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To: Dayuhan who wrote (14320)10/29/2003 3:43:00 AM
From: LindyBill  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 793708
 
There is no point in pretending that the welfare of the Iraqis had anything to do with it, since both we and they know it isn't true.

I operate on the Axiom that every action in the world is done for selfish reasons. But I think you are being too cynical here.

I know, from reading the accounts since the 1991 war, that there was a lot of guilt built up in, among others, Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz. They felt we should have gone to Baghdad in 91, and knew how badly the Iraqis were being treated. But it doesn't always work out the way we want it too.

"Give them money, are they grateful?
No, the're spiteful, and the're hateful,"



To: Dayuhan who wrote (14320)10/29/2003 5:44:43 AM
From: LindyBill  Respond to of 793708
 
I suspect Posner is pretty close to the truth. The bit about the Saudi's dying after we told the House of Saud about them is controversial, but I suspect true.
______________________________________________

BOOKS OF THE TIMES | 'WHY AMERICA SLEPT'
The Tragedy of National Complacency
By WALTER RUSSELL MEAD
WHY AMERICA SLEPT
The Failure to Prevent 9/11
By Gerald Posner
241 pages. Random House. $24.95.

Success, it is said, has a thousand fathers, while failure is an orphan. Gerald Posner's "Why American Slept: The Failure to Prevent 9/11" goes far to prove the opposite: the C.I.A., the F.B.I., Congress, the State Department, the media, the White House, the foreign policy establishment and the general climate of public opinion all contributed to the failure to prevent the devastating mass terror attacks of 2001.

It is very hard for outsiders to judge the reliability of books that claim to give the inside story of secret and dramatic events. Mr. Posner apparently relies heavily on James Woolsey, the former director of central intelligence, for much of his information; other sources would no doubt have given a very different spin to the story. The F.B.I. and the C.I.A. come under heavy criticism; both agencies emerge looking more like the Keystone Kops than elite organizations, but on balance Mr. Posner seems to blame the F.B.I. more.

He writes that some of the C.I.A.'s most serious breaches involved failing to hand over information to the F.B.I. in a timely way. Bureaucratic rivalry was part of the reason, but so, too, was what seemed at times to have been a well-founded fear that the F.B.I. would not use information effectively and might compromise it. Mr. Posner argues convincingly that the F.B.I.'s orientation toward solving crimes rather than preventing them is a major cultural obstacle that will have to be overcome if the F.B.I. is to become more effective in what looks more and more like intelligence and less and less like conventional police work.

Mr. Posner faults what he calls excessive concerns over civil liberties for tying the hands (or intimidating the agents) of law enforcement agencies. It is hard to evaluate these claims fully, but he makes a strong case that whatever happened after 9/11, the pendulum had swung too far in the direction of controlling and limiting the activities of law enforcement and intelligence activities before the attacks. The lesson for civil libertarians here may be that giving law enforcement a little more authority in peacetime will help avoid the sharp pendulum shifts that come after events like the September attacks.

"Why America Slept" closes with a riveting and disquieting account of the interrogation by American agents of the captured Al Qaeda leader and Osama bin Laden confidant Abu Zubaydah. Winning the wounded Mr. Zubaydah's cooperation by alternately giving and withholding pain medication, the agents succeeded in extracting limited amounts of information.

The trickle turned to a torrent when Mr. Zubaydah was deceived into thinking he was being interrogated by Saudis. He acted like a man delivered into a safe haven and started babbling the names of high-ranking Saudis who he believed would protect him. Once American officials shared this information with the Saudis, the people on the list rapidly began dying under mysterious circumstances before Americans could interrogate them.

The book's greatest defect is its failure to answer the question posed by the title. This is really the story of how America slept: how one agency after another missed obvious clues, concealed information, ignored danger signs. Why we allowed such a culture of failure and mediocrity to grow through so many bureaucracies is another question, and Mr. Posner doesn't really address it.

The answer may have something to do with the widespread American optimism after the fall of the Berlin Wall that history was over, and that the United States had won. Our economic system and our values were triumphant; nobody anywhere on the planet could threaten our security or challenge our ideas. As a result our diplomats, our intelligence agencies and our political leaders grew lax. We could afford to be "fault tolerant"; we could afford to indulge in pleasant fantasies about the kind of world we lived in.

Mr. Posner calls his book infuriating, and he is right. The level of sheer incompetence repeatedly demonstrated by everyone from senior officials to operatives on the ground makes a dismal story. On the brighter side, the message of "Why America Slept" is on balance a hopeful one. Incompetence in our security establishment is something we can address. If such a spectacular and long-running series of failures was necessary to provide the opening the terrorists used on 9/11, then it's not unreasonable to hope that we can defend ourselves much more effectively in the future.

Walter Russell Mead is the Henry A. Kissinger senior fellow in United States foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations and the author of "Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How It Changed the World."
nytimes.com



To: Dayuhan who wrote (14320)10/29/2003 6:44:21 AM
From: LindyBill  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 793708
 
I couldn't believe this when we did it. "The Spectator"
____________________________________

The Ottoman umpire

Owen Matthews on Washington’s embarrassment over Iraqi hostility to Turkish peacekeepers

The United States is suffering from a reverse Midas touch in Iraq. Just as things start to go right, fate intervenes to screw it up. So it was with Turkey’s agreement in principle earlier this month to share the burden of occupation, an event billed by the White House as a major turning point. Turkey, as a serious military power willing to contribute a 10,000-strong division (roughly equal to the current British presence), would dramatically alleviate the US’s acute manpower shortage. Better still, as one US diplomat enthusiastically explained to me, the Turks, as ‘Sunni Muslims from the same neighbourhood’ would be ‘welcomed’ by the Iraqis because they were ‘on the same cultural wavelength’.

It was in this belief — that Turkey was somehow the vital missing link which would make the occupation suddenly start to go right — that the US expended months of diplomatic effort, plus an $8.5 billion loan, persuading Ankara to come on board. Throughout this process, members of the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC), particularly but not exclusively the Kurds, were telling anyone who would listen that they opposed the presence of troops from any of Iraq’s neighbours in their country. So it should have come as no surprise that when the Turks finally came through with a qualified yes to deploying troops, the IGC came out unanimously against: 24 to 0. Nor were the Kurds the most strident opponents — Adel Abdul Mehti, a Shi’ite IGC member representing the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, complained that ‘the Americans are trying to act as the authority, not only de facto but the legitimate authority and they’re dictating things, trying to intervene. This is not acceptable to Iraqis.’ Even the three Turkoman representatives on the Council, though personally in favour, decided to vote against because they realised, as one of them put it, ‘opposition [to Turkish troops] in Iraq is too strong, there could be clashes and that is in no one’s interest.’

Talk about snatching defeat from the jaws of victory. Instead of welcoming a major new partner in the Coalition of the Willing, the US-led Coalition Provisional Authority, headed by L. Paul Bremer III, faces a breakdown in its relations with the only political institution in Iraq — the IGC — created by the US.

‘We take the governing council seriously,’ insisted Bremer last week as he gadded from Black Hawk to Land Cruiser in his trademark combination of dark blue suit and yellow suede Timberland boots. ‘We are in a partnership. We don’t see eye to eye on everything; why should we?’ Yet Washington must now either make arrangements for the deployment of Turkish troops against the wishes of the IGC, or abandon the idea of Turkish help altogether.

Neither is an attractive option. Despite the US’s widely advertised military superiority, the strain of keeping such a massive military presence in Iraq is beginning to show. Already reservists are facing the prospect of a full year ‘in country’, twice as long as a normal tour. The uncomfortable truth is that the US cannot easily sustain the current occupation on its own. It needs more bodies on the ground, and effective fighting troops too, not just the politically useful but practically useless handfuls of Mongolians, Latvians and Hondurans who are usually posted to supply depots and the like while GIs get on with the serious business of security and reconstruction. And apart from Turkey, there have been few takers for participation in Iraq. India has cried off, citing trouble in Kashmir, and Pakistan is still dragging its heels. Even after last week’s UN resolution, major military powers like Russia and France have yet to step up to the plate.

In the wake of the IGC’s very public rejection of the Turks’ offer of peacekeepers, Ankara’s government, sensing a brewing military and PR disaster, is backing off the idea of sending troops at all. The feeling seems to be mutual — Washington has, in the opinion of Turkish diplomats, been ‘dragging its feet’ about arranging the practicalities of Turkish deployment, while at the same time leaking to the press plans for scaled-down versions of Turkish participation.

Turkey’s politically powerful military are putting down stiff conditions of their own before they finally commit to sending troops. Particularly thorny is a demand by the Turkish military that all its troops must travel and be supplied overland, and that Turkish forces will be responsible for the security of the route. That’s a major problem for the Kurds, because the main road from Turkey into Iraq runs through their territory, and is one of the Kurds’ most strategic assets. Also, the Turkish military has often cited protecting the interests of Iraq’s Turkomans as one of the reasons for deploying in Iraq. That also worries the Kurds. What if there’s a repeat of the kind of Turkoman–Kurd clashes that took place in Kirkuk in August, leaving 11 dead, wondered one senior Kurdish official. ‘I fear the Turks would feel justified in rushing a few tens of kilometres north to intervene. That would be disaster.’ A third problem is Turkey’s demand that a refugee camp for Kurds who fled Turkey in the 1990s during a separatist conflict that claimed 30,000 lives be shut down, supposedly because it harbours militants wanted by Ankara. It’s ‘deeply worrying’, says the Kurdish official, that Turkey is beginning to ‘tell us how to run our own affairs even at this early stage.’

Now Ankara’s politicians, if not the military, also seem to be waking up to the fact that Washington’s plan may not be a great idea. Turkey’s army is a conscript one, which makes sending Mehmetchik (‘little Mehmet’, the generic Turkish trooper) to war an emotive national issue fraught with electoral disaster if it goes wrong.

‘We will not go where we are not wanted,’ said Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan over the weekend, reversing his earlier, high-handed position that ‘the US is our interlocutor’, not Iraq. As of this week, says a senior foreign ministry source, Ankara is likely to insist on a formal invitation from the IGC before sending troops. So for the time being, unless Mr Bremer can pull off a miracle of diplomacy and get the IGC to change their minds, the burden of occupation will remain on the shoulders of the US, with significant help from only Britain and Poland.

The debacle could have been avoided. The clash with the IGC was entirely predictable. The fact that Washington seems to have been taken by surprise by the vehemence of the Iraqis’ opposition suggests that the US should spend more time evaluating the realities on the ground, instead of trying to bend them to fit a view of reality that exists only in the optimistic imaginations of Beltway policymakers.

But there may yet be an up side to the affair, a rare instance of a positive manifestation of the law of unintended consequences. The IGC, as a result of its opposition to the US over Turkish troops, has never enjoyed more credibility or popularity among ordinary Iraqis, who were previously inclined to see it simply as US stooges. Since whatever government eventually grows up in Iraq to replace the coalition occupiers will grow out of the IGC in some shape or form, growing public trust in the Council, rather than some more radical alternative, must be a good thing. In the long term, the confidence the IGC has won by standing up to America may do Iraq more good than Turkish peacekeepers ever could.
spectator.co.uk



To: Dayuhan who wrote (14320)10/29/2003 8:16:15 AM
From: LindyBill  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 793708
 
"The Hashemite Restoration!" After all the kidding around I did about this last year, it would be amusing if it came about. The Authors are enough to make you pause and consider it.
____________________________________________

AFTER THE WAR

King and Country
The Hashemite solution for Iraq.

BY BERNARD LEWIS AND R. JAMES WOOLSEY
Wednesday, October 29, 2003 12:01 a.m.

Following the recent passage of the Security Council resolution on Iraq, the key issue continues to be how quickly to move toward sovereignty and democracy for a new government. The resolution's call for the Iraqi Governing Council to establish a timetable by Dec. 15 for creating a constitution and a democratic government has papered over differences for the time being.
But there are still substantial disagreements even among people who want to see democracy and the rule of law in Iraq as promptly as possible. The U.S. sees the need for time to do the job right. France, Germany and Russia want both more U.N. participation and more speed--a pair of mutually exclusive objectives if there ever was one. Some Iraqis call for an elected constitutional convention, others for a rapid conferring of sovereignty, some for both. Many Middle Eastern governments oppose democracy and thus some support whatever they think will fail.

There may be a path through this thickening fog, made thicker by the rocket and suicide-bombing attacks of the last three days. It is important to help Ambassador Paul Bremer and the coalition forces to establish security. But it is also important to take an early step toward Iraqi sovereignty and to move toward representative government. The key is that Iraq already has a constitution. It was legally adopted in 1925 and Iraq was governed under it until the series of military, then Baathist, coups began in 1958 and brought over four decades of steadily worsening dictatorship. Iraqis never chose to abandon their 1925 constitution--it was taken from them. The document is not ideal, and it is doubtless not the constitution under which a modern democratic Iraq will ultimately be governed. But a quick review indicates that it has some very useful features that would permit it to be used on an interim basis while a new constitution is drafted. Indeed, the latter could be approved as an omnibus amendment to the 1925 document.
This seems possible because the 1925 Iraqi constitution--which establishes that the nation's sovereignty "resides in the people"--provides for an elected lower house of parliament, which has a major role in approving constitutional amendments. It also contains a section on "The Rights of the People" that declares Islam as the official religion, but also provides for freedom of worship for all Islamic sects and indeed for all religions and for "complete freedom of conscience." It further guarantees "freedom of expression of opinion, liberty of publication, of meeting together, and of forming and joining associations." In different words, the essence of much of our own Bill of Rights is reflected therein.

We need not shy away from the 1925 constitution because it establishes a constitutional monarchy. Understandings could readily be worked out that would not lead to a diminution of Amb. Bremer's substantive authority in vital areas during the transition--some ministries may, e.g., transition to Iraqi control before others. In the document as it now stands the monarch has some important powers since he appoints the government's ministers, including a prime minister, and the members of the upper house, or senate. Many of these and other provisions would doubtless be changed through amendment, although the members of the current Governing Council might be reasonably appointed to some of these positions on an interim basis. Some new features, such as explicit recognition of equal rights for women, a point not clear in the 1925 document, would need to be adopted at the outset. During a transition, pursuant to consultations with Amb. Bremer and with groups in Iraq, the king could under the constitution appoint ministers, including a prime minister, and also adopt provisional rules for elections. The elected parliament could then take a leading role in amending the constitution and establishing the rules for holding further elections.

Using the 1925 constitution as a transitional document would be entirely consistent with permanently establishing as head of state either a president or a monarch that, like the U.K.'s, reigns but does not rule.

It is worth noting that monarchy and democracy coexist happily in a number of countries. Indeed, of the nations that have been democracies for a very long time and show every sign that they will remain so, a substantial majority are constitutional monarchies (the U.S. and Switzerland being the principal exceptions). And we should recall how important King Juan Carlos was to the transition from fascism to democracy in Spain. As odd as the notion may seem to Americans whose national identity was forged in rebellion against George III, there is nothing fundamentally undemocratic about a limited monarchy's serving as a transitional, or even a long-term, constitutional structure in Iraq or any other country.

Selecting the right monarch for the transitional government would be vitally important. Conveniently, the 1925 constitution provides that the people of Iraq are deemed to have "confided . . . a trust" to "King Faisal, son of Hussain, and to his heirs . . . ." If the allies who liberated Iraq recognized an heir of this Hashemite line as its constitutional monarch, and this monarch agreed to help bring about a modern democracy under the rule of law, such a structure could well be the framework for a much smoother transition to democracy than now seems at hand. The Sunni Hashemites, being able to claim direct descent from the Prophet Mohammed, have historically been respected by the Shiites, who constitute a majority of the people of Iraq, although the latter recognize a different branch of the family. It is the Wahhabis of Saudi Arabia, not the Hashemites, who have been the Shiites' persecutors.

The respect enjoyed by the Hashemites has been earned. They have had a generally deserved reputation for tolerance and coexistence with other faiths and other branches of Islam. Many Iraqis look back on the era of Hashemite rule from the 1920s to the 1950s as a golden age. And during the period of over 1,000 years when the Hashemites ruled the Hejaz, wherein the Muslim holy cities of Mecca and Medina are located, they dealt tolerantly with all Muslims during the Haj, or annual pilgrimage. Disagreements and tension under Hashemite rule have never come close either to the bloody conflicts of many centuries' duration in Europe between Catholics and Protestants or to the massacres and hatred perpetrated by the Wahhabis and their allies in the House of Saud.

Recently in a brilliant essay in the New Republic, Nobel Prize winner Amartya Sen has pointed out that tolerance and "the exercise of public reason" have given democracy solid roots in many of the world's non-European cultures, and that balloting must be accompanied by such local traditions in order for democracy and the rule of law to take root. The legitimacy and continuity which the Hashemites represent for large numbers of people in the Middle East, and the tolerance of "public reason" with which they have been associated, could provide a useful underpinning for the growth of democracy in Iraq.

Historically, rulers in the Middle East have held office for life and have nominated their successors, ordinarily from within the reigning family. This ensured legitimacy, stability and continuity, and usually though not invariably took the form of monarchy. In the modern era succession by violence has sadly become more prevalent. It would be reasonable to use the traditional Middle Eastern concepts of legitimacy and succession and to build on the wide and historic appreciation for the rule of law and of limited government to help bring about a transition to democracy. The identification of legitimacy with the Western practice of balloting has now occurred in many cultures around the world, but it may well occur sooner in Iraq if it is developed at least initially as an expanding aspect of an already legitimate constitutional order.

Some contend that a process that gave the U.N. a central role would somehow confer legitimacy. We are at a loss to understand this argument. Nearly 40% of the U.N. members' governments do not practice succession by election. In the Middle East only Israel and Turkey do so. Why waste time with U.N. member governments, many of them nondemocratic, working out their differences--and some indeed fundamentally oppose democracy in Iraq--when the key parties who need to do that are the Iraqis? Besides, real legitimacy ultimately will come about when Iraq has a government that "deriv[es] its just power from the consent of the governed." During a transition in which Iraq is moving toward democracy, a government that is operating under its existing constitution, with a monarch as called for in that document, is at least as legitimate as the governments of U.N. members that are not democracies at all.
Much would hinge on the willingness of the king to work closely and cooperatively with Amb. Bremer and to appoint a responsible and able prime minister. The king should be a Hashemite prince with political experience and no political obligations or commitments. In view of the nation's Shiite majority, the prime minister should be a modern Shiite with a record of opposition to tyranny and oppression. Such leaders would be well-suited to begin the process that would in time lead to genuinely free and fair elections, sound amendments to the 1925 Iraqi Constitution, and the election of a truly representative governing body. We would also strongly suggest that the choices of king and prime minister be made on the basis of character, ability and political experience--not on the basis of bias, self-interest, grudges or rivalries held or felt by some in the region and indeed by some in the U.S. government.
Mr. Lewis is a professor emeritus at Princeton and the author, most recently, of ?The Crisis of Islam? (Modern Library, 2003). Mr. Woolsey is a former director of the CIA.
opinionjournal.com



To: Dayuhan who wrote (14320)10/29/2003 10:39:29 AM
From: Nadine Carroll  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 793708
 
There is no point in pretending that the welfare of the Iraqis had anything to do with it, since both we and they know it isn't true.

No, it had something to do with it. The authors of the present policy feel great shame over America's failure to aid the Kurdish and Shia uprisings in 1991. It wouldn't have been enough, without compelling national interests. But it was there. Don't let me see you fall into the simple-minded trap of saying, either America's motives must be totally pure, or they're totally cynical.



To: Dayuhan who wrote (14320)11/1/2003 8:07:51 AM
From: Lane3  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 793708
 
You may find this column interesting. I know I did.

washingtonpost.com
A War of Choice, and One Who Chose It

By David Ignatius

Sunday, November 2, 2003; Page B01

HILLA, Iraq

It was a classic Paul Wolfowitz moment: He was speaking at a new women's rights center here nine days ago when someone asked for his advice on writing an Iraqi constitution. Wolfowitz, the professor turned Pentagon war planner, began quoting Alexis de Tocqueville's theories about democracy to the residents of this ancient city on the banks of the Euphrates River.

"There are people in the world who say that Arabs can't build democracy," Wolfowitz told the crowd. "I think that's nonsense. You have a chance to prove them wrong. So please do it."

That interaction captured the missing element in many analyses of the Iraq conflict. Commentators in Europe and the Arab world write darkly about America's designs on Iraqi oil, or a conspiracy to enrich Vice President Cheney's old friends at Halliburton, or a plot to help Israel. It would be nice, in a weird way, if the Iraq war were anchored to such worldly interests. But it isn't.

The reality is that this may be the most idealistic war fought in modern times -- a war whose only coherent rationale, for all the misleading hype about weapons of mass destruction and al Qaeda terrorists, is that it toppled a tyrant and created the possibility of a democratic future. It was a war of choice, not necessity, and one driven by ideas, not merely interests. In that sense, the paradigmatic figure of the war is Wolfowitz, deputy secretary of defense and the Bush administration's idealist in chief.

I traveled through Iraq with Wolfowitz on the whirlwind trip last weekend that concluded with a rocket attack Sunday on the hotel where we were staying in Baghdad. For people watching on television, that assault may have conveyed the vulnerability, and perhaps futility, of America's mission: We keep trying to help the Iraqis, it seems, and they keep shooting missiles back at us.

But seen through Wolfowitz's eyes, the rocket attack was just a blip -- no more daunting than the car bombs, assassinations and ambushes that are daily facts of life here for U.S. forces and their Iraqi allies. More important to Wolfowitz were the dozens of Iraqis and Americans he met who are risking their lives for the U.S. mission and the ideals that Wolfowitz holds dear. In that sense, the trip was fuel for Wolfowitz's intellectual engine.

As we were flying back to Washington in a lumbering C-17, I asked Wolfowitz if he ever worried that he was too idealistic -- that his passion for the noble goals of the Iraq war might overwhelm the prudence and pragmatism that normally guide war planners. He didn't answer directly, except to say that it was a good question. And it's a starting point for some reflections on Wolfowitz and his war, seven bloody months after U.S. troops invaded Iraq.

Wolfowitz is a rare animal in Washington -- a genuine intellectual in a top policymaking job. He was dean of the Paul H. Nitze School for Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University before taking his current Pentagon post, and he has the kind of curious mind that makes him as good a listener as talker. He is also a man who for more than a decade, ever since he served as ambassador to Indonesia, has been fascinated with the Muslim world.

That passion undercuts the widespread notion that Wolfowitz is simply a neoconservative tool of Israel. He is instead a kind of amateur Orientalist: He reads about the Arab world, bleeds for its oppression and dreams of liberating it. He seeks out Arab intellectuals who can advise him on policy, and he says he opposes Israeli settlements. Wolfowitz, as an outsider, may romanticize the Arab world, but there's no denying his intellectual interest.

His idealism about the potential for change in the Middle East was on display throughout his recent trip. He told the gathering at the women's rights center in Hilla, for example, that democracy wasn't just about elections -- which are somewhat discredited in Arab countries by the experiences of Egypt, Jordan and even Saddam Hussein's Iraq. Ultimately, he argued, democracy was about justice.

"To Americans, the most important thing about democracy is to guarantee human rights and justice for all," he said. At other stops, he made a similar pitch about the role of courts and legal institutions in a free society.

Wolfowitz's emphasis on justice emerged in part from conversations he had in September with Jamil Mroue, publisher of the Daily Star in Beirut. Over a four-hour dinner in Washington, Mroue argued that if America simply stressed security in Iraq, it would be no different than the authoritarian rulers who govern in the name of security throughout the Arab world. The missing ingredient was justice, said Mroue. Taken with the argument, Wolfowitz arranged for Mroue to meet with his top aides.

Mroue is only one Arab influence on Wolfowitz's thinking. Wolfowitz's initial mentor on Iraq was Ahmed Chalabi, the long-exiled leader of the Iraqi National Congress and a man with powerful ties to the neoconservative establishment in Washington. A brilliant if abrasive intellectual, Chalabi helped convince Wolfowitz that the Iraqi people longed for liberation and would rally behind an American invasion.

Chalabi had a receptive audience. Wolfowitz, as under secretary of defense in the first Bush administration, had advocated toppling Hussein after the first Gulf War in 1991. He thought then and for most of the '90s that the regime could be overthrown by Iraqi insurgents, without sending U.S. troops to Baghdad. But after 9/11, Wolfowitz decided it was too dangerous to wait, and began arguing forcefully within the administration for an Iraq invasion.

The once close relationship between the administration and Chalabi has cooled, in part because of Chalabi's inability to get along with the head of the U.S. occupation authority, L. Paul Bremer III. (Indeed, President Bush is said to have used crude language in expressing his anger toward Chalabi in a conversation in September with Jordan's King Abdullah. Chalabi professes to be unconcerned about his new unpopularity in Washington. "Do you know that Adenauer was arrested by the British in 1945?" he told me at a reception in Baghdad a week ago, referring to the man who eventually became the architect of postwar Germany, Konrad Adenauer.)

The Iraqis who matter to Wolfowitz now are the indigenous leaders who can take over responsibility for Iraq's governance and security. Here, too, Wolfowitz's views were shaped by a conversation with an Arab intellectual -- a Lebanese professor and former cabinet minister named Ghassan Salame, who outlined a plan for a rapid transfer of sovereignty to the Iraqis when he met with Wolfowitz for two hours in September. Much of Wolfowitz's schedule a week ago was meant to highlight this new strategy. Wolfowitz visited Iraqi police stations in Hilla, Kirkuk and Baghdad, and a Civil Defense Corps training camp in Tikrit.

At each stop, he argued that only the Iraqis can provide security for their country. That is undoubtedly true, but I suspect that Wolfowitz may be overly optimistic about how quickly the new security forces will be ready to take over from American troops. The Iraqis recruits are courageous and well-meaning -- but at this point they are no match for the insurgents.

Still, Wolfowitz feels an almost visceral sense of loyalty to his Iraqi allies. And that helps explain why he is so determined to stay the course. Everywhere he went he saw reminders of the cost Iraqis have paid. The Hilla meeting, for example, was chaired by a local leader, Iskander Witwit, who lost 34 members of his family to Hussein's forces after the 1991 Shiite uprising in southern Iraq. Witwit carries with him a photo of his late brother, who was decapitated by Hussein, to remind himself what he's fighting for.

Wolfowitz asked the audience in Hilla how many had lost close relatives to Hussein's secret police. About half the people in the room raised their hands.

The Pentagon number two also stopped near Kirkuk for a moving visit to a site where U.S. troops had been ambushed days before. He heard the story of how Lt. David Bernstein, a young officer who graduated eighth in his class at West Point, died saving the life of one of his men. His voice heavy with emotion, Wolfowitz told the commander of the unit that had been ambushed, "We're going to win this."

Wolfowitz's Iraq is haunted by the ghosts of those who have died fighting for the dream of a free Iraq. That's the paradox of intellectuals in politics -- the abstract ideals they preach become encrusted with the blood of those who fight to make them real.

I find it impossible to fault on moral grounds the case for toppling Saddam Hussein last March, and for staying the course now. America did a good deed in liberating Iraqis from a tyrannical regime. But Hussein never posed the sort of imminent danger to America that administration rhetoric implied, and Wolfowitz must share the blame for exaggerating that threat. However dubious the arguments for war may seem in retrospect, I believe it would be wrong to abandon Iraq now, when a relatively small number of insurgents are waging a ruthless campaign to subvert the change and reconstruction that most Iraqis seem to want.

One lesson of this painful year is that too much moralizing is dangerous in statecraft. The idealism of a Wolfowitz must be tempered by some very hard-headed judgments about how to protect U.S. interests. Wolfowitz said in an interview with a Vanity Fair reporter earlier this year that he was a "practical idealist" and that, for him, policymaking wasn't "just a matter of doing business and being sensible." His commitment to principle is admirable, but sound policy can't be premised on the dream of human perfectibility, in Iraq or anywhere else.

America's problems in Iraq stem in large part from wishful thinking, and Wolfowitz and his colleagues must be careful to avoid any more of it now as they try to craft a sustainable strategy. What worries me most after touring Iraq with Wolfowitz is how little the U.S. forces know about their adversaries here. Pressed at a briefing about who is controlling the resistance, a general answered, "We don't have the intelligence to lay this out on a chart." That was chilling.

Now that the going is difficult in Iraq, the Bush administration needs to think more with its head and less with its heart. The idealists can win this war, but only if they act with brutally honest pragmatism.

Author's e-mail:

davidignatius@washpost.com

David Ignatius is a columnist for The Post and a former executive editor of the International Herald Tribune.

© 2003 The Washington Post Company