be the default position in Tehran, with more adventurous arguments struggling to gain acceptance.

The United States, for its part, is divided between the desire to try one more turn at the table to win it all and the fear that it is becoming hopelessly trapped. Iran is divided between a belief that the time to strike is now and a fear that counting the United States out is always premature. This is an engine that can, in due course, drive negotiations. Iran might be "evil" and the United States might be "Satan," but at the end of the day, international affairs involving major powers are governed not by rhetoric but by national interest. The common ground between the United States and Iran is that neither is certain it can achieve its real strategic interests. The Americans doubt they can create a pro-U.S. government in Baghdad, and Iran is not certain the United States is as weak as it appears to be.

Fear and uncertainty are the foundations of international agreement, while hope and confidence fuel war. In the end, a fractured Iraq -- an entity incapable of harming Iran, but still providing an effective buffer between Iran and the Arabian Peninsula -- is emerging as the most viable available option.



To: michael97123 who wrote (213675)1/20/2007 11:54:03 AM
From: Bruce L  Respond to of 281500
 
Rauch on a bad idea that deserves a try: National Journal

SOCIAL STUDIES
A Bad Idea That Deserves A Try
By Jonathan Rauch, National Journal
© National Journal Group Inc.
Friday, Jan. 19, 2007

President Bush, characteristically, is not leveling with the public about the risks he is taking with his plan to "surge" more U.S. forces into Iraq. Jack Keane, a retired Army vice chief of staff and a leading proponent of the strategy, is more frank. Here is what he told Charlie Rose earlier this month:

If Iraqi security forces do not step in soon and provide nonsectarian law and order, the surge buys nothing more than a lull, if that.


"If we have to go into Sadr City" -- a Shiite stronghold in Baghdad -- "what will happen will be rather dramatic. The Badr Corps and the Jaish al-Mahdi [two major Shiite militias], which are not aligned, will align. And they'll also be able to align the vigilante groups, which are essentially protecting the neighborhoods and causing some mischief and havoc. They'll all get aligned, and we'll have to contend with about 70,000 people under arms in one of the heavily and most densely populated areas of Baghdad."

Read that again. Then repeat after me: Uh-oh.

Painfully aware that the Iraq war has given commentators a lesson in humility, I offer the following assessment with no certainty at all but with the hope of at least contributing to clarity: The Bush Surge is unlikely to work, but Congress should not try to stop it.

The surge appears really to be a bundle of four policies. The military surge itself would introduce about 21,500 additional U.S. troops into the theater. By itself, that seems too little, too late. Hope for success hinges on a second element, a tactical change that is meant to improve the troops' military effectiveness: Instead of clearing areas of insurgents and militias and then handing them over to (unreliable) Iraqi forces, the Army and Marines -- along with Iraqis -- will stay put and hold the territory they clear. The idea is to make the population feel safe enough to reject militia protection and support the government. Then, in theory, the government will establish its authority and will have a fighting chance.

This theory is plausible, but it works only if security is provided sustainably, not temporarily. No one will defy the warlords and death squads if they are still lurking around the corner. And everyone knows that the Americans are not going to police the streets of Baghdad for long. If Iraqi security forces do not step in soon and provide nonsectarian law and order, the surge buys nothing more than a lull, if that.

The third element is a new commitment to jobs and economic reconstruction. Here the idea is to provide productive work for the young men whom military action will drive from the streets. Again, the theory is plausible. But economic development is a slow-acting medicine. It is necessary but not sufficient.

That leaves the fourth element of the strategy, by a long shot the most difficult and important: Induce the Iraqi government to get off the fence and decisively confront Shiite militias and ethnic-cleansers. This is crucial. Unless the government shows that it can and will pacify sectarian Shiite militants whose death squads radicalize Sunnis and intimidate moderate Shiites, the downward spiral of sectarian war seems guaranteed to continue.

The problem, of course, is that the Iraqi government is a sectarian Shiite coalition, and its parliamentary stability depends on a bloc controlled by Moktada al-Sadr, the most volatile and powerful of the country's Shiite warlords. In other words, the government cannot confront the Shiite warlords without, in effect, confronting itself -- and possibly splitting and disintegrating.

Think of the Bush plan, then, not primarily as a military escalation, a change in tactics, or a reconstruction effort, but first and foremost as a gun to the head of Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki's Iraqi government. "You talk like a unity government," the U.S. is telling Maliki, "but now we are putting 21,500 men on the ground to see that you act like one."

In the past, the Iraqi government has blocked American forces from confronting Shiite militants. This time, according to U.S. military planners, there will be no such constraints. Americans will treat Shiite militants as toughly as they do the Sunnis -- and, more to the point, the U.S. will expect Iraq's Shiite-dominated police and army to cooperate.

And if they don't? Well, the plan has some fairly obvious flaws. One is that the gun at Maliki's temple targets the United States, too. America's sole leverage is the implicit threat to leave if the Iraqi government does not make good on its commitments. For U.S. forces to leave is, of course, exactly what Shiite militants and their Iranian allies want. They hope to send the United States packing and then get on with the business of ethnically cleansing Baghdad and setting up a Shiastan in southern Iraq. That could set off a full-blown civil war, but it is one that the Shiite militants, with their numerical majority and support from Tehran, think they could win.

And so they are well positioned to wait out what they can reasonably expect will be America's last attempt at military pacification. They are also well positioned to undermine and exhaust it. With tentacles reaching deep into Iraq's security agencies and government, they can work both sides of the street, "helping" the Americans by day and terrorizing Iraqis by night. If I were an Iraqi Shiite militant, that is surely what I would do.

Can the Maliki government stop them? Does it even want to? Here Brown's Law (named for Sid Brown, a late Senate staffer) comes into play: If you tell politicians to do something they can't do, they will always find a way not to do it. By asking the Maliki government to suppress and, if necessary, defeat the strongest and fiercest part of its own coalition, the United States is asking the government to commit political, and perhaps also personal, suicide -- all for the sake of making a deal with Sunnis who look, to the Shiites, eminently untrustworthy. If you were Maliki, would you do that?

It's understandable, therefore, that Baghdad has responded to the surge plan with a sour ambivalence that is almost palpable. Confronted with an impossible choice between the Sadrists and the Americans, Maliki will find a way not to choose. Then it will be the United States that faces an impossible choice. Either the Pentagon draws back from confronting Shiite militants and effectively abets their low-grade civil war with the Sunnis (the current situation, more or less), or it confronts the Sadrists and other Shiite militants pretty much on its own.

Going to war against the Shiites would be a nightmare, and everyone knows it. American forces could soon find themselves in firefights not only with tens of thousands of armed and angry Shiite militants but also with Iraqi police and army units, in or out of uniform. The Pentagon could win such a conflict militarily, Keane told Rose, "but in my judgment we should avoid it at all costs, and try to resolve it politically."

In effect, Keane appears to be saying that the plan works at an acceptable cost only if the United States can pacify the Shiite militants without forcibly confronting them. To me, and possibly also to the Sadrists, this looks like what gamblers call a bluff.

So why shouldn't the Democratic Congress block such an unpromising strategy? Three reasons point, I think, independently in the same direction.

First, the Constitution. It provides for one commander-in-chief, not 536.

A determined president can evade all but the tightest congressional attempts to override his military decisions, and any sufficiently tight congressional strictures are likely to emasculate the presidency and fracture the Congress.

Second, politics. Blocking the president's last-resort plan would divide the country for years to come. Many Republicans would believe that the war was winnable and that Democrats lost it. If the United States is going to leave Iraq, it should do so when even Republicans agree that there is little reason to stay -- which they will, if Bush's Hail Mary pass fails.

Third, morality. America has not quite discharged its debt to Iraq.

Apart from evacuating as many as possible of those Iraqis who personally aided the American effort, the United States can do nothing for moderate and peace-loving Iraqis if the Baghdad government is determined to press or abet a sectarian agenda. A tragedy will unfold. But if there is any chance that the Iraqi government might yet be salvageable, then the United States owes it to the Iraqis to find out.

Once the surge takes place, Americans are likely to know in a matter of months whether the Maliki government is serious about pacifying Shiite militants, coming to terms with Sunnis, and cleaning up the ministries and security forces. If not, Washington can begin withdrawing forces and shift into damage-control mode -- not without guilt, but at least with certainty.

-- Jonathan Rauch