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Politics : View from the Center and Left -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: JohnM who wrote (109728)4/24/2009 9:18:04 AM
From: JohnM  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 541486
 
Philip Zelikow, who had several different roles in the Bush administration, including overseeing the 9-11 commission staff, argues that we need a careful examination of what actually took place in interrogation. And that the results will likely be that the "extreme" methods failed to produce results. A "torture doesn't work argument."
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The New York Times
April 24, 2009
Op-Ed Contributor
A Dubious C.I.A. Shortcut
By PHILIP ZELIKOW

Charlottesville, Va.

GOOD intelligence can sometimes be gained by tormenting captives beyond endurance. It is an old, old technique, refined during the 20th century by science — and pseudo-science. By 1949 George Orwell could envision the shrewdly calibrated torments that induced his protagonist in “1984” to love Big Brother. Such methods worked all too well, Orwell feared. The United States experimented in the 1950s and 1960s with novel ways of extracting information. But, until 2002, it never considered the kind of systematic and truly Orwellian C.I.A. program that has now been revealed. Yet the question lingers: Do such methods really work? Don’t we need something like this?

The C.I.A. program did generate a huge volume of intelligence material. Many of these interrogation reports did contain valuable information. After all, the C.I.A. had exclusive custody of many of the most important Qaeda captives for years. Any of the flow from that river would be theirs. Agency officials thus wrote memos recounting plots prevented and people captured.

Yet the C.I.A.’s claims that its methods produced actionable information can also be misleading. Former Vice President Dick Cheney says he would like all of the agency’s defenses of its interrogation program declassified. But that would declassify only one side of the intelligence argument. Each of these accounts of disrupted plots and captured terrorists has a back story, full of lore and arguments about who developed which lead and whose sources proved out.

A professional evaluation of the C.I.A.’s claims would have to examine these cases to sift and weigh the contributions. The Senate Intelligence Committee is embarking on an important effort to sort out the claims and counterclaims.

What the committee may well find, after all the sifting, is that the reports were a critical part of the intelligence flow, but rarely — if ever — affected a “ticking bomb” situation. Yet the main rationale for using extreme methods is to save time. To the extent that the methods are more than just a way of debasing an enemy, their added value is in breaking people quickly, with the downsides including unreliability.

That is one reason the methods of torment do not stack up well against proved alternatives that rely on patience and skill. In setting up this program, officials do not seem to have thoughtfully considered those alternatives. The Intelligence Science Board, a federal advisory group, published a report in 2006 illustrating how those in charge of interrogations could have more thoroughly looked at options. The Israelis and British also have a huge amount of painfully acquired experience in using those alternatives, including in some cases where they really did have ticking bombs, either Palestinian or Irish. Neither of those countries can lawfully adopt the C.I.A. program revealed in the Justice Department memos; the Israeli Supreme Court has spoken to these issues in exceptionally eloquent opinions.

The United States has plenty of its own experience to consider, in law enforcement (remember the frenzy a generation ago over the Supreme Court’s Miranda decision requiring suspects to be read their rights?) as well as in war. In World War II, the United States and Britain had special programs for “high value” captives. Thousands of lives were at stake. Yet, even in a horrifyingly brutal war, neither government found it necessary to use methods like the ones in this C.I.A. program. George Marshall would not have needed a lawyer to tell him whether such methods were O.K.

More recent history is also revealing. America inadvertently carried out an experiment in how best to question Qaeda captives. On the one side there was the C.I.A. effort, while on the other there was the military-run program against Al Qaeda in Iraq. The Iraq program, organized by the Joint Special Operations Command, was reformed after the Abu Ghraib scandals. It respected basic international standards. It used teams made up of experts from the military, the C.I.A. and law enforcement. The F.B.I. did not have to stay away, as it did from the C.I.A.’s “enhanced” interrogations.

Qaeda captives in Iraq were hard cases, often more seasoned in violence than captives taken elsewhere. Yet the program in Iraq was and remains highly successful. I was impressed when I observed it in 2005 as part of a wider look at our intelligence efforts. I know that Joint Special Operations Command leaders told the White House that they could interrogate captives effectively under the higher standards.

There is another variable in the intelligence equation: the help you lose because your friends start keeping their distance. When I worked at the State Department, some of America’s best European allies found it increasingly difficult to assist us in counterterrorism because they feared becoming complicit in a program their governments abhorred. This was not a hypothetical concern.

A thoughtful inquiry parsing the pros and cons is necessary — but it may not end up finding much, if any, net intelligence value from using extreme methods. It should also consider the future of the C.I.A.: over the long haul, it might be best for the agency if its reputation rested on outstanding professional standards and patient expertise.

Philip Zelikow, a professor of history at the University of Virginia, was the counselor of the State Department from 2005 to 2006 and the executive director of the 9/11 commission.

nytimes.com



To: JohnM who wrote (109728)4/24/2009 9:30:05 AM
From: KyrosL  Read Replies (4) | Respond to of 541486
 
<<officials in the Bush administration instituted torture as a policy>>

Isn't it obvious to everybody that Bush and Cheney themselves either explicitly or implicitly approved of the torture, and, therefore, they are the only ones to be prosecuted, since the buck stopped with them and since Obama has established that those that followed orders are not to be prosecuted?

Why then does Krugman and others talk about "officials" to be prosecuted, rather than the two at whose desk the buck stopped?



To: JohnM who wrote (109728)4/24/2009 6:38:53 PM
From: Steve Lokness  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 541486
 
John;

Does Krugman hate Obama because he is black? Obama is so far to the left of Bush one would think that Krugman could find something nice to say about him> He wasn't this mean towards Bush/Cheney.

For example, would investigating the crimes of the Bush era really divert time and energy needed elsewhere?

Goodness sake yes. All you need to do to let loose the conservative attack dogs is to go after Bush. Seems Krugman would rather see Obama lather at the mouth with rabid spittle running off his chin attacking Bush than work towards health care.

I don’t know about you, but I think America is capable of uncovering the truth and enforcing the law even while it goes about its other business.

America is great in holding their leaders accountable. Several magazines and book authors have as their raison d'etre the long and detailed look at anything suggesting of wrong doing. They'll get to the truth.......

because it’s about reclaiming America’s soul.

Isn't that exactly what Obama is doing Mr. Krugman!



To: JohnM who wrote (109728)4/25/2009 5:28:16 PM
From: greenspirit  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 541486
 
No Mr. Krugman, Nobel Prize writer for the nearly bankrupt N.Y. Times, it's about rewriting history and casting an ugly shadow on the Bush legacy.

Despite Bush, Cheney and whoever else the hard core left brands as part of the evil cabal, they kept America safe after 9/11.

We can now afford to look back, because of the dedication and skillful work they performed. I'll wager no one on the boards of SI predicted after 9/11 we would go this long, without suffering some kind of terrorist attack on American shores. Yet we have....

Whether the self-emulation foreign policy path of Obama proves to be as successful is an open book at this stage. I certainly hope his embarrassing rants about how arrogant America is, don't come back to haunt us like the roosters his spiritual advisor taught and believed.

Former KGB head Putin must be laughing his head off at the naiveté of Obama and his foreign policy "experts", for believing hand shakes and smiles will change the hearts and minds of dictators like Chavez who hate America to their core.

Not long ago, Venezuela had real hope of raising their standard of living, quality of life and becoming a strong economic power. Now they've embrassed the Cuban path, with the name Chavez replacing Castro.

At least Bill Ayers is happy....He probably won't be bombing any more buildings with his friend Obama in the White House.

I predict if Obama is re-elected, within 1 year there will be a call by liberal Democrats to repeal the 21st Amendment and allow him to serve as President for life, just like Chavez.