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To: koan who wrote (78407)4/27/2008 8:03:06 AM
From: see clearly now  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 116555
 
In Poker would this be a 'tell'?

The Pentagon Strangles Our Economy: Why the U.S. Has Gone Broke
By Chalmers Johnson, Le Monde diplomatique
Posted on April 26, 2008, Printed on April 27, 2008
alternet.org

The military adventurers in the Bush administration have much in common with the corporate leaders of the defunct energy company Enron. Both groups thought that they were the "smartest guys in the room" -- the title of Alex Gibney's prize-winning film on what went wrong at Enron. The neoconservatives in the White House and the Pentagon outsmarted themselves. They failed even to address the problem of how to finance their schemes of imperialist wars and global domination.

As a result, going into 2008, the United States finds itself in the anomalous position of being unable to pay for its own elevated living standards or its wasteful, overly large military establishment. Its government no longer even attempts to reduce the ruinous expenses of maintaining huge standing armies, replacing the equipment that seven years of wars have destroyed or worn out, or preparing for a war in outer space against unknown adversaries. Instead, the Bush administration puts off these costs for future generations to pay or repudiate. This fiscal irresponsibility has been disguised through many manipulative financial schemes (causing poorer countries to lend us unprecedented sums of money), but the time of reckoning is fast approaching.

There are three broad aspects to the U.S. debt crisis. First, in the current fiscal year (2008) we are spending insane amounts of money on "defense" projects that bear no relation to the national security of the U.S. We are also keeping the income tax burdens on the richest segment of the population at strikingly low levels.

Second, we continue to believe that we can compensate for the accelerating erosion of our base and our loss of jobs to foreign countries through massive military expenditures -- "military Keynesianism" (which I discuss in detail in my book Nemesis: The Last Days of the American Republic). By that, I mean the mistaken belief that public policies focused on frequent wars, huge expenditures on weapons and munitions, and large standing armies can indefinitely sustain a wealthy capitalist economy. The opposite is actually true.

Third, in our devotion to militarism (despite our limited resources), we are failing to invest in our social infrastructure and other requirements for the long-term health of the U.S. These are what economists call opportunity costs, things not done because we spent our money on something else. Our public education system has deteriorated alarmingly. We have failed to provide health care to all our citizens and neglected our responsibilities as the world's number one polluter. Most important, we have lost our competitiveness as a manufacturer for civilian needs, an infinitely more efficient use of scarce resources than arms manufacturing.

Fiscal disaster

It is virtually impossible to overstate the profligacy of what our government spends on the military. The Department of Defense's planned expenditures for the fiscal year 2008 are larger than all other nations' military budgets combined. The supplementary budget to pay for the current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, not part of the official defense budget, is itself larger than the combined military budgets of Russia and China. Defense-related spending for fiscal 2008 will exceed $1 trillion for the first time in history. The U.S. has become the largest single seller of arms and munitions to other nations on Earth. Leaving out President Bush's two on-going wars, defense spending has doubled since the mid-1990s. The defense budget for fiscal 2008 is the largest since the second world war.

Before we try to break down and analyze this gargantuan sum, there is one important caveat. Figures on defense spending are notoriously unreliable. The numbers released by the Congressional Reference Service and the Congressional Budget Office do not agree with each other. Robert Higgs, senior fellow for political economy at the Independent Institute, says: "A well-founded rule of thumb is to take the Pentagon's (always well publicized) basic budget total and double it." Even a cursory reading of newspaper articles about the Department of Defense will turn up major differences in statistics about its expenses. Some 30-40% of the defense budget is 'black,'" meaning that these sections contain hidden expenditures for classified projects. There is no possible way to know what they include or whether their total amounts are accurate.

There are many reasons for this budgetary sleight-of-hand -- including a desire for secrecy on the part of the president, the secretary of defense, and the military-industrial complex -- but the chief one is that members of Congress, who profit enormously from defense jobs and pork-barrel projects in their districts, have a political interest in supporting the Department of Defense. In 1996, in an attempt to bring accounting standards within the executive branch closer to those of the civilian economy, Congress passed the Federal Financial Management Improvement Act. It required all federal agencies to hire outside auditors to review their books and release the results to the public. Neither the Department of Defense, nor the Department of Homeland Security, has ever complied. Congress has complained, but not penalized either department for ignoring the law. All numbers released by the Pentagon should be regarded as suspect.

In discussing the fiscal 2008 defense budget, as released on 7 February 2007, I have been guided by two experienced and reliable analysts: William D Hartung of the New America Foundation's Arms and Security Initiative and Fred Kaplan, defense correspondent for Slate.org. They agree that the Department of Defense requested $481.4bn for salaries, operations (except in Iraq and Afghanistan), and equipment. They also agree on a figure of $141.7bn for the "supplemental" budget to fight the global war on terrorism -- that is, the two on-going wars that the general public may think are actually covered by the basic Pentagon budget. The Department of Defense also asked for an extra $93.4bn to pay for hitherto unmentioned war costs in the remainder of 2007 and, most creatively, an additional "allowance" (a new term in defense budget documents) of $50bn to be charged to fiscal year 2009. This makes a total spending request by the Department of Defense of $766.5bn.

But there is much more. In an attempt to disguise the true size of the U.S. military empire, the government has long hidden major military-related expenditures in departments other than Defense. For example, $23.4bn for the Department of Energy goes towards developing and maintaining nuclear warheads; and $25.3bn in the Department of State budget is spent on foreign military assistance (primarily for Israel, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, the United Arab Republic, Egypt and Pakistan). Another $1.03bn outside the official Department of Defense budget is now needed for recruitment and re-enlistment incentives for the overstretched U.S. military, up from a mere $174m in 2003, when the war in Iraq began. The Department of Veterans Affairs currently gets at least $75.7bn, 50% of it for the long-term care of the most seriously injured among the 28,870 soldiers so far wounded in Iraq and 1,708 in Afghanistan. The amount is universally derided as inadequate. Another $46.4bn goes to the Department of Homeland Security.

Missing from this compilation is $1.9bn to the Department of Justice for the paramilitary activities of the FBI; $38.5bn to the Department of the Treasury for the Military Retirement Fund; $7.6bn for the military-related activities of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration; and well over $200bn in interest for past debt-financed defense outlays. This brings U.S. spending for its military establishment during the current fiscal year, conservatively calculated, to at least $1.1 trillion.

Military Keynesianism

Such expenditures are not only morally obscene, they are fiscally unsustainable. Many neo-conservatives and poorly informed patriotic Americans believe that, even though our defense budget is huge, we can afford it because we are the richest country on Earth. That statement is no longer true. The world's richest political entity, according to the CIA's World Factbook, is the European Union. The E.U.'s 2006 GDP was estimated to be slightly larger than that of the U.S. Moreover, China's 2006 GDP was only slightly smaller than that of the U.S., and Japan was the world's fourth richest nation.

A more telling comparison that reveals just how much worse we're doing can be found among the current accounts of various nations. The current account measures the net trade surplus or deficit of a country plus cross-border payments of interest, royalties, dividends, capital gains, foreign aid, and other income. In order for Japan to manufacture anything, it must import all required raw materials. Even after this incredible expense is met, it still has an $88bn per year trade surplus with the U.S. and enjoys the world's second highest current account balance (China is number one). The U.S. is number 163 -- last on the list, worse than countries such as Australia and the U.K. that also have large trade deficits. Its 2006 current account deficit was $811.5bn; second worst was Spain at $106.4bn. This is unsustainable.

It's not just that our tastes for foreign goods, including imported oil, vastly exceed our ability to pay for them. We are financing them through massive borrowing. On 7 November 2007, the U.S. Treasury announced that the national debt had breached $9 trillion for the first time. This was just five weeks after Congress raised the "debt ceiling" to $9.815 trillion. If you begin in 1789, at the moment the constitution became the supreme law of the land, the debt accumulated by the federal government did not top $1 trillion until 1981. When George Bush became president in January 2001, it stood at approximately $5.7 trillion. Since then, it has increased by 45%. This huge debt can be largely explained by our defense expenditures.

The top spenders

The world's top 10 military spenders and the approximate amounts each currently budgets for its military establishment are:

Our excessive military expenditures did not occur over just a few short years or simply because of the Bush administration's policies. They have been going on for a very long time in accordance with a superficially plausible ideology, and have now become so entrenched in our democratic political system that they are starting to wreak havoc. This is military Keynesianism -- the determination to maintain a permanent war economy and to treat military output as an ordinary economic product, even though it makes no contribution to either production or consumption.

This ideology goes back to the first years of the cold war. During the late 1940s, the U.S. was haunted by economic anxieties. The great depression of the 1930s had been overcome only by the war production boom of the second world war. With peace and demobilization, there was a pervasive fear that the depression would return. During 1949, alarmed by the Soviet Union's detonation of an atomic bomb, the looming Communist victory in the Chinese civil war, a domestic recession, and the lowering of the Iron Curtain around the USSR's European satellites, the U.S. sought to draft basic strategy for the emerging cold war. The result was the militaristic National Security Council Report 68 (NSC-68) drafted under the supervision of Paul Nitze, then head of the Policy Planning Staff in the State Department. Dated 14 April 1950 and signed by President Harry S. Truman on 30 September 1950, it laid out the basic public economic policies that the U.S. pursues to the present day.

In its conclusions, NSC-68 asserted: "One of the most significant lessons of our World War II experience was that the American economy, when it operates at a level approaching full efficiency, can provide enormous resources for purposes other than civilian consumption while simultaneously providing a high standard of living."

With this understanding, U.S. strategists began to build up a massive munitions industry, both to counter the military might of the Soviet Union (which they consistently overstated) and also to maintain full employment, as well as ward off a possible return of the depression. The result was that, under Pentagon leadership, entire new industries were created to manufacture large aircraft, nuclear-powered submarines, nuclear warheads, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and surveillance and communications satellites. This led to what President Eisenhower warned against in his farewell address of 6 February 1961: "The conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new in the American experience" -- the military-industrial complex.

By 1990 the value of the weapons, equipment and factories devoted to the Department of Defense was 83% of the value of all plants and equipment in U.S. manufacturing. From 1947 to 1990, the combined U.S. military budgets amounted to $8.7 trillion. Even though the Soviet Union no longer exists, U.S. reliance on military Keynesianism has, if anything, ratcheted up, thanks to the massive vested interests that have become entrenched around the military establishment. Over time, a commitment to both guns and butter has proven an unstable configuration. Military industries crowd out the civilian economy and lead to severe economic weaknesses. Devotion to military Keynesianism is a form of slow economic suicide.

Higher spending, fewer jobs

On 1 May 2007, the Center for Economic and Policy Research of Washington, DC, released a study prepared by the economic and political forecasting company Global Insight on the long-term economic impact of increased military spending. Guided by economist Dean Baker, this research showed that, after an initial demand stimulus, by about the sixth year the effect of increased military spending turns negative. The U.S. economy has had to cope with growing defense spending for more than 60 years. Baker found that, after 10 years of higher defense spending, there would be 464,000 fewer jobs than in a scenario that involved lower defense spending.

Baker concluded: "It is often believed that wars and military spending increases are good for the economy. In fact, most economic models show that military spending diverts resources from productive uses, such as consumption and investment, and ultimately slows economic growth and reduces employment."

These are only some of the many deleterious effects of military Keynesianism.

It was believed that the U.S. could afford both a massive military establishment and a high standard of living, and that it needed both to maintain full employment. But it did not work out that way. By the 1960s it was becoming apparent that turning over the nation's largest manufacturing enterprises to the Department of Defense and producing goods without any investment or consumption value was starting to crowd out civilian economic activities. The historian Thomas E Woods Jr. observes that, during the 1950s and 1960s, between one-third and two-thirds of all U.S. research talent was siphoned off into the military sector. It is, of course, impossible to know what innovations never appeared as a result of this diversion of resources and brainpower into the service of the military, but it was during the 1960s that we first began to notice Japan was outpacing us in the design and quality of a range of consumer goods, including household electronics and automobiles.

Can we reverse the trend?

Nuclear weapons furnish a striking illustration of these anomalies. Between the 1940s and 1996, the U.S. spent at least $5.8 trillion on the development, testing and construction of nuclear bombs. By 1967, the peak year of its nuclear stockpile, the U.S. possessed some 32,500 deliverable atomic and hydrogen bombs, none of which, thankfully, was ever used. They perfectly illustrate the Keynesian principle that the government can provide make-work jobs to keep people employed. Nuclear weapons were not just America's secret weapon, but also its secret economic weapon. As of 2006, we still had 9,960 of them. There is today no sane use for them, while the trillions spent on them could have been used to solve the problems of social security and health care, quality education and access to higher education for all, not to speak of the retention of highly-skilled jobs within the economy.

The pioneer in analyzing what has been lost as a result of military Keynesianism was the late Seymour Melman (1917-2004), a professor of industrial engineering and operations research at Columbia University. His 1970 book, Pentagon Capitalism: The Political Economy of War, was a prescient analysis of the unintended consequences of the U.S. preoccupation with its armed forces and their weaponry since the onset of the cold war. Melman wrote: "From 1946 to 1969, the United States government spent over $1,000bn on the military, more than half of this under the Kennedy and Johnson administrations -- the period during which the [Pentagon-dominated] state management was established as a formal institution. This sum of staggering size (try to visualize a billion of something) does not express the cost of the military establishment to the nation as a whole. The true cost is measured by what has been foregone, by the accumulated deterioration in many facets of life, by the inability to alleviate human wretchedness of long duration."

In an important exegesis on Melman's relevance to the current American economic situation, Thomas Woods writes: "According to the U.S. Department of Defense, during the four decades from 1947 through 1987 it used (in 1982 dollars) $7.62 trillion in capital resources. In 1985, the Department of Commerce estimated the value of the nation's plant and equipment, and infrastructure, at just over $7.29 trillion ... The amount spent over that period could have doubled the American capital stock or modernized and replaced its existing stock."

The fact that we did not modernize or replace our capital assets is one of the main reasons why, by the turn of the 21st century, our manufacturing base had all but evaporated. Machine tools, an industry on which Melman was an authority, are a particularly important symptom. In November 1968, a five-year inventory disclosed "that 64% of the metalworking machine tools used in U.S. industry were 10 years old or older. The age of this industrial equipment (drills, lathes, etc.) marks the United States' machine tool stock as the oldest among all major industrial nations, and it marks the continuation of a deterioration process that began with the end of the second world war. This deterioration at the base of the industrial system certifies to the continuous debilitating and depleting effect that the military use of capital and research and development talent has had on American industry."

Nothing has been done since 1968 to reverse these trends and it shows today in our massive imports of equipment -- from medical machines like proton accelerators for radiological therapy (made primarily in Belgium, Germany, and Japan) to cars and trucks.

Our short tenure as the world's lone superpower has come to an end. As Harvard economics professor Benjamin Friedman has written: "Again and again it has always been the world's leading lending country that has been the premier country in terms of political influence, diplomatic influence and cultural influence. It's no accident that we took over the role from the British at the same time that we took over the job of being the world's leading lending country. Today we are no longer the world's leading lending country. In fact we are now the world's biggest debtor country, and we are continuing to wield influence on the basis of military prowess alone."

Some of the damage can never be rectified. There are, however, some steps that the U.S. urgently needs to take. These include reversing Bush's 2001 and 2003 tax cuts for the wealthy, beginning to liquidate our global empire of over 800 military bases, cutting from the defense budget all projects that bear no relationship to national security and ceasing to use the defense budget as a Keynesian jobs program.

If we do these things we have a chance of squeaking by. If we don't, we face probable national insolvency and a long depression.



To: koan who wrote (78407)4/27/2008 12:14:03 PM
From: Dan3  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 116555
 
Re: I look at Hanford with its 100 billion dollar price tag clean up

That's something of a red-herring. At hanford site, they dug shallow ditches and dumped toxic material in them - for decades. At the time, they were thinking that the human race was 30 minutes away from extinction from a nuclear holocaust (On the Beach, anyone?) and that what they were doing would deter that outcome. Who knows? Maybe they were right. Doesn't really look that way now, but those were different times.

Some of the worst problems at ORNL site are from mercury, not radioactive isotopes.

Practices used in Gold, lead, coal, and copper mining have left behind deadly superfund sites consisting of giant lakes of toxic heavy metal sludge. Sludge that won't be a deadly poison for 100 or 10,000 years, it will be a deadly toxic forever.

Should we ban the use of gold, lead, coal, and copper because of those past practices?

I'm not saying that nuclear is anything other than a source of deadly environmental risks, just that, as an energy source, it presents fewer such risks than any other proven alternative that's capable of saving us from a starvation driven world war.

===================================
Y-12 MERCURY TASK FORCE FILES:
A GUIDE TO RECORD SERIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AND ITS CONTRACTORS
INTRODUCTION
Overview
The purpose of this guide is to describe each of the series of records identified in the documents of the Y-12 Mercury Task Force Files that pertain to the use of mercury in the separation and enrichment of lithium isotopes at the Department of Energy's (DOE) Y-12 Plant in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. History Associates Incorporated (HAI) prepared this guide as part of DOE's Epidemiologic Records Inventory Project, which seeks to verify and conduct inventories of epidemiologic and health-related records at various DOE and DOE contractor sites.

This introduction briefly describes the Epidemiologic Records Inventory Project and HAI's role in the project. Specific attention will be given to the history of the DOE-Oak Ridge Reservation, the development of the Y-12 Plant, and the use of mercury in the production of nuclear weapons during the 1950s and early 1960s. This introduction provides background information on the Y-12 Mercury Task Force Files, an assembly of documents resulting from the 1983 investigation of the Mercury Task Force into the effects of mercury toxicity upon workplace hygiene and worker health, the unaccountable loss of mercury, and the impact of those losses upon the environment. This introduction also explains the methodology used in the selection and inventory of these record series. Other topics include the methodology used to produce this guide, the arrangement of the detailed record series descriptions, and information concerning access to the collection.

The Epidemiologic Records Inventory Project
The Epidemiologic Records Inventory Project reflects DOE Secretary Hazel R. O'Leary's efforts to support openness initiatives in the areas of environment, safety, and health. In view of the importance of various administrative, organizational, and operational records to epidemiologic and health-related studies, a moratorium on the destruction of such records has been in effect since 1989.

In May 1992, the DOE Office of Epidemiology and Health Surveillance (EH-42), responsible for coordinating all epidemiologic activities throughout the Energy complex, directed each DOE site and DOE contractor to prepare an inventory of all records pertinent to worker or community health-related studies. EH-42 prepared and furnished each site with guidelines that defined epidemiologic records, provided instruction for describing record series, outlined the site's role in inventorying epidemiologic records, and discussed the relationship of the epidemiologic inventory to DOE's comprehensive records inventory. These inventories should be completed in 1995.

In August 1993, DOE selected History Associates as its support services contractor for the Epidemiologic Records Inventory Project. HAI, a professional records management, archives, and historical research services firm incorporated in 1981, has provided records management, historical research, and technical support for a number of DOE projects. HAI's role in this project includes verifying the accuracy, comprehensiveness, and quality of existing inventories, providing guidance to site records management teams, and, in some cases, conducting additional inventories.

As part of its task to verify and conduct inventories of epidemiologic and health related records at DOE and DOE contractor sites, HAI conducted a pilot study at the DOE-Oak Ridge Reservation. The primary purpose of this pilot project was to assist DOE in responding to the information needs identified in a March 1994 meeting with DOE, the Tennessee Department of Health (TDH), and other stakeholders. These groups expressed interest in the records relating to radioactive lanthanum (RaLa), iodine-131 and iodine-133, cesium-137, and the Mercury Task Force files. HAI began this task by inventorying and describing the record series contained in the Mercury Task Force files related to operations using large quantities of mercury. HAI is currently identifying and inventorying records relating to RaLa, iodine, and cesium, as well as resolving protocol and access issues. Although the identification and inventory of record series relating to other topics are still in progress, this process when completed, will allow DOE to provide the best possible assistance to health researchers interested in using the records relating to these hazardous substances.

HISTORY OF OAK RIDGE

The Oak Ridge Reservation
Oak Ridge, Tennessee, was one of three sites established by the Manhattan Project during World War II for the development of the first atomic bombs. Selected on September 19, 1942, the Clinton Engineering Works (CEW), later named Oak Ridge Reservation (ORR), supported three major production centers. The X-10 site, which later expanded to become the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), housed the first large-scale graphite reactor. Known then as the Clinton Pile, the graphite reactor provided irradiated uranium slugs from which plutonium could be separated at the Oak Ridge pilot plant. The Y-12 facility produced enriched uranium-235 by electromagnetic separation; and the last production plant, K-25, produced enriched uranium-235 by the gaseous diffusion method.

The Oak Ridge plants produced significant amounts of hazardous waste by-products, and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) included Oak Ridge on its National Priorities List of Superfund hazardous waste sites in November 1989. In 1991 DOE signed the Oak Ridge Health Agreement that provides funds to the state of Tennessee for independent health assessment studies of the Oak Ridge operations and the surrounding population.

The Y-12 Plant
Since its inception in 1943, the official mission of Y-12 has changed over the decades. Originally, Y-12 separated the fissionable uranium isotope, uranium-235, from the more plentiful, but stable uranium-238 isotope, using the electromagnetic process. After the war, when this process was discontinued, Y-12's mission changed to manufacturing and developmental engineering. The plant produced nuclear weapon components, developed and fabricated test hardware for weapons, processed source and special nuclear materials, provided fabrication support for other Oak Ridge Reservation Plants, and supported other federal agencies. Y-12 recovered enriched uranium from obsolete weapons and scrap materials, processed enriched uranium from other DOE sites, and produced lithium compounds. Currently, the plant's mission is to serve as a key technology center for the development and demonstration of unique materials, components, and services of importance to DOE and the nation. Y-12 accomplishes its mission through the manufacture, reclamation, and storage of nuclear materials, construction of components for the nation's defense capabilities, and support of national security programs.

Since 1943, three contractors have operated the Y-12 Plant for the Manhattan Engineer District (MED) and its successor agencies. Tennessee Eastman, a subsidiary of Eastman Kodak Company, was the original contractor with the US Army Corps of Engineers. The Atomic Energy Act of 1946 assigned all atomic energy activities to the US Atomic Energy Commission (USAEC), effective January 1, 1947, and, later that year, the MED disbanded. In 1947, the Carbide and Carbon Chemical Corporation (CCCC), which later became known as Union Carbide Corporation (UCC)-Nuclear Division, replaced Tennessee Eastman and remained the Y-12 site contractor until 1984. In that year, Martin Marietta Energy Systems (MMES) assumed the Y-12 contract.

Lithium Isotope Separation and Enrichment at Y-12
In the early 1950s, the United States started to develop thermonuclear weapons. Unlike previous nuclear weapons, which derived their explosive force from the fission of uranium atoms, these new weapons obtained their energy from the fusion, or combination, of heavy hydrogen atoms. For this reason, these weapons became known as hydrogen bombs.

The primary material used in thermonuclear weapons was a form of hydrogen fuel known as lithium deuteride, produced from the lithium-6 isotope. Naturally occurring lithium contains about 7 percent of the lithium-6 isotope, while the rest of it is the lithium-7 isotope. In the 1950s, the Y-12 Plant developed, designed, constructed, and operated an industrial scale production process to separate and enrich the lithium-6 isotopes from lithium-7 isotopes for the production of lithium deuteride.
The separation process that produced most of the lithium deuteride was called Colex, a column-exchange process, in which the lithium isotopes were separated as the lithium was transferred between two chemical phases. One of the phases was an aqueous solution of lithium hydroxide and the other a lithium amalgam, a solution of lithium in mercury. The lithium-6 isotope dissolved more thoroughly in mercury than lithium-7. Lithium amalgam remained in a stable state while in contact with an aqueous solution. In other words, the lithium-6 atoms migrated to the amalgam and the lithium-7 atoms adhered to the lithium hydroxide in the aqueous fluid. Cold War production schedules of lithium deuteride required millions of pounds of mercury, and President Eisenhower authorized Y-12 to use a significant portion of the mercury from the National Stockpile for the Colex process from 1955 to 1963.

Colex operations were located in Buildings 9201-4 (Alpha 4) and 9201-5 (Alpha 5), and these became the mainstay of Y-12's lithium separation and enrichment process. Active from 1955 to 1963, Colex operations produced enough enriched lithium to fulfill anticipated future needs in the weapons program. In 1963, the Y-12 lithium separation and enrichment program was shut down, and over the next several years, the plant was engaged in dismantling production equipment and recovering mercury from the production facilities and equipment. Most of the equipment still remains in Building 9201-4.

Oak Ridge developed and used other methods to separate lithium isotopes. In the early 1950s, ORNL experimented with substituting water with an organic solvent. This process, known as Orex, an organic exchange process, was not pursued beyond the pilot stage because of technical difficulties. Buildings 9733-1 and 9202 housed the Orex pilot plants from 1951 to 1953. Another method used in the separation of lithium isotopes was Elex, an electro-chemical separation process. Elex was conducted in Buildings 9733-2 and 9201-2 between 1950 and 1951. A production scale Elex process was started up in Building 9204-4 (Beta 4) and operated from 1953 to 1956. By 1956, Y-12 found Elex to be an inefficient process, abandoned it entirely, and operated the Colex process only.

The Establishment of the Y-12 Mercury Task Force Files

The 1983 Mercury Task Force
The Y-12 Mercury Task Force Files represent the result of a 1983 investigation into the use of mercury at Y-12 during the 1950s and early 1960s. This investigation, by a group of Y-12 employees unassociated with the lithium separation and enrichment processes, followed the May 17, 1983, publication of a declassified version of Mercury Inventory at Y-12 Plant, 1950 Through 1977 (Y/AD-428). The publication of this report generated much media and public interest in the use of mercury at Y-12, especially in the effects of mercury toxicity on worker health, the unaccountable loss of mercury, and the impact of those mercury losses on the environment.

On May 20, 1983, Y-12 managers selected a Task Force to investigate the apparent mercury problem at Y-12. The Task Force's investigation took eight weeks, during which time the group collected pertinent documents concerning the lithium separation and enrichment processes, mercury material accountability, monitoring of the workplace for mercury contamination, worker exposure, and environmental releases. Following the investigation, the Mercury Task Force summarized its findings in a classified report entitled Mercury at Y-12: A Study of Mercury Use at the Y-12 Plant, Accountability, and Impacts on Y-12 Workers and the Environment-1950 to 1983 (Y/EX-21). A declassified version (Y/EX-24) is available, as is Mercury at the Y-12 Plant: A Summary of the 1983 UCC-ND Task Force Study (Y/EX-23).

Workplace Hygiene and Worker Health

An area of interest of the Mercury Task Force was the impact of mercury toxicity on workplace hygiene and worker health. From the beginning of the lithium isotope separation and enrichment process at Oak Ridge, AEC officials and Y-12 Plant managers and industrial hygienists recognized the need to safeguard and monitor the health of the workforce. From 1950 to 1954, industrial hygiene programs were instituted in the Orex, Elex, and Colex pilot plants. With the industrial scale use of mercury in the Colex operations after 1954, these officials became especially concerned about the medically recognized hazards of inhaling toxic mercury vapor. Since greater quantities of mercury would be used in full-scale Colex operations than previously, the plant expanded existing industrial hygiene programs and implemented new ones to protect worker health.

The Colex process was a pioneering technology that required specialized pumps, valves, and other equipment not used previously for such applications. Plant engineers anticipated frequent maintenance and operational problems during the initial months of operation. In 1955, the first full-scale year of the Colex process, the pumps and valves required much service and repair. Often the processing system was full of mercury and large quantities of it leaked and spilled on the floor. Drainage systems were modified so that the floor drains would direct the mercury into special tanks that separated the mercury from wastewater, mainly mopwater, collected in sumps that emptied into the creek.

From the outset of the Colex operations in 1953, Y-12 conducted both routine air sampling to monitor the mercury concentrations within the workplace and a urinalysis program to monitor individual worker exposure. During the start-up of Colex operations in 1955, air sampling indicated that mercury concentrations in Buildings 9201-4 and 9201-5 were higher than the then recommended standard of 0.1 milligram/cubic meter (now 0.5 mg/m3). Urinalysis also indicated that workers had been exposed to higher concentrations of mercury than normal in 1955. In general, the risk of mercury exposure was greatest in 1955 and 1956, the ramp-up years of Colex operations. After 1956, the risk declined as air sampling data indicated mercury concentrations below the threshold limit value of 0.1 mg/m3.

In addition to the air sampling and urinalysis programs, Y-12 conducted a special medical surveillance program of the Colex workforce. Workers were medically examined every six months and workers with a history of albuminuria, kidney problems, or hypertension were screened out and not assigned to work in mercury exposed areas.

In late 1955, AEC and Y-12 managers instituted various mechanisms to reduce mercury concentrations in the workplace and safeguard worker health. The plant studied paints and other substances that could reduce vapor pressure and dissolve mercury droplets. Large fans were installed at the ends of the process buildings to remove contaminated air and circulate fresh air throughout the production areas. A special vacuum system was installed for mercury removal. In early 1956, the plant emphasized the use of respirators and, after a close examination of the commercially available respirator filter cartridges, selected the Mersorb cartridge for use by Colex workers. The effectiveness of these and other measures is documented in the historical record of air concentrations, which shows significant reduction of mercury concentrations in the air by March 1956 and successful control of mercury release during the subsequent operating years.

Worker Medical and Mortality Studies, 1974-1983

The Mercury Task Force reviewed existing medical and mortality studies of mercury workers and suggested an additional one. In 1974, the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), under the direction of Dr. Z. Bell, conducted a medical check-up of 23 former Colex workers still employed at Y-12. Bell's examination revealed no cases of mercury poisoning and only one case of mercurialentis, a harmless discoloration of the eye, in a worker for whom there was no record of exposure.

In 1983, Oak Ridge Associated Universities conducted a preliminary mortality study of the Y-12 mercury workforce (1,477) and other Y-12 workers (4,920), comparing these groups to the U.S. population as a whole, to see if the death rates were higher for workers exposed to mercury than those not exposed to mercury. No differences were found between either cohort of Y-12 workers and the U.S. population, and no difference was found between Y-12 mercury workers and other Y-12 workers in death rates due to cancer, neurological disease, respiratory disease, and kidney failure.

As a result of the investigation by the Mercury Task Force, Y-12 initiated a special medical examination of the Y-12 mercury workforce, a study that offered the opportunity to evaluate a large group of people (2,450) 20 years after well documented exposure to mercury (27,000 urinalyses). Whereas studies conducted elsewhere of human populations with similar degrees of mercury exposure indicated no organic effects, this one could offer different results since the Y-12 population was larger and had a longer term after exposure. The investigators were looking for the most common symptoms of chronic metallic mercury poisoning--tremors, memory loss, and gingivitis. These symptoms are also signs of the natural aging process, another characteristic of the extant Y-12 mercury workforce. In August 1983, Y-12 selected eight experts in mercury toxicity and chronic mercurialism diagnosis and requested their recommendations on what

Mercury Material Balance
According to the 1977 Mercury Inventory Report, 2.4 million pounds of mercury were "lost" or "spilled" during the lithium separation process. Although the report correctly referred to this figure as the amount "lost" or "spilled" plus an "unaccounted for" amount, the subsequent public debate over the Y-12 mercury problem obscured the distinctions between those terms. The Task Force attempted to clear up the confusion over the amount of mercury "lost" and the amount "unaccounted for" by reviewing the extant records dealing with shipping, receiving, flasking, storage, accounting, and budget.

After reviewing the records, the Mercury Task Force determined that 2.0 million pounds of mercury were "lost" or "unaccounted for." The Task Force reported a lower figure than the 1977 Inventory Report because it found increases in several areas in which mercury was unaccounted for originally. The Task Force arrived at a lower amount of losses because in its in-depth review of the records, it was able to account for mercury previously believed to be lost. Of the 2.0 million pounds of "lost" mercury, the Task Force determined that 0.7 million pounds could be traced to losses to the environment.

The Task Force concluded that 1.3 million pounds of mercury still remained "unaccounted for," estimating that 60,000 pounds might be located within the structure of the buildings-- inside the walls, ceilings, floors, and insulation. These are areas where the mercury would have been hardest to recover, as vapors and droplets were absorbed into these fixtures throughout the period of greatest mercury use. The Task Force based this estimate on an EPA study of the chlor-alkali industry, which showed substantial losses of mercury each year by absorption into building structure.

After its investigation, the Task Force remained uncertain about how much mercury was actually received at Y-12 during the 1950s and early 1960s. Rust Engineering conducted the mercury receiving operation for the AEC at Y-12. All records concerning such receipt had been transferred to the Federal Records Center in East Point, Georgia, and subsequently destroyed. The Task Force failed to uncover any data concerning the amount of mercury received at Y-12, but, based on interviews with former AEC officials, speculated that the facility had received somewhere between 500,000 and 900,000 pounds. From interviews, the Task Force also learned that much of the mercury was never weighed by the GSA, the AEC, Y-12, or Rust Engineering. These interviews revealed that the mercury flasks, which held up to 76 pounds of the substance, often leaked and many were not full when emptied into the Colex cascade.

INFORMATION FOR ACCESSING RECORDS

METHODOLOGY
In a March 1994 meeting with DOE, the Tennessee Department of Health and other stakeholders, HAI agreed to identify, inventory, and describe the record series which comprise the Y-12 Mercury Task Force Files. Since the records were already gathered as part of the investigation of the 1983 Mercury Task Force, there was no need for HAI to formulate criteria for the identification and selection of these records. Instead the HAI team familiarized themselves with the history of Oak Ridge, the Y-12 Plant, the use of mercury there, and the lithium isotope separation and enrichment processes. HAI accomplished background research through a thorough review of Mercury at the Y-12 Plant: A Summary of the 1983 UCC-ND Task Force Study (Y/EX-23) and Mercury at Y-12 (Y/EX-24) reports and the Oak Ridge Health Studies: Phase 1 Report, produced by ChemRisk in September 1993. HAI also conducted a preliminary examination of the Y-12 Mercury Task Force Files in March 1994.

In June 1994, HAI identified, inventoried, and described the record series of the Y-12 Mercury Task Force Files. Because of the sensitivity of this collection (a majority of the documents are classified as being Confidential, or Secret Restricted Data for national security reasons) classification officers at Y-12 reviewed HAI's completed inventory forms. For quality control, a member of HAI senior management reviewed the inventory that was completed by a different HAI employee against the actual records.

Data Elements
In accordance with the guidelines in Information Required by the Department of Energy for Epidemiologic and Health Studies, DOE developed a list of 123 (later revised to 85) data elements to assign to record series descriptions. In general, the data elements consist of terms pertaining to contractor organizations, individual employees, industrial hygiene activities, and facilities characteristics that help categorize and describe the major information contained in each of the record series. The data elements assigned to each record series are listed as numbers that correspond to the data elements found in Appendix A.

PRODUCTION AND USE OF THE GUIDE

After completing the inventory at the Y-12 Record Center, HAI researchers analyzed their inventory forms and described their contents. Information on each record series found in this guide includes the title of the series, their inclusive dates, location, active or inactive status, access restrictions, accession or other identification number, total volume, and the numbers of the record containers. Descriptions of the record series also provide information on the medium in which the record exists, their suitability for electronic scanning, their physical condition, the availability of finding aids, the arrangement of the records, the originating office, any known duplication, and the disposition authority.

SCOPE OF THE GUIDE
This guide reflects HAI's June 1994 inventory and description of the record series of the Y-12 Mercury Task Force Files. HAI inventoried the collection at a record series level and, therefore, the information provided represents a broad description of the documents rather than a description of each individual document. Researchers who want to see a brief description of most of the documents in the Y-12 Mercury Task Force Files should consult the unclassified version of a report, Mercury at Y-12: A Study of Mercury Use at the Y-12 Plant, Accountability, and Impacts on Y-12 Workers and the Environment-1950-1983 (Y/EX-24). Titles of documents that are classified have been removed from this report.

ARRANGEMENT OF THE GUIDE

History Associates grouped the record series descriptions into four categories in order to facilitate research. A brief explanation of each category is as follows:

I. FINDING AIDS & REFERENCE REPORTS
HAI inventoried and described the finding aids available for the Y-12 Mercury Task Force Files. Finding aids include two computer printouts of the Y-12 Mercury Database. These printouts are part of the Y-12 Mercury Task Force Files and are stored with them in the Y-12 Records Center vault. One printout is ordered by document/file number and the other is ordered alphabetically by author. These printouts are especially valuable since an electronic version of the Mercury Task Force Database no longer exists. Other finding aids described include the report, Mercury at Y-12 (Y/EX-24), the bibliography of this report, which lists each document included in the collection, and a listing of the documents in a collection of unclassified materials that belong to the Y-12 Mercury Task Force Files. This collection is located in the DOE-OR Public Document Reading Room, 55 Jefferson Circle, Oak Ridge, TN, and at the Y-12 Plant, Building 9106, Room 41.

II. PROGRESS REPORTS

This category contains various reports that document the operations of the Y-12 Plant from the early 1950s to the mid-1970s. The bulk of the records represent the 1950s and the early 1960s, the period of greatest mercury use in the lithium isotope separation and enrichment processes.

III. MERCURY ACCOUNTABILITY RECORDS
Record series found under this heading relate to accounting and budgetary matters concerning mercury, in addition to shipping and receiving information, inventory and flasking information, and alloy and solvent loss in specific locations.

IV. HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL RECORDS
The health and environmental group of records include health physics progress reports, records relating to urinalysis programs, records relating to air sampling programs for solvents and other materials, and records concerning the release and measurement of mercury within the environment.

Data Items in Record Series
Each record series description contain fifteen major pieces of information. Each of the fifteen is listed and further explained below.

Title and Inclusive Dates
Each record series description begins with a title that reflects the broad content of the record series and the inclusive dates of the records.

Location
Information on the physical location of the record series and an indication of its status, active or inactive, is provided here. Active records are necessary to conduct current business and are generally maintained in an office. Inactive records are those no longer needed for current business and are generally transferred to records storage areas for disposition. The Y-12 Mercury Task Force Files are located in the Y-12 Records Center vault.

Access Restrictions
Since most of the documents contained in the Y-12 Mercury Task Force Files are classified for national security reasons, access to the collection requires an individual to possess a DOE "Q" clearance and a demonstrated need to know. These requirements also hold for entrance to the Y-12 Records Center vault, where the collection is housed. For information on access to the Y-12 Mercury Task Force Files, researchers must first contact the custodian of the collection, Lowell L. McCauley, 615-574-7593.

The Y-12 Mercury Task Force Files were reviewed by the Y-12 Office of Classification to determine which documents could be released to the public based on current DOE guidelines. These documents were identified, recommended for public release, and sent to the DOE-OR Public Reading Room by Y-12 Information Management Services. The DOE-OR Public Reading Room is located at 55 Jefferson Circle. Copies of these unclassified materials are also located on the Y-12 Plant in Building 9106, Room 41. For information on viewing these collections at the DOE-OR Public Reading Room, contact Pam Buchanan, 615-576-1216. For information on viewing these documents onsite, contact Steve Wiley, Y-12 Health Studies Agreement Coordinator and Tennessee Oversight Agreement Coordinator, 615-576-0263.

For information regarding access to the Y-12 Records Center, contact Jack Lewis, Y-12 Records Manager, 615-576-8834.

Classified Information
To assist researchers and others in understanding the types of classified information, and the restrictions that govern access to it, the following excerpts from the DOE's Understanding Classification (June 1987) are provided: Categories of Classified Information
There are three categories of classified information: Restricted Data; Formerly Restricted Data; and National Security Information.

1. RESTRICTED DATA (RD) is a special category of classified information with which the Department of Energy is principally concerned. The Restricted Data category is defined in the Atomic Energy Act as follows:

"The term RESTRICTED DATA means all data concerning (1) design, manufacture, or utilization of atomic weapons; (2) the production of special nuclear material; or (3) the use of special nuclear material in the production of energy, but shall not include data declassified or removed from the Restricted Data category pursuant to section 142."

2. FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA (FRD) is information which has been removed from the Restricted Data category after the Department of Energy and the Department of Defense (DOD) have jointly determined that the information relates primarily to the military utilization of atomic weapons and can be adequately safeguarded in the same manner as National Security Information in the United States. This is known as transclassification. Such data may not be given to any other nation except under specially approved agreements.

3. NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION (NSI) is information which requires protection against unauthorized disclosure in the interest of the national defense or foreign relations of the United States and has been determined to be classified in accordance with the provisions of Executive Order 12356 or a prior Executive order.

Levels of Classified Information
There are three levels of classified information: Top Secret; Secret; and Confidential.

1. TOP SECRET is the level assigned to information of utmost importance to the national defense and security. Its unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to national security.

2. SECRET is the level for information which, in the event of an unauthorized disclosure, could reasonably be expected to cause serious damage to national security.

3. CONFIDENTIAL is the level for information which, in the event of unauthorized disclosure, could reasonably be expected to cause damage to national security.

For further information, see also DOE Office of Safeguards and Security Headquarters, Security Education Overview Handbook (DOE/SA-0004).

Volume
An estimated volume of the records is given in linear feet and the exact number of file folders is provided as part of the record series description. One cubic foot is, on the average, equal to 24 file folders.

Accession/Other Identification Number
The Y-12 Mercury Task Force Files are organized according to a numerical filing system. Each file is numbered (1-853) and the number is preceded by an "M" for mercury. The number of each file for each record series is provided in sequential order as part of the record series description.

Condition
HAI judged the physical condition of the record series, categorizing them as either good, fair, or poor. If the records were judged to be in poor condition, an explanation is provided.

Container Number
Most records are stored in standard containers that hold one cubic foot of documents. In the case of the Y-12 Mercury Task Force Files, the container numbers represent file cabinet drawers. The Y-12 Mercury Task Force Files are contained in four legal-size filing cabinets secured by combination locks in the vault of the Y-12 Records Center. Drawer numbers are listed sequentially as part of the record series. Drawer 1: M1-M55; Drawer 2: M56-M109; Drawer 3: M110-M164; Drawer 4: M165-M230; Drawer 5: M231-M303; Drawer 6: M304-M349; Drawer 7: M350-M402; Drawer 8: M403-M462; Drawer 9: no M-numbered files; Drawer 10: M463-M498; Drawer 11: M499-M598; Drawer 12: M599-M699; Drawer 13: M700-M853; Drawer 14: Y-12 Mercury Task Force Database Printouts.

Medium
The physical nature of the records, such as paper, microfilm, electronic, or audiovisual, is noted.

Scanning Suitability
HAI has provided a statement concerning the suitability of records for electronic scanning purposes. Factors which may effect scanning suitability, including paper size, weight, ink and paper colors, type font, and the presence of handwritten data, graphics, diagrams, and photographs are noted under this heading. Depending on the state-of-the-art in scanning technology, this statement may not be accurate in the future.

Duplication
As part of a classification review of the records in the Y-12 Mercury Task Force Files, all originally unclassified records were copied and placed in the DOE-OR Public Document Reading Room, 55 Jefferson Circle, 615-576-1216. Copies of these originally unclassified documents are also located on the Y-12 Plant in Building 9106, Room 41.

Arrangement
The arrangement of the record series, for example, numerical, chronological or alphabetical, is described when possible. The Y-12 Mercury Task Force Files are arranged by a numerical filing system. Each file is numbered (1-853) and the number is preceded by an "M" for mercury.

Originating Office
The originating office of the organization (e.g., Health Physics Department, Radiation Safety Division, or Union Carbide Company) which produced the records is provided here. In some cases, as in Technical Reports, Technical Memoranda, and Quarterly Reports, for example, several organizational departments and divisions contributed documents to the record series, and the term "various departments and divisions" is used.

Finding Aids
If finding aids exist, they are described.

Disposition Authority
Disposition authorities cited refer to the NARA General Records Schedules and DOE Records Schedules. Since this is a permanent collection, disposition authority is not applicable.

Data Elements
The data elements, which are similar to key words, that HAI considered pertinent to the record series are listed in numerical order. The numbers correspond to the revised data elements list (see Appendix A).