Interesting Analysis of the Iraq situation from Stratfor.
The bottom line
The US wants to turn Iraq into a de facto colony like Kuwait.
Almost every other major nation opposes this.
Saddam is mainly interested in survivial.
The Battle of Saddam Hussein
Summary
As Stratfor has stated previously, the period between the
beginning of weapons inspections and the onset of war will be
dominated by diplomatic efforts to avert war -- efforts that
focus increasingly on finding a path for Saddam Hussein's
resignation and exile. That attempt is under way, led by nations
that want to avoid a U.S. occupation of Iraq. For Washington, the
important issue is not whether Hussein goes but whether it
controls Iraq afterward. For Hussein, the question is whether
there is any reason to leave.
Analysis
Behind the public obsession with weapons of mass destruction, one
of the United States' not-particularly-hidden goals in Iraq has
been regime change. Although that goal has been clear, what
precisely would constitute "regime change" is less obvious. What
exactly does the United States mean by regime change? What would
satisfy Washington?
Opponents of a war with Iraq, both European and Islamic, have
tried to use the WMD issue and the United Nations apparatus to
prevent a U.S. attack. It has become clear that this is not going
to work, and they therefore have turned their attention to
another war-avoidance strategy, trying to get Saddam Hussein to
resign and accept exile. In doing this, they would be able, in
their minds, to deliver regime change to the United States
without a war. This leaves three questions: First, why do these
countries oppose war; second, would the United States accept
Hussein's resignation as an end to the Iraq chapter; and third,
would Hussein accept exile under any circumstances?
The motives of the anti-war nations are far from humanitarian.
Many of the same countries that were agitating for war against
Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic suddenly find war with Iraq
intolerable. Their real motivation is fear that the United
States, once it occupies Iraq, not only will dominate the region,
but use Iraq as a base from which to extend its control
throughout the Arabian Peninsula, with inevitable political and
economic consequences. For European states like France, Germany
and Italy, an already unmanageable United States would swell in
power. For countries like Saudi Arabia or Iran -- none of which
have any use for Iraq -- the possibility of U.S. military power
on their borders, based in an Iraq completely under U.S. control,
is something they don't want to think about. If Hussein's regime
was destroyed through war, this would be the outcome.
Therefore, it would be best if war could be avoided. If the war
aim can be defined downward simply to involve Hussein's
resignation -- and if that resignation could be arranged -- war
could be avoided. A new personality would emerge to govern Iraq
and he undoubtedly would cooperate with weapons inspectors and
life would go on -- without the U.S. Third Infantry Division
parked on the border of Saudi Arabia or U.S. fighters patrolling
the skies over the entire region. Or without a U.S.-dominated
military government handing out contracts for oil field
reconstruction. It therefore makes perfect sense for Saudi,
Iranian, Russian and German leaders and a slew of others to try
to negotiate Hussein out of Baghdad.
The United States normally personalizes its foreign policy goals,
demonizing the leader and his immediate lieutenants but leaving
vague its position on the rest of the governing apparatus.
Therefore, the Bush administration has left it deliberately vague
as to what it means by regime change. Officials have referred to
the Japanese model, in which a U.S.-controlled military
government allowed the Japanese bureaucracy to continue to
function while eliminating a thin layer of leaders. Of course,
the Japanese model was built on unconditional surrender: It was
not negotiated, it was imposed.
The United States is utterly torn on the negotiated aspect of
this war. On the one hand, negotiation with some members of the
senior military or government officials is built into the war
plan. The U.S. government hopes that, at some point during the
war, there will be a coup in Baghdad that would allow U.S. forces
to enter without opposition. This would leave some members of the
regime and Ba'ath Party in office, but it would leave the U.S.
military in control of them and in control of Iraq through them.
That is why the Bush administration keeps mentioning Japan. The
United States controlled Japan completely but governed through
former Japanese government officials at the sub-cabinet level and
below.
Hussein's resignation, even if it included the top layer of his
government, would not provide the United States complete control
over the new regime, which is precisely why so many countries --
including Egypt and Saudi Arabia -- favor it. Egyptian diplomatic
sources in Europe tell Stratfor that a high-ranking Iraqi
official, possibly Ali Hassan al Majid, will meet with Egyptian
President Hosni Mubarak in Cairo on Jan. 18 or 19 to discuss
eleventh-hour strategies to avert a war. One of the most likely
strategies would be to secure Hussein's retirement while leaving
a strong-willed government led by Ba'ath party officials in
power.
But the issue is not personnel. The United States could live with
exactly the same leaders who might ascend after Hussein's
resignation if it could control them and bring troops into the
country. But Washington could not live with that leadership if it
were not under U.S. control and if U.S. forces were kept out of
the country.
Therefore, the U.S. response to any resignation by Hussein would
be to demand that a peacekeeping force be bought into Iraq to
guarantee that there are no weapons of mass destruction and to
aid in the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people. Washington
would want U.S. forces playing a leading role in this
peacekeeping force. The reasons would have little to do with WMD
and even less to do with humanitarian concerns; they would have
to do with making certain that, at the end of the day, Iraq was
under U.S. control.
Of course, since that is exactly the reason for war opponents to
engineer Hussein's exile -- to prevent U.S. domination -- the
engineers would be rushing their own forces into the country to
make certain that no vacuum was filled by the United States. The
brute power politics of all parties would be filled with the
rhetoric of humanitarianism, national self-determination, the
rights of the Iraqi people and so on.
All of this leaves the question of whether Hussein has any
interest in a deal. Unlike most issues in geopolitics, this has a
strong personal component. Hussein's personality frequently has
been likened to that of Hitler, usually by people who have met
neither. Hitler could have capitulated much earlier, saving
Germany the last months of the war. That would not have been
incompatible with a suicide, but he did not choose that route.
Would Hussein rather be dead than in exile? Would he rather die
at the end of a brutal war than before it, sparing his country?
It is easy to have opinions on this, but much harder to know what
he would do.
Let's begin here. Hussein is a risk-taker: Throughout his life he
has endangered his life in order to hold onto or increase his
power. Since he is not risk-averse, the fact that he might die in
a coming war is not going to be the determining factor; the
probability of his dying in that war or losing it and becoming a
prisoner is the determining factor. To be more precise, his
perception of the risks will determine what he will do. In the
past, he had a pretty good sense of the risks.
Hussein has nothing to gain from a war and a great deal to lose.
He will do anything to prevent or postpone a war. He has used the
U.N. inspections regime skillfully to delay the war and still has
hopes that it might prevent one. He undoubtedly will use the
possibility of resignation and exile in the same way -- holding
out hope to those who want to avoid a war, trapping the United
States in a position from which it cannot launch an attack
because a peaceful solution would appear imminent.
There is a risk for Hussein, though, in flirting with this idea:
If his followers come to believe that he actually is considering
leaving office, a power struggle for replacing him immediately
would emerge, and they even might stage an internal coup.
Therefore, Hussein will have to flirt publicly while making it
clear domestically that he has no intention of leaving. In fact,
he has to do this even if he expects to leave -- otherwise, his
entire bargaining position on the terms of his exile might
disintegrate. So external indications of interest will be coupled
with increased internal controls, making it impossible to tell
whether or not he is serious. Of course, since those negotiating
his exit are not really interested in exile as much as preventing
or delaying a war, they will collaborate with him in putting off
the decisive moment when he leaves the country -- they don't want
to know whether he is bluffing or not.
If Hussein was certain that (1) the United States will launch a
war and (2) that he will be defeated, that would be the
circumstance under which he would consider exile. He still is not
completely certain that the United States will attack -- or at
least, that it will attack before the summer. He also is not
certain that the United States would defeat him in a war.
From where Hussein sits, the United States is afraid to take
casualties. His view of history is that ever since Vietnam, the
United States has waged its wars in such a way as to prevent or
minimize casualties. When U.S. forces started taking casualties,
as in Beirut or Somalia, they withdrew. In Afghanistan, the
United States avoids casualties by staying close to its
strongholds. Regardless of whether this perception is true, this
is what Hussein -- and others -- believe about the United States.
Hussein believes he can inflict heavy casualties on the United
States. He apparently thinks that using chemical weapons against
U.S. forces during an advance on Baghdad, and forcing U.S. toops
into house-to-house fighting in the city, will raise the number
and fear of more casualties sufficiently that the United States
will accept a U.N.-sponsored cease-fire. In his view, Iraqi
forces are capable of achieving this. He may not be certain of
it, but recall that Hussein is a risk-taker. The probability is
high enough that he can inflict casualties and that the United
States will retreat in the face of those casualties that he is
willing to risk the war rather than accept exile.
One of the reasons for this is that human rights groups and
others have made it clear that anyone accused of war crimes
should stand trial before an international tribunal. Amnesty
International recently made this demand. From Hussein's point of
view -- and he has seen the fate of Milosevic -- regardless of
what Saudi or Russian leaders may promise, he eventually could
wind up in The Hague and spend the rest of his life in prison. As
unattractive as exile in Khartoum or Tripoli might be for him,
the former prospect is even worse. We suspect that if there is
any gray area, Hussein will hold on. It is a fascinating paradox
that the very forces that are most vigorously opposing a war also
are those that would make a compromise settlement impossible,
since Hussein certainly will demand amnesty before he goes and it
is not clear who, if anyone, can provide him that blanket
amnesty.
Therefore, it is possible that there will be a coup that forces
Hussein into exile -- and it is certain that Hussein will use the
exile issue to his advantage -- but it is difficult to imagine
circumstances under which he voluntarily would go into exile. It
is equally difficult to imagine a coup, at least until the war
begins. One might add that whoever stages the coup would be
nearly as morally unsavory as Hussein and would not solve any of
the issues on the table unless he acceded to U.S. demands. Since
accession to Washington's demands is precisely what those trying
to negotiate exile fear most, an internally forced exile that
satisfies everyone would be the hardest to reach.
The ultimate dilemma of exile is that nothing being offered to
Hussein is particularly safe or attractive. He apparently is not
convinced that he cannot fight the United States to a draw, and
he is not certain that there will even be a war. For Hussein, the
exile issue is a tool designed to confuse his audience and buy
time. |
