To: robnhood who wrote (10747 ) 5/31/1999 5:10:00 PM From: George Papadopoulos Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 17770
Last one from Statfor: This, therefore, is the moment of truth for NATO. Milosevic says that he has agreed. Now what? In many ways, waging the war was much easier for NATO than making the peace will be. stratfor.com 1845 GMT, 990531 - Milosevic Makes His Move and Life Gets Complicated There can no longer be any evasion of the fact that Belgrade has accepted the principles of the G-8 agreement. This poses two problems for NATO. First, does it endorse the G-8 agreement. Second, what are the first steps that need to be taken to implement the G-8 agreement. The G-8 agreement reduces the direct influence of NATO in Kosovo, replacing NATO's command structure with a UN command structure. The Russians have put forward concrete proposals for implementing this. Each of their proposals is in the spirit of the G-8 accord, but each is inherently controversial. For example, the Russians are proposing that NATO countries that have bombed Serbia remain on the frontiers of Kosovo, while non-bombing NATO countries would actually move troops into Kosovo. That would take care of NATO requirements for a presence while taking care of Serbian objections that those who have bombed Serbia should not be the peacekeepers. It would also keep out the most robust forces. Thus, the precise meaning of G-8 is up in the air. NATO can interpret the G-8 accords to mean nearly the same as Rambouillet. Serbia can interpret them with much greater latitude. It will be up to the Russians to bridge the gap—and their skill and interest in carrying out that task is open to question. The second place all this can go wrong is in the steps for implementation. This is going to be extraordinarily complex, with Serb withdrawals, UN permissive entries, bombing halts, refugee returns all being choreographed in a complex dance. Simply consider this question: how many Serb forces will have to have left Kosovo to constitute the basis for a bombing halt, and what trusted party will verify it. Or this: what nation's forces will first enter Kosovo and where will they be deployed. The essential problem is that in this armistice, each side retains the ability to walk away from the table. Serbia has not been defeated, nor has NATO. This is a peace talk in which the war option remains on the table for both sides. Each side enhances its position if it can convince the other side that it will walk out if it doesn't get what it wants. The really complicating factor is that on the NATO side at least, there are substantially more than one side. The United States might be prepared to walk out on a deal that the Italians want to take. This means that behind the NATO-Serb negotiations (which will be taking place whatever Jamie Shea decides to call it), there will be complex negotiations underway inside of NATO. Milosevic and the Russians will each be in a position to manipulate those internal negotiations if NATO is not careful. This, therefore, is the moment of truth for NATO. Milosevic says that he has agreed. Now what? In many ways, waging the war was much easier for NATO than making the peace will be.