Here's a little backgrounder on the Yougo mess that should help everyone understanding why it's so crucial to have the U.S.A. managing the crisis:
The U.S. Role In Catalyzing And Sustaining Serbian Aggression
Presentation by
PHILIP J. COHEN, M.D.,
Bethesda, Maryland,
To Clinton-Gore Transition Team
at Little Rock, Arkansas,
on December 17, 1992.
One-sided US support for a centralized communist Yugoslavia encouraged this war from the outset. Secretary of State James Baker chastised both Slovenia and Croatia for their moves towards independence and flatly stated that a "cold welcome" awaited these republics if they left Yugoslavia. Just days before the invasion of Slovenia, in June, 1991, Baker visited Belgrade and assured its government that the US was committed to the "territorial integrity of Yugoslavia." The Belgrade government dominated by Serbian nationalists interpreted this message as a "green light" for the military invasion of the democracy-seeking secessionist republics. Immediately after this invasion, the administration expressed concern that Hungary, Romania, Greece, or Albania could be drawn into the conflict, but that the US role in this explosive crisis would be only to advise and advocate the preservation of the unity of Yugoslavia.
From the outset, the US ceded leadership of the resolution of the Yugoslav crisis to the EC, but even having done so, the US shaped the framework in which the EC was to operate:
1) rejection of independent, democratic governments;
2) an arms embargo on both the heavily armed aggressor as well as the disarmed victims of aggression;
3) no US support for military intervention.
The intrinsic flaw of placing this crisis under EC guidance could have been anticipated from the beginning, since EC decisions required unanimous concensus, rendering the formulation of policy slow, inefficient, and ineffective. Despite the self-congratulations of the Europeans over their initial mediation efforts, Serbian aggression steadily escalated. Even when US denounced Serbia as the aggressor in September, 1991, the accompanying message was that America, finding no strategic interest, would not militarly intervene to stop the killing. At the same time, the EC also announced that it was not prepared for military intervention. Encouraged by announcements of no military intervention, Serbia further escalated attacks on civilians in Croatia. When, in November, 1991, the US joined the EC in economic sanctions against Serbia, President Bush expressed doubt that sanctions, including a proposed oil embargo, would end the war. The US, however, offered no further alternatives.
Larger geopolitical considerations may explain why the US from the outset favored the status quo of the communist regime in former Yugoslavia in preference to the support of the democratic aspirations of the majority of its people. At that time, three Baltic republics of the Soviet Union were also seeking independence. Gorbachev, seeing the dissolution of Yugoslavia as a precedent for the dissolution of the Soviet Union, vigorously opposed the secession of Slovenia and Croatia. Since detente with the Soviet Union was then an over-riding concern of American policy, it was not surprising that the US supported Gorbachev in opposing independence bids in both the Soviet Union in 1991. The world changed quickly, but US policy remained unchanged, even as Serbia's indiscriminate attacks upon civilians escalated. Moreover, when the EC finally did achieve the delicate consensus to recognize the independence of Slovenia and Croatia, the US actively campaigned against recognition, undermining the European initiative. In November, 1991, the EC imposed economic sanctions on Yugoslavia, but in early December these were lifted on all republics except Serbia and Montenegro. Only days after the Europeans made their sanctions selective against the aggressors and removed sanctions from the victims, the US imposed sanctions against all of Yugoslavia, in an action uncoordinated with the EC.
David Hoffman: "Baker Urges Yugoslavs to Keep Unity: U.S. Would Not Recognize Independent Republics, Secretary Says,"
Washington Post, Washington, DC, June 22, 1991, p.A1.
John M. Goshko: "U.S. Opposes Using Force To Keep Yugoslavia United,"
Washington Post, Washington, DC, June 27, 1991, p. A36.
(Full text)
at Zeljko Lupic's War against Croatia Page
Direct link: mprofaca.cro.net
Although I don't agree at all with the title's formulation (which hints at a US responsibility in the current Kosovo crisis), I found it interesting to show that the Kosovo war is deja vu over and over and over again...
As the above article shows, the Bush administration was well aware of the dangerous tensions stemming from any border change in the Balkans. Yet, Germany, freshly reunified in 1989, pushed for the diplomatic recognition of Slovenia and Croatia... Europe (France, that is) could not oppose it and the Bosnian conflict unfolded. Europeans have therefore demonstrated their total inability in managing their own ethnic-minded struggles and History shows us that the US attitude was wise in trying to keep the Balkan fabric as a multi-ethnic status quo.
The mismanagement of the European powers led to the collapse of the whole region, forcing the US to intervene as the only superpower of last resort (that owns enough military clout to cope with such a mess). |
