To: Ish who wrote (42238 ) 4/13/1999 10:14:00 PM From: nuke44 Read Replies (3) | Respond to of 67261
Unfortunately, there's a world of difference between our "payback" attack on Libya in Apr. '86 and what we've got on our hands in Yugoslavia. Libya was a retributive attack in response to Khaddafi's sponsorship of terrorism. It was meant to exact a price and do as much damage as possible in a short period of time without any concern for "collateral damage" and without any other long range goals. The USSR was still very much a player at that time and the entire dynamic governing NATO responses was completely different then. While the attack certainly fucked up Khaddafi's day, it pales in comparison to the scope of operations against Serbia. Especially in light of NATO's stated long term goals of an enforced peace in the Balkans and equality for all ethnic groups. Not to demean the U.S. effort against Libya. One of my most cherished and politically incorrect souvenirs from my Air Force days is a T-shirt we had made when I was stationed with the 48th Tac Fighter Wing at RAF Lakenheath England. We were the wing that conducted the attack on Libya. On the front, the shirt had a caricature of Khaddafi looking skyward, with an F-111F screaming in about twenty feet over his head. On the back, it had L I B Y A in three inch letters. Underneath each letter was smaller script, spelling out L akenheath I s B ombing Y our A ss. Tacky? Maybe. Unrepentent? Possibly. An expression of disdain for an overmatched adversary? Could be. But there was then, as I suspect there is now amongst U.S. military personnel, a sense of satisfaction that we had delivered an ultimatum against aggression and when that ultimatum was ignored, we delivered as promised. There is nothing as draining on or degrading to military readiness, as to be poised on alert for months on end, with no intent of using military action other than as a threat. It detracts from the deterrent value of military power when the opposing side doesn't believe that such military will actually be put to use. It even encourages potential adversaries into making some really ignorant mistakes, as is the case with Milosevic and the Serbian military. They thought when all was said and done, we would bluster and threaten and then do nothing of any consequence, much as we had for the past six years and then allow them to create a "peace" in Kosovo on their own terms. The bigger picture here is that NATO, in it's new post war incarnation, has decided on a course of action for the coming millennium. NATO is sending a message to the rest of the world that it intends to be a powerful force in establishing what happens on a global scale in the next century. In Yugoslavia, they are defining their role and establishing their credibility as a force to be reckoned with. Because of that, I don't expect them to back off until Milosevic's military has been reduced to a smoldering wreck and even the most biased anti-NATO observers won't be able to claim that the Serbs achieved even a pyrrhic victory. The sad truth is, Milosevic had a chance to stop the hostilities even after they had started by backing down and allowing NATO it's symbolic victory and ceasing it's oppression of the Kosovar Albanians. By refusing to back down he was challenging NATO's authority and power, not just in Yugoslavia but worldwide. Divergent forces such as China, Russia, and a dozen smaller but equally ambitious nations are watching closely. Not because they give a rat's ass about the Serbs (with the possible exception of Russia), but because they would dearly love to see NATO fall on it's ass. So in order to establish it's bona fides in the pecking order of the upcoming millennium, the hostilities in Yugoslavia will be over, when NATO decides it's over and what Milosevic does or doesn't do really doesn't matter. I wonder what the T-shirt for this one's going to look like.