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Politics : Foreign Affairs Discussion Group -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: geode00 who wrote (230092)5/7/2007 11:18:04 PM
From: bentway  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 281500
 
Whatever our Commander Guy is seeing through his binoculars, you know it's not in the real world..



To: geode00 who wrote (230092)5/8/2007 12:26:07 AM
From: stockman_scott  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 281500
 
The Peace Presidents
______________________________________________________________

By Jean Edward Smith*
May 7, 2007, 6:36 pm
campaigningforhistory.blogs.nytimes.com

On Feb. 8, 2004, George W. Bush proudly proclaimed to Tim Russert on “Meet the Press,” “I am a war president.” Like an 8-year-old playing with toy soldiers, Bush, an Air National Guard dropout, looked at war with vicarious enthusiasm. Contrast the attitude of the nation’s “peace presidents” – supreme commanders who led the nation to victory in the greatest wars the country faced: men who had experienced the grim reality of battle and wanted no part of it.

Ulysses S. Grant condemned war as “the most destructive and unsavory activity of mankind.” Surveying the carnage at Fort Donelson during the Civil War, he told an aide, “this work is part of the devil that is left in us.”

Dwight D. Eisenhower, another former general, was equally outspoken: “I hate war as only a soldier who has lived it can, as only one who has seen its brutality, its futility and stupidity…. War settles nothing.”

Both Grant and Eisenhower were elected with expectations that they would put a victorious end to conflicts in which the country was then engaged. Both presidents did end the fighting. But not in ways that their bellicose supporters anticipated.

In Grant’s case, the frontier was ablaze, and it was widely assumed that the general-in-chief who had bested Robert E. Lee would make quick work of the Plains Indians who were slowing the nation’s westward expansion. That bet was misplaced. Grant admired the integrity and lifestyle of Native Americans and ordered an end to the slaughter. He reined in Generals William Tecumseh Sherman and Philip Sheridan (who seemed bent on annihilation), dispatched a brace of “humanitarian generals” to the West, provided aid and comfort to entice the tribes onto reservations, and replaced corrupt Indian agents with Quakers. “Grant’s peace policy” – as it is called by historians – brought peace to Great Plains without racial genocide.

Twice more Grant faced down the hawks clamoring for war — first with Great Britain, then with Spain. British-American relations had not recovered from the Civil War for several reasons: Irish-American expatriates were conducting cross-border raids into Ontario; conflicting claims to fishing rights in the North Atlantic often resulted in bloodshed; a boundary dispute in the Pacific Northwest lay unresolved; and the unpaid claims from Union shipping losses continued to fester.

Grant rejected the possibility of a military solution, and with the cooperation of the Gladstone government in Britain, he submitted the issues to arbitration. This marked a breakthrough in the settlement of international disputes and paved the way for the Anglo-American accord that survives to this day.

The issue with Spain involved Cuba. Portions of the island were in revolt against Spanish rule, and American public opinion demanded intervention on the side of the rebels. Grant not only refused, but deployed the Navy to prevent American freebooters from joining the conflict.

In 1952, Eisenhower was elected with the expectation he would win the war in Korea. After the election Ike went to Korea, measured the situation firsthand, and concluded the war was unwinnable. Without hesitation he negotiated an armistice. After Eisenhower made peace in Korea, not one American serviceman was killed in combat during the next eight years.
Like Grant, Eisenhower believed the United States should never go to war unless national survival was at stake. He resisted calls for preventive war against China and Russia, reached out to the Soviet Union after Stalin’s death and slashed the Defense Department budget. He declined to take military action to defend the Chinese offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu, stepped aside when Hungary exploded in 1956 and refused to deploy American forces in situations that might lead to combat without Congressional authorization.

When the National Security Council – Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, Vice President Richard Nixon and the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff – unanimously recommended the use of nuclear weapons at Dien Bien Phu to rescue the beleaguered French garrison, Eisenhower summarily rejected the proposal. “You boys must be crazy,” he told Robert Cutler, the national security adviser. “We can’t use those awful things against Asians for the second time in less than 10 years. My God.”

In 1956, when Britain, France and Israel colluded to invade Egypt, Eisenhower forced them to withdraw, toppling Anthony Eden’s government in London and threatening financial reprisals against Israel. That repudiation of what Ike called “old fashioned gunboat diplomacy” not only kept the peace but enhanced American prestige throughout the world.

George Bush and the neocons have no monopoly on glorifying military adventure. Madeleine Albright, President Clinton’s secretary of state, caused General Colin Powell a case of near cardiac arrest when she asked at a meeting of the National Security Council, “Why do we have an Army if we are not willing to use it?”

War is not an instrument of policy. It is an act of desperation. “Any course short of national humiliation or national destruction is better than war,” Grant told Prince Kung of China in 1879. “War itself is so great a calamity that it should only be invoked when there is no way of saving a nation from a greater [one].”
___________________________________________

*Jean Edward Smith, the John Marshall Professor of political science at Marshall University, in Huntington, W. Va., is the author of 12 books, including biographies of Ulysses S. Grant, Chief Justice John Marshall and General Lucius D. Clay. His latest book is “F.D.R.”



To: geode00 who wrote (230092)5/8/2007 12:36:49 AM
From: stockman_scott  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 281500
 
Are Iraq War Costs Spinning Out of Control?
______________________________________________________________

by David R. Francis
Columnist of The Christian Science Monitor
Published on Monday, May 7, 2007

The invasion of Iraq was launched four years ago with a “shock and awe” display of American military might. As bombs fell, Baghdad’s skyline lit up.

Today, United States taxpayers are faced with a bill for the war that could also inspire shock and awe.

Through Sunday, the war’s cost was $423 billion, according to an online cost meter posted by the National Priorities Project, a Washington advocacy group ( costofwar.com ). The last five digits on the meter are spinning far faster than the electricity meter in your home. Last Wednesday, the bill was $422 billion.

The mounting financial burden is prompting various think-tank experts to reassess the nation’s military and homeland security costs.

Reviewing what Congress has approved so far for war spending, Steven Kosiak, an analyst at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments in Washington, reckons $370 billion for Iraq, $100 billion for Afghanistan, and $30 billion for homeland security activities. That adds up to $500 billion for the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT).

Last week President Bush vetoed a $124 billion war-spending bill because it contained timetables for troop withdrawal. Of that amount, some $93 billion was for the Iraq war in fiscal 2007.

Mr. Bush’s new budget asks for $142 billion to fund war efforts in fiscal 2008. Of this, about $110 billion would be for Iraq, says Mr. Kosiak.

These numbers are huge. The National Priorities website reckons the money spent on the war could have alternatively paid for more than 20 million four-year scholarships at public universities or 3.7 million public housing units.

Even if the war were to end in days, its costs to taxpayers will drag on for decades. A study by Linda Bilmes, an economist at Harvard University, and Columbia University’s Joseph Stiglitz last fall estimated total costs could reach $2.2 trillion – “and counting.” That was before the president’s recent “surge” plan.

Such calculations are rough and depend on assumptions. Nonetheless, the sum is miles away from the administration’s original estimate that the war would cost $50 billion. Lawrence Lindsay, a White House economic adviser at that time, lost his job after suggesting the war might cost $200 billion.

Professors Bilmes and Stiglitz put the long-term budgetary costs, assuming the US maintains a small presence in Iraq through 2016, in the $1.4 trillion range. If all troops are home by 2010, the Iraq operations would cost $1 trillion.

These numbers include veterans’ healthcare and disability compensation. In addition, there are demobilization costs. And the military will have to replace or refurbish much worn-out equipment. For instance, the Army’s tanks were not built for sandy desert conditions and deteriorate rapidly in Iraq.

On top of budgetary costs, Bilmes and Stiglitz (a top economic adviser to President Clinton) add costs borne by individuals and families, or by nonfederal government agencies. These, for instance, involve the loss of productive capacity of American soldiers and contractors killed or seriously wounded in Iraq – an amount put at $16.9 billion. Economists and private insurance firms commonly refer to this as the “value of a statistical life.”

Bilmes and Stiglitz further assume the war has boosted the cost of oil. The extra cost, if that increase is $10 a barrel, reaches $125 billion over five years.

Last week another liberal economist, Dean Baker, codirector of the Center for Economic and Policy Research in Washington, found that the jump in US military spending associated with the GWOT (a jump that amounts to 1 percent of our gross domestic product) stimulates the US economy at first. But starting around the sixth year from the start of the war, the impact turns negative. After 10 years, there would be 464,000 fewer jobs than otherwise, he estimates.

To make federal spending on defense and security more effective and cost efficient, a task force managed by the Institute for Foreign Policy last month recommended a unified security budget that would pull together spending on offense (military forces), defense (homeland security), and prevention (nonmilitary international engagement). As it is, the proposed $623 billion military budget for fiscal 2008 will mean a higher military bill (in inflation-adjusted dollars) than at any time since World War II.

The task force report holds that such a unified budget would support a less militarized, less unilateral approach to US security, with greater emphasis on diplomacy. But as one author, Lawrence Korb, senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, notes, this change has been suggested for a few years – to no effect.

Robert Hormats, author of “The Price of Liberty: Paying for America’s Wars,” released last week, complains that the Iraq war has been paid for by adding to US foreign debt, not by national sacrifices as has usually happened in the past. He warns that rising entitlement program costs, such as those for Social Security and Medicare, will make it more difficult for the US to pay for the GWOT in the future, even after the Iraq war has ended.

© 2007 The Christian Science Monitor