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To: Maurice Winn who wrote (73103)4/14/2011 5:53:54 AM
From: elmatador  Respond to of 217713
 
One of the biggest challenges facing the buyers is an outstanding pension obligation that could total billions of dollars, as well as the complexity of structuring a minority stake in a joint venture.

Nokia, Siemens Consider JV Stake Sale
online.wsj.com



To: Maurice Winn who wrote (73103)4/14/2011 11:27:18 AM
From: elmatador  Respond to of 217713
 
"the idea that attending Harvard is all about learning? Yeah. No one pays a quarter of a million dollars just to read Chaucer. The implicit promise is that you work hard to get there, and then you are set for life. It can lead to an unhealthy sense of entitlement. “It’s what you’ve been told all your life, and it’s how schools rationalize a quarter of a million dollars in debt,” Thiel says.

...

“If Harvard were really the best education, if it makes that much of a difference, why not franchise it so more people can attend? Why not create 100 Harvard affiliates?” he says. “It’s something about the scarcity and the status. In education your value depends on other people failing. Whenever Darwinism is invoked it’s usually a justification for doing something mean. It’s a way to ignore that people are falling through the cracks, because you pretend that if they could just go to Harvard, they’d be fine. Maybe that’s not true.”

techcrunch.com



To: Maurice Winn who wrote (73103)4/15/2011 3:43:06 AM
From: elmatador  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 217713
 
a mischievous column likening America's universities to its car companies in about 1950: on top of the world and about to take an almighty fall.

The latest bubble?
Apr 13th 2011, 11:50 by Schumpeter

ON September 2nd 2010 I wrote a mischievous column ("Declining by degree") likening America's universities to its car companies in about 1950: on top of the world and about to take an almighty fall. Since then I have heard the argument dismissed and denounced by the presidents of Harvard, Princeton and New York University. John Sexton, NYU's affable president, even likened me to a member of the tea party, for which there is no more damning condemnation in academic circles.

So I am particularly delighted to read Peter Thiel's latest thoughts on the higher-education bubble. Mr Thiel, the co-founder of PayPal and a legendary investor, has a long history of identifying bubbles. He insisted on striking a deal, against everybody's advice, when the market valued PayPal at "only" $500m, on the ground that the dotcom bubble was about to burst (this was March 2000). He refused to buy property until recently, figuring that the dotcom bubble had simply shifted to housing.

Mr Thiel believes that higher education fills all the criteria for a bubble: tuition costs are too high, debt loads are too onerous, and there is mounting evidence that the rewards are over-rated. Add to this the fact that politicians are doing everything they can to expand the supply of higher education (reasoning that the "jobs of the future" require college degrees), much as they did everything that they could to expand the supply of "affordable" housing, and it is hard to see how we can escape disaster.

Here is Sarah Lacy's summary of Mr Thiel's argument about the safety-blanket role of higher education:

Like the housing bubble, the education bubble is about security and insurance against the future. Both whisper a seductive promise into the ears of worried Americans: Do this and you will be safe. The excesses of both were always excused by a core national belief that no matter what happens in the world, these were the best investments you could make. Housing prices would always go up, and you will always make more money if you are college educated.
Mr Thiel's own solution to the problem befits a man with money and a mission: he is offering 20 students $100,000 scholarships, over two years, to leave school and start a company rather than enter college.

While I'm on the subject of higher education, I'll point to three other bits and pieces that have caught my attention. Paul Krugman has pointed out that, contrary to popular wisdom, expounded relentlessly by the OECD among other august bodies, technological progress may reduce the demand for high-end jobs, not just low-end jobs. Computer software is now employed to perform tasks that used to require armies of lawyers, engineers or highly educated workers.

The belief that education is becoming ever more important rests on the plausible-sounding notion that advances in technology increase job opportunities for those who work with information — loosely speaking, that computers help those who work with their minds, while hurting those who work with their hands.
Some years ago, however, the economists David Autor, Frank Levy and Richard Murnane argued that this was the wrong way to think about it. Computers, they pointed out, excel at routine tasks, “cognitive and manual tasks that can be accomplished by following explicit rules.” Therefore, any routine task — a category that includes many white-collar, non-manual jobs — is in the firing line. Conversely, jobs that can’t be carried out by following explicit rules — a category that includes many kinds of manual labor, from truck drivers to janitors — will tend to grow even in the face of technological progress.
And here’s the thing: Most of the manual labor still being done in our economy seems to be of the kind that’s hard to automate. Notably, with production workers in manufacturing down to about 6 percent of US employment, there aren’t many assembly-line jobs left to lose. Meanwhile, quite a lot of white-collar work currently carried out by well-educated, relatively well-paid workers may soon be computerized. Roombas are cute, but robot janitors are a long way off; computerized legal research and computer-aided medical diagnosis are already here.
Of course, the value of education cannot be reduced to dollars and cents, as much as elite universities try to do so. Education is its own reward. But I wonder about the quality of a great deal of higher education, especially in the humanities. The best academics, the Gordon Woods of this world, produce wonderful stuff. But I am regularly shocked by the quality of the books that flow into The Economist's offices from university presses, by the tediousness of the subject matter, the contortions of the prose and the willingness of the authors to bow the knee to various exhausted academic pieties (the various "isms") in the name of challenging conventions (try looking at anything produced by Duke University Press, for example).

I was struck by a recent review in Slate, by William Deresiewicz, of Marjorie Garber's new book "The Use and Abuse of Literature", which begins thus, and goes on to become even more brutal:

Marjorie Garber's new book brought me back to my days as an English professor; I thought I was reading a freshman essay. My marginal comments might as well have been written in red: "What is the point of this paragraph?" "Where are we in the argument—and what exactly is the argument?" "Sloppy thinking." "You need to unpack this." "Again, is there a point here, or just a mass of notes?" "You have to develop your thesis, not just keep reiterating it." The Use and Abuse of Literature purports to be a rallying cry for serious reading by a decorated and prolific Harvard professor, but once you pick your way through its heap of critical detritus—its mildewed commonplaces and shot-springed arguments, its half-chewed digressions and butt ends of academic cliché—you uncover underneath it all a single dubious and self-serving claim: that the central actor in the literary process is, what do you know, the English professor.
And Ms Garber, remember, is a leading professor at America's leading university, or one of them anyway. Imagine what the average exercise in literary theory is like from a professor at a second- or third-division school. It is hard to regard this sort of stuff as a contribution to either knowledge or civilisation.

My third article is also from Slate. This suggests that applications for law school have dropped by more than 11% since last year, in part because students are beginning to realise that it makes no sense to pile up hundreds of thousands of dollars in debt in order to join the legion of unemployed lawyers.

According to data from the Law School Admission Council, first reported by the Wall Street Journal, the number of applicants to law school has dropped a whopping 11.5 percent year-to-year—to the lowest level since 2001 at this point in the application cycle. Some schools are still accepting applications, so the numbers will change in the coming weeks, says the council's Wendy Margolis. But about 90 percent of applications are in, and the pattern is clear.
This fits in with my own observations of what is happening in business schools, which have been relentlessly raising their prices by 6% a year. Middle-ranking schools are seeing a significant drop in demand, which they have masked by taking weaker candidates, but which will eventually force them to start cutting back.

Perhaps the education bubble is already beginning to burst.



To: Maurice Winn who wrote (73103)4/15/2011 3:21:59 PM
From: elmatador2 Recommendations  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 217713
 
BRIC wall

Growth tends to slow when GDP per head reaches a certain threshold. China is getting close

Apr 14th 2011 | from the print edition

THE economic crisis may have been debilitating for the rich world but for emerging markets it has been closer to a triumph. In 2010 China overtook a limping Japan as the world’s second-largest economy. It looks sets to catch America within a decade or two. India and Brazil are growing rapidly. The past few years have reinforced the suspicion of many that the story of the century will be the inexorable rise of emerging economies. If projections of future growth look rosy for emerging markets, however, history counsels caution. The post-war period is rich in examples of blistering catch-up growth. But at some point growth starts to disappoint. Gaining ground on the leaders is far easier than overtaking them.

Rapid growth is initially easy because the leader has already trodden a clear path. Developing countries can borrow existing technologies from countries that have already become rich. Advanced economies may be stuck with obsolete infrastructure; laggards can skip right to the shiniest and best. Labour productivity soars as poor economies shift workers from agriculture to a growing manufacturing sector. And rapid income growth among young workers boosts savings and fuels investment.

But the more an emerging economy resembles the leaders, the harder it is to sustain the pace. As the stock of borrowable ideas runs low, the developing economy must begin innovating for itself. The supply of cheap agricultural labour dries up and a rising number of workers take jobs in the service sector, where productivity improvements are more difficult to achieve. The moment of convergence with the leaders, which once seemed within easy reach, retreats into the future. Growth rates may slow, as they did in the case of western Europe and the Asian tigers, or they may falter, as in Latin America in the 1990s.

The world’s reliance on emerging markets as engines of growth lends urgency to the question of just when this “middle-income trap” is sprung. In a new paper* Barry Eichengreen of the University of California, Berkeley, Donghyun Park of the Asian Development Bank and Kwanho Shin of Korea University examine the economic record since 1957 in an attempt to identify potential warning-signs.

The authors focus on countries whose GDP per head on a purchasing-power-parity (PPP) basis grew by more than 3.5% a year for seven years, and then suffered a sharp slowdown in which growth dipped by two percentage points or more. They ignore slowdowns that occur when GDP per head is still below $10,000 on a PPP basis, limiting the sample to countries enjoying sustained catch-up growth. What emerges is an estimate of a critical threshold: on average, growth slowdowns occur when per-head GDP reaches around $16,740 at PPP. The average growth rate then drops from 5.6% a year to 2.1%.

This estimate passes the smell test of history (see chart). In the 1970s growth rates in western Europe and Japan cooled off at approximately the $16,740 threshold. Singapore’s early-1980s slowdown matches the model, as does the experience of South Korea and Taiwan in the late 1990s. As these examples indicate, a deceleration need not precipitate disaster. Growth often continues and may accelerate again; the authors identify a number of cases in which a slowdown proceeds in steps. Japan’s initial boom lost steam in the early 1970s, but its economy continued to grow faster than other rich nations until its 1990s blow-up.

In the right circumstances the good times may be prolonged, allowing an economy to reach a higher income level before the inevitable slowdown. When America passed the threshold it was the world leader and was able to keep growing rapidly so long as its own innovative prowess allowed. Britain’s experience indicates economic liberalisation or a fortunate turn of the business cycle may also prevent the threshold from binding at once.

Openness to trade appears to be a potent stimulant: the authors attribute the outperformance of Hong Kong and Singapore to this effect. Lifting consumption to just over 60% of GDP is useful, as is a low and stable rate of inflation. Neither financial openness nor changes of political regime seem to matter much, but a large ratio of workers to dependents reduces the odds of a slowdown. An undervalued exchange rate, on the other hand, appears to contribute to a higher probability of a slowdown. The reason for this is not clear but the authors suggest that undervaluation could lead countries to neglect their innovative capacity, or may contribute to imbalances that choke off a boom.

Middle Kingdom, middle income

The authors are careful to say that there is no iron law of slowdowns. Even so, their analysis is unlikely to cheer the leadership in Beijing. China’s torrid growth puts it on course to hit the $16,740 GDP-per-head threshold by 2015, well ahead of the likes of Brazil and India. Given the Chinese economy’s long list of risk factors—including an older population, low levels of consumption and a substantially undervalued currency—the authors suggest that the odds of a slowdown are over 70%.

It is hazardous to extend any analysis to a country as unique as China. The authors acknowledge that rapid development could shift inland, where millions of workers have yet to move into manufacturing, while the coastal cities nurture an ability to innovate. The IMF forecasts real GDP growth rates above 9% through to 2016; a slowdown to 7-8% does not sound that scary. But past experience indicates that slowdowns are frequently accompanied by crises. In East Asia in the late 1990s it became clear that investments which made sense at growth rates of 7%, say, did not at expansion rates of 5%. Political systems may prove similarly vulnerable: it has been many years since China has to deal with an annual growth rate below 7%. Structural reforms can help to cushion the effects of a slowdown. It would be wise for China to pursue such reforms during fat years rather than the leaner ones that will, eventually, come.

* “When Fast Growing Economies Slow Down: International Evidence and Implications for China”. NBER working paper, March 2011

economist.com