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Politics : View from the Center and Left -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: Thomas A Watson who wrote (56197)	3/26/2008 7:01:06 PM
From: Cogito	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 543546

>>The report states what I see as clear and compelling evidence that it was reasonable for saddam's bluff to be not discounted as an imaginary threat. You can chose not to see it that way<< Thomas - It's not so much choosing not to see it that way. I just don't see how a report that repeats, again and again, that Saddam did not have WMDs and did not have the capacity to produce them shows that the threat was real. >>Saddam Husayn so dominated the Iraqi Regime that its strategic intent was his alone. He wanted to end Intent sanctions while preserving the capability to reconstitute his weapons of mass destruction (WMD) when sanctions were lifted.<< I do realize that Saddam would have loved to have such weapons, but what he wanted and what he had were two very different things, according to the ISG report you are using to support your view. The "mental gymnastics" I have performed involved reading the entire report, and understanding what it meant. Have you read beyond the first two sentences? I ask, because if you went on just a few paragraphs more you would have seen this (emphasis mine): "Saddam wanted to recreate Iraq’s WMD capability—which was essentially destroyed in 1991—after sanctions were removed and Iraq’s economy stabilized, but probably with a different mix of capabilities to that which previously existed. Saddam aspired to develop a nuclear capability—in an incremental fashion, irrespective of international pressure and the resulting economic risks—but he intended to focus on ballistic missile and tactical chemical warfare (CW) capabilities. "Iran was the pre-eminent motivator of this policy. All senior level Iraqi officials considered Iran to be Iraq’s principal enemy in the region. The wish to balance Israel and acquire status and influence in the Arab world were also considerations, but secondary. "Iraq Survey Group (ISG) judges that events in the 1980s and early 1990s shaped Saddam’s belief in the value of WMD. In Saddam’s view, WMD helped to save the Regime multiple times. He believed that during the Iran-Iraq war chemical weapons had halted Iranian ground offensives and that ballistic missile attacks on Tehran had broken its political will. Similarly, during Desert Storm, Saddam believed WMD had deterred Coalition Forces from pressing their attack beyond the goal of freeing Kuwait. WMD had even played a role in crushing the Shi’a revolt in the south following the 1991 cease-fire. "The former Regime had no formal written strategy or plan for the revival of WMD after sanctions. Neither was there an identifiable group of WMD policy makers or planners separate from Saddam. Instead, his lieutenants understood WMD revival was his goal from their long association with Saddam and his infrequent, but firm, verbal comments and directions to them." The three most important points are that 1) Saddam's WMD capability was essentially destroyed in 1991, 2) he wanted to develop WMDs but had no capability to do so, and 3) *Iran, not the US* was the enemy that motivated him to want WMDs. - Allen