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... apparently Putin in a bind ...
Putin is still in a bind thetimes.co.uk
Ukraine isn’t ready for its big offensive, but it has no choice
Mark Galeotti
April 08 2023, 6.00pm BST
Ukraine’s long-anticipated counter-offensive is proving irresistible to the social media armchair warriors, despite Kyiv’s appeals for them to stop treating the war like a spectator sport. However, their enthusiastic discussion of alternative battle plans belies the degree to which, as a Ukrainian official admitted, “in some ways we all have much less freedom of manoeuvre” than might be assumed.
Publicly the Ukrainians are bullish. Oleksii Reznikov, the defence minister, promised last week that the big push was imminent. “As soon as there is God’s will, the weather and a decision by commanders, we will do it,” he said.
British officers who have been working with the Ukrainian military report that their counterparts are in confident mood about the coming push. One said: “They’re up for it, and in it to make some serious gains on the ground.”
On the other hand, leaked US intelligence assessments depict Ukraine as unlikely to make more than “modest territorial gains” from the entrenched Russian forces, who on Friday carried out airstrikes on Ukrainian cities that killed at least 25 people.
Lost element of surprise
In part this discrepancy reflects the difference between tactics and strategy. So far the Ukrainian military has demonstrated not just skill and determination, but also imagination. From using small, highly mobile anti-tank teams to blunt and block Russian armoured thrusts in the early weeks of the war to the deployment of jerry-rigged explosive drone-ships against Crimean ports, they have not just outfought but out-thought their enemies on a tactical level.
On Saturday morning a massive fire at a Russian oil depot in Sevastopol was blamed by the Crimean authorities on a drone attack, although Kyiv declined to take credit.
A fuel tank burns after a drone strike on Saturday in Sevastopol, occupied Crimea
MIKHAIL RAZVOZHAEV/TELEGRAM
The Ukrainians have also often been able to catch the Russians by surprise at an operational and strategic level, such as in September’s Kharkiv offensive in the northeast of the country. By striking when Moscow’s attention was focused on the south, and in areas largely stripped of Russian troops, they were able to retake more than 12,000 square kilometres in a month.
Jens Stoltenberg, Nato’s secretary-general, claimed on Thursday that 98 per cent of the western weaponry pledged to Ukraine had been delivered.
However, while the Ukrainians are moving quickly to assimilate their 230 new and reconditioned western tanks and 1,550 armoured vehicles, they still lack proper air defences for any big offensive operation. That puts them at risk from Russian airpower. Western defence sources are also uncertain whether senior commanders can adapt to the new systems as well as their soldiers on the ground.
Yet Kyiv has little real choice but to launch a major spring or summer offensive. Its leaders are increasingly boxed in. As an American defence official put it: “The Ukrainians have surprised us as well as Putin in the past, but have much less room for manoeuvre now . . . and the Russians know it.”
President Zelensky has managed the West with great skill, but to maintain its support he has to show what Washington insiders rather tastelessly call a “return on investment”.
He must also balance domestic politics. Hawks such as Kyrylo Budanov, Ukraine’s military intelligence chief, prevent any meaningful talk about negotiations, even though some in the government think now is the time to put out feelers. One western diplomat in Kyiv described a “surreal parallel experience” as his interlocutors “discuss potential formats for negotiations one evening” and then “shout that there can be no talks with Russia” in public the next day.
Ukraine’s September offensive in the Kharkiv region took Putin by surprise while he focused on the south
JUAN BARRETO/AFP
Weapons are no good without ammo
There are also sharp limits to what the West can do. While there are calls for new and more weapons to be provided, from ATACMS (Army Tactile Missile System) long-range missiles to F-16 jets, it is not just caution or parsimony that holds the West back. One of the key issues is that of ammunition: sending more weapons systems is of little value without the shells, bullets or missiles that they are consuming at a prodigious rate.
At present, for example, the Ukrainians expend more 155mm shells in a month than America produces in a year. The West is investing in new production capacity, but this takes months or years. Ammunition cannot be conjured out of the air and Paris is blocking the EU from buying supplies outside the bloc.
Kyiv will have to attack regardless, probably aiming at some ambitious target, such as the southern city of Melitopol, a road and rail hub whose liberation would cut the so-called land bridge between Crimea and Russia.
Moscow knows this. Beyond the continued grinding assaults on the cities of Bakhmut and Vuhledar, it is already moving into a defensive mode. Ukrainian estimates, endorsed by the British Ministry of Defence, suggest that the Russian casualty rate has fallen by almost a third as a result. They are digging in, with satellite photos showing a growing array of trenches and fortifications, especially along the likely lines of Ukrainian attack in the south. It is, of course, possible that Kyiv will strike elsewhere, such as at the city of Donetsk, but while this would be symbolically powerful, it would be a tough fight, and of much less practical value.
Putin is still in a bind
Russia is operating under sharp constraints. It, too, is expending more ammunition than it can produce. It is running short of precision-guided missiles, meaning that attacks like Friday’s are likely to become rarer. More to the point, Putin wants successes, but the more aggressive the Russian operations, the more losses they take and the sooner he will again be faced with the tough decision of how to make up the shortfall. Despite a media blitz that includes “be a man” adverts on every TV channel, it is clear that recruitment is underwhelming.
Making up the losses will require either another wave of mobilisation or deploying conscripts. Both would be unpopular and Putin is unwilling to make those decisions so long as he can avoid them, especially before September’s regional elections.
Thus, while forces beyond Zelensky’s control are pushing Kyiv to attack, Moscow is reluctantly committed to defence, relying only on the hope of outlasting Ukraine’s will to resist and the West’s willingness to bankroll it. Local attacks notwithstanding, this is about the only strategy that Putin can adopt.
China wins either way
Despite his upbeat visit to Moscow, President Xi still isn’t sending arms to Putin
PAVEL BYRKIN
Sergey Lavrov, Russia’s foreign minister, claimed at a news conference at the UN on Wednesday that Nato was trying “to break Russia apart” but was actually making it stronger, not least on the global stage. However, for all Moscow’s belligerent rhetoric, it is also constrained by its need to avoid worsening its foreign relations.
It is taking pains to avoid any direct provocation of Nato. Moscow has, for example, held back from launching attacks on weapons routes to Ukraine. Even at the peak of Russia’s air campaign, it avoided flights too close to Ukraine’s western borders, lest one of its aircraft strayed into Nato airspace.
Even nations that Moscow once considered second-rank powers now have an effective veto on aspects of Russian policy, or at least the chance to demand a high price for their assistance. Turkey turns a blind eye to sanctions-busting smuggling in and out of Russia, for example, and Iran sells it drones. In return, the Russians are having to accept that Ankara and Tehran are increasingly active in regions where Moscow once held sway and generally make nice to regimes that can be considered ”frenemies” at best.
China is gaining more traction the longer the war continues and the deeper the damage to Russia’s economy. Despite upbeat communiqués after President Xi’s visit to Russia last month, Beijing is still not supplying weapons, ammunition, or even the kind of unconditional political support that Putin wanted.
Instead, Xi openly forced the Russians to dial down their barely-veiled nuclear threats and last week had an hour-long phone conversation with Zelensky, their first since the invasion. Beijing’s evident desire someday to be the broker of peace — consolidating its claims to have become a true global power — may be a lifeline for Putin, but also a noose if he begins to look too intransigent or unrealistic a partner. In the words of a Russian political observer: “Xi’s not yet telling Putin what to do — but he is certainly signalling what he had better not do.”
While both sides have considerable tactical freedom then, they are strategically limited. Ukraine must launch a major attack; Russia must try and deny them a crowd-pleasing victory.
They each have their parts to play, and everyone knows the script – it’s really a question of how well they act and improvise their roles.
Professor Mark Galeotti is the author of more than 20 books on Russia, most recently Putin’s Wars: From Chechnya to Ukraine, published by Bloomsbury |
