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To: Jeffrey S. Mitchell who wrote (2260)12/30/2001 10:28:19 AM
From: walstmonky  Respond to of 12465
 
"Lycos Network Abuse Department"

Now that's funny.



To: Jeffrey S. Mitchell who wrote (2260)1/1/2002 1:42:44 AM
From: Jeffrey S. Mitchell  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 12465
 
FYI: AIC.GOV.AU -- Anger, Disappointment and Disgust: Reactions of Victims of a Telephone Investment Scam

I didn’ t know there was a scheme or scam until it went into bankruptcy or whatever. I almost had a nervous breakdown. I have practically no income. I’m almost 71 years old and I borrowed from equity on my house. I owe almost US$75,000. The first mortgage was just paid off after 30 years.

It has totally caused a major loss of self esteem and realisation of victimisation. I considered suicide. I am losing my house.


(Victim reports of their reactions after learning that they had been duped by a telephone investment scheme.)

A great deal of research has focused on the physical and fiscal consequences of victimisation by street crimes, particularly by the crime of forcible rape (Burgess & Holstrom 1974). Such research typically portrays anger, long-term emotional trauma, self-blame, and anxiety about future safety (Greenberg & Ruback 1992; Karmen 1990). Much less attention has been paid to the consequences of victimisation by fraud and false pretences: this is an issue, as Levi & Pithouse (1992, p. 229) note, ‘upon which no hard evidence has been collected . . . in the world.’ It is sometimes maintained that the effects of fraud and of various kinds of white-collar offences are more devastating to their victims than street crimes. Street crimes, according to Durkheim’s (1938, pp. 68-71) theme, unite ‘decent folk’ against wrongdoing and help to define permissible behaviour boundaries (Erikson 1966). White-collar offences, on the other hand, call into question basic values that victims have come to rely upon, most notably that those with whom they deal will be honest and trustworthy (Sutherland 1949, p. 13; Braithwaite & Pettit 1990, p. 188: Edelhertz 1970, p. 124).

We sought to examine these ideas by means of a survey of victims of a telecommunications fraud that primarily involved land leases for oil and gas prospecting and for conveyance of oil and gas, allegedly already pumped, through pipelines. There were about 12,000 investments in the program by approximately 9000 persons nationwide, none of whom recovered much money, and some of whom suffered severe financial losses. Investigators from the state of California contacted 8527 of the victims, who together were bilked out of US$125,851,462. It is estimated that the total loss inflicted by the fraud reached US$217 million.

Operating The Scheme

Deceptive claims that an investor could earn a profit of between 30 and 40 per cent a year by putting money into an oil and gas partnership lay at the heart of the earliest phase of the fraudulent solicitations. The major perpetrators were known as the ‘two Daves' -- David H. Bryant and David C. Knight. In the end they were charged in California with wilful misrepresentations, failure to disclose a previous cease and restrain order, and failure to tell potential investors of the 55 per cent commission and loading costs. They also did not inform investors that they were co-mingling funds, had an abysmal track regard in previous ventures, and that the actual control of the 187 or more business entities and limited and general partnerships for which they solicited funds all were under their own control.

Names of prospective investors in the schemes were secured from marketing firms which identify persons believed to have disposable income. Persons were cold-called, that is, telephone contact was made with individuals who had no previous relationship with the brokers. Those solicited were told to ‘hurry’ and make up their minds because others wanted to participate and there was room for only a limited number of investors. By the end of the scheme, more than 300 persons were pushing the offerings; salespersons retained 35 per cent of the amount they raised. Many of the sellers were recruited by Bryant, himself a recovering alcoholic, at Alcoholics Anonymous meetings.1

-----
1 Is it merely a coincidence that the Home-Stake swindle in the 1950s and 1960s, an oil and gas investment scheme, also was operated by a man who found his foremost associate when both were in an alcoholic recovery program? (see McClintick 1977, p. 36).
-----

Possible investors typically were told on the telephone that there existed ‘fantastic investment opportunities’ in whatever enterprise the two Daves were pushing at the moment. Usually no attempt was made to solicit money on the initial call; the salesperson primarily sought to determine whether the person being called was financially capable of participating in the scheme. Elegant promotional materials then would be dispatched to those who seemed to be likely targets. Before hanging up on the initial call, the broker told potential customers to write down any questions about the contents of the brochure and reports that they would receive: then these could be discussed during a subsequent call. About a week later, the salesperson called again. While each pitch varied somewhat, the sales staff worked from a script, which advised a friendly mix of warm greetings, contrived small talk, followed by a rundown about some ‘great acreage’ sitting on top of ‘huge oil reserves’. Returns to the investor within a few years were promised, with figures such as 15 to one or 37 to one often cited. The investor’s money, once secured by the promoters, often never reached the field project, where one existed. Delays in payoffs were explained by means of fabricated or embellished stories of unforeseen drilling expenses, poor weather, or equipment failures. When projects operated, other problems surfaced: leases were not properly negotiated, and the project often was acquired for substantially less than the investors had been led to believe. Full interest in the same asset often were sold to different investment groups. Toward the end of the scheme, the promoters began to push general partnerships which allowed them to further assess investors for ‘new’ expenses that ‘unexpectedly had arisen.’ Any token return that investors received almost invariably was less than five per cent of their investment. After a while, the promoters came to arrange loans through reputable banks for investors who were told that they could pay off their promissory notes from investment profits. The personal lives of the scheme operators was financed out of whatever company had money available at the time.

Ultimately, on 7 May 1991, the nearly-decade long scheme came to an end when a California court receiver, without warning, seized all of the two Dave’s assets to end, as a creditor’s attorney noted, ‘six years of their systematic and relentless stripping of assets from investors, partnerships and projects’ (Weisz et al. 1993, p. 97).

The Victims

From the base of 8527 identified investors, we sent questionnaires in January 1994 to randomly-selected victims. We received 152 completed questionnaires out of a possible 281. The respondents overwhelmingly were men: 124 males and 21 females, with four respondents indicating that their was a joint venture (though the husband in each case returned the questionnaire). The largest group of victims was between 53 and 62-years-old when they were solicited and were generally well educated. Most (33 per cent) lived in the suburbs of metropolitan areas, with 18 per cent residing in large cities (200,000 population and above), 23 per cent in medium-sized cities (50,000 to 200,000), 20 per cent in towns (2000 to 5000 population), and 7 per cent in rural areas. Reported yearly income (salaries plus other income) at the time they responded to the investment solicitation covered a wide range. Six of the respondents had an income of below US$25,000 while 14 took in more than US$100,000 a year.

For the 133 persons who supplied this information, 65 per cent invested less than US$30,000, 17 per cent between US$30,000 and US$74,999, with the remaining 18 per cent putting up more than US$75,000. The largest four investments were for US$160,000, US$200,000, US$280,000, and US$326,000.

The overwhelming reason why persons invested was the agent’s persuasiveness (over 66 per cent) with the prospectus being noted as influential by fewer than 20 per cent of the respondents:

The promise of excellent returns and tax breaks. The representatives were very persuasive and well-trained. For every objection they had a ready answer.

He seemed to believe in what he was doing. Prospectus seemed to be professional. I thought he was honest.

The note in the prospectus said they were risky investments, but I was told that they have to put that in all prospectuses and I believed him that they really weren’ t risky.


Only one person felt compelled to offer as another reason for investing a pithy five-letter response: ‘Greed’.

Reflecting on the experience, most of the respondents singled out the risk factor and the promised rate of return as the representations made to them that they now believe were false. There were also occasional inventive ploys to consummate sales. A respondent remembers, for instance: ‘One phone salesman called me and told me he quit his job at blah-blah securities because he knew he was selling phoney and fictitious properties.’

Personal Reactions among Victims

A limited number of descriptors usually sufficed for the respondents to portray their reactions when, as the question asked, ‘you learned that you would likely lose your investment in the scheme?’ By far the two major reactions were ‘anger’ (with variants such as ‘shocked’, ‘mad as hell’, ‘enraged’, ‘horrified’, ‘felt betrayed’, and ‘felt terrible’) and disappointment and feeling ‘sick’ (with variants such as ‘hurt’, ‘very upset’, ‘devastated’, ‘depressed’, ‘frustrated’, and ‘almost had a nervous breakdown’. ‘Lying bastards!’ one respondent scrawled. Only a few went beyond single-word descriptors to portray serious personal problems as a result of their experience. Among these was: ‘It has totally caused a major loss of self-esteem and realisation of victimisation. Honest, I consider suicide; I am losing my house!!!’ And only one victim expanded on the sense of betrayal. ‘Pat [the saleswoman] had called so often and sounded so sincere’, this respondent wrote, ‘that she seemed like a friend. I couldn’t afford to lose that much money’. A small minority turned the blame inward rather than toward the perpetrators. One respondent wrote: ‘I did not realise I was so stupid.’ Two others, along much the same line, wrote: ‘Very upset--lifetime savings gone. No way to recoup losses. Annoyed with myself for being so stupid and being taken in by this scam’, and ‘Disappointed about being gullible.’ There were also details of more severe emotional traumas: ‘Plagued with remorse and sleepless nights. Not only loss of investment, but I am billed quarterly for IRA [Individual Retirement Account] investment.’ One respondent observed that his wife had continuously sought to dissuade him from putting his money into the scheme. His final reaction was: ‘I had lost my credibility in front of my wife. I could not admit she was right. I agreed now that I’ll not make any investment without her approval.’

Some of the respondents felt compelled to pay credit to the talents of fabrication displayed by the salespeople: ‘I had been scammed by a very persuasive individual’, one wrote, while another replied: ‘I realised that I had been conned out of my money by good con artists.’ Only a very few--less than a handful--took a nonchalant stance: ‘Breaks of the game’, wrote one such. ‘Not all investments are successful after all.’ ‘Easy come, easy go’, wrote another, while a third scrawled: ‘There’s a sucker born every minute.’ And, inevitably, there was the upbeat pollyanna: ‘I was very upset’, he wrote, ‘but as with all mistakes I try to make them a learning experience’.

Discussion

It is often suggested that crimes in which the victims’ trust is traduced inflict greater injury than those in which harm is more physical and more impersonal. The present study provides a portrait of the victimisation of almost 9000 persons of US$217 million in what might be regarded as a very large but nonetheless commonplace telephone investment scam. The victims were in the main middle-aged and older middle-class investors looking for better-than-average profits and the prospects of the tax break granted for oil and gas programs. They were shamelessly cheated by scheme operators and solicitors who put together persuasive dramaturgy. Most of the victims apparently lost money that they could more or less afford, though some were placed in serious financial jeopardy by the scam.

How did they react? Our survey indicates strong personal distress among the victims, but there is no pressing of their laments to a larger stage, that is, to expressions of malaise with the society in general, the economic system, or cynicism about human nature. The respondents appear to have isolated the scam as an event in which they succumbed to slick pressuring and, on their part, inadequate resistance. The results often darkened their existence and they continue to hope against hope for some possible restitution that would put them back into the financial situation they enjoyed before they invested in the oil and gas swindle.

Years after the scheme, most victims continue to express strong feelings of anger and distress. These feelings, however, rarely fix on any particular person. Only a few focus their emotions on the salesperson, in part because, as some noted, they remain uncertain whether those who worked the telephone lines themselves were culpable or whether they were carrying out their assignment in good faith. The two Daves--the true villains in the scheme--remain too remote and invisible for the victims to draw the victims’ fire. In this regard, there was no need for the fraud promoters to ‘cool off the mark’ (Maurer 1940; Goffman 1952), that is, to becalm the victims so that they would not turn on the perpetrators. These fraud victims see no reasonable personal retaliatory action that they might take; their hope lies with the authorities who, as is so often the case, are faulted for not providing much, if any, information to the victims on how the case is proceeding.

A telling point that can be gleaned from the responses is that, in this kind of fraud, the respondents can take at least some small comfort in the fact that they now have learned a tactic that will satisfactorily protect themselves from future similar victimisations. Hang up the phone when an alleged broker calls is what they overwhelmingly advise others--and, of course, themselves. A lesson that will satisfactorily suffice in the future has been learned. In this sense, at least certain forms of fraud and white-collar crime can be seen from a victimology viewpoint as self-contained episodes, perhaps awful in themselves, but limitable. The data from the study reinforce the theme regarding the high fiscal price exacted by frauds and white-collar crime. The 9000 victims on the average invested about US$30,000 in the scheme. Very few burglaries and many fewer robberies come close to taking so high a fiscal toll on their victims.

Victims almost uniformly provided strong emotional expressions of outrage regarding what had happened to them: how much, if at all, stronger these expressions are by victims of other forms of criminal activity can be demonstrated only by a comparative study, well-controlled in terms of items such as demographics and harms. Such a study ought to have a high place on the research agenda of victimologists.

While the telephone scam had elements of betrayal and violation of trust it also possessed for the victims some remoteness: the perpetrators did not violate their personal space but rather carried out their ruse at a distance, in a faceless manner. The continuous litany of warnings by the victims responding to our questionnaire to others that they be on guard against telephone solicitors carries with it the message that none should be allowed to intrude into our privacy, even by telephone, unless they have proper credentials or, put another way, it conveys the rather sad lesson that human beings in today’s world need to be wary of any stranger allegedly bearing gifts.

References

Braithwaite, J. & Pettit, P. 1990, Not Just Deserts: A Republican Theory of Criminal Justice, Clarendon, Oxford.
Burgess, A. & Holmstrom, L. 1974, ‘Rape trauma syndrome’, American Journal of Psychiatry, vol. 131, pp. 981-6.
Durkheim, E. 1938, ‘The rules of sociological method [1895]’, trans. Sarah A. Solovay & John H. Mueller, Free Press, New York.
Edelhertz, H. 1970, The Nature, Impact, and Prosecution of White-Collar Crime, US Government Printing Office, Washington, DC.
Erikson, K. 1966, Wayward Puritans: A Study in the Sociology of Deviance, Wiley, New York.
Goffman, E. 1952, ‘On cooling the mark out: Some aspects of adaptation to failure’, Psychiatry, vol. 15, pp. 451-63.
Greenberg, M. & Ruback, R.B. 1992, After the Crime: Victim Decision Making, Plenum, New York.
Karmen, A. 1990, Crime Victims: An Introduction to Victimology, 2nd edn, Brooks/Cole, Pacific Grove, Ca.
Levi, M. & Pithouse, A. 1992. ‘The victims of fraud’, in Unraveling Criminal Justice: Eleven British Studies, ed. D. Downes, Macmillan, London, pp. 229-46.
Maurer, D. 1940, The Big Con, Bobbs-Merrill, Indianapolis.
Sutherland, E. 1949, White Collar Crime, Dryden, New York.
Weisz, B. et al. 1993, Gas, lies, and computer tape: The saga of Dave and Dave: Report to the American/Allied Trustee, Inman, Weisz and Steinberg, Los Angeles.

aic.gov.au



To: Jeffrey S. Mitchell who wrote (2260)1/9/2002 12:56:49 AM
From: Jeffrey S. Mitchell  Respond to of 12465
 
Re: 1/7/01 - [Marchese vs. Dobry] Marchese seeks Rule 11 Sanctions against Dobry attorney Tobin Richter

Note: The following was manually typed from a pdf Pacer court filing

MARCHESE’S RESPONSE TO DOBRY’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND MARCHESE’S CROSS-MOTION FOR SANCTIONS

Plaintiff, Richard Marchese ("Marchese"), by and through his attorneys, for his response to the motion for reconsideration filed by defendant Gary Dobry ("Dobry") and for his cross-motion for sanctions against Dobry and his counsel, Tobin Richter, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 11 states as follows:

INTRODUCTION

Quite simply, Defendant Gary Dobry and his counsel are out of control and have with their instant motion transcended all bounds of proper and civil conduct in this litigation. As if on a quest to plumb the depths of dilatory, contumacious, contemptuous and outrageous conduct, Dobry and his counsel have once again attempted to delay these proceedings, have once again falsely and maliciously strewn unsupported, false, and defamatory allegations against Marchese, and have once again shown nothing but disrespect and contempt for this Court. That Dobry’s motion for reconsideration is deficient as a matter of law and should be stricken is beyond doubt. Nothing in this motion could not have been raised on the multiple occasions when the issue of inspection and copying of Dobry’s computers was previously before this Court, and Dobry has failed to satisfy any of the required elements which would even warrant consideration of this strongly disfavored type of motion.

However, it is not the procedural and substantive deficiencies of the motion which should be of grave concern and serious offense to this Court, but rather the dilatory manner and timing in which this motion was brought; the outrageous, preposterous, and foundationless content of the motion, in which Dobry continues his campaign of harassment and defamation under the cloak of a pleading; and the content of this motion in light of Dobry's ongoing, repeated and deliberate efforts to impede these proceedings and further defame Marchese. In light of the content of the motion, and when all of Dobry's conduct in this case is considered, this Court should not hesitate to impose the harshest possible sanctions against Dobry and his counsel, pursuant to the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This action involves allegations by Marchese that Dobry has for the past three years engaged in a[n] ongoing, habitual and offensive campaign to defame and harass Marchese and his family through his posting of hundreds, if not thousands, of false and defamatory messages on the Internet regarding Marchese. Marchese’s initial complaint was filed on September 12, 2000, and on November 27, 2001, Marchese filed an Amended Complaint that includes allegations regarding false and defamatory statements made by Dobry subsequent to the filing of the initial complaint, as well as a claim for invasion of privacy/intrusion upon seclusion based upon Dobry’s publication of private information on the Internet regarding Marchese and his family. The amended complaint also includes allegations that Dobry has not only posted false and defamatory messages himself, but has directed others to do the same. In his answer to the Complaint and Response to Request for Admissions, Dobry has admitted posting many of the messages at issue.

Notwithstanding the nature of the allegations in this lawsuit, notwithstanding the entry of two separate protective orders, and notwithstanding two previous motions for sanctions, Dobry has continued his campaign by posting malicious and harassing statements both on the message boards and on his website during the course of this litigation. These activities are set forth in detail in the Amended Complaint and Marchese’s prior motions for sanctions. In contrast, as Marchese has sworn in an affidavit filed in this case, Marchese has not once posted any messages on the Internet regarding Dobry, either prior to or subsequent to the filing of this lawsuit, nor has he ever directed anyone to do so on his behalf. Allegations to the contrary in Dobry’s latest missive are wholly fabricated, without any evidentiary support, and are nothing more than conjecture and wishful thinking on Dobry’s part.

In an effort to determine the extent of Dobry’s campaign of defamation, Marchese on November 8, 2000—over 13 months ago—served Dobry, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 34, with a request for production and inspection of computers. As set forth in Marchese’s prior Motion to Compel (again, one of at least two Marchese has had to file in this case), Dobry repeatedly refused to produce the computers. Accordingly, on November 9,2001—almost two months ago—Marchese filed a Motion to Compel production of the computers. The motion set forth the scope of information sought and contained argument and citations which supported the production of the computers. At no time did Dobry file a written response to that motion, nor did he ever request leave to do so. On November 14, 2001—over six weeks ago—this Court granted Marchese’s Motion to Compel and directed Dobry to produce the computers for inspection and copying within 21 days. The Court left it to the parties to work out the details of the appropriate protocols to be used for the inspection and copying of the computers.

Subsequent to the entry of the Court’s order granting Marchese’s motion to compel, counsel for Marchese sent Tobin Richter, counsel for Dobry, a proposed agreement regarding the protocols to be used for the Inspection which also contained extensive provisions for the protection of the information obtained from those computers. After Dobry’s counsel responded with objections and counterproposals, Marchese’s counsel presented him with a revised document which largely incorporated all of the protections Dobry was seeking. That of course was still not satisfactory to Dobry’s counsel, and on December 20, 2001, the parties appeared before this Court at which time the Court largely adjudicated the competing proposals. At that hearing, Dobry once again had the opportunity and did in fact make many of the same arguments that he now regurgitates in the pending motion regarding alleged conflicts of interest, the necessity or propriety of Marchese’s expert being appointed by the Court, and the "constitutionality" of this common and routine discovery practice. The Court rejected these arguments.

In order to preclude Dobry’s counsel from further delaying matters with surprise and picayune objections to the proposed order, counsel for both parties stayed in the courtroom after the December 20 hearing and went through the draft order prepared by Marchese’s counsel to make sure that the parties were in full agreement (as to form) of the contents of the order so that it could be entered forthwith. Notwithstanding the fact that Dobry’s counsel had at that time stated that he agreed to the contents of the modified order as to form, he once again raised additional objections to the order and delayed its entry for yet another week. After the contents of the order had finally been agreed to as to form, Dobry, true to his form, requested that the inspection be delayed for over three more weeks; three more weeks after the 13 month old request was served, three more weeks after the six week old order was entered directing Dobry to produce his computers. When pressed by Marchese’s counsel for a legitimate reason for the delay, Dobry’s counsel stated that he could not provide one (though it is now apparent that his desire to prepare and file this motion was the reason). Ultimately, the parties agreed on December 28, 2001 and an order reflecting same was entered. Counsel for Dobry confirmed to counsel for Marchese on at least two occasions subsequent to the entry of the order that he would make the computers available by that date.

Shockingly (though perhaps not), three days before the date on which he agreed the computers would be produced pursuant to the protective order which sets forth strenuous protections for and limitations on the information to be retrieved from Dobry’s computers, Dobry and his counsel noticed this Motion for Reconsideration. As set forth below it is not only insufficient as a matter of law, but the manner in which it was filed and its outrageous contents warrant the imposition of the harshest sanctions on both Dobry and his counsel, Tobin Richter.

ARGUMENT

I. Dobry Utterly Fails To Satisfy The Elements Necessary For a Motion to Reconsider

Dobry cites no law in his motion which would justify the reconsideration of the Court’s Order. This is perhaps because the law is clear that his motion should not even be considered by this Court. Motions for reconsideration serve a limited purpose and will be granted only where the Court has patently misunderstood a party, or has made a decision outside the adversarial issues presented to the Court by the parties, or has made an error not of reasoning but apprehension. United States v. Olsen, 2001 WL 817854 (N.D.Ill. 2001). Motions for reconsideration also may be proper where there has been a controlling or significant change in the law or facts. Id. These types of problems "rarely arise and the motion to reconsider should be equally rare." Bank of Waunakee v. Rochester Cheese Sales, Inc., 906 F.2d 1185, 1191 (7th Cir. 1990) (emphasis added).

Dobry was given at least two opportunities to argue or brief the issues relating to the inspection of the computers and did in fact present the same arguments that he makes in his motion. It would be rather condescending for Dobry to imply that the Court did not understand either the issues or the arguments made by Dobry. Furthermore, there has been no change in either law or "facts" since the order was entered. Certainly, as set forth below, the statements in Dobry’s motion regarding Marchese and others would qualify as "facts" only in an Oliver Stone movie, and nothing Dobry sets forth as ‘facts" is of recent origin or was only recently "discovered" by Dobry. There is simply nothing in Dobry’s motion which warrants reconsideration of the court’s order as matter of law. Dobry and Richter have substituted desperation in place of justification in filing this motion.

II. Dobry and Richter Deserve To Be Sanctioned For The Unfounded And Defamatory Statements in Their Motion

The desperation of Dobry to avoid turning over the now obviously damning information on his computers is most evident in the outrageous, offensive, and ridiculous allegations that fill his motion. Without a scintilla of evidence, Dobry and Richter irresponsibly accuse Marchese (and his attorney) of a variety of criminal acts, violations of protective orders, and other scurrilous activity. While the motion refers to an affidavit by Dobry to be filed and served on January 3, 2001, Dobry and Richter have failed to provide any such affidavit as pledged by that date nor prior to the filing of this response. What is perhaps in the affidavit is of little consequence, however, because nothing in such a document could possibly offer any legitimate evidentiary support to the ridiculous allegations in the motion.

Dobry and Richter state without any qualification, and without a scintilla of evidence, that Marchese is engaged in securities fraud regarding AZNT because Dobry apparently lost money. While that may explain Dobry’s pathological obsession with harassing and defaming Marchese, it does not make it a fact. To allege such things in a pleading without doing any due diligence to determine the truth or falsity of such an allegation of criminal activity is a clear violation of Rule 11 by Dobry and his counsel. Dobry and Richter should take no comfort in referring to some book by some unknown third-party who, by Dobry’s own admission "reaches no definitive conclusions about the collapse of AZNT prices." If they have evidence, they should present it before they spew such garbage in a court document.

Even more egregious and worth of sanctions are Dobry and Richter’s statements, again without a scintilla of evidence, that Marchese "and his agents" have created a website designed to harass Dobry and have criminally trespassed or "hacked" Dobry’s computers. The earth-shattering evidence to support these serious allegations: "There is no one with any reason or motivation do to [sic: "to do"] these things other than Mr. Marchese and his agents." (Dobry brief, p. 4). Such as [sic] statement is nothing short of laughable in light of the fact that Dobry has a $1 consent judgment against him in federal court in New Hampshire in which he admitted repeatedly defaming an individual by the name of Michael Zwebner, and Dobry’s own manifesto on his website (attached to Marchese’s amended complaint) identifies scores of individuals as being part of some global conspiracy who no doubt have issues of their own with Dobry. Regardless, to assert that this court should reconsider its order based on such ludicrous conjecture defies credulity. That Dobry and Richter have in this document accused Marchese of criminal trespass without a shred of evidence defies civility.

Finally, Dobry and Richter, as per usual without a scintilla of evidence, accuse Marchese and his undersigned attorney, David Argentar, of violating the protective order entered in this case. They obliquely assert that an Internet posting regarding Dobry by an unknown and unnamed individual "contains information only obtainable from the deposition text." The undersigned, as an officer of the court, will certify, that the transcript, videotape, CD’s or other text of Dobry’s deposition have never left his office or been copied, they have not been seen by Marchese or anyone else, nor has he orally shared the contents with anyone in any detail, including with Mr. Marchese. If Dobry and Richter would like to accuse the undersigned or Marchese of violating protective orders, they would be best served by meeting the ethical obligations imposed by the federal rules and provide evidentiary support more substantial than "it just must be so".

Fed.R.Civ.P. 11(b) states that by presenting a pleading to a court, an attorney certifies:

To the best of the person’s knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances…
***

(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support…

Rule 11 in substance requires the signing lawyer or party to certify that on the basis of a reasonable factual prefiling inquiry he is informed and believes that the paper has a factual and legal basis and that it is not interposed for delay. Coburn Optical Industries, Inc. v. Cilco, Inc., 610 F.Supp.656 (M.D.N.C. 1985) Richter certified that these outrageous allegations of criminal and contemptuous conduct by Marchese and/or his attorney have evidentiary support based solely and exclusively on the affidavit that Dobry promised he would provide, which no doubt is filled with wild speculation and conjecture. The Seventh Circuit has affirmed the awarding of sanctions against attorneys who make allegations of criminal or contemptuous conduct in a pleading based solely on a client’s affidavit, without any further inquiry or evidentiary support, and should do so in this case. See, e.g., Anderson v. City of Montgomery, 111 F.3d 494 (7th Cir. 1997). The cloak of a pleading is not made of kevlar, shielding an attorney from the consequences of unsubstantiated and irresponsible allegations.

Not only do Dobry and Richter make frivolous allegations regarding Marchese, they have constructed a fantastic daisy chain of relationships with allegedly create a conflict of interest involving Rome Associates, Marchese’s retained computer expert. They make this argument notwithstanding the fact that this court has expressly ruled that any prior affiliation or relationship between Marchese and Rome is no basis for objection to their retention as experts. In fact, Rome Associates has certified that they have never performed any services for any of the individuals and entities that Dobry requested. As such, Dobry now must reach out to the Teamsters as part of his last-ditch effort to avoid facing the consequences of his actions. The court should reject this silliness.

Finally, the scant legal arguments in the brief, which Dobry has already had an opportunity to present, are unpersuasive and threadbare. Dobry cannot say how a decision from the Southern District of Indiana, Simon Property Group v. mySimon, Inc., is binding on the Northern District of Illinois, and more importantly, he utterly overstates and misrepresents the court’s decision. The fact that the court decided to appoint the expert in that case hardly means that they must be court appointed in every case as Dobry suggests. Furthermore, Dobry’s wrapping himself in the First Amendment is preposterous, as the information being obtained from his computers has been severely limited by the parameters of the entered protective order, and computer discovery has over the past few years become a common and widely accepted mechanism as more and more discoverable and relevant information is maintained solely in electronic form.

CONCLUSION

It is patently obvious that this legally insufficient motion was filed solely to delay these proceedings and avoid the discovery of relevant and important information. It should of course be denied. It is also apparent that Dobry and his counsel’s contumacious, obstructionist, and irresponsible course of conduct both inside and outside the courtroom will continue unabated unless this Court takes action. Accordingly, Plaintiff Richard Marchese respectfully prays that this Court enter an Order:

A. Denying Dobry’s Motion for Reconsideration;

B. Directing Dobry to comply with all terms and provisions of the Protective Order entered on December 28, 2001, specifically including but not limited to directing Dobry to make his computers available for inspection and copying in one location no later than January 11, 2002;

C. Entering a default judgment against Dobry and setting this matter for prove-up as to damages on a date certain;

D. Assessing sanctions against Dobry and his counsel, Tobin Richter, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 11, specifically including but not limited to an award of Marchese’s attorneys fees and costs in responding to the is motion and preparing all prior motions to compel or for sanctions;

E. Providing for such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.

Respectfully submitted,

RICHARD MARCHESE
By: One of His Attorneys
David S. Argentar
Mandell Menkes & Surdyk, LLC



To: Jeffrey S. Mitchell who wrote (2260)1/17/2002 1:17:29 AM
From: Jeffrey S. Mitchell  Read Replies (6) | Respond to of 12465
 
Re: [Marchese vs. Dobry] Dobry subpoenas Silicon Investor for numerous aliases

January 16, 2002

Dear Valued Silicon Investor Member:

Silicon Investor is in receipt of a subpoena for the subscriber information, Richard Marchese v. Gary Dobry, U.S. District Court Case Number 00-C-5606, associated with the account: [account name]. We are providing you notice so that you may file a motion to quash the subpoena if you so choose. If you would like us to fax a copy of the subpoena to you, please let us know. Unless we hear from you, we will be releasing the subscriber information after January 25, 2002.

Sincerely yours,

Jan Riggs
Associate Paralegal
InfoSpace, Inc.
601 108th Ave. NE, Suite 1200
Bellevue, WA 98004
Direct: 425.709.8170
Fax: 425.201.6167
Email: jriggs@infospace.com

NOTICE: This communication may contain privileged or other confidential information. If you have received it in error, please advise the sender by reply email and immediately delete the message and any attachments without copying or disclosing the contents. Thank you

Document Requests

Documents which identify the person or persons who have posted messages on Silicon Investor message boards using the following aliases, including: (a) all registration data supplied by such persons; (b) including, but not limited to: full names and addresses: mailing, billing and e-mail; (c) full credit card number and credit card type and all information supplied about the credit card and its issuer; and (d) any correspondence (letter or electronic, or telephonic) recorded by any means or noted or logged electronically between Silicon and any of the following for the following accounts:

X the Unknown
Ken
TideGlider
Michael D Kugler
jhild
Eric Ziegler
Bill Ulrich
Kerry Carmichael
Cousin Bob
Zonkie
Josef Svejk
TomCat
Sane456
A_Murray
Tastes Like Chicken
ThirdEve
smartin
TLWatson59
marcos
Janice Shell
Grupo_Brad
yardslave
Cousin Shorty
Wolff
TED_DENNIS
PattiBob
imbass
Art_Murray
Christina Christensen
scionist
tonto
DizzyG
Eric Zeigler
Jeffery S Mitchell
LevelHead
SIBob (Admin)
Lucky 777
Arcane Lore
N
Lather,Rinse,Repeat
John_Sutton