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Technology Stocks : George Gilder - Forbes ASAP -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: SteveG who wrote (1001)	3/14/1999 2:54:00 PM
From: Zoltan!	Read Replies (2) \| Respond to of 5853

>>not to take anything away from George, but you should check your details, and I would suggest doing so in the definitive and VERY detailed book on the history of HDTV by highly regarded and Pulitzer prize winning author/journalist Joel Brinkley (one of David Brinkley's sons) - "Defining Vision". Too much complexity to go into at this point, but Gore battled for government funding of research on HDTV in general (not analog vs. digital). Mr. Gilder was not mentioned in this otherwise Balzakianly referenced tome. It would be interesting to hear from George his participation in this process. I would not Joel Brinkley all too seriously, he has been a reliable shill for the Dems, something his father did not share given his long perspective, especially regarding the current administration. The battle was well documented at the time in the pages of the Wall Street Journal and the Democrats did try to get the government to fund a huge effort to "catch up" with the Japanese in analog HDTV, arguing that was the future which we could not cede to the Japanese. Enlightened others, including George Gilder I believe, testified to make their plans abortive, arguing that digital was the future. Thanks to men like him, the US missed that particular train wreck. The whole effort by the Dems was part of their scheme to create in the US an industrial policy like the state capitalists, ie. Japan and Europe. As events have proved out, that model has failed miserably for everyone but the political class and their bureaucracies. Heck, they win when they get more power, every failure but a clarion call for more intervention. The problem with Joel Brinkley is that he's all too political an historian. Too bad, Columbia used to have one of the finest history departments extant. Oh well, Northwestern has Gary Wills to live down.

To: SteveG who wrote (1001)	3/14/1999 4:01:00 PM
From: Zoltan!	Respond to of 5853

Excellent article: cato.org ......The Choice Unlike most innovations, HDTV has led an active, controversial public life. From its beginning HDTV was held up in Washington as one of those rare "industries that have the potential to dominate the twenty-first century." Government direct support was held to be necessary and vital to American economic interests. At the height of the debate in 1989, there were seven HDTV bills before Congress, over 10 different committees were holding hearings, and countless reports from special interest groups and blue-ribbon commissions were circulating in Washington. Much more than a technical issue, in the words of then-Senator Albert Gore (D-Tenn.), "HDTV has become a political dividing line, where opposing conceptions of government meet." On one side are those who put their faith in coordinated plans, supported by public funds and the advice of experts, to develop critical technologies that they believe should not be left to an imperfect market to develop. On the other side are those who believe that such plans are inherently imperfect and out of step with the emerging high-tech order, and that government support is more effective when focused on creating an environment that promotes the competitive forces of the market. The Japanese and European HDTV strategies provide instructive examples of the planning mentality. Indeed, both were held up in the late 1980s as models for what an American competitiveness policy should emphasize: strategic long-term planning at the national level, coordinated and collaborative precompetitive R&D, and strong public support through the commercialization stage. HDTV thus became an important test case. For Japan, HDTV represented an opportunity to transform its image from a follower to an innovator in high technology. For the European Community (EC), HDTV was the flagship of its new technology policy under the 1986 Single Market Act. For the United States, HDTV represented the policy of the Bush administration to emphasize the market. The American debate was often heated, driven by the fear that this country would lose its competitive edge unless it kept pace with the spending and planning programs of its trading partners. Back in 1989 a parade of industry "experts" testified on the dire need for America to wake up and match the efforts of Japan and Europe in HDTV. Because both regions had already set their HDTV standards and were spending millions to commercialize it, such industry heavyweights as Zenith and the American Electronics Association (AEA) argued that without a comparable program the United States would be left behind in the global high- tech race. "If the United States does not choose to reenter consumer electronics via HDTV," warned the AEA, "the country as a whole is likely to continue to experience a declining world market share in automated manufacturing equipment, personal computers, and semiconductors. Loss of these markets will contribute to the erosion and eventual loss of a U.S. manufacturing base." To avoid this catastrophe, industry representatives called for a "well-coordinated" $1.3 billion HDTV program that included public-private consortia, federal grants, loan guarantees, nurturing of infant industries, and guaranteed procurement contracts to promote prototype development and domestic production. The Bush administration rejected the plan. The Department of Commerce study, which had contemplated spending billions to accelerate HDTV technology, was abandoned and never completed. Craig Fields, who had promoted a national program for HDTV before Congress, was cut out of policy discussions and then later lost his job as Defense Advance Research Project Agency (DARPA) director. Other ideas for special government-created enterprises (like the Consumer Electronics Capital Consortium) were either shelved or listed as dead on arrival at the White House. The respective decisions of Japan, Europe, and the United States thus put into motion a unique test of opposing views of government's role in promoting high technology. Four years later, the consequences provide a revealing commentary on how planning failed and even an imperfect marketplace can triumph. The Consequences Contrary to the forecasts of the doomsayers, American firms were neither left behind nor out of the HDTV race. Instead, in 1992 the United States surpassed Japan in semiconductors and Intel dethroned NEC to become the world's largest chipmaker. In 1992 Japanese electronic makers watched output fall by over 10 percent as U.S. computer manufacturers watched output climb by over 8 percent. For the four top Japanese computer makers (Hitachi, Toshiba, NEC, and Fujitsu), sales and profits continued to fall in 1993 while Intel and Microsoft moved to the forefront as the two most powerful companies in the computer business that are shaping how video will be displayed on future computer screens. And despite Japan's head start and Europe's deep pockets, American companies now lead in severa l key areas of HDTV. Ironically, the United States may be the one exporting an HDTV standard to its trading partners. Headlines and press accounts these days proclaim "U.S. Edge in HDTV," "U.S. Passes Japan in HDTV Race," and "Europe Must Now Follow the U.S. in HDTV." Reasons for U.S. Success, Europe and Japan's Failure Why this reversal of fortunes? There are many reasons.....

To: SteveG who wrote (1001)	3/14/1999 4:36:00 PM
From: JMD	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 5853

SteveG, I have not read the "definitive" book 'Defining Vision' but if Brinkley missed George Gilder's participation in this debate, then he (Brinkley) simply blew it. GG wrote extensively during this period--I know because I DID read all of Gilder's stuff. In fact, that is when I started to actively follow GG's writings, and of course his prediction, e.g., that the Japanese were committing financial hari kari by multibillion yen backing the wrong horse, proved to be 100% accurate. I was reminded of this yesterday as I saw my first HDTV(the digital kind) live demonstration. Must say that it was very, very impressive. Don't know if the same picture/sound quality could have been achieved via the HDTV analog route, but what I saw was a long way from chopped liver. Kind regards, Mike Doyle

To: SteveG who wrote (1001)	3/26/1999 2:09:00 PM
From: George Gilder	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 5853

Not to knock Brinkley, who figured out HDTV in 1997 I believe, and won a Pulitzer prize, which is nearly always awarded to suitably safe books after the issue is settled and politically correct. Microcosm attacked HDTV and predicted the death of television in 1989, and Life After Television came out successively in 1990, 1991, and updated in 1994 and 1995. All called HDTV a dog. I said the only reason any one is interested in it is that government is always the dog's best friend. My role was attacking from the outside and consulting on the inside of the Reagan Administration, including the FCC. Brinkley covered the bureaucrats and celebrates digital HDTV, which is simply going to be a display option for web based entertainment and information.