To: tekboy who wrote (26453 ) 4/22/2002 2:46:46 PM From: LindyBill Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 281500 I posted this as part of a package the other day, but no one seemed to look at them I have to admit your post on them got lost in the "Noise" of the thread. I have just finished reading the Cohen piece. Every couple of paragraphs, I would stop, shake my head, and say to myself, "Where has this guy been!" I have never read a piece on the Defense Department that I agreed with more, or that has caused me to assess my thinking as much. One thing Hackworth makes a big point of, and is right about, IMO, is that the Grunts are being bypassed in what they need while concentration is put on large expenditure weapons systems. For instance, the M16 Rifle is an out-of-date, inferior weapon to what is available today. The HK MP5 is an example of a much better Grunt weapon, ready to go, and proven. Here is a link to what it looks like.hkpro.com It is being used by the CIA and some special forces, but the 10th Mountain and the rest of the Army has still got the M16. The same problem exists with clothing, boots, and food. The standard MRE food pack, ( Call "Meals Rejected by Ethiopians" byt the troops) took years for the Army to come up with, and is inferior to the food made available to the French and British troops. The key tactical point that Cohen addresses is I.S. We are now using very good systems to distribute battlefield Info, but are we doing it right? One of the big criticisms of the Army is that the Generals "Micromanage" too much. Remember the old "REMF" complaint from Vietnam? Franks is running the Afghanistan war from his Florida HQ. From what I have read, this has worked well for the first part of the attack, once the Air Force weenies were put in their place, but was a strategic failure at the end of the main campaign, when the enemy was allowed to escape in Pakistan. I realized as I was reading Cohen's piece that the main jump in efficiency and savings from I.S. in both private and public systems is the elimination of a lot of "Middle Management" from the command chain. This means, in the Army, that a Regimental Commander can now issue correct orders to a Platoon Leader, bypassing the BAttalion and Company Commander. I would bet that Frank's staff was issuing orders to SF Teams in Afghanistan directly from Florida. The possible "good" and "bad" from this jumps out at you. The urge to "Micromanage" has to balanced with the need to not override local commanders. But the key thrust of Cohen's article, IMO, is the near impossiblity of making changes, at the Pentagon level, of the weapon and command systems. When you look at the lack of continuity in top management, due to Political changes, and the Services desire to buy big weapon systems, it is obvious why it is hard to get things done. I have said before that the way the Military works, you have to give them three times, at least, as much money to do something as you would a private business, and that this cannot be changed. But, this means if you really throw money at them, as we are doing this year, you can get some changes through. Cohen lists several of them. lindybill@thisswinefinallyreadyourpearls.com