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Strategies & Market Trends : 2026 TeoTwawKi ... 2032 Darkest Interregnum -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: elmatador who wrote (20532)	7/28/2007 8:43:51 AM
From: Snowshoe	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 219129

>>Is aging infrastructure slowing the U.S.?<< This kind of wayo appears like clockwork whenever the Democrats are trying to win back the White House. The same theme was flogged endlessly when Bill Clinton ran for president against Bush senior in 1992.

To: elmatador who wrote (20532)	7/28/2007 3:40:41 PM
From: Elroy Jetson	Read Replies (2) \| Respond to of 219129

Brazil's strained infrastructure a bottleneck in nation's quest for economic superpower status The Associated Press -- Published: July 26, 2007 iht.com RIO DE JANEIRO, Brazil: Aviation chaos, unpaved highways and the threat of energy rationing point to perhaps Brazil's greatest challenge in its quest to become an economic superpower: How to upgrade its overburdened infrastructure. The government is planning to spend billions of dollars (euros) in coming years to modernize and expand strained roads, power plants and ports in a bid to accelerate growth in South America's largest economy. But decades of infrastructure neglect, due to years of economic instability in the wake of the Latin American debt crisis of the 1980's, will not be quickly remedied. The strain, in some cases, is having disastrous consequences. Last week's airline crash at a Sao Paulo domestic airport, in which 199 died, and a radar outage over the Amazon days later brought international attention to issues for years plaguing the country's aviation system: Precarious radar coverage, poorly trained air traffic controllers and antiquated runways ill-equipped to handle modern jumbo jets. The aviation woes show "in a dramatic fashion the extent to which growing infrastructure and energy bottlenecks constitutes one of the government's top policy challenges," said Christopher Garman, the Latin America director for Eurasia Group, a political risk consulting firm. A nation of 187 million rich in natural resources, Brazil is often cited — along with Russia, India and China — as one the main challengers to the United States' economic dominance in the coming century. But Brazil's gross domestic product grew by a paltry 3.7 percent in 2006, with analysts pointing to a balky infrastructure as one of the main culprits. Meanwhile China grew by 11.1 percent, India by 9.4 percent in India and Russia by 6.7 percent. In an attempt to remedy the situation, the government unveiled in January a huge, "Growth Acceleration Project," or PAC for its Portuguese initials. It calls for spending approximately US$252 billion (€184 billion) over the next four years on transportation, energy and ports. So far, little if any of that money has been spent, however, largely due to the country's bureaucracy and regulatory morass, with environmental authorities slow to approve plans and squabbling over the bidding process. Meanwhile, the country's infrastructure languishes. Many of Brazil's highways have yet to be paved and those that are often suffer from crater sized-potholes. There is no national railway system, so goods must be moved in trucks which line up for miles outside the nation's ports, waiting to load their cargo, slowing down exports. But the most serious problem may lie in the electric sector. Most analysts predict Brazil will have to resort to energy rationing as it did in 2001 if new power plants do not come on line soon. An energy crisis that rocked the country in 2001 was widely thought to have sunk the previous government's chance of re-election and helped get Luiz Inacio Silva, a former-union firebrand and the country's first working class president, elected in 2002. A study released Tuesday by the Acende Brasil Institute, which is linked to the Brazilian Chamber of Electricity Investors, found that if the economy grows in line with projections of 4.8 percent annually, Brazil runs a 28 percent risk of having to ration energy in 2011. Faster growth would only hasten the crisis, putting greater pressure on Silva, who has seen his image damaged by last week's crash in much the same way Hurricane Katrina hurt U.S. President George W. Bush. Silva's government has been roundly criticized for doing little to improve aviation safety, even after the crash over the Amazon in September of a Boeing 737 that exposed many of the system's deficiencies. Alexandre Barros, a political risk consultant for the Early Warning institute in Brasilia, said last week's Sao Paulo accident will likely spur the government to open up to more private investment in infrastructure. "Normally, governments only act in response to a crisis," said Barros. "I think this will only increase the pressure for privatization and more public, private partnerships." But proponents of privatization will likely find stiff opposition in Silva's Workers' Party. The president's power base lies with the poor, and the government is loath to anger supporters with the kind of rate hikes greater privatization would likely bring. Privatizing the country's airports and aviation infrastructure is even more difficult because Silva — a former opponent of the country's 1964-86 military dictatorship — has been unable to wrest control of the aviation system from the military. Garman says there is another reason why Silva's government may have done little to address the aviation system troubles. "The vehement reaction is coming from the press and people who fly airplanes," said Garman. "But in Brazil most of the people can't afford to fly." .

To: elmatador who wrote (20532)	7/28/2007 3:44:34 PM
From: Elroy Jetson	Respond to of 219129

A study by the Brazilian Association of Vegetable Oil Manufacturers, from 2000, concluded that Brazilian producers have a significant disadvantage because of the deficiencies in transportation. In the USA, 89% of the price FOB of the sales go to the producers, while in Brazil the producers pocket only 79%; this happens because, in USA, 9% of the price is used to pay freights, while in Brazil the figure is 17%, and in Argentina only 8%; besides, in Brazil, 4% of the price is used to pay the port fees (twice as much as in the competing countries). The difficulties of the Brazilian soy exporters are so summarized by the Association: "In Brazil, the deficiencies in the infrastructure of transportation (from the farms to the ports) and the high costs of portuary services (in Brazil, cost is US$ 7 per ton, while in Argentina it is US$ 3 per ton) represent a heavy burden to the farmers, who end up paying the costs by means of a reduction of the money effectively received by them. It is estimated that 67% of the Brazilian soy is transported by trucks, 28% by trains and only 5% by ships and similars. The average distance that the grains must travel until the nearest port is about 1,000 km, increasing transportation costs. In the USA, 61% of the soy is transported by vessels, allowing for a reduction in costs. In Argentina, 82% of the soy production is transported by trucks, but the distances until the ports are shorter. In average, the cost of transportation is US$ 28 per ton in Brazil, US$ 14 per ton in Argentina and US$ 15 per ton in the USA. These differences in the costs of transportation and embarkment have a negative impact on the price effectively seen by producers. A producer in Parana, even being closer to the port, received (in 1999) an average of US$ 9.03 less than the Argentinean producer per ton of soy; this difference increases to US$ 33.82 per ton, for the producers of Mato Grosso. In 1999, in average, the soy producers in Argentina were paid US$ 179.50 per ton, while the producer from Parana got US$ 170.47 and the ones from Mato Grosso got only US$ 145.68 per ton. This study clearly demonstrates how much (negative) influence the poor infrastructure of transportation has on Brazilian competitiveness. .

To: elmatador who wrote (20532)	7/28/2007 4:16:03 PM
From: Elroy Jetson	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 219129

How the United Stated created Brazil's basic infrastructure. Vargas ruled as President of Brazil until 1937. On November 10, 1937 Vargas announced the birth of the Estado Novo. The Congress had been dissolved and replaced by loyal military officers. Thus, began the Vargas dictatorship. Before 1937, Nazi Germany had a huge hand in modernizing Brazil’s army and providing mechanics necessary for industrialization. However, with the rise of the Estado Novo, the United States took a more active approach to maintaining a favorable relationship with Brazil. The United States won out, after Germany’s failure to provide promised military weapons. From that time on, Brazil became an important supplier of raw materials to the Allied war effort. These raw materials did not come free of charge. In return for them, the United States invested huge sums of money in Brazilian infrastructure. Highways, railroads, ports, and airports were constructed almost entirely from United States’ funds. The United States also created the Brazil steel industry by funding Brazil’s first steel mill. Vargas further industrialized Brazil by creating the National Motor Factory, which produced truck and airplane engines. Vargas allowed one union per economic sector. Thus, the labor force was effectively tied to the government. Because of these improvements, industry in Brazil quickly grew, although coffee still remained as the king of the exports. In 1945, with the defeat of fascism in Europe, the political scene was becoming less and less friendly to Vargas. People were unhappy with the growing foreign debt and the runaway inflation rates. In October 1945, the military that had once supported Vargas deposed him. He was allowed to return to ranch in Rio Grande do Sul. The Estado Novo was over. In its place the Second Federation would be created. However, this was not the end of Vargas’ political career. In 1950 he was again elected President, this time by means of a direct election. However, once again, he faced harsh economic problems. In 1954, unable to face the huge criticism from nearly every political sector, Vargas shot himself through the heart, effectively ending a political career that was highlighted by nineteen years as the Brazilian leader. mn.essortment.com .