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Politics : Foreign Affairs Discussion Group -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: maceng2 who wrote (9160)	11/6/2001 5:51:13 PM
From: jjkirk	Read Replies (2) \| Respond to of 281500

Hi Pearly, Re: Set up a firebase in the middle of Taliban territory and your question: Would that be a winning solution? First the disclaimer...this is from an old 'has been' who, even if he was still wearing the suit, would have no say in the matter of planning...only the execution would be my pleasure...but my thoughts... 1. This "firebase" had better be built around a fixed wing airfield, cause it is still 800 mi from the middle of Afgan to steaming stations 100-150 mi off Pakistani coast. Fixed wing resupply would be critical to getting Class V resupply...er, ammo. Beaucoup helos and crews would be worn out supporting a "firebase" at that range, with no fixed wing backup in the buildup of the necessary levels of men, materials and equipment, and evacuation of broken items likewise. 2. WHY would the Taliban want to "come and get" the Brits...unless the Brits plopped down in the middle of a primary resupply route from Pakistan, or wherever...a place that the Tbags had to transverse...Is there a "Ho Chi Minh"-like trail, 25 or so miles wide, that would be worthy of such interdiction? No doubt the Brits would be running combat patrols out of this "firebase", taking advantage of the protective umbrella of supporting arms...that would extend the area affected by the burr under the Tbags' saddle...perhaps drawing Tbags away from other areas into kill zones...Would they take the bait?... 3. I am not an expert on Brit military history, but I am sure they are not thinking of a "firebase" in terms of the 50-100 yd long knobs that we worked out of in Vietnam...It would have to be as large as the Khe San base with an airfield, since resupply would not be just a 30-40 minute chopper ride away.... 4. I stand by my previous comments re: "Amateurs study tactics, professionals study logistics", and, close once again with a wise Army general's take on the subject. LOGISTICIANS "Logisticians are a sad, embittered race of men, very much in demand in war, who sink resentfully into obscurity in peace. They deal only with the facts but must work for men who merchant in theories. They emerge in war because war is very much fact. They disappear in peace because, in peace, war is mostly theory. The people who merchant in theories, who employ logisticians in war and ignore them in peace, are Generals. Logisticians hate Generals. "Generals are a happily blessed race who radiate confidence and power. They feed on ambrosia and drink only nectar. In peace they stride confidently and can invade a world simply by sweeping their hands grandly over a map pointing their fingers decisively up terrain corridors, blocking defiles and obstacles with the sides of their hands. In war they must stride more slowly because each General has a logistician riding on his back --- and he knows that at any moment, the logistician may lean forward and whisper, "No, you can’t do that." Generals fear logisticians in war, and in peace, Generals try to forget logisticians." "Romping along besides Generals are strategists and tacticians. Logisticians despise strategists and tacticians. Strategists and tacticians do not know about logisticians until they grow up to be generals --- which they usually do." "Sometimes a logistician gets to be a general. In such a case, he must associate with Generals whom he hates. He has a retinue of strategists and tacticians whom he despises. And on his back is a logistician whom he fears. This is why logisticians who get stars also get ulcers and cannot eat their ambrosia." Lt. Gen. W.W. Vaughan USA (Before the 29th Annual Convention of the American Logistical Assn.) Message 16596737

To: maceng2 who wrote (9160)	11/6/2001 6:09:15 PM
From: Bilow	Read Replies (2) \| Respond to of 281500

Hi Pearly_Button; Re setting up a firebase and saying "come and get it." For all the talk about how the Afghans or Taliban are different, there is a long tradition of militaristic nations being subdued only through that sort of tactic. That is, they'll keep fighting until it has been proved to them that they have met an enemy who is better than them in all ways. The British had that problem with the Zulus. After the disaster at Isandalwanda (more officers were killed there than at Waterloo) the British repeatedly defeated Shaka from behind fixed fortifications (read from the sky). But the Zulus just kept coming back for more because they thought that the British were cowards who were unable to meet them face to face. When the British figured out this psychology, they arranged for a meeting in the open, and defeated the Zulu there: The final battle of the Zulu War of 1879 took place on the plain of Ulundi. A force of 4 166 white and 1 005 black troops, two Gatling guns and 12 Field guns under Lord Chelmsford, formed a square, and provoked the Zulus to attack. The battle lasting from 08h30 to 09h30 resulted in the total defeat of the Zulu army. The Zulu force of between 15 000 and 20 000 commanded by Siwedu, Mnyamana, Dabulamanzi and Mtshingwayo, had about 1 500 dead. The British suffered a loss of 12 dead. battlefields.co.za Gatling guns against spears. This is about what a land confrontation between the US and the Taliban would be like, but until it happens the Taliban will continue to believe that they can never be defeated on the ground. It's the knowledge of the inevitability of defeat that makes nations quit fighting, not the actual death of all the soldiers. This is why the US psyops against the Taliban is heavy on the concept of the hopelessness of their cause against US military might. Note that in their propaganda, the Taliban is minimizing their own losses and exaggerating US losses. This is because they know that their cause is only valid if God demonstrates his support for them. Since He hasn't shown up with bolts of lightening for some time, they know that they have to do the dirty work themselves, so they challenge the US to a confrontation on the ground. If we set up a firebase on the ground somewhere reasonably close to Kandahar it might be just the thing. -- Carl P.S. Isandalwana is a proud moment in Zulu history, and they have lots of stuff for tourists there: classicretreats.co.za