>>Zlot, poor Zlot, TRY to calm down! (And also try to say "AS usual".) Sales of nuclear weapons technology to Indonesia? Gimme a break. How would they PAY for it?
I shall when you correctly state what I wrote and when you try using "give me" in place of "gimme". You can't be so old that you are THAT confused.
>>Ronnie--okay, he was Altzheimered out by then
So what you are trying to say, that you can still make a living?
>>And as for "human rights policy"...wasn't taht a Carter thing? Despised as impractical by the Republicans, Reagan included?
No, Reagan introduced it in the early 1970's and ran on it in 1976 against the failure of "detente". Carter adopted it rhetorically as a campaign device and while in office during which time he helped extend the policy of detente and the reach of totalitarianism in Eastern Europe, Central America and Iran. Unlike his failed predecessor, Reagan successfully promoted human rights in actuality and with genuine results - a concept alien to you as a committed liberal (or should be committed). In fact the Washington Post recently carried an article on the subject:
Reagan's Example On China
By William C. Triplett II
Wednesday, March 18, 1998; Page A21
The recent discovery of Chinese proliferation transgressions presents the
Clinton administration with an opportunity to regain momentum and
demonstrate some foreign policy leadership.
As revealed by The Post's Barton Gellman and John Pomfret on March
13, the American intelligence community has discovered "secret
negotiations" between the Chinese and Iranian governments designed to
transfer hundreds of tons of chemicals that could be used to enrich uranium
to weapons-grade levels. Apparently, this particular transaction was
aborted by the American discovery and subsequent diplomatic protest.
Because the negotiations were secret and at the
government-to-government level, they raise immediate concerns about
Chinese government intentions regarding nuclear transfers. In this case, the
discovery of the Beijing-Tehran conduit is more important than the
discovery of the anhydrous hydrogen fluoride in the pipeline. Given our
intelligence limitations regarding Chinese proliferation activities, we can
only speculate what else may have passed down the conduit and what
other deals are in the works. If, as many experts suspect, the Chinese have
a full-scale "denial and deception" program in place, any transfer could
take place without being discovered.
While the Clinton administration can claim victory for stopping this
particular transfer, last week's revelations could not come at a worse
moment. Unless a two-thirds vote of both houses can be mustered against
it by today, the U.S.-China Nuclear Cooperation Agreement will go into
effect. Considering recent events, President Jiang Zemin's
no-nuclear-transfer pledge to President Clinton seems worthless.
But it's not too late: The administration can take down the agreement
temporarily in order to allow for "consultations" with the Chinese.
This, in fact, is what the Reagan administration did in 1984 when faced
with exactly the same problem. In the spring of that year, President Reagan
initialed the agreement in Beijing. Immediately after the proposal was
brought before Congress, allegations of Chinese assistance to the Iranian
nuclear weapons program surfaced in The Post. The Republicans held the
Senate in 1984, and the administration knew that, with strong business
community support, it could bull its way through.
Instead, President Reagan chose to take down the agreement, negotiate
stronger nonproliferation commitments from the Chinese and resubmit it to
the Senate a year later. This took policy integrity, some willingness to
acknowledge criticism and, finally, courage.
Following President Reagan's path is the right thing to do. First, the
president would be seen as standing up to Beijing, a move certain to draw
praise on the Hill. Last week the Senate adopted a bipartisan resolution
demanding that the administration bring Beijing's human rights offenses to
the attention of the U.N. Human Rights Committee in Geneva. The
resolution passed 95 to 5.
Second, taking down the agreement, even for a few months, would send a
strong signal to Beijing and other proliferators that the Clinton
administration won't cover up for them. It would demonstrate that there is
a cost to be paid for supporting the weapons of mass destruction programs
of terrorist countries.
Third, it would have generalized foreign policy benefits for the president
and his team. To put it diplomatically, his team has had credibility problems
in recent months. But if he takes down the agreement, it will signal that
neither the president nor his team will square the policy circle just to curry
favor with the business community. Not only will the administration be
commended, correctly, for honesty, it will make others around the world
change their evaluation of just what they can get away with: in essence a
warning to those who would consider the administration a doormat.
Finally, the downside, the risk to the business community, is minimal.
Nuclear power plants take years and years to plan and build. This would
be particularly true in earthquake-prone China. If the president were to
withdraw the agreement and resubmit it after he returns from China in July
(presumably with new assurance), at the end of the construction period no
one would miss these few months of delay.
So the revelation of China's attempts to cheat on its non-proliferation
commitments forces President Clinton to choose. He can go the route of
honesty, integrity and leadership that President Reagan chose. Or he can
try to ride it out and run the risk of further embarrassment the next time
something is discovered in the Beijing-Tehran weapons of mass destruction
conduit.
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