To: gunther who wrote (1030 ) 5/29/1998 10:46:00 AM From: Mohan Marette Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 12475
Indo/US relations since 1954- India's threat perspective. [Source : The Indian Defence Review, c 1997 by Lancer Publishers & Distributors.]ÿ [For Private use only] Gunther and all: Here is an excerpt from an article written by Brigadier G.B.Reddi Retired)regarding India's defence policy issues. I believe it is published some time in 1997 in India Defence weekly by Lancer UK. If you want to read the whole article a link is given at the end. Keep in mind that it's the personal opinion of a retired Brigadier and do not reflect the actual government policy and the actual reality might very well be different. +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++Indo/US Relations. After 1954, our relations with USA deteriorated irretrievably. Mutual distrust largely marked our relations. After the end of the Cold War, both countries made an attempt to rechart the course to ally status. Expectations of building enduring economic ties were raised. Hopes of military co-operation even were kindled. Despite our endemic political instability and grotesque bureaucracy, US promoters launched joint ventures: Coke, Kentucky Chicken, Levi Jeans etc. signifying a major breakthrough. When the prospects of a new relationship were emerging, the Brown Amendment struck us. The Americans paid scant respect to our reactions. They were insensitive to our hawks, who are demanding quid pro quo. Naturally, the pitch has been queered demanding "throw the Coke, Kentucky, Levi and Enron" out. US influence will diminish. Many favour reciprocatory politico-diplomatic affronts and thus a reversal of the politico-diplomatic-economic clock, albeit temporarily. In the ultimate analysis, there is a lack of coherent and credible strategic thrust. But there is excitement over emerging challenges and opportunities. And we over-react and expose our vulnerabilities. Today's situation is not as bad as it is made out to be. But it will become worse if USA provides military and economic aid to Pakistan continuously, and China resumes covert or overt support to our insurgencies in the North-East. The Current situation still offers opportunities for promoting our relations both with USA and China. If we do not seize them now, time may run out for us. India's Threat perspective ÿ Until 1971, our threat perspective largely centred around Pakistan. Later, it shifted to China with utter disregard for emerging geo-strategic realities. However, it was limited to a conventional warfare scenario. China's nuclear weapon capability was conveniently left out. We almost went to war with Pakistan and China during the late 1980s-dangerous brinkmanship. We aggressively sought a regional superpower role during the 1980s and intervened in Sri Lanka and the Maidives. We may set our superordinate goal as parity with China. But, China is way ahead of us. Its modernization programmes are in advanced stages of progress. It has renewed its Russian connection. MiG-31 and SU-27 aircraft have already joined the PLA in 1 994. MiG-31 s are being license-produced at the rate of 4 aircraft per month. China is also taking Israeli assistance. A whole range of advanced technologies are being used to upgrade and modernize Chinese forces. Its implications are manifold. Of all of them, three are critical. One, China is far ahead of us in all almost all fields, and without technology induction we cannot catch up with them. Two, China may transfer state-of-the-art weapons systems to Pakistan, if USA denies the same to them. Three, we must make the right choice between USA, EU, and Russia for our combat systems to match China"s MiG-31s, SU-27s, etc. We must make sincere fundamental shifts on our political and diplomatic fronts. Pending significant breakthroughs, the choice for us is simple-maintain minimum strategic nuclear and non-nuclear deterrence vis-A-vis China. It should automatically counter Pakistani threat. Surely the costs, over the last 47 years, to develop nuclear technology need to be gainfully utilized. A brief analysis of our nuclear threat perspective will show the void or dilemmas. These are succinctly highlighted in the book, The Blind Men of Hindoostan by General K. Sundarji, acclaimed as the thinking general. The logic of undertaking threat perceptions separately for nuclear and non-nuclear contingencies is quite incomprehensible. They can be done separately, but should be finally synthesized. Only then does holistic analysis become possible. Such a strategic clarity on. "Against whom, how, when and where?" is exceedingly vital for long-term defence preparedness and planning. On the internal front, we viewed insurgencies in our North-East as a good training ground for war with monumental stupidity and failed to find enduring solutions. Even now, lack of political will to resolve out standing internal threats is quite apparent. In Punjab, our leaders abetted Sikh separatist demands and dealt with them lackadaisically until we were rudely awakened by Operation Blue Star. There is continuing strategic bankruptcy in Jammu & Kashmir. More important is the woeful lack of sensitivity to the rising expectations of people everywhere for devolution, decentralization and autonomy. No nation can wage wars on both the external and internal fronts simultaneously. It is a sure recipe for disaster. Ideally, peace is vital to promote progress and prosperity. If so, minimization of threat concerns should form the basis of our political and diplomatic strategy. If we allow a threat-level analysis based on force-level comparisons purely for a conventional warfare contingency, our requirements will multiply phenomenally. Our nation cannot afford it. Anyway, the days of uni-service centred threat analysis are over. An integrated approach is vital. In the absence of a National Security Council, it is an anathema for all generalists and specialists. The economic constraints will be real. The focus must be on development first and defence later. The cost of modern armies will be astronomical. Hence, modernization must change from the numerical superiority syndrome to technical superiority concept.bharat-rakshak.com