Silicon Investor (SI) -- The First Internet Community

STOCKTALK

We've detected that you're using an ad content blocking browser plug-in or feature. Ads provide a critical source of revenue to the continued operation of Silicon Investor. We ask that you disable ad blocking while on Silicon Investor in the best interests of our community. If you are not using an ad blocker but are still receiving this message, make sure your browser's tracking protection is set to the 'standard' level.

Pastimes : Kosovo -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: nuke44 who wrote (2578)	4/7/1999 10:33:00 PM
From: Broken_Clock	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 17770

nuke'em, <I'm not sure why, because most of the time it would have been a hell of a lot easier and less costly to turn our backs and let events take their course > Now isn't that sad? I think it is inevitable that war happens, and as to why? That is the easy answer to find: Jas 4:1 From whence come wars and fightings among you? come they not hence, even of your lusts that war in your members? {fightings: or, brawlings} {lusts: or, pleasures} You basically have a bunch of greedy, selfish people in charge.

To: nuke44 who wrote (2578)	4/7/1999 11:01:00 PM
From: wonk	Respond to of 17770

The following link provides some insight as to why the the Balkans (also including Albania, Greece, Turkey and Bulgaria) remains a tinderbox, and, IMO, why NATO has a vested interest. Nationalism and Identity Politics in the Balkans: Greece and the Macedonian Question Victor Roudometof Abstract: The dispute between Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) is a symbolic struggle concerning legitimate rights over "Macedonia"--the name, the territory, and the loyalty of its inhabitants. The dispute was created by two conflicting national narratives. In the Balkans, nation-building has emphasized particularistic over universalistic criteria. Local national narratives were instrumental in establishing the legitimate possession of a territory by a particular ethnic group. Historically, these narratives are tied to local nationalisms since their function is to designate a territory as the exclusive homeland of a particular nation. The Macedonian narrative views Macedonia as occupied by the Macedonian nation and suggests the existence of national minorities in Bulgaria and Greece. The Greek narrative does not acknowledge the existence of a Macedonian nation and considers the existence of a Macedonian minority within Greece to be a manifestation of Macedonian irredentism. The Macedonian narrative directly questions the Greek narrative's assumption of historical continuity. The strong Greek reaction against FYROM's declaration of independence is a response to this implicit threat to modern Greek identity.... ...indeed, with the 1913 partition of Macedonia among Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece, the ideology of the homogeneous nation-state triumphed over federalism. As a result of this historical contingency and of the post-1913 homogenization policies of the Balkan states themselves, nation-building in Greece, Bulgaria, and Serbia has emphasized ethnicity and religion rather than citizenship as the major criteria for establishing a person's membership in the national "imagined community." The creation of the first Yugoslavia (1918) was a deviation from this trend. However, the new state had to deal with a multitude of problems that concerned the coexistence of multiple ethnicities (Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, and other smaller groups) within the boundaries of a single unit (Djilas 1991; Banac 1984; Ramet 1992).... An important feature of the Balkan pattern of nation-building (as it emerged in the post-1850 period) has been the systematic subordination of citizenship rights to the principle of nationhood.... ...In order to foster subjective identification with the principles of nationhood, the Balkan nation-states have developed historical narratives to help justify their irredentism and their historical rights in different parts of the Ottoman Empire. 6 The visions of a Greater Bulgaria, a Greater Serbia, and the Greek "Great Idea" each employed a historical narrative to justify irredentist claims. Such narratives aim at establishing a connection between the particular nation and the territory it occupies--or the territory it should occupy--thus legitimizing the possession of a territory by a particular collectivity.... jhupress.jhu.edu

To: nuke44 who wrote (2578)	4/7/1999 11:03:00 PM
From: Stormweaver	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 17770

>>As a matter of fact, the "Kissingers of this world", specifically >>Henry Kissinger, is adamantly opposed to our intervention in the >>Balkans, probably because of his involvement with the politically >>orchestrated debacle in Viet Nam. Firstly Kissinger was opposed to the bombing because he knows that a diplomatic settlement was possible. As Alexander Haig said a week ago on MSNBC, the Rambouillet agreement was a joke and any leader in their right mind would sign it. Now that we have started this whole mess Kissinger agrees to military force in only so far as NATO and the U.S. can save face.

To: nuke44 who wrote (2578)	4/7/1999 11:55:00 PM
From: dumbmoney	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 17770

As a matter of fact, the "Kissingers of this world", specifically Henry Kissinger, is adamantly opposed to our intervention in the Balkans, probably because of his involvement with the politically orchestrated debacle in Viet Nam. On the contrary, virtually the entire foreign policy establishment is calling for a ground war in Yugoslavia. See for example search.washingtonpost.com Kissinger expressed doubts (not outright opposition) about starting the war, but like the others he believes it must now be won at any cost in order to avoid making NATO look bad (he doesn't say it quite that way, of course). The drumbeat for a ground war is getting louder and more urgent. Gradual escalation is the order of the day. The press is on board - notice the praise heaped on presidential candidates who advocate ground war. Don't lecture me on things you don't have a clue about. I was one of those conscripts and some of those 50,000 dead were my good friends. I left some of my own blood there mixed with that of our enemies. You would have been a better friend to help them avoid sacrificing themselves in a dirty, meaningless civil war. They died for no good reason (and that [weak] reason was much stronger than the reason for dying in Yugoslavia). Don't compare dying in a meaningless civil war to WWII. It's idiotic.