To: Bilow who wrote (19167 ) 9/14/1998 10:23:00 AM From: Zoltan! Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 20981
Perjury Isn't a Political Decision By JONATHAN TURLEY On a recent visit to Capitol Hill, I was struck by a single thought: There is no statue to Edmund Ross. The Capitol is full of statues honoring figures from Philo Farnsworth (a pioneer in television) to Lajos Kossuth (a leader in the Hungarian Revolution of 1848) but you will not find a statue to Ross. This omission struck me after testifying in the Senate on the president's possible impeachment or indictment for crimes in office. Increasingly, defenders of the president are adopting a consistent defense strategy on impeachment. They are arguing on television programs and floor statements that the impeachment decision is a political, not a legal, determination. The effort to frame the House vote as a political decision would manifestly change the personal obligations of the members under the Constitution. It is argued that the president's popularity and policies can outweigh any criminal accusations stemming from a personal relationship--in other words, that the members are not required to focus exclusively on the factual determination of criminal or abusive acts in office. This appeal to political rather than legal judgment has been reinforced by the president, who has consistently raised his policy accomplishments and goals as part of his defense to these allegations. Likewise, the president's congressional allies have increasingly cited legislative objectives like saving Social Security as relevant to the decision on impeachment. If successful, this strategy would substitute a decision on the commission of criminal acts in office with a balancing test measuring political conduct on one side against illegal conduct on the other. Under such an approach, it can be argued that the benefits of the president's service should overwhelm the costs of his conduct with a White House intern. The problem is that perjury is not politics and the impeachment clause was never intended to be a vehicle for political nullification of criminal acts. The argument that impeachment is merely politics by another means is foreign to the language and history of the Constitution. While impeachment is a decision made by political figures, the determination itself is based on a legal judgment. This is what triggered my search for the statue of Edmund Ross. In March 1868, Andrew Johnson was placed on trial before the Senate for 11 Articles of Impeachment--the same number of Articles sent to Congress by Kenneth Starr. At the time of his impeachment, Johnson may have been the most unpopular president in our country's history. A Southerner brought to office after the Civil War by Abraham Lincoln's assassination, Johnson opposed the draconian anti-Southern measures of the "Radical Republicans" in Congress. The Radical Republicans in the House impeached Johnson on a series of questionable charges, including the removal of Radical Republican Edwin Stanton as secretary of war. Once in the Senate, however, the Radical Republicans discovered that some of their members were wavering with thoughts of voting on principle rather than politics. The Radical Republicans promised to destroy any member who failed to vote the party line. Seven Republicans, however, refused to vote on the basis of politics. The most vilified defector was Sen. Edmund Ross of Kansas, who cast the deciding vote that saved (by one vote) Johnson from removal. For this selfless act, Sen. Ross returned to Kansas only to be shunned, physically assaulted, and ruined both politically and financially. It was not until almost a hundred years later that Ross received a small recognition for his sacrifice when he was included as one of the examples in John F. Kennedy's "Profiles of Courage." The Johnson case answered the question of whether the Congress had the integrity to acquit an unpopular but innocent president. The Clinton case may answer the question of whether the Congress has the integrity to convict a popular but guilty president. In answering this question, the House will have to review not only the personal role of its members but the institutional role of the Judiciary Committee in an impeachment case. This review may require initial correction of errors committed during the Nixon hearings. In the Nixon case, the House Judiciary Committee performed a long, comprehensive review of the allegations with months of investigation, subpoenas and witnesses. In my view, however, the House Judiciary Committee erred in allowing its review to intrude upon the role of the Senate which, according to Article I, "shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments." Under the impeachment clause, the House should function as a grand jury not (as in the Nixon case) as a trial jury. Articles of impeachment function in the same way as counts to an indictment. The House does not determine guilt or impose a penalty but simply defines the articles of impeachment for a trial on the merits. The political balancing test suggested by the president's allies would have no place in such a proceeding. Like a grand jury, the House must exclude arguments based on the president's popularity or past accomplishments as immaterial to its constitutional function. It would be outrageous for a defendant to answer a criminal charge with a list of popular acts taken outside his criminal conduct. It is only after guilt is established that a defendant is allowed to present such arguments to mitigate the penalty, not (as is suggested with the president) to diminish culpability. It is only after determining guilt that the Senate can consider issues of character and service as relevant to the final question of removal. On the facts now before us, it is difficult to see how House members can vote on principle against submitting this matter to the Senate. At a minimum, this president appears to have committed perjury. Perjury committed by a president, however, may be one of the most serious forms of criminal conduct since it is the crime that shields all other criminal acts from the public. The House cannot simply proclaim, as is popular in current commentary, that any criminal acts are negated by a good economy. A president's latitude to commit crimes does not rise or fall with the gross national product. By any reasonable measure, perjury and obstruction of justice clearly fall within "high crimes or misdemeanors." In the end, the decision will be left to each individual member as it was left to Edmund Ross. After the decision on impeachment is made, however, someone might consider adding one small but relevant legislative item. We should have a statue of Edmund Ross, a legislator who not only knew the meaning of politics and principles but also the difference. Mr. Turley is a professor at George Washington University Law School in Washington, D.C.interactive.wsj.com