NO, that would be all the more reason for IRAN to come to IRAQ's rescue. along with some other little countries over there that are already pissed off at us:
From: alert@stratfor.com
Date: Mon, 9 Nov 1998 19:06:27 -0600 (CST)
To: alert@stratfor.com
Subject: Iran
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Global Intelligence Update
Red Alert
November 10, 1998
Message to Arafat Signals Khameini's Declining Power
On November 6, the Palestinian newspaper "Al-Hayat al-Jadidah"
and the "Voice of Palestine Radio" reported that Palestinian
President Yasser Arafat had received messages from Iranian
President Mohammad Khatami and former Iranian President and
recently elected head of Iran's Council of Experts, Ali Akbar
Hashemi Rafsanjani, apologizing for the recent remarks made by
Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. The messages also
reportedly expressed thanks to Arafat for his mediation efforts
that helped save Iran from a war with Afghanistan. Arafat helped
effect the release of 10 Iranian prisoners held by the Taleban.
Khatami's message reportedly stated, "You have removed from our
backs a mountain of domestic pressures that almost involved us in
the Afghan quagmire."
On October 30, Ayatollah Khamenei lashed out at Arafat for his
cooperation in the "shameful" Wye River Agreement, calling Arafat
a "traitor and a lackey of the Zionists." Khameini's remarks,
and subsequent bombings attributed to Iranian-backed Palestinian
factions that caused Israel to suspend implantation of the
accord, unleashed a torrent of Palestinian criticism against
Khamenei. The extraordinary apologies from Khatami and
Rafsanjani for Khatami's comments, and their indirect explanation
of the events surrounding the Iranian military standoff with the
Taleban, mark a new phase in the intense political infighting
that has plagued Iran since before Khatami's election.
Khamenei's condemnation of Arafat and the Wye River Agreement was
shortly followed by a suicide bombing in the Gaza Strip in
October that killed an Israeli soldier. As Palestinian police
cracked down on Islamic militant groups in the West Bank in the
aftermath of the bombing, the Palestinian Authority accused
Tehran of sponsoring the Hamas cells that carried out the attack.
Iran denied the charges and said that its support for the groups
was merely "spiritual" -- possibly in part a subtle allusion to
Iran's supreme religious leader, Ayatollah Khamenei. However,
the Gaza attack was followed by another bombing in the Mahane
Market -- this one attributed by Palestinian security forces to a
faction of Islamic Jihad that receives instructions from the
Iranian-backed Hezbollah. Following the Mahane Market bombing,
Palestinian officials alleged that members of Hamas and Hezbollah
had tried to assassinate Arafat and members of his cabinet in the
last few months, and that charged that Tehran was becoming more
actively involved with Palestinian terrorist groups.
Still, despite the apologies from Khatami and Rafsanjani,
Palestinian Authority officials continued to lash out at Khameini
during a weekend visit to Iraq. On November 7, while holding
talks with Iraqi leaders in Baghdad, Palestinian Authority
Secretary General Tayeb Abdelrahim told Radio Monte Carlo that,
"an extremist faction in Iran, led by Khamenei wants to aggravate
the situation in the Palestinian territories to spark a civil
war." He continued, "The Palestinian Authority is utterly
convinced that the hard-liners in Iran have succeeded in
infiltrating certain Palestinian factions which worked with Iran
and received its aid in the past." However, Abdelrahim made a
point of stating that his comments were not directed at Khatami
or Rafsanjani, but at Khameini and his allies. If meeting with
Iraqi officials wasn't enough of a jab at Tehran, Palestinian
Minister for Public Works Azzam al-Ahmad made sure the PNA's
feelings were clear when he met in Baghdad with the leader of
Iran's main armed opposition group, the Mujahedeen al-Kalq (MKO).
The Palestinians' continued angry retaliation for Khameini's
comments, even after Khatami and Rafsanjani's apologies, may not
help Palestinian-Iranian relations, but it does not change the
extraordinary nature of the apologies. Khatami and Rafsanjani's
reported apologies were a staggering expression of Iran's
internal political struggle and its spillover into Iranian
foreign policy. By publicly apologizing for Khameini's
statements, Khatami and Rafsanjani undermined Khameini's
political and spiritual authority. By supporting Arafat, the
Iranian leaders also gave a tacit nod to his leadership
decisions, including his approval of the Wye River Agreement.
In thanking Arafat for saving Iranian face in its recent standoff
with the Taleban, Khatami hinted that the crisis may have been
the result of yet another domestic power play. In this case,
hard-line instigation of public outcry drove Khatami to the brink
of a conflict he desperately wanted to avoid. Expanding on this
scenario, this offers an interesting interpretation of the
Zolfaqar II military exercise and the deployment of more than
200,000 Iranian troops to the Afghan border. If Khameini was
driving public opinion against the Taleban, in an effort to
instigate a war Khatami wished to avoid, then the deployment of
the pro-Khameini Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) to the border could
have been part of that domestic political struggle. That would
mean that the subsequent deployment of regular Army troops to the
border could have been as much an attempt to keep an eye on the
IRGC as to increase pressure on the Taleban.
The apologies were the latest, most dramatic, and most public
sign that Iran's internal struggle between Khatami's moderates
and Khameini's hard-liners is going against Khatami, but they
were not the only indication. The tide began to turn on October
23, when Rafsanjani was chosen to head the Iranian Council of
Experts, the 86-member body that has the power to select or expel
the Velayat-e Faqih, or Supreme Leader -- currently Khamenei.
Rafsanjani's ascent to this role is a major setback for
conservatives, as Rafsanjani has already facilitated much of
Iran's domestic and international political turnaround.
Following the death of Ayatollah Khomeini, Rafsanjani pioneered
Iran's reopening to the world. Though he did not achieve the
same degree of political liberalization and openness that Khatami
has initiated, Rafsanjani broke ground during his tenure as
President of Iran that made Khatami's achievements possible.
After Khatami's election, Rafsanjani launched another diplomatic
campaign that dramatically improved Iran's relations with its
Arab neighbors, most notably Saudi Arabia.
As head of the Expediency Council, Rafsanjani has played a key
role in mediating between Khatami and Khameini, on balance
intervening on behalf of the moderates. Rafsanjani reportedly
convinced Khamenei not to interfere on behalf of a conservative
candidate in the 1997 presidential election won by Khatami. In
December 1997, Rafsanjani helped quell a rapidly escalating
conflict between Khatami and Khameini supporters following
comments challenging the infallibility of the Velayat-e Faqih by
dissident cleric Ayatollah Montazeri. Again, following the June
1998 arrest of the pro-Khatami Mayor of Tehran, Gholamhossein
Karbaschi, Rafsanjani intervened to keep moderates and hard-
liners from taking their argument to the streets. As early as
July, Rafsanjani began more blatantly siding with the moderates,
declaring that the Velayat-e Faqih was not infallible, and should
be subject to removal if he makes mistakes.
Rafsanjani who, like Khatami, favors turning Iran into a more
politically open, free-market society, with some degree of
detente with the U.S., now wields the power to remove Khameini's
chief rival. Khameini is evidently feeling political control
slip away, and in a furious speech on November 3 lashed out
publicly at those who argue for enhanced U.S.-Iranian relations.
In a speech marking the anniversary of the 1979 takeover of the
U.S. embassy, Khameini insisted that "The severing of relations
between Iran and the United States has been to the 100 percetn
benefit of the Iranian people." In what was clearly the public
airing of a behind-the-scenes debate, Khameini blasted "certain
circles within Iran, who seek to insinuate that a resumption of
relations with Washington can solve the economic problems Iran is
facing." "Iran does not need the United States to overcome its
economic crisis," he insisted. Yet in a clear snub to Khameini,
Rafsanjani, while speaking at Friday Prayers in Tehran on
November 6, welcomed a UN motion to consider Khatami's proposal
concerning a "people to people" dialogue with the U.S.
While Rafsanjani and Khatami are clearly gaining strength,
Khameini is not yet defeated. The Council of Experts is packed
with Khameini supporters, who Rafsanjani must sway to make
effective use of this tool. And even if the Council is turned
against Khameini, he retains one very powerful trump card -- the
IRGC. If, in fact, the IRGC has already been used on the Afghan
border as a tool of domestic Iranian politics, Khatami must be
prepared for the possibility that it will be used again -- next
time more directly.
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