The Times, UK
Communists' drums of war haunt Yeltsin
AT NO time since October 1993, when Boris Yeltsin ordered tanks to bombard his parliament, the Congress of People's Deputies, into submission, has Russia looked closer to civil war.
Five years ago, crisis was averted. Then, as now, the President was locked into a test of strength with his legislature. Then, after a tantalising few hours while the generals decided who to support, Mr Yeltsin prevailed. This time, he cannot be so sure.
There are no tanks on the streets of Moscow today and, despite alarmist reports from people such as Viktor Ilyukhin, the Communist chairman of the Duma security committee, that troops are on alert, the
barracks remain closed. Mr Yeltsin has avowed that he will not go against the Constitution; his opponents have done likewise. The political crisis could still be resolved through negotiation and
compromise.
But Russians reading Kommersant Daily, the main business newspaper, yesterday could be forgiven for getting a different impression. A front-page editorial, running alongside a huge picture of Gennadi
Zyuganov, the Communist Party leader and under a banner headline: "Zyuganov ready for war", proclaimed that Russia was on the brink of civil conflict.
The newspaper said that Mr Zyuganov's categoric insistence that his party would continue to reject Viktor Chernomyrdin, Mr Yeltsin's candidate for Prime Minister, through the second and third rounds of
voting amounted to a declaration of war by the left-wing opposition.
"The time of bargaining is over. That was the conclusion of Tuesday's meeting of the Duma Council, which itself more closely resembles a council of war. The Left majority has adopted a strategic decision:
no concessions, no Chernomyrdins," the editorial said.
Mr Zyuganov has himself accused Mr Yeltsin of pushing the country towards civil war through his obduracy and urged him to propose a different candidate to the Duma. Names that have emerged include
Yegor Stroyev, the moderate chairman of the Federation Council, the upper house of parliament, or Yuri Luzhkov, the Mayor of Moscow.
Mr Yeltsin's advisers are also urging him to drop Mr Chernomyrdin. But for him to do so would be a humiliating climbdown, his first political defeat at Mr Zyuganov's hands. Last Sunday, he was willing even to cede some of his key powers in exchange for his man's approval. Only a last-minute change of heart by the Communists, whose lust for blood even took their allies unawares, prevented the deal from going through.
If the two sides stick to their guns over the next few days, the consequences could be calamitous. The Communists, aware that a third-round rejection of Mr Chernomyrdin would lead to Mr Yeltsin dissolving parliament and calling new elections - or even imposing a state of emergency - could seek to pre-empt him by initiating long-threatened impeachment proceedings. Once this process has begun, the President cannot dissolve parliament.
Mr Yeltsin is unlikely to sit and wait for this to happen. He has nothing to gain from waiting for a third-round vote if it is going to go against him. Instead, he could simply apply his constitutional powers to dissolve the Duma immediately, or after the second-round vote tomorrow, and call a state of emergency.
The question then would be whether the legislature would meekly submit or defy him. If it refused to be dissolved, the chances are that it would get tremendous support from a population that has suffered far too much over the past seven years to believe Mr Yeltsin or the Government any more.
If tens or even hundreds of thousands of people flocked to Moscow from the provinces to defend parliament - as they did to support Mr Yeltsin during the putsch of 1993, the President will be forced to
call in the troops, if only to preserve order.
But before he can take such a step, he must first work out whether the army would support him. As President, he is commander-in-chief and a refusal by the military to obey his orders would amount to mutiny.
But Mr Yeltsin has few friends in the army. His plans for military reform, coupled with the appalling underfunding that the army has suffered over the past few years and the humiliation of its defeat in
Chechnya, has caused widespread, bitter resentment.
The so-called military opposition, led by disgruntled former generals such as Aleksandr Lebed and the late Lev Rokhlin, makes up the most credible opposition force in the country.
Mr Lebed has frequently, if at times melodramatically, issued a warning that the army is in a revolutionary mood. He is doubtful that it would rally behind the President.
"All Russian citizens greatly dislike the Duma today, but they dislike Yeltsin even more," Mr Lebed said last night. "If Yeltsin does anything drastic, everyone will rush to save parliament."
In October 1993, Mr Yeltsin's victory was mainly assured by the intervention on his behalf of two crack Interior Ministry divisions. The Kantemirovskaya Tank Division, based at Narofominsk, 40 miles
southwest of Moscow, and the Tamanskaya Motorised Infantry Division, based in Golitsyno, 20 miles west of the capital, sent tanks and armoured vehicles to surround the White House, while crack Alfa
units of the Presidential Guard fought off attempts by the rebels to take over the Ostankino television centre.
Further support came later from the 119th Airborne Division, based in Ryazan, the Tula Airborne Landing Division and the 27th Motorised Infantry Brigade in Tyoply Stan, southeast Moscow.
Again, in the event of military intervention, it would be the units based in and around Moscow that would play the crucial role, allowing the troops in the outlying military districts to wait and see how things turned out. And like last time, the army would wait to see how the interior troops fared before coming in themselves.
But according to Pavel Felgenhauer, defence editor of Segodnya, Mr Yeltsin can no longer count on any support from either the Kantemirovskaya or the Tamanskaya: "They hate his guts. They wouldn't lift a finger to save him." The same applied to the paratroops, who would be seeking a lead from a figure such as Mr Lebed, before deciding which side to take.
Mr Felgenhauer doubted whether even the Presidential Guard would do much to help Mr Yeltsin. He said: "Their first loyalty is to the KGB and the KGB is not too fond of Yeltsin. Professionally speaking,
they would defend the Kremlin, but they would not take orders to go out and beat up pensioners. In the end they would be about as much use to Yeltsin as the Iranian Imperial Guard was to the Shah."
On the other hand, the Russian Army has traditionally remained loyal to the established power, however reluctantly. The political impasse could not continue for long and the army would not stay in barracks if
rioting broke out on the streets. In such circumstances, commanders would be faced with the choice of supporting Mr Yeltsin, his parliamentary opponents or a third figure such as Mr Lebed, who might just step in as the self-proclaimed saviour of Russia. For that to happen without bloodshed or a shot being fired is scarcely conceivable. |
