Pollack argues for an offensive against Iraq at the earliest opportunity and presents a compelling case.
To summarize: sanctions is an endless game of cat & mouse that Hussein has begun to outmaneuver us in, with other nations openly ignoring them. Deterrence is too risky because no-one's sure how long Hussein can be deterred, with his past record of military miscalculations. But we cannot wait for him to develop nuclear capabilities; he's just gotta go.
Checking off the options, there's an insubstantial base of available proxies to fight the war for us. Perceived half measures will lose the support of allies and will not work, as the last Gulf War made clear: his troops did not quit after punishing air attacks as the Taliban did in Afghanistan.
Pollack claims the only remaining option is committing sufficient ground troops to ensure the fall of Hussein and the reconstruction of a government that is not hostile to us. This would have the added benefits of reducing the need to have a sizable military presence committed to the region and reducing our position as an ongoing irritant to the Muslim world. In his estimation, Arab neighbors would stay on board and worldwide, the loudest dissent would come from France, Russia and China. Which we could ignore.
In his words:
"The military aspects of an invasion, actually, are likely to be the easiest part of the deal. The diplomatic fallout will probably be more difficult, with its severity directly related to the length of the campaign and the certainty of its outcome. Just as in Afghanistan, the longer it drags on and the more uncertain it looks, the more dissent will be heard, both at home and abroad -- whereas the quicker and more decisive the victory, the more palatable it will be for all concerned."
Considering his experience, knowledge, and contacts, his judgment about the first end goal and our capability to accomplish it cannot be dismissed and few would have greater resources at their command to mount a counter-argument.
But on that first desired end, I'd ask if there's a better guarantee of toppling Hussein with less lives at risk on both sides. Simply: is it time to uncork the nuclear genie again?
Such a consideration cannot come easily; to one whose stomach churns at the mere thought of that, it is difficult even to put these words down in writing. But as I see it, that option must be reviewed, with these considerations analyzed:
1) With fortified bunkers and a record of evasiveness, Hussein might survive conventional theater attacks with Plans B, C, D, etc in place that could include the launch of bio-chemical weaponry most experts feel he already possesses. A first strike that immediately takes him and his inner circle and successors out instantly eliminates most incentives for his troops to continue. And likely ends the threat of a counterattack with WMD.
2) It would permanently erase all doubts throughout the Muslim world about our willingness to wage war at its most extreme. Though the immediate outrage would be large, the realization of our willingness to go that far would cause the most extreme to recognize the folly of any further physical confrontations. Beyond the anger, it would trigger a profound soul searching for a better way.
3)Both of those impacts were felt on August 6th and 9th, 1945, when the atomic bomb debuted against an enemy whose fanaticism parallels the fanaticism we face today. Historic evidence of the desired result exists. Still, the negatives must be addressed.
4) Would someone else step into the fray? China and Russia immediately come to mind. Going back to the Morse article about oil, Russia is actually an oil-producing competitor to Iraq. It's chief interest would be who would end up controlling that oil. As well, Iraq owes a sizable debt to Russia. Since most of its interest there is monetary, rather than strategic (I'm guessing), Russian support might be buyable. And thus allied, Russian and US diplomats quite likely could persuade China to stand down.
5) What about lesser nuclear powers? Most are allies. The other known nuclear powers who might wish to retaliate lack the throw capacity to reach the US. Countries with significant Muslim populations who might wish to do so include Pakistan, and India, and it's conceivable that Iraq and Iran might have some nuclear capacity but none could target the US.
6) Would they target Israel? Only at the risk of a stronger response than they can deliver. And it cannot be stressed enough that an alliance of Russia and the US has the potential capacity to convince the entire world to stand down.
7) What about civilian casualties in Iraq? First, it would be convenient if Hussein would step outside of Baghdad for a moment. That's unlikely; if he did so and our intelligence picked it up he would likely be targetable with lesser weapons. Second, I am far from expert in nuclear weaponry, but the sense I get is there are smaller nuclear weapons available that could limit the swath of destruction. It could well be argued that the single strike would reduce overall casualties of a longer war with a single strike.
8) Admittedly, the moral dillemma is one of the two greatest arguments against this strategy. It is, after all, the Iraqi leadership that is hostile. Can we justify such an action without evidence of a hostile citizenry (as was the case in Japan) and without evidence that Hussein has done anything recently to warrant such a response? I doubt it. However, if in the buildup or initiation of hostilities with Iraq, Hussein lets loose with a single weapon of mass destruction, I believe a nuclear counter-strike could be defended.
9) The other greatest argument against this consideration goes back to a threat Osama Bin Ladin made. He indicated that if we resorted to WMDs, so would Al Qaida. Was that bluster? Nobody is certain. However, if Al Qaida operatives have a biochemical or nuclear capability, the experts I've heard suggest it is small, and would likely be a 'last parting shot' deal. Still, it's a considerable deterrent to our use of nukes, but it may not be deterrent enough.
Rather than conclude that I've developed a Strangelovian bent in this analysis, first reconsider the positives. A nuclear strike would achieve the first objective of eliminating a hostile government with an immediate potential to unleash WMDS against its neighbors, against our troops in conventional battles, and with a past history of supporting terrorist organizations.
Second, it would send the message that what many view as 'the unthinkable' is not; that any major assault on US soil will make the unthinkable possible against all participants in that assault, be it a hostile nation, a terrorist group, or a nation abetting that terrorist group. That would certainly dry up support for such groups as well as providing incentive to such groups to reconsider their efforts to use force against a vastly superior force.
There's a third potential positive that might emerge, as well. Besides the clamor to drag our leadership before the World Court for civilian deaths, many throughout the world, including within our borders, would renew the old cry to eliminate nukes altogether. From such a hue and cry, the non-nuclear world would likely be quick to sign onto an agreement that would prevent the further spread of nuclear capabilities. There might even be sufficient world pressure to cause further sharp reductions in stockpiles within the leading nuclear powers, including us. A fresh reminder of the importance of limiting WMDs can't be all bad, if it creates that result too.
Again, before assuming I'm daft or bloodthirsty for proposing it, remember two things.
Most important, I'm not proposing that we use nukes to bring down Hussein and send an important message to the world. I'm only proposing that it deserves full strategic analysis as an existing option, by others far more qualified to weigh its practicality, its attendant risks, and its moral viability.
Additionally, there remains an entire remaining segment to my argument that I hope to have time to address in a Sunday posting, which Mr. Pollack did not address that deserves to be weighed and analyzed. That segment may be the decisive factor in determining whether this segment is supportable and whether Mr. Pollack's analysis is supportable.
So please reserve judgment and stay the catcalls and lynch mobs till I've completed my analysis.
-Kev@ifeelsodirty.ugh |
