To: GUSTAVE JAEGER who wrote (15680 ) 1/4/2000 8:03:00 AM From: MNI Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 17770
Gustave, thanks, there is not much I could object to in Gedmin's review. Instead I will write a appreciation of its' virtue. Especially I want to mention the correct appreciation his predecessor's (Helmut Schmidt's) foreign policies got in the article as the real foundation of Kohl's foreign policies lines. As a confessed Kohl fan, it may be allowed for me to diminish his alleged ingenuity to the point where I say that his most important, and maybe best, decision was to choose continuity with Schmidt's foreign policies. The following succession of international successes is an enlarged reprise of another event where Kohl stole of Schmidt's success, namely in the ending of the Mogadisciu plane hijack drama, a defining moment in modern German history. Schmidt himself has revealed that his appeal to and good understanding with Zbigniev Brzezinski was the key to the successful design of the NATO double-trail policies. It therefore might have been as accurate by the author to name not only J.Carter and C.Vance as bogeymen, but also Z.Brzezinski as a positive example in the same context. Before I am totally carried away with my Schmidt-laudatio I should take up the author's correct apprehension that while Schmidt may have made the design he could not ensure his power well enough to carry out his plans. As many people said, 'Schmidt is the right man in the wrong party', his policies might have been revised if he had stayed in the office. I want to note that one of the few expectations conservatives had when Kohl started his first term was he would undermine the good understanding Schmidt had kept with France (a special friendship with Giscard d'Estaing was its' symbol enactment) for a short-term appeasement of either German farmers or German taxpayers, or both. Kohl's confessed unproficiency in living languages (not surprising after learning Latin and Greek in Ludwigshafen's Theodor-Heuss-Gymnasium) was taken as a reason of ridicule not only by the opposition, together with his also imperfect German pronunciation. I think the aspect of ridicule was the one that foremost made him act swiftly. The fitting conclusion to this post is to say that I fear chancellor Schroeder, who otherwise has borrowed and copied from Schmidt as well as Kohl, currently does not seem to understand the special value reliability, continuity and slow movement have in international policies, especially if fears of our neighbours are a major motive of action - even if you think you have reason to dismiss those fears as irrational, as Schroeder surely does. It may lead to the conclusion that Kohl's deal - transferring some of Germany's sovereignty to the EU in exchange for the reunification within the Western context - was faulty insofar as Kohl could not guarantee that his successors, whether inimical or friendly on the domestic level, would keep the terms of the agreement. :-( Regards MNI.