To: Chuzzlewit who wrote (50418 ) 7/10/1998 8:13:00 AM From: Geoff Nunn Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 176387
***OT*** Chuz - re: the trucking business, and ways in which the federal government has benefited it, the role played by the Interstate Commerce Commission (now defunct) shouldn't be overlooked. At first, the ICC benefited trucking unwittingly. It did so by maintaining artificially high rates on railroad services (tarriffs), causing trucking to rapidly grow beginning in the nineteen twenties. It benefiting trucking additionally when it established, in the Motor Carrier Act of 1935, a cartel to protect trucks from having to compete among themselves. As you probably know, the ICC was created in the late nineteenth century in response to complaints about the railroads. To simplify a complex story, the biggest complaint usually had to do with high rates on "short haul" routes in which the railroads had monopolies. In contrast, on long haul routes there was often fierce competition and rates were low. So low, in fact, the railroads would often join together and form cartels ("pools") in which they would practice price fixing. Unfortunately for the railroads, the cartel agreements had a way of breaking down because of secret rebates which favored large shippers. Although the larger shippers received low rates, smaller shippers complained about "discriminatory pricing." These two complaints, monopoly prices and discriminatory pricing, lead to the creation of the ICC in 1887. What has been the effect of the ICC on railroad and trucking rates? A number of economists have studied this issue, including Nobel Laureate George Stigler, and they concluded that ICC regulation lead to less competition and higher rates in both cases. The evidence is overwhelming that the ICC was created to protect the very businesses it was supposed to regulate -- not consumers. Stigler studied the issue in his doctoral dissertation, and concluded that the ICC had been "captured" by railroad interests, and later trucking interests. Others have suggested that the ICC was a stalking horse for business interests from the beginning. My point in raising this issue is that government programs are sometimes heavily tinged with special interest influence. The ICC is not an isolated example. I could produce a long list of examples but one will suffice. In the last years of the Reagan Administration, the federal government spent approximately $27 bil. on farm subsidies. (considerably more than it spent on beekeeper subsidies, BTW). I'm unaware of any respectable argument among economists that this was money well spent. The usual argument is that it distorts the agricultural markets and reduces efficiency. The $27 bil. is simply a response to a powerful special interest -- the farm lobby -- I can think of no other explanation. Can you? One can make a case for government stockpiling of foodstuffs but these programs go well beyond that. Geoff