To: Thomas M. who wrote (18280 ) 12/7/2002 6:12:20 AM From: GUSTAVE JAEGER Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 23908 Told you so.... (*)Saturday, December 07, 2002 Tevet 2, 5763 Unnecessary frictionBy Ze'ev Schiff Chief of Staff Moshe Ya'alon's criticism of American policy regarding Yasser Arafat, expressed at a closed session of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, has drawn the most attention, but the harshest exchanges actually took place at the meeting between Ya'alon and Secretary of State Colin Powell. When Powell said that Israel didn't understand the consequences of the most recent siege of the Muqata, Ya'alon replied, according to the Americans: "You're the one who doesn't understand!" The incident could have been chalked up to a nondiplomatic style of speaking, but something similar was happening in Israel at the same time. When Undersecretary of State for Middle East Affairs David Satterfield was visiting the region, he met with the general staff for a talk at which U.S. Ambassador Dan Kurtzer was also present. At a certain point in the discussion, the deputy head of intelligence, Brigadier General Yossi Kuperwasser, told the Americans that Washington was harming Israel's security interests. The American guests were stunned and Ambassador Kurtzer made his dismay with these comments very clear. You don't have to accept our assessments, he said, but we vehemently protest and reject the assertion that the United States is harming Israel's security. Incidentally, not all the generals who took part in the meeting agreed with the deputy intelligence chief. In this case, too, one might wish to say that it was only the manner of speaking that was the problem, but something else was at work as well. Before Satterfield's visit (which was part of a tour that included several Arab countries), a request was received for a meeting with Israel's new foreign minister, Benjamin Netanyahu. Incredibly, Netanyahu's bureau turned the request down, saying that the minister was very busy and that he would make time for a meeting only if was a matter of dire urgency. Among other things, Satterfield obviously wished to discuss the issue of Washington's "road map" to a resumption of negotiations. The foreign minister's refusal to meet with a senior American diplomat - and one who is considered sympathetic to Israel - is unprecedented. Perhaps Netanyahu was seeking "to stick one" to Sharon on a matter of crucial importance to him - relations with Washington. They certainly weren't surprised at the foreign minister's office when President Bush declined to take a phone call from him. The accumulation of these things, in addition to Sharon's delay in fulfilling his promise to Bush to transfer another payment of Israel's debt to the Palestinians, all attest to unnecessary friction in relations with Washington. This discord is also evident among Israel's top leadership regarding some very sensitive areas. In his remarks in Washington, the chief of staff insisted that the second operation against the Muqata was "not his baby." His proposal was to isolate Arafat, not to expel him - to aim for "killing him softly" as a leader. America was not opposed to the operation as a whole, just the Muqata part. President Bush sent a message to Sharon and Ambassador Kurtzer, who is an observant Jew, and went to Sharon's farm on Shabbat to deliver it. But Sharon still did not fully grasp the message. What's even odder is that whenever the chief of staff's bureau inquired about Washington's stance, Sharon's bureau claimed that everything was fine and that there was no American opposition. The same thing happened whenever a complaint of this sort was relayed to Israel's ambassador in Washington, Danny Ayalon. The details were not forwarded to the chief of staff's bureau. Finally, after several days of this, Ambassador Kurtzer requested a meeting with Ya'alon. It appears that only then did the Israel Defense Forces come to realize the depth of the American opposition to the operation at the Muqata. This didn't stop Ya'alon from criticizing the American administration, or from telling Colin Powell that it was American pressure concerning the Muqata that led to the collapse of the Palestinian opposition to Arafat and to the latter's sense that Washington had sat him "back on his horse."haaretzdaily.com (*) Message 15375667