I see that part of the discussion about Iran is they couldn't have any way to deliver a nuke....Well, would a sub be able to do it? I see 15 years ago, they had one....do they have more now? Or other delivery systems we don't know about sold to them by any number of countries?
Found this article from the early 1990's.... and another link at the bottom of this....
Home > Backissues > 1292 > The Iranian Submarines: A New Naval Arms Race?
December/January 1992/93, Page 40
Security and Defense
The Iranian Submarines: A New Naval Arms Race?
By Michael Collins Dunn
wrmea.com
On or about Nov. 13, a Kilo-class submarine with a mixed Russian and Iranian crew entered the Arabian/Persian Gulf through the Strait of Hormuz, to take up at least temporary berthing at the port of Bandar Abbas. The Kilo, the first full-sized attack submarine acquired by any Gulf state, was not the only sub in the Gulf, however. The American Los Angeles-class attack submarine Topeka had entered the Gulf a short time before, ostensibly for some repair work but clearly in preparation for the dawn of the submarine era there.
Except for Iran's nuclear program, no aspect of its current military buildup has received as much attention as the submarine purchase from Russia. The U.S. openly tried to talk the Russians out of making the sale on the grounds that it was against their own national interest. When Secretary of State James Baker apparently succeeded, there was talk of the triumph of American policy. But it soon became clear that whatever the Russian Foreign Ministry might say, the Defense Ministry was going to sell the subs to any client who could pay in hard currency.
Iran reportedly has ordered two of the subs and has an option for a third. The Iranian exile group, the People's Mojahedin, says that according to its information from inside Iran, all three subs have been paid for in full and Defense Minister Akbar Turkan is actively negotiating the purchase of two more.
This column has been accused of "Iran bashing," of making too much of the current Iranian arms buildup. In the interest of fairness, it should be noted that although the Kilo's arrival marks the first time a Gulf state has had a submarine, it is not the first time one has tried to acquire one. Iran's late Shah was seeking subs almost a decade and a half ago. If the U.S. had been building any conventionally powered submarines, it would have sold him some gladly. Since the U.S. only builds nuclear-powered subs and does not sell them outside of NATO, the Shah was looking to Germany. Iran's revolution blocked delivery.
More recently, in the mid-1980s, as part of its naval expansion program, Saudi Arabia began shopping for submarines. The main Western European suppliers of conventionally powered submarines are Germany, France and the Netherlands, and the Saudis were looking at these. But financial constraints and other priorities led to the submarine buy being put on hold.
Nor are these the first submarines in the Middle East: Israel, Egypt, Syria, Libya, and Algeria all operate submarines, and so does Iran's eastern neighbor, Pakistan. While most of these are older than the Kilos, they are a reminder that submarines have been in the region for a long time.
And Iran can make a certain case for needing submarines. They can protect the shipping lanes Iran uses to export oil, its primary source of hard currency.
So why the fuss?
The main reason, of course, is that anyone with even a fairly short memory will recall the Iranian attacks on neutral shipping in the Gulf in 1987 and 1988, which led to American reflagging and escorting of Kuwaiti tankers up the Gulf and, eventually, to direct conflict between U.S. forces and the Iranian navy's vessels and Revolutionary Guard gunboats. Iran has several times expressed its intention of controlling access through the Strait of Hormuz to any shipping it considers inimical to its interests. The U.S., which since the 1790s has been preaching freedom of the sea lanes, has seen that as a threat.
These Iranian patrol subs, built to attack shipping or other subs, pose a fairly limited threat, especially in Gulf waters. As anyone who has flown over the Gulf knows, it is a very shallow sea. On sunny days (that is, usually) one often can see the bottom. That means anti-submarine aircraft or helicopters could readily spot a hostile sub trying to elude them. The Gulf is narrow as well: not only can the subs not hide, they can't run very far either.
But no one believes the Iranians intend to deploy the subs permanently inside the Gulf. The fact that the first sub apparently will be berthed at Bandar Abbas for now is probably just a show of force and a bit of a challenge to the U.S. The permanent submarine base is expected to be at Chah Bahar on the Arabian Sea (part of the Indian Ocean). There Iranian submarines can patrol the approaches to the Gulf in deeper waters, where flight away or downward is easier.
Still, the threat is mostly to regional shipping in circumstances in which the United States or Western powers are not involved. The moment they interfere with world shipping to the point that the U.S. steps in, they are essentially doomed. These are diesel-electric subs, and they run noisily compared to the super-quiet nuclear models of the major powers. Western anti-submarine-warfare ships and planes can find and destroy them rather easily. In a war situation in which the Kilos were seeking to destroy Saudi, Kuwaiti, neutral or Western shipping, there would be no Hunt for Red October: there would be a turkey shoot.
The Pattern of Acquisitions
So the arrival of the subs in themselves—and at this writing there is only one there—is not so much the cause for concern as the pattern which surrounds the sub acquisitions. Iran seems to be building up its forces for a more aggressive, power-projecting policy. And its history of attacking innocent shipping makes one worry about the subs. Yes, once the U.S. intervened it could remove all three, or five, Kilos readily. But before the U.S. arrived on the scene the Kilos could wreak a certain amount of havoc on the small navies of the Arab Gulf states, or on their tanker fleets.
In isolation, the subs would not mean much. But there are indications that Iran's naval intentions are not entirely benign.
While not everyone accepts the People's Mojahedin version of events, they have sources inside Iran and they have frequently, though not invariably, been right. According to the group's Washington spokesman, the sub purchases are just one part of a larger picture.
—Naval headquarters and the two top Armed Forces chiefs, Qasem Ali Zahirnezhad and Ali Shamkhani, all have been transferred to Bandar Abbas in the Gulf.
—New bases are being set up at Qeshm Island and Bandar-i-Lingah.
—Iraqi MiGs which were flown to Iran during the Gulf war have been moved to Jask on the Strait of Hormuz, and Iranian pilots can fly the MiG-29 since Iran's own acquisition of that model.
—A Marine Revolutionary Guards Brigade, the 35th Sajad Marines Brigade, is now stationed on Abu Musa, the disputed island over which Iran took full control this year after sharing control for 21 years with Sharja in the UAE.
—Two more Guards brigades, the 19th Fajr and 36th Salmas, are now stationed in the southern sector near the Gulf.
—A Silkworm anti-shipping missile brigade is now based near the strait. The Assef Missile Brigade has its logistical headquarters in the region and will soon be stationed on Qeshm Island and at Bandar-i-Lingah.
It seems that Iran is not only building up its navy, but concentrating its naval power in the region of the Strait of Hormuz. Seizing full control of Abu Musa is just one small piece of this larger puzzle, as are the submarines, the Silkworms, and the naval maneuvers conducted earlier this year which included marine landings on a "hostile" shore and interdiction of passage of the straits to a hypothetical enemy.
It does not take an "Iran-basher" to look at this buildup and conclude that Iran is seeking to acquire the ability to control access to the Gulf, interfere with shipping inside the Gulf, and make amphibious landing anywhere in the Gulf region. Although arrival of the submarine does not drastically change the balance of power in the sense that a sudden nuclear capability would, it is not surprising that the six Gulf Cooperation Council countries are deeply concerned.
Michael Collins Dunn, Ph.D., is senior analyst of the International Estimate, Inc., a Washington-based consultancy, and editor of its biweekly newsletter, The Estimate.
wrmea.com
And another article from 1996 |
