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Politics : Clinton's Scandals: Is this corruption the worst ever? -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: George Coyne who wrote (8563)10/19/1998 4:25:00 PM
From: jbe  Read Replies (6) | Respond to of 13994
 
<OT: Former Soviet Union, Capitalism, and Democracy>

What would be your time frame for the former Soviet Union to successfully absorb democracy and capitalism?

Excellent question, George. I wish I could give a definite answer to it. But I'll try to sum up some of my thoughts on the question, as concisely as I can.

For the moment, let us separate out the "democracy" part from the "capitalism" part.

1) Democracy. In the days of "perestroika", I used to object to the argument that since the Russians (and other peoples of the former Soviet Union, with the exception of the Balts) had "never known" democracy, and hence could never "absorb" it, or at the very best would be able to absorb it only with great difficulty, and over a long time.

History, of course, is full of "what ifs". It could be, and has been, argued that Russia had already begun constructing democratic institutions (e.g., the State Duma) in the early 20th century, and that IF there had been no World War, and IF there had been no Bolshevik coup, Russia might have proceeded along the democratic road in a normal, evolutionary fashion...(But since there WAS a war, it seems unlikely that a non-Bolshevik Russia would have escaped the wave of fascism that swept over continental Europe in the twenties and thirties.)

In any event, to say that a people without much democratic experience in the past could not "absorb" democracy in the future seemed to me to be unduly elitist, unduly pessimistic, and unduly deterministic. It is an ahistorical view, for one thing. I always like to say that History teaches us only one thing for sure: and that is, that everything changes.

Developments since "perestroika", and the actual collapse of the Soviet Union, have caused me to modify this view, for several reasons, including:

a) The former Soviet republics have evolved into 15 very different countries, with very different cultural traditions. Some of them are far less "democratic" today than they were as Soviet republics in the late Gorbachev days. So I have less hope for democracy in Turkmenistan, for example, than in the Russian Republic.

b) The lack of a "civil society." We sometimes forget that "democracy" is not just a political system, but a social system as well. In other words, democracies are marked not just by the fact that they have freely elected representatives, from different parties, at all levels of government. They also have a civil society -- a network of associations, organizations, religious institutions, non-profit groups supporting one cause or another, etc., etc. -- that do much of society's work, and stand between the state and the citizen. The former Soviet republics have been slow to develop such a network. Some have not developed one at all. So there is little standing between the state and the citizen.

c) Next, there is what is perhaps the most serious problem of all: the very word "democrat" has become a term of abuse, especially in Russia. That is because so many of the leaders calling themselves
"democrats" (from Yeltsin on down), have not behaved like democrats. Not surprisingly, that has brought the term itself into disrepute. (May I suggest that the same thing may have happened in this country, with the term "liberal"?)

d) Democracy and the "West" are associated in the minds of the citizens of the former Soviet Union. At first, when the West was still widely admired, and regarded as a model to be emulated, democracy was regarded positively. But when the attitude towards the West turns negative (as it has, to a certain degree, in Russia), that is likely to carry over to the very concept of democracy as well.

However, I still remain moderately optimistic. Citizens of many (not all) of the countries of the former Soviet Union have gotten so used to speaking their minds, so used to the relative freedoms they now enjoy (along with the hardships!), so less submissive to authority, that I do not think it will be possible to reverse the long-term trend towards democracy.

Well, so much for being concise! And there are so many other considerations I never even got to!

Sorry to be so long-winded. My "thoughts", such as they are, on the "capitalism" part of the question had better be deferred to a future post.

jbe





To: George Coyne who wrote (8563)10/20/1998 12:58:00 AM
From: jbe  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 13994
 
<OT: Former Soviet Union, Capitalism, Democracy - Part II>

George, I will now try to tackle the capitalism part of your provocative question.

First of all, I have to confess that I am not an economist, and so I will be on much shakier ground here. Secondly, my remarks will deal with Russia ONLY. Bear in mind that we are talking about 15 different countries here, three of which (the Baltic countries) are already both "democratic" and "capitalist."

That said, I will risk a few observations.


1) The Russian "reformers," Gaidar & Co., clearly made many mistakes. You do not have to be an economist to see the two I consider to be the most serious; all you need is common sense. Surprisingly (or unsurprisingly?), however, many economists, ours as well as theirs, have overlooked them.

What I have in mind specifically is the failure to encourage the development of small and medium-sized enterprise, and the failure to devise a rational tax policy.

The reformers started right in with the toughest part of the agenda (the one the Chinese, wisely, deferred to the last): privatizing the big state-owned "dinosaurs." The Chinese had realized it would be both cheaper and easier to encourage the growth of small businesses that could fill all the holes in the economy with much needed consumer goods, and perhaps, by providing much-needed competition, even force the "dinosaurs" to be more efficient. By the time the Chinese turned to the task of privatizing the dinosaurs, small and medium size enterprises were producing over 50% of the nation's GNP!

The Russians, unfortunately, did not draw on the Chinese experience at all. The rush was on to privatize everything that already existed (much of it was junk anyway), and often at bargain-basement prices, but nothing was done to encourage the growth of anything new.

Not only that --the growth of anything new was actually discouraged by a wacko tax policy that was especially biased against producers and thus (relatively speaking) in favor of traders. For example, "income" was equated with "profit," and the business was taxed on that. Clearly, somebody who has an expensive production plant to maintain is going to be hurt more than someone who does not.

The result? Enterprising businessmen fled from production (if they were ever in it in the first place); everyone was forced to cheat on the tax man, which in turn contributed to growing lawlessness; production fell catastrophically, while virtually all consumer goods were imported from abroad; etc.

Russia has banks (which are now failing); it has a stock market; it has a mafia (which is so intertwined with legitimate business that it is hard to tell where one begins and the other leaves off); it has a lot of traders - petty traders who travel to Turkey regularly to get goods to peddle in outdoor markets, as well as big shots who trade raw materials to Western countries. But the only productive businesses out there are, for the most part, the now privatized enterprises inherited from the Soviet period, many of which are barely functioning, which cannot pay their workers, & etc...

On top of this, there is an almost total lack of the kind of legal infrastructure a modern market economy requires. The reformers' idea was that they would privatize first, and then all the laws, regulations, courts, etc., would sort of spring up later, or spring forth, like so many Minervas from the head of Zeus. Well, it didn't happen. This is one other explanation for the rise of the mafia.

Mr. Ivanov, for example, signs a contract with Mr. Popov for the delivery of something or other, and pays him in advance. Mr. Popov does not deliver. How can Mr. Ivanov get his contract enforced? There is no court he can turn to. So, he calls in an "enforcer" - Vanya, let's say. Vanya & his boys kidnap Mr. Popov, and force him to deliver the goods, or return the money. Mr. Ivanov is happy, Vanya & his boys are happy (they have gotten paid). Have they committed a criminal act, or not?

Frankly, I don't know what kind of economic system Russia has now. The one thing I can say for sure -- it certainly is not capitalism. But since many people think it is, it has given capitalism, like democracy, a bad name, at least for the time being.

So, will "real" capitalism ever develop in Russia?

That is a question I will have to sleep on, along with your new double-barreled question, namely: is capitalism possible without democracy, and is democracy possible without capitalism? Luckily for me, a couple of people have already tackled that one. And I can go to bed! <gg>

jbe