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To: tekboy who wrote (52311)10/16/2002 4:55:49 AM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 281500
 
America dismisses Europe's fears on Iraq war

timesonline.co.uk



To: tekboy who wrote (52311)10/16/2002 4:56:31 AM
From: LindyBill  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 281500
 
"Ahh, there's good News tonight!" I love what this article says Rumsfeld is doing to the "Perfumed Princes of the Pentagon." Better control of the top promotions, cuts in Weapon systems we don't need, and more control by the Secretary sounds good to me.

washingtonpost.com
Rumsfeld's Style, Goals Strain Ties In Pentagon
'Transformation' Effort Spawns Issues of Control

By Vernon Loeb and Thomas E. Ricks
Washington Post Staff Writers
Wednesday, October 16, 2002; Page A01

When Marine Lt. Gen. Gregory S. Newbold was preparing earlier this year to leave his position as director of operations for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, his boss, Gen. Richard B. Myers, nominated an Air Force officer to succeed him.

But when Myers, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, told Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld that Lt. Gen. Ronald E. Keys would be the next director of operations, or "J-3," one of the most important jobs in the U.S. military, he got a rude surprise. Not so fast, said Rumsfeld, who in a sharp departure from previous practice personally interviews all nominees for three-star and four-star positions in the military. Give me someone else, Rumsfeld told Myers after twice interviewing Keys.

Myers complied and came up with a selection more to Rumsfeld's liking, Air Force Lt. Gen. Norton A. Schwartz, ending a long-standing practice of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs naming his own top subordinates.

Senior military officers now recount Keys's demise to illustrate a pronounced civilian-military divide at the Pentagon under Rumsfeld's leadership. Numerous officers complain bitterly that their best advice is being disregarded by someone who has spent most of the last 25 years away from the military. Rumsfeld first served as secretary of defense from 1975 to 1977, in the Ford administration.

Indeed, nearly two dozen current and former top officers and civilian officials said in interviews that there is a huge discrepancy between the outside perception of Rumsfeld -- the crisp, no-nonsense defense secretary who became a media star through his briefings on the Afghan war -- and the way he is seen inside the Pentagon. Many senior officers on the Joint Staff and in all branches of the military describe Rumsfeld as frequently abusive and indecisive, trusting only a tiny circle of close advisers, seemingly eager to slap down officers with decades of distinguished service. The unhappiness is so pervasive that all three service secretaries are said to be deeply frustrated by a lack of autonomy and contemplating leaving by the end of the year.

Rumsfeld declined to be interviewed for this article.

His disputes with parts of the top brass involve style, the conduct of military operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere, and sharply different views about how and whether to "transform" today's armed forces. But what the fights boil down to is civilian control of a defense establishment that Rumsfeld is said to believe had become too independent and risk-averse during eight years under President Bill Clinton.

What makes this more than a bureaucratic dispute, however, is that it is influencing the Pentagon's internal debate over a possible invasion of Iraq, with some officers questioning whether their concerns about the dangers of urban warfare and other aspects of a potential conflict are being sufficiently weighed -- or dismissed as typical military risk aversion.

The dispute also promises to have a huge impact in the coming year over the fate of hugely expensive weapons systems, with Stephen A. Cambone, a top Rumsfeld deputy, now recommending more than $10 billion in savings by cutting or delaying the Air Force's F-22 stealth fighter, the Navy's next generation aircraft carrier, and three Army programs, the Comanche reconnaissance helicopter, the Stryker wheeled combat vehicle and the Future Combat System.

These tensions were straining relations between the uniformed military and Rumsfeld prior to Sept. 11, 2001, but were partially submerged by the Afghan war and other counterattacks on terrorism. They have now reemerged as the Pentagon plans for a possible war in the Persian Gulf and for a fiscal 2004 budget that is in danger of being swamped by war costs and long-deferred expenditures on modernization, new weapons and Rumsfeld's desire to transform the military into a 21st-century force.

"There is a nearly universal feeling among the officer corps that the inner circle is closed, not tolerant of ideas it doesn't already share, and determined to impose its ideas, regardless of military doubts," said Loren B. Thompson, a defense analyst at the Lexington Institute who has close ties to defense contractors and the military.

"All of the bad blood of last year is coming back in a very big way," said one former Pentagon official.

All three service secretaries were recruited from private industry to bring "best business practices" to the Pentagon and promised autonomy in making management reforms. But all three find their actions constrained by Rumsfeld and what is referred to as his small "palace guard," according to Pentagon insiders.

Air Force Secretary James Roche has felt he lacked input on decisions about the service's centerpiece program, the F-22, senior officers and defense contractors say. Navy Secretary Gordon England has expressed an interest in a top job at the proposed Department of Homeland Security, and Army Secretary Thomas E. White, a former executive at Enron Corp., has been tarnished by the Enron scandal, his failure to promptly divest his Enron holdings, and a controversy over his use of Army aircraft for personal business.

Presiding over a Pentagon thick with tension is an ironic position for an administration that came to office promising to show new respect for the military. In Congress and elsewhere in Washington, some now are questioning whether the military feels free to give its best advice to the administration -- or whether that advice is being welcomed.

"I've heard repeatedly about the lack of trust between the secretary and the uniformed officers," said Sen. Jack Reed (D-R.I.), a member of the Armed Services Committee and a former Army officer who commanded an infantry company in the 82nd Airborne Division. "That, I think is a problem," particularly, he added, with the administration contemplating an invasion of Iraq.

"If there is an atmosphere where contrary views aren't well received, you may move into an operation that isn't well-advised," a three-star officer warned.

Myers, in an interview, denied that he or any other senior officers feel constrained in speaking their mind to Rumsfeld or raising objections about pending military operations. "It has never been easier to express our opinion, our thoughts, with any secretary," Myers said. "There is ample opportunity, in fact, encouragement, to present other views and disagree. . . . I think it's very, very healthy."

Victoria Clarke, Rumsfeld's spokeswoman, cited a series of "spectacular accomplishments" at the Pentagon -- a new defense strategy, a nuclear posture review, a restructured missile defense program, far more realistic budgeting procedures, and an ambitious agenda for "transforming" the military -- and said they simply could not have happened without close civilian-military relations.

"It's extraordinary that those things got done, in the face of amazing resistance to change, at the same time we were prosecuting the war on terrorism," Clarke said, adding that Rumsfeld "not only welcomes, but encourages, dissent."

Rumsfeld's Revolution
While issues of great substance lie at the heart of Rumsfeld's unsettled relationship with the military, discussion of the current environment at the Pentagon invariably begins with assessments of the defense secretary's powerful personal style.

Even Rumsfeld's detractors admit he is a man of considerable energy and intellect who is pushing the right issues and raising many of the right questions at the Pentagon. Rumsfeld, 70, is universally praised for his handling of the war in Afghanistan, where he and other members of the Bush Cabinet insisted on a bold plan for toppling the Taliban and driving al Qaeda out of the country.

What appears at times to be indecisiveness on Rumsfeld's part, according to one senior officer, stems from his deep personal involvement in operational planning. "The guy wants to see [a plan] at the 30 percent level, and the 60 percent level, so it's become a very iterative process, and it's been hard for the bureaucracy to adjust to that," the officer said. "It's good in the sense that the man is talented and has tremendous insight into the political process. The only time it's bad is having" to make decisions rapidly in the context of ongoing operations.

But the result, said one White House aide, is that "it's hard to get decisions out of the Pentagon, because he doesn't delegate."

It has become a truism in national security circles that Rumsfeld has been a better secretary of war than secretary of defense. Rumsfeld has two dominant priorities. The first is reshaping the U.S. military from a heavy, industrial-age force designed in the Cold War to an agile, information-age force capable of defeating more elusive adversaries anywhere on the globe.

Rumsfeld's second priority, about which he has been less open, is reasserting civilian control over a military establishment that had grown autonomous -- and, many believe, too cautious -- during the Clinton years. Indeed, Rumsfeld has pushed throughout the war on terrorism for bolder plans from the military. Under his stewardship, war planning has become far more effective and imaginative, said a former official who otherwise is critical of Rumsfeld.

"This guy really is trying to get [the Pentagon] to work for him," said one former defense official. "I don't think he's chosen the right path. But it's not a question of him being the devil and everyone else is a misunderstood angel."

If Rumsfeld returned to the Pentagon in January 2001 predisposed to see senior military officers as dull and uncreative, as many believe, he has since shown a willingness to reassess their capability. Officers, even those unhappy with Rumsfeld's approach, say relations between his office and the uniformed branches have improved as both sides have come to better understand how to interact, thanks in part to the crucible of the war in Afghanistan.

"Rumsfeld has changed over time. He's still cantankerous, but he's not necessarily as combative as he was at one point in time," one three-star officer said. "There is more mutual respect."

Others are far more pessimistic. "Things are more fouled up [at the Pentagon] than I've ever seen them," said one former defense official sympathetic to Rumsfeld.

"The depth of disaffection is really quite striking," added one defense consultant. "I think Rumsfeld is courting a rebellion."

Two other people who have dealt with Rumsfeld said there is still a glass bowl in the secretary's office. Rumsfeld likes to tell people that if he says anything nice about anyone, a coin is put in the bowl. Rumsfeld likes to point out that the bowl is almost always empty. It puzzles some generals that he would take pride in such a hard-line approach.

"It is," said one, "a heck of a way to run an organization."

Joint Staff in the Cross Hairs
Rumsfeld's primary objective in reasserting civilian control over the Pentagon has been in reining in a Joint Staff that the defense secretary, according to associates, believed had become too powerful and independent of civilian control, with officers acting at times as though they were not subordinate to their civilian bosses.

The Joint Staff, an umbrella organization that draws from all four services, consists of about 1,200 officers and other personnel and plays a critical role in overseeing the daily activities of the U.S. military around the world. The staff works for the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. But Rumsfeld has made it clear that, in his Pentagon, the chairman works for him.

Since Rumsfeld's first tour as defense secretary in the mid-1970s, the Joint Staff has grown enormously in power and capability. During the Ford administration, it was something of a backwater where the services placed officers considered second-rate. But after the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act greatly empowered the chairman, making him the formal leader of the Joint Chiefs and explicitly the principal military adviser to the president, the staff began getting the best the services had to offer, in part because that law barred officers lacking "Joint" time from becoming top generals or admirals.

Rumsfeld, say people who have dealt with him over the last two years, saw the Joint Staff as sometimes unresponsive to civilian leadership, even asserting its own policy positions at interagency meetings. He wasn't alone in that feeling, recalled one officer at the Pentagon, who said that Joint Staff officers sometimes seemed to have the attitude that "the suits don't need to know this, they stay in our lane, we stay in ours."

Under Rumsfeld, the civilians are no longer cut out.

Rumsfeld, early on, tried to gain control over the key position of director of the Joint Staff, the person who helps determine the daily agenda of the U.S. military leadership. When his move to oust the incumbent met opposition, he backed down. But he succeeded in making the point that the defense secretary would be intimately involved in deciding who filled the top positions. And he prevailed when it came time this year to pick a new J-3 to replace Gen. Newbold, who had told colleagues he found the job deeply frustrating partly because of Rumsfeld's constant bypassing of the Joint Staff.

Rumsfeld made it clear that he did not feel Keys, the general first nominated by Myers to succeed Newbold, was suited for the job. One three-star officer said Rumsfeld considered Keys unimaginative, while a four-star officer said the defense secretary considered Keys arrogant.

"He has been relentless and aggressive in putting these guys in their place," concluded one former Pentagon official. Myers also has come in for criticism from other generals who think he has failed to stand up to Rumsfeld, and some point to the Keys nomination to make their case.

"In the Rumsfeld Pentagon, the chairman works as staff to the secretary of defense," the former official added.

Myers said he has heard such complaints but that he finds them voiced by officers who do not understand the closeness of the relationships that exist between him and Rumsfeld, Deputy Defense Secretary Paul D. Wolfowitz and Marine Gen. Peter Pace, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs.

"I think the relationship between the Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense staff is really very good and very close, and also has matured over time," Myers said. "If I didn't feel like I had my say to my boss and had an opportunity to be influential, I wouldn't be here."

At the moment, Rumsfeld is working to strip the Joint Staff of a series of its offices -- legislative liaison, legal counsel and public affairs. These have given the military leadership a degree of autonomy by providing it direct pipelines to Congress, to other parts of the government and to the media.

Clarke, Rumsfeld's spokeswoman, denied Rumsfeld has singled out the Joint Staff in an attempt to diminish its power. "The secretary thinks the entire department, civilian and military, was lethargic, bureaucratic, not fully addressing the dramatically changed world in which we find ourselves," she said. "And he has appropriately lit fires under everybody and said, 'Ladies and gentlemen, the stakes around here are very high.' And some people respond well to that and some people don't."

The Army in Opposition
The biggest battle facing Rumsfeld is with the Army, the nation's largest military service, which effectively has gone into opposition against the secretary of defense.

The Army, for institutional and historical reasons, is the most skeptical of the services of Rumsfeld's drive to move the military into the information age. Rumsfeld has complained that the Army is too resistant to change, while Army officers claim the defense secretary does not sufficiently appreciate the value of large, armored conventional ground forces.

"Does he really hate the Army?" asked one Army officer, obviously pained by the question. "I don't know."

The relationship, never close, hit the rocks when Rumsfeld let it be known in April that he had decided to name Gen. John M. Keane, the Army's vice chief of staff, as its next chief, 15 months before its current chief, Gen. Eric K. Shinseki, was scheduled to retire. This immediately made Shinseki a lame duck and undercut his ambitious "transformation" agenda, which he had set forth in late 1999.

"I do feel that this secretaryship has been very hard on this chief and has undermined his ability to bring about the kind of transformation that Shinseki envisioned," said Rep. Jerry Lewis (R-Calif.), chairman of the House Appropriations Committee's defense subcommittee. "Clearly there's a need for some repairing of relations between the department and the Army."

Next, Rumsfeld killed the Army's new mobile howitzer system, the Crusader, on grounds that it was too heavy to deploy to distant battlefields and not "transformational" enough to be relevant on the future battlefield.

Army leaders had coveted Crusader for years as a weapon system that would finally make the Army second to none in artillery firepower. They were particularly steamed at how Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz killed the system, keeping the Army in the dark about what was happening until Congress was ready to vote on the fiscal 2003 budget.

In recent weeks, another dispute has arisen, with officials in Rumsfeld's office expressing concerns about the effectiveness of the new Stryker wheeled combat vehicle designed to replace the tank in the latest Army fighting unit called the Interim Brigade Combat Team. Cambone, Rumsfeld's closest aide, has proposed cutting in half the Army's plan to field six of these combat teams, saving $4.5 billion in Stryker procurement.

The Interim Brigade Combat Team is Shinseki's bridge between the heavy Army of the Cold War and the Army of the future. But Cambone is also zeroing in on two programs at the heart of that future Army, or Objective Force, proposing a 50 percent cut in the Army's Comanche helicopter and a two-year delay in fielding its Future Combat System.

But Rumsfeld's office, aided by former House speaker Newt Gingrich (R-Ga.), who is close to Rumsfeld and deeply interested in how to reform the Army, is now questioning whether Stryker measures up.

"The mood is so morose these days" in the Army, concluded a retired general.

Already on edge, Army generals were dismayed when some Republican defense experts suggested that invading Iraq would be easy. And on top of everything else, the Army now is trying to figure out how it would supply tens of thousands of troops to keep the peace in Iraq should President Saddam Hussein be ousted in a U.S. invasion.



To: tekboy who wrote (52311)10/16/2002 6:00:49 AM
From: stockman_scott  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 281500
 
A more effective ultimatum to Iraq

By Robert Kuttner
Columnist
The Boston Globe
10/16/2002

THERE IS AN alternative to invading Iraq that deserves serious consideration. The United States, working with the United Nations, should give Saddam Hussein one last chance to grant unimpeded access to weapons inspectors. If he refuses, the United States should bomb suspected weapons sites.

Critics of President Bush's plan to invade Iraq and overthrow Saddam's regime have one strong argument and one weak argument. The strong argument has nothing to do with whether Saddam is an appalling dictator, whether he is trying to acquire nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, or even whether he'd use them.

The strong argument is that the aftermath of war would not be worth the cost. The United States would have fewer friends in the world and a more militant terrorist movement to contend with. It would have set a precedent for unilateral military action. We would have a prolonged occupation of a country whose inhabitants would be far less hospitable to GI Joe than the defeated Germans or Japanese were. Invasion of Iraq and the toppling of Saddam Hussein could well destabilize the geopolitics of the entire Middle East region. That is the realist argument against this war.

The weak argument is that Saddam isn't such a bad guy or that other bad guys have nuclear weapons or that we should just work with the UN under current inspection plans. The problem with that argument is that every time President Bush seems reined in by the process of working through the UN, Saddam keeps making a liar out of Bush's critics.

Doves should recall that Saddam, after invading Kuwait and being beaten back by a US-led coalition, agreed to an armistice that required renouncing weapons of mass destruction and admitting weapons inspectors to confirm that he was in compliance. In return, he was allowed to stay in power. By now, it's clear that Saddam has no intention of giving inspectors even the kind of access that the stronger UN inspection force had prior to 1998.

A much-discussed plan in Washington is one proposed by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace for ''coercive inspections.'' Under that plan, weapons inspectors would have full access to any site they desired, backed by a multinational military force that would come in with the inspectors.

It's a fine plan and a good alternative to the disruption and slaughter caused by war. The only problem is that Saddam is extremely unlikely to agree to it.

Our usual allies who are resisting Washington's grand design for Iraq are not doing so out of love of Saddam Hussein, out of cowardice, or because they have made separate oil deals. They are resisting for fear of the chaos that war would bring to the entire region and out of concern for the severe setback to international cooperation and international law.

The other members of the Security Council will very likely go along with a tougher set of inspection demands, but in the end they will be stymied when Saddam refuses to cooperate in good faith. This will leave the Bush administration in the position of saying, ''I told you so,'' and the US-led invasion will proceed.

But an ultimatum to Saddam, to let in armed inspectors or face the bombing of weapons plants and sites, would have several advantages over other approaches.

First, it would spare a lot of casualties among US troops and Iraqi civilians.

Second, it would get rid of the weapons of mass destruction that are Bush's rationale for full-blown war. If Saddam refused, he would face the demolition not just of known weapons plants but of the ''presidential palaces'' that have long been suspected as hiding weapons development.

Third, this approach would prevent the need for a prolonged US occupation.

Fourth, there would be far less damage to the fabric of multilateral cooperation and international law.

Fifth, it would neutralize Iraq as a military threat to the region without the disruptive side effects that might prove more disastrous to world peace and US interests than Saddam himself.

Finally, bombing weapons sites would indicate that the United States is very serious while stopping short of all-out war. That, in turn, might allow for one round of diplomacy that could result in a viable inspection system. If Saddam is denied weapons, one way or another, we can avoid all-out war.

Invasion of Iraq would mark the failure of US power to use its influence in proportion to achievable US goals. There are military alternatives that add up to more realistic defense policy than going to war.
__________________________________________________________

Robert Kuttner's is co-editor of The American Prospect. His column appears regularly in the Globe.

© Copyright 2002 Globe Newspaper Company.

boston.com



To: tekboy who wrote (52311)10/16/2002 10:42:14 AM
From: carranza2  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 281500
 
The scenario that bothers me and which I can't see more than three or four stages into the future is one in which Israel's enemies, Hizbollah being the most likely aggressor, take advantage of the move against Iraq, provoking an Israeli response--perhaps a new invasion of S. Lebanon--that draws in Syria and maybe Iran when Hizbollah gets hammered.

I see the likelihood of such a scenario as being increased if our military strategy is not one involving the use of utterly overwhelming force sufficient to deter an attack against Israel.

What do you think the chances are for a wider conflagration resulting from a move into Iraq?

C2@stillhaven'readPollackhaverealworktododammit!.com



To: tekboy who wrote (52311)10/16/2002 1:54:29 PM
From: jcky  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 281500
 
This is where I'm most scared this admin would fumble the ball. I simply can't understand why they haven't devoted more time and energy and resources to making the new Afghan polity work, for example, and that doesn't bode well for Iraq. They might try to pass it off to the UN or some others, in order to avoid the headaches of doing it themselves.

I am scratching my head trying to contemplate what this administration hopes to accomplish by ignoring the nation-building process in Afghanistan. If anything, a successful transition of law and order in Afghanistan will pay huge dividends for Bush's policy of regime change in Iraq and build the political capital necessary to convince the UN in supporting a multi-lateral effort to reconstruct Iraq, post-Saddam.

Is this administration brazenly committed to an unilateral invasion of Iraq and letting the UN sweep up the mess afterwards with respect to nation-building efforts? The geopolitical value of Iraq, namely, its known oil reserves and its proximity to hotbeds of Islamic fundamentalist activities, would suggest some form of American military presence post-Saddam even if the primary objective is not related to reconstruction or nation-building. And why would the UN be duped into nation-building chores knowing our previous track record?



To: tekboy who wrote (52311)10/16/2002 7:01:19 PM
From: Jim DuBois  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 281500
 
Thanks for the response. I don't doubt that we can ultimately win militarily. I hope that the optimists are correct about the relative ease. And I am sure that no one on this thread will taunt or remind you if your educated hypothesis is wrong.;)

I will check out the monograph. And yes, it is the apparent lack of time and resources to the post war, and the microwave attention span after the flash and bang, that is making my stomach churn. As to WWII, I agree that strategy shifted for Europe, but did it do so for Japan, which seems more analogous. Unlike Europe there was a significant need for a cultural shift in a culture strikingly different than our own.



To: tekboy who wrote (52311)10/16/2002 9:58:03 PM
From: Bilow  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 281500
 
i tekboy; Re: "After that, if you assume no coup and eventual unconditional surrender of the military (with Saddam dead in a bunker), then the fun begins."

I agree with you that conquering Iraq should not be a problem, and that the military will unconditionally surrender fairly quickly. But the problem is the civilians, not the military.

Wars in which one side wins with "maneuver", followed by an occupation, tend to be the ones associated with high amounts of guerilla warfare. Examples of this would be the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71, and the German conquering of France in 1940. It takes about six months of occupation before guerilla warfare is organized. Both the above wars had this sort of delay, and we've seen it again with Israel's occupations.

When France was first invaded in WW2, Hitler kept his troops (at least in the West), on a short leash as far as atrocities go. The locals were surprised that the same German soldiers that had burned cities and libraries, taken hostages, used civilians in human shield attacks, and shot thousands in reprisal for imaginary incidents of guerilla warfare were now quite polite. Hitler was well aware of the bad propaganda effect of the WW1 atrocities, and that they had likely been caused by panic among German troops rather than by real guerilla warfare, and gave strict commands to his troops that they be on their best behavior.

It was only six months later, with the appearance of the Resistance, that the Germans began atrocities in occupied France / Belgium in WW2.

When soldiers get shot up by civilians, they tend to shoot back at the wrong civilians in reprisal. Our own troops have already shot up an apparently unarmed SUV in Kuwait when one of the Kuwaitis in it pulled out a cell phone. This sort of treatment tends to make a percentage of the locals suspect the foreign troops of evil designs on them, which increases the support they give to the resistance.

It's very easy for the guerillas to operate because all the foreign soldiers are suitable targets. On the other hand, the foreigners have great difficulty figuring out who is on their side and who they should shoot. They inevitably begin to realize that the only effective way they have of destroying the opposition is to simply kill people in cities that support the opposition. If they do enough of this, it will terrorize the locals into clamping down on the guerilla activity. But "enough" is a hell of a lot.

Violations of the Geneva Convention toward civilians supporting guerilla activity is not some bizarre and rare accident of warfare, but is extremely common in these situations. The undeniable fact that we're already having trouble with this in Kuwait, our very close ally, surely indicates that in Iraq itself, with 10 years of sanctions and hostilities between us and them, it would be a monumental problem.

-- Carl