Silicon Investor (SI) -- The First Internet Community

STOCKTALK

We've detected that you're using an ad content blocking browser plug-in or feature. Ads provide a critical source of revenue to the continued operation of Silicon Investor. We ask that you disable ad blocking while on Silicon Investor in the best interests of our community. If you are not using an ad blocker but are still receiving this message, make sure your browser's tracking protection is set to the 'standard' level.

Politics : Foreign Affairs Discussion Group -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: c.hinton who wrote (246420)	10/24/2007 12:35:10 AM
From: c.hinton	Respond to of 281500

The largest single expulsion of the war began in Lydda and Ramla July 14 when 60,000 inhabitants of the two cities were forcibly expelled on the orders of Ben-Gurion and Yitzhak Rabin. According to Flapan (1987, pp. 13-14) in Ben-Gurion's view Ramlah and Lydda constituted a special danger because their proximity might encourage cooperation between the Egyptian army, which had started its attack on Kibbutz Negbah, near Ramlah, and the Arab Legion, which had taken the Lydda police station. However the author considers that, Operation Dani, by which the two towns were seized, revealed that no such cooperation existed. In the opinion of Flapan, "in Lydda, the exodus took place on foot. In Ramlah, the IDF provided buses and trucks. Originally, all males had been rounded up and enclosed in a compound, but after some shooting was heard, and construed by Ben-Gurion to be the beginning of an Arab Legion counteroffensive, he stopped the arrests and ordered the speedy eviction of all the Arabs, including women, children, and the elderly"[53]. In explanation, Flapan cites that Ben-Gurion said that "those who made war on us bear responsibility after their defeat."[54] Rabin wrote in his memoirs: What would they do with the 50,000 civilians in the two cities ... Not even Ben-Gurion could offer a solution, and during the discussion at operation headquarters, he remained silent, as was his habit in such situations. Clearly, we could not leave [Lydda's] hostile and armed populace in our rear, where it could endanger the supply route [to the troops who were] advancing eastward. ... Allon repeated the question: What is to be done with the population? Ben-Gurion waved his hand in a gesture that said: Drive them out! ... 'Driving out' is a term with a harsh ring ... Psychologically, this was one of the most difficult actions we undertook. The population of [Lydda] did not leave willingly. There was no way of avoiding the use of force and warning shots in order to make the inhabitants march the 10 to 15 miles to the point where they met up with the legion. (Soldier of Peace, p. 140-141) Flapan maintains that events in Nazareth, although ending differently, point to the existence of a definite pattern of expulsion. On 16 July, three days after the Lydda and Ramlah evictions, the city of Nazareth surrendered to the IDF. The officer in command, a Canadian Jew named Ben Dunkelman, had signed the surrender agreement on behalf of the Israeli army along with Chaim Laskov (then a brigadier general, later IDF chief of staff). The agreement assured the civilians that they would not be harmed, but the next day, Laskov handed Dunkelman an order to evacuate the population[55]. Additionally, widespread looting and several cases of rape[3] took place during the evacuation. In total, about 100,000 Palestinians became refugees in this stage according to Morris (2003, p. 448).

To: c.hinton who wrote (246420)	10/24/2007 2:12:20 AM
From: Nadine Carroll	Read Replies (4) \| Respond to of 281500

By mid-May 4000 Arabs remained in Haifa. These were concentrated in Wadi Nisnas in accordance with Plan D whilst the systematic destruction of Arab housing in certain areas, which had been planned before the War, was implemented by Haifa's Technical and Urban Development departments in cooperation with the IDF's city .............. This is horsepucky. The Arabs of Haifa borrowed trucks from the Brits and evacuated themselves despite being told by Ben Gurion and Golda Meir that they had nothing to fear from the Haganah. They said they had to go anyway. It was very orderly. The Arab High Command was making it clear in the early months of 1948 that those Arabs found sitting next to the Jews would be regarded as renegades when they rolled in driving the Jews into the sea. They advised getting out of the way and returning once the Jews were gone.