SI
SI
discoversearch

We've detected that you're using an ad content blocking browser plug-in or feature. Ads provide a critical source of revenue to the continued operation of Silicon Investor.  We ask that you disable ad blocking while on Silicon Investor in the best interests of our community.  If you are not using an ad blocker but are still receiving this message, make sure your browser's tracking protection is set to the 'standard' level.
Politics : Foreign Affairs Discussion Group -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: Jacob Snyder who wrote (116598)10/12/2003 7:49:16 AM
From: Elsewhere  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 281500
 
Here's the link to the original LA Times article:
latimes.com



To: Jacob Snyder who wrote (116598)10/12/2003 7:58:13 AM
From: lorne  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 281500
 
‘A gift from God’ renews a village
Iraqi engineers revitalize marshes that Hussein had drained
msnbc.com

ZAYAD, Iraq, Oct. 11 — The surging water from the Euphrates River first quenched the desiccated soil around this village. Then, with a steady crescendo, it smothered farming tracts, inundated several homes and enveloped the landscape to the horizon.
”HAMDULILLAH,” intoned Salim Sherif Kerkush, the stout village sheik. Thank God. Thin reeds now sprout on the glassy surface. Aquatic birds build nests on tiny islands. And lanky young boys in flowing tunics spend the first few hours of each day as generations of adolescent males in their families have: gliding across the water in narrow wooden boats to collect fish trapped in homemade nets.
“The water is our life,” Kerkush said as he gazed at the marsh that now encroaches to within a few feet of his house and stretches as far as the eye can see. “It is a gift from God to have it back.”
A dozen years after Saddam Hussein ordered the vast marshes of southeastern Iraq drained, transforming idyllic wetlands into a barren moonscape to eliminate a hiding place for Shiite Muslim political opponents, Iraqi engineers have turned on the spigot again.
The flow is not what it once was — new dams have weakened the mighty Tigris and Euphrates rivers that feed the marshes — but the impact has been profound. As the blanket of water gradually expands, it is quickly nourishing plants, animals and a way of life for Marsh Arabs that Hussein had tried so assiduously to extinguish.
In Zayad, a tiny hamlet about 210 miles southeast of Baghdad that was one of the first places to be flooded, residents have rushed to reclaim their traditions. Kerkush drove to the port city of Basra to buy a wooden boat known as a mashoof. His children assembled fish nets. Other relatives scoped out locations to build a house of reeds.
The marsh has once again assumed its omnipresent role in the village. Women clad in black head-to-toe abayas wade into the water to wash clothes. The mullet found in the murky depths, though small and bony, is grilled for dinner every night. Swamp grasses are cut to feed the cows and sheep that will eventually be traded for water buffalo.
“Everyone is so happy,” Kerkush said as he watched his son stand in a mashoof and steer it like a gondolier with a long wooden pole. “We are starting to live like we used to, not the way Saddam wanted us to live.”

A SIMPLE LIFE DESTROYED
Born in 1949, Kerkush remembers a childhood identical to those described by his father and his grandfather. It was, he believes, a way of life little changed since the days of the ancient Sumerians who lived near the marshes and were the first humans to practice irrigated farming.
The progress of the 20th century — the advent of cars and computers, of television and telephones — did not penetrate the dense reed beds and narrow waterways that protected their village.
“It was a very simple life,” he recalled. “We would fish. We would collect the reeds. We would plant rice.”
They rarely ventured more than a few villages from home, and outsiders rarely ventured into the marshes. In hamlets such as Zayad, home to about 120 families, everyone is related and marriage among cousins is common.
The marsh dwellers were largely unknown to the outside world, even to other Iraqis, until British explorer Wilfred Thesiger chronicled the seven years he spent with them in his 1964 book “The Marsh Arabs.” The marshes, he wrote, were a place where one could encounter “stars reflected in dark water, the croakings of frogs, canoes coming home at evening, peace and continuity, the stillness of a world that never knew an engine.”

Although Hussein’s government built dams along the Tigris and Euphrates in the 1970s, and paved roads through the wetlands in the 1980s to move supplies to the front lines during the eight-year war with Iran, the marshlands remained largely intact. In 1990, an estimated 300,000 people lived there.
Everything changed after the 1991 Persian Gulf War, when Shiite Muslims in the south rose up against Hussein’s government. Some Shiite leaders, particularly those who sneaked into the country from Iran, hid in the marshes, which were out of the reach of Hussein’s tanks and artillery. The Shiite leaders were welcomed — and aided — by the Shiite Marsh Arabs.
Even after Hussein’s army quashed the revolt by slaughtering thousands of Shiites and attacking their villages, the president was bent on retribution. He ordered the marshes drained.
To subvert nature, he approved the construction of a massive network of canals, pipelines and dams. State-owned businesses and private firms were required to dispatch all their bulldozers to work on the projects. Sunnis from Hussein’s strongholds in central Iraq, including Tikrit and Fallujah, were encouraged to travel south to help dig.
The engineering feat was enormous — and remarkably successful. The Euphrates, which spilled entirely into the southern half of the marshes, was diverted into a wide new canal called the Mother of All Battles River that stretched more than 100 miles around the former wetlands. Farther upstream, billions of gallons of Euphrates water was redirected in another canal and dumped into a depression in the desert.
The same strategy was employed on the Tigris River, parching the northern and eastern sections of the marshes.

Before Hussein’s drainage project, Iraq’s marshes were the Middle East’s largest wetland, covering about 7,500 square miles. By the late 1990s, satellite images indicated that less than 10 percent of Iraq’s marshland had any water. What remained was miles of parched, salty earth covered with clumps of scrub brush.
With no way to fish or farm, no reeds or birds, legions of Marsh Arabs had no choice but to leave the only place they considered home. Tens of thousands fled as refugees to Iran. By 1993, the United Nations estimated there were only 50,000 marsh dwellers left, and their numbers continued to dwindle over the following years.
In Zayad, the water level dropped as if someone had pulled a plug, residents said. Soon there was only mud. The reeds died. The birds flew away. The water buffalo had no place to roam.
Unlike their neighbors, the people of Zayad opted to stick it out instead of moving. Hunger was rampant. Some were forced to sell their possessions for food. Reed homes fell into disrepair because there were no building materials. Instead, the villagers built mud-brick huts.
“We went from having everything to having nothing,” Kerkush said. “Our land turned to desert. How can anyone live in the desert?”

REDIRECTING THE RIVER
In mid-April, a few days after Hussein’s government fell, Ali Shaheen returned to his job as director of the Irrigation Department in Nasiriyah. Located about 25 miles northwest of Zayad, Nasiriyah was the scene of some of the heaviest fighting during the war. But with the hostilities over and Shiites firmly in control of the local government, he decided to try to reverse the damage Hussein had wrought.
With a U.S. military escort, he drove to Garmat Bani Hassan, a town a mile away from Zayad. There, he ordered creaky metal gates on the Euphrates to be cranked open for the first time since 1991.
Shaheen, a short, balding civil engineer with a stubble-covered face, did the same thing with two other gates before embarking on a bigger engineering challenge — redirecting the Euphrates. He requisitioned several Irrigation Department bulldozers and smashed the dam Hussein had constructed to divert water to the Mother of All Battles River. For good measure, he had Hussein’s river blocked off with a mountain of dirt.
He had no orders to redirect the rivers. There was no functioning Irrigation Ministry at the time. But he assumed he was doing what the Marsh Arabs wanted.
“Drying the marshes was a crime,” said Shaheen, who joined the Irrigation Department in 1998, after the canals and dams were built. “I felt I needed to do whatever I could to restore what Saddam destroyed.”
As the Euphrates returned to its original course, water surged toward Zayad and other villages on the western side of the marshes that are closest to the river’s mouth. The arid flats were covered with more than three feet of water, swallowing the scrub brush and a few homes that were built after the marshes were dried.
Shaheen calculated that more than 1 quadrillion gallons — a 1 followed by 15 zeroes — were needed to fill the Euphrates side of the marshes. But the flow at Nasiriyah, which had been 106,000 gallons per second before 1991, was down to 21,000 gallons per second because of new dams and irrigation canals built in Iraq, Syria and Turkey over the past decade. “The water we have is not enough,” he said.
By midsummer, the water’s advance had slowed. Villages just a few miles east of Zayad are still dry, with residents wondering when they will be able to ride a mashoof again.
If the flow does not increase, Shaheen predicted it will take more than 100 years to flood the marshes. “It’s not an issue of opening the gates and dams over here,” he said. “We need more water from upstream.”
Iraq’s new minister of water resources, Latif Rashid, said increasing the flow will require Syria and Turkey to reduce their consumption. “We’d like our just share,” he said. “They should respect our needs.”
Shaheen and other Iraqi water experts said they believe Hussein told Syria and Turkey to take as much water as they pleased — a policy that many say now needs to be reversed. Compared to the mid-1980s, the volume of water flowing into Iraq through the Euphrates has fallen 50 percent, according to the Water Ministry.
Rashid said he was shocked to see the extent of the destruction when he recently flew over the former marshlands with L. Paul Bremer, the U.S. administrator of Iraq. “It’s hard to imagine how catastrophic it is,” he said.
He said he has set up a commission to develop a plan to restore the marshes in a way that ensures that new farms and villages are not flooded and that upstream demand does not deprive the wetlands of sustenance. But he warned that results would not come soon.
“It’s not a question of opening a dam or turning a knob,” he said. “This is going to take a long time.”

RESTORING MARSH LIFE
Sitting atop a reed mat on his concrete porch, Kerkush said he dreams of once again building a mudheef — a long, domed-roof structure made of tightly woven reeds that Marsh Arabs used to receive visitors. Clad in a crisp white tunic and a black-and-white head scarf, he would sit inside and entertain other sheiks with black coffee and tales of days past.
The mudheef was center of our social life,” he said. “We didn’t need television.”
Because of new roads and with his shop in a nearby trading town, outside influences have permeated the marshes faster than the water. He has heard of the Internet and would like to “bring it” to the village.
“I’d like a mudheef and the Internet,” he said with an optimistic gleam. “I don’t want to live entirely in the past.”
When his son piloted his boat back to shore, Kerkush walked over to examine the morning’s catch, just as his father did years ago. The metal bucket was half empty. The tiny mullet inside would be worth no more than 2,000 Iraqi dinars — about $1 — at the nearby market.
It was not his son’s fault, Kerkush said. “The marsh is not fully back to life,” he said. “The fish have not had enough time to grow.”
The rest of the marsh is similarly nascent. The reeds are not yet sufficient to rebuild the huts destroyed by Hussein’s army. The birds that have returned are not the right species to trap.
But as the scion of a clan that has lived here for perhaps 5,000 years, Kerkush said he is willing to be patient while engineers and politicians figure out how to pump more water into the marshes.
“Saddam did everything he could to kill us,” he said. “You cannot recover from that right away.”



To: Jacob Snyder who wrote (116598)10/12/2003 4:29:39 PM
From: Eashoa' M'sheekha  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 281500
 
Swimming with the Dolphins.

Ha'aretz Daily Newspaper Tuesday, June 9, 1998

Israel's new Dolphin submarines, built in Germany, will add a new dimension to the nuclear arms race in the Middle East
By Yossi Melman

At the beginning of 1999, when the navy will bring into active service the first of three Dolphin submarines constructed at German shipyards, the Middle East arms race will take on new proportions. One submarine, whose construction already is complete, is now conducting exercises in the North Sea. According to official navy reports, 45 crew members will serve on the Dolphin. It is 75 meters long and is powered by diesel and electric engines. Its carrying capacity while under water Ñ 1,700 tons. According to the same reports, the Dolphin will be fitted with pipes for launching 10 torpedoes.

Public discourse recently has centered on the implications of the Pakistani and Indian nuclear experiments on Israel and the Middle East in general. Most experts agree that the experiments on the Indian subcontinent will spur Iran in its attempts to arm itself with nuclear weapons, and subsequently, Iraq as well. According to American and Israeli intelligence estimates, Iran will have the capability to manufacture a nuclear bomb in another five to seven years.

This served as the background for a number of media scenarios, which centered on what Israel can do to prevent additional countries from going nuclear. This was the concept that guided Prime Minister Menachem Begin in June 1981 when he ordered the Israeli Air Force to bomb and destroy the Iraqi nuclear reactor, Tamuz. Based on the prime minister's reasoning, Israel has formulated the "Begin doctrine," that Israel will not allow any country in the Middle East to lay its hands on nuclear weapons.

It is generally accepted throughout the world that Israel has had nuclear weapons for more than a quarter of a century. (A new book, soon to be published in the United States, claims that Israel already had nuclear weapons during the Six-Day War, in 1967.) Israel's nuclear monopoly gave it its deterrent ability and military-psychological edge over its enemies. The loss of the nuclear hegemony Ñ even if it does not actually threaten Israel's existence Ñ certainly would threaten Israeli military superiority and its ability to dictate political conditions and settlements with the Arab world. The assumption by experts is that Israel will do everything in its power to prevent countries like Iran or Iraq from leveling the balance of terror. Consequently, there are those in the West who believe that sooner or later, Israel is likely to decide on a preemptive attack on Iran's nuclear sites, to keep it from developing nuclear weapons.

A number of Israeli leaders have dropped hints in that direction, as did former Air Force commander Major General Herzl Bodinger. What is clear is that it will not be an easy task. Iran has studied the lessons of the Israeli attack on the reactor near Baghdad: its nuclear installations are scattered over a number of different sites, unlike the situation in Iraq. But it can be assumed that all the difficulties notwithstanding, Israel's air force has the operational ability, with F-16 planes, to seek out and destroy these sites.

Under the assumption that it is not possible to prevent Iran from purchasing military nuclear capability, experts estimate that the Middle East will find itself embroiled in a nuclear arms race. This could mean the development of second nuclear strike capability.

According to foreign reports, Israel has always tried not to lag behind the state-of-the-art technology, and it is among the leaders in the world in the development of scientific and technological advances. Those reports also claim that Israel has a large array of such capabilities or the technological ability to attain them. According to American intelligence estimates, Israel has about 200 atom bombs, apparently including neutron bombs as well. It has varied means of launching, from planes and missiles. According to foreign reports, Israel has Jericho ground-to-ground missiles, Gabriel sea-to-sea missiles, and at least the knowledge and ability to develop cruise missiles.

The Washington Post, in an article eight years ago, quoted American and Western European intelligence experts and strategists "who claim that submarines could give Israel second nuclear strike capability." The article stated that "if Arab forces succeed in striking the nuclear reactor at Dimona, ground-to-ground missiles and air force bases, Israel could still respond with a cruise missile launched from a submarine."

The same article quoted two experts, Paul Rogers of Bradford University in England and Seth Kraus of the Naval College of Rhode Island, who estimated that Israel already then had the knowledge and technology necessary to develop a cruise missile. The cruise missile is unique in its capability to move along a set course at a low altitude, until it hits its target. That is why it is so hard to hit or intercept.

The American and West European experts estimate that if Iran or Iraq do attain nuclear weapons, Israel will not be able to stand aside and see the foundation of its deterrence undermined. While participation in the nonconventional arms race is costly, international experience in general, and recently that of the Indians and Pakistanis, shows that occasionally countries can be drawn into such a race to attain or conserve superiority or as the result of the over-ambitiousness of policy-making bureaucrats and technocrats.

The need to replace the old fleet of navy Gal submarines arose in the 1970s. A small book, published by the submarine flotilla organization, tells the story of the efforts to obtain new submarines. A committee headed by Major General Yisrael Tal, known to favor the development of advanced weapons systems, discussed the issue and recommended that the navy equipment be renewed. Practical preparations began in 1979, while Rafael Eitan was chief of staff. Under Eitan's guidance, a delegation set out in 1981 to locate suitable shipyards. However, despite the recommendations of the Tal committee, and the support of Chief of Staff Moshe Levy, who succeeded Eitan, and Minister of Defense Yitzhak Rabin, the execution was delayed. Officers of the General Staff objected to the submarine initiative, considered it superfluous and that it would cost money that could be better used for more important equipment.

In 1989, the German government decided to allow Israel to construct its submarines in one of its shipyards, but it was not clear where the funding would come from. Israel wanted to take the money from the American aid budget, but there were objections in the United States to funding a venture that would only benefit the German economy. Eventually, U.S. President George Bush's administration agreed to grant the money needed, after it became clear that there was no American shipyard capable of building the submarines for Israel. In February 1990, the first payment was made, and in August the second. But on November 30, 1990, Minister of Defense Moshe Arens decided to cancel the venture. It turned out that despite the American aid, Israel would have to pay for a considerable part of the deal out of its own defense budget.

Arens' decision was made as part of a series of cutbacks in the defense budget forced on him by the government. There was great agitation in the navy as a result. Navy commander Michah Ram said that being told of the cancellation was the worst moment in his life. Senior submarine flotilla members protested. They published an ad in the papers and, led by Brigadier General Yisrael Leshem, former commander of the submarine flotilla, demonstrated in front of the prime minister's office in Jerusalem. The protest was to no avail. A few months later, however, the defense cabinet met and canceled the defense minister's order. The cabinet decided to provide funds to build the submarines.

The decision to save the venture was brought about by the Gulf War, which began in January 1991. The German government, which felt guilty following disclosure that German companies had supplied the materials for Iraq's nonconventional weapons program Ñ including chemical weapons Ñ announced that it would fund the construction of two submarines for Israel. Colonel (Res.) Mike Eldar relates in his book, "Dakar," that consequently the two subs are known in the navy as "Sadaam" and "Hussein." Israel decided to pay for the third submarine itself.

There was a good reason for the navy to stress that the submarines were needed for more than just the navy. Former navy commander Major General Avraham Botzer, interviewed on "A New Evening" on Channel 1 in December 1990, made sure to couch his message in general terms. "The submarines must be a means of the State of Israel, not just the navy," he said. "Submarines all over the world serve as part of the deterrent system against nonconventional warfare," he added. "They are a way of guaranteeing that the enemy will not be tempted to strike preemptively with nonconventional weapons, and get away scot-free.

© copyright 1998 Ha'aretz. All Rights Reserved



To: Jacob Snyder who wrote (116598)10/12/2003 10:34:51 PM
From: epicure  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 281500
 
WMD's!!!!
oh no
I guess we should attack Israel?



To: Jacob Snyder who wrote (116598)10/13/2003 12:27:54 AM
From: Jacob Snyder  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 281500
 
The "Geneva Understandings" - a draft memorandum
for a permanent Israeli-Palestinian peace
agreement formulated by members of the Israeli
opposition and Palestinian officials:

* The Palestinians will concede the right of
return. Some refugees will remain in the
countries where they now live, others will be
absorbed by the PA, some will be absorbed by
other countries and some will receive financial
compensation. A limited number will be allowed
to settle in Israel, but this will not be
defined as realization of the right of return.

* The Palestinians will recognize Israel as the
state of the Jewish people.

* Israel will withdraw to the 1967 borders,
except for certain territorial exchanges, as
described below.

* Jerusalem will be divided, with Arab
neighborhoods of East Jerusalem becoming part
of the Palestinian state. Jewish neighborhoods
of East Jerusalem, as well as the West Bank
suburbs of Givat Ze'ev, Ma'aleh Adumim and the
historic part of Gush Etzion - but not Efrat -
will be part of Israel.

* The Temple Mount will be Palestinian, but an
international force will ensure freedom of
access for visitors of all faiths. However,
Jewish prayer will not be permitted on the
mount, nor will archaeological digs. The
Western Wall will remain under Jewish
sovereignty and the "Holy Basin" will be under
international supervision.

* The settlements of Ariel, Efrat and Har Homa
will be part of the Palestinian state. In
addition, Israel will transfer parts of the
Negev adjacent to Gaza, but not including
Halutza, to the Palestinians in exchange for
the parts of the West Bank it will receive.

* The Palestinians will pledge to prevent terror
and incitement and disarm all militias. Their
state will be demilitarized, and border
crossings will be supervised by an
international, but not Israeli, force.

* The agreement will replace all UN resolutions
and previous agreements.
haaretzdaily.com

My comment:
1. Overall, a much better basis for peace than the Road Map. It doesn't insist on disarmament of Palestinian groups as a first step.
2. the borders are logical, approximating the existing demographic frontier.
4. It needs to define exactly how many Palestinians get to settle inside Israel.
5. It needs to define exactly how the disarming of the new Palestinian State, and the ending of terror and incitement, will happen. Who will enforce and moniter it? What happens if these terms are violated? "Pledging" isn't good enough. They have to do it, with consequences if they don't.
6. This plan requires both the Palestinians and Israelis to do things they have, so far, proved unwilling to do: give up the right of return, and dismantle settlements.