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Politics : Formerly About Advanced Micro Devices -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: combjelly who wrote (346880)8/15/2007 5:26:28 PM
From: goldworldnet  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 1574679
 
A Letter from Don Lester

John Mills wrote: "War is an ugly thing, but not the ugliest of things. The decayed and degraded state of moral and patriotic feeling which thinks that nothing is worth war, is far WORSE. The person who has nothing for which he is willing to fight, nothing which is more important than his own personal safety, is a miserable creature, and has no chance of being free unless made or kept so by the exertions of better men than himself."

America is in a worldwide struggle for her very survival. Today, the military calls it a Global War on Terror (GWOT). Your freedom and mine is in great peril both from within and without. The terrorists are motivated by hate and the desire of world domination. They must be taken seriously!

My name is Don Lester. I fought and was decorated for my service in Vietnam. Our forces, the American Military, never lost a battle in that war. Yet, the enemy watched our media and recognized our 'will to win' was being destroyed from within.

I personally met one of the officers in charge of the Vietcong who were fighting in South Vietnam. He said their forces were ready to "surrender" after the 68 Tet Offensive. But, they saw the Media portrayal of young men burning their draft cards and burning the flag. Then, they heard the media portray the Tet Offensive as a success for the Vietcong. He told me the Vietcong resurrected their offensive because they knew that "a nation divided cannot stand".

What does this have to do with us today? Well, it seems to me that the same Far Lefts' agenda is the same as it was during the Vietnam War. The Pelosi's, Kerry's, Kennedy's, Murtha's and others seem to want us to lose this fight for freedom.

I pray that our generation doesn't go down as the 'surrender generation'.

What about you? Do you believe America is in a war against terror - that if lost – could end the culture as we know it? Do you believe that the president of Iran says their goal is to wipe out the "little satan”, Israel and the “big satan”, America?

Thank you to all who have been supporting VETERANS FOR VICTORY PAC. It was your help that allowed us to support four winners in last November's congressional election. We could do nothing without you. Please write to us and give us your input. We thank all of our Veterans for their great dedication and unselfish service to this Nation. May the Lord richly bless all of you and your families.

Don Lester

veteransforvictory.com

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To: combjelly who wrote (346880)8/15/2007 5:37:59 PM
From: goldworldnet  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 1574679
 
For those too young to remember him, Vo Nguyen Giap was the North Vietnamese minister of defense. The Tet offensive in which the Viet Cong were virtually wiped out, along with a fair number of North Vietnamese regulars, was his idea. In his words, he believed there would be a popular uprising in support of the offensive. Still according to him, North Vietnam was ready to surrender after the failure of Tet. But then they noticed the reaction to Tet in the American press, among American lawmakers, and with the American public. The North Vietnamese, he says, realized that if they could hang in there they would win ultimately because of the negativity being directed against the war, primarily through the press. So we lost a war in which we won every battle. Jack Murtha and many members of Congress are acting as if they're trying to effect the same result again.

Pete Farris, St. Michaels, MD (Sent Tuesday, February 20, 2007

hardblogger.msnbc.msn.com

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To: combjelly who wrote (346880)8/15/2007 5:51:51 PM
From: goldworldnet  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 1574679
 
How North Vietnam Won The War

Taken from The Wall Street Journal, Thursday August 3, 1995
What did the North Vietnamese leadership think of the American antiwar movement? What was the purpose of the Tet Offensive? How could the U.S. have been more successful in fighting the Vietnam War? Bui Tin, a former colonel in the North Vietnamese army, answers these questions in the following excerpts from an interview conducted by Stephen Young, a Minnesota attorney and human-rights activist. Bui Tin, who served on the general staff of North Vietnam's army, received the unconditional surrender of South Vietnam on April 30, 1975. He later became editor of the People's Daily, the official newspaper of Vietnam. He now lives in Paris, where he immigrated after becoming disillusioned with the fruits of Vietnamese communism.

Question: How did Hanoi intend to defeat the Americans?
Answer: By fighting a long war which would break their will to help South Vietnam. Ho Chi Minh said, "We don't need to win military victories, we only need to hit them until they give up and get out."

Q: Was the American antiwar movement important to Hanoi's victory?
A: It was essential to our strategy. Support of the war from our rear was completely secure while the American rear was vulnerable. Every day our leadership would listen to world news over the radio at 9 a.m. to follow the growth of the American antiwar movement. Visits to Hanoi by people like Jane Fonda, and former Attorney General Ramsey Clark and ministers gave us confidence that we should hold on in the face of battlefield reverses. We were elated when Jane Fonda, wearing a red Vietnamese dress, said at a press conference that she was ashamed of American actions in the war and that she would struggle along with us.

Q: Did the Politburo pay attention to these visits?
A: Keenly.

Q: Why?
A: Those people represented the conscience of America. The conscience of America was part of its war-making capability, and we were turning that power in our favor. America lost because of its democracy; through dissent and protest it lost the ability to mobilize a will to win.

Q: How could the Americans have won the war?
A: Cut the Ho Chi Minh trail inside Laos. If Johnson had granted [Gen. William] Westmoreland's requests to enter Laos and block the Ho Chi Minh trail, Hanoi could not have won the war.


Q: Anything else?
A: Train South Vietnam's generals. The junior South Vietnamese officers were good, competent and courageous, but the commanding general officers were inept.

Q: Did Hanoi expect that the National Liberation Front would win power in South Vietnam?
A: No. Gen. [Vo Nguyen] Giap [commander of the North Vietnamese army] believed that guerrilla warfare was important but not sufficient for victory. Regular military divisions with artillery and armor would be needed. The Chinese believed in fighting only with guerrillas, but we had a different approach. The Chinese were reluctant to help us. Soviet aid made the war possible. Le Duan [secretary general of the Vietnamese Communist Party] once told Mao Tse-tung that if you help us, we are sure to win; if you don't, we will still win, but we will have to sacrifice one or two million more soldiers to do so.

Q: Was the National Liberation Front an independent political movement of South Vietnamese?
A: No. It was set up by our Communist Party to implement a decision of the Third Party Congress of September 1960. We always said there was only one party, only one army in the war to liberate the South and unify the nation. At all times there was only one party commissar in command of the South.

Q: Why was the Ho Chi Minh trail so important?
A: It was the only way to bring sufficient military power to bear on the fighting in the South. Building and maintaining the trail was a huge effort, involving tens of thousands of soldiers, drivers, repair teams, medical stations, communication units.

Q: What of American bombing of the Ho Chi Minh trail?
A: Not very effective. Our operations were never compromised by attacks on the trail. At times, accurate B-52 strikes would cause real damage, but we put so much in at the top of the trail that enough men and weapons to prolong the war always came out the bottom. Bombing by smaller planes rarely hit significant targets.

Q: What of American bombing of North Vietnam?
A: If all the bombing had been concentrated at one time, it would have hurt our efforts. But the bombing was expanded in slow stages under Johnson and it didn't worry us. We had plenty of times to prepare alternative routes and facilities. We always had stockpiles of rice ready to feed the people for months if a harvest were damaged. The Soviets bought rice from Thailand for us.

Q: What was the purpose of the 1968 Tet Offensive?
A: To relieve the pressure Gen. Westmoreland was putting on us in late 1966 and 1967 and to weaken American resolve during a presidential election year.

Q: What about Gen. Westmoreland's strategy and tactics caused you concern?
A: Our senior commander in the South, Gen. Nguyen Chi Thanh, knew that we were losing base areas, control of the rural population and that his main forces were being pushed out to the borders of South Vietnam. He also worried that Westmoreland might receive permission to enter Laos and cut the Ho Chi Minh Trail. In January 1967, after discussions with Le Duan, Thanh proposed the Tet Offensive. Thanh was the senior member of the Politburo in South Vietnam. He supervised the entire war effort. Thanh's struggle philosophy was that "America is wealthy but not resolute," and "squeeze tight to the American chest and attack." He was invited up to Hanoi for further discussions. He went on commercial flights with a false passport from Cambodia to Hong Kong and then to Hanoi. Only in July was his plan adopted by the leadership. Then Johnson had rejected Westmoreland's request for 200,000 more troops. We realized that America had made its maximum military commitment to the war. Vietnam was not sufficiently important for the United States to call up its reserves. We had stretched American power to a breaking point. When more frustration set in, all the Americans could do would be to withdraw; they had no more troops to send over. Tet was designed to influence American public opinion. We would attack poorly defended parts of South Vietnam cities during a holiday and a truce when few South Vietnamese troops would be on duty. Before the main attack, we would entice American units to advance close to the borders, away from the cities. By attacking all South Vietnam's major cities, we would spread out our forces and neutralize the impact of American firepower. Attacking on a broad front, we would lose some battles but win others. We used local forces nearby each target to frustrate discovery of our plans. Small teams, like the one which attacked the U.S. Embassy in Saigon, would be sufficient. It was a guerrilla strategy of hit-and-run raids.

Q: What about the results?
A: Our losses were staggering and a complete surprise;. Giap later told me that Tet had been a military defeat, though we had gained the planned political advantages when Johnson agreed to negotiate and did not run for re-election. The second and third waves in May and September were, in retrospect, mistakes. Our forces in the South were nearly wiped out by all the fighting in 1968. It took us until 1971 to re-establish our presence, but we had to use North Vietnamese troops as local guerrillas. If the American forces had not begun to withdraw under Nixon in 1969, they could have punished us severely. We suffered badly in 1969 and 1970 as it was.

Q: What of Nixon?
A: Well, when Nixon stepped down because of Watergate we knew we would win. Pham Van Dong [prime minister of North Vietnam] said of Gerald Ford, the new president, "he's the weakest president in U.S. history; the people didn't elect him; even if you gave him candy, he doesn't dare to intervene in Vietnam again." We tested Ford's resolve by attacking Phuoc Long in January 1975. When Ford kept American B-52's in their hangers, our leadership decided on a big offensive against South Vietnam.

Q: What else?
A: We had the impression that American commanders had their hands tied by political factors. Your generals could never deploy a maximum force for greatest military effect.

grunt.com

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To: combjelly who wrote (346880)8/15/2007 5:52:49 PM
From: longnshort  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 1574679
 
The Tet offense was one of the biggest one way lost of any war ever



To: combjelly who wrote (346880)8/15/2007 5:54:42 PM
From: longnshort  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 1574679
 
The misreporting, along with Communist and North Vietnamese agents in the United States, led to demonstrations in the streets by Americans in protest of the war. Gen. Giap later wrote in his book, that the news media reporting and the demonstrations in America surprised them. Instead of seeking a conditional surrender, they would now hold out because America's resolve was weakening and the possibility of victory could be theirs.



To: combjelly who wrote (346880)8/15/2007 5:55:16 PM
From: longnshort  Respond to of 1574679
 
The Wall Street Journal published an interview with Bui Tin who served on the General Staff of the North Vietnam Army and received the unconditional surrender of South Vietnam on April 30, 1975. During the interview Mr. Tin was asked if the American antiwar movement was important to Hanoi's victory. Mr. Tin responded "It was essential to our strategy", referring to the war being fought on two fronts, the Vietnam battlefield and back home in America through the antiwar movement on college campuses and in the city streets. He further stated the North Vietnamese leadership listened to the American evening news broadcasts "to follow the growth of the American antiwar movement." Visits to Hanoi made by persons such as Jane Fonda, former Attorney General Ramsey Clark and various church ministers "gave us confidence that we should hold on in the face of battlefield reverses." Mr. Tin surmised, "America lost because of its democracy; through dissent and protest it lost the ability to mobilize a will to win." Mr. Tin further advised that General Vo Nguyen Giap (Commanding General of the North Vietnam Army) had advised him the 1968 Tet Offensive had been a defeat.

From 1969 to the end of the war, over 20,000 American soldiers lost their lives in a war that the United States did not have the resolve to win. If General Giap was accurate in his assessment that North Vietnam was going to seek a conditional surrender but stopped due to the sensationalism of the American news media and the anti-war protests following the 1968 Tet Offensive, it follows that those who participated in these anti-war activities and misreporting have to share partial responsibility for those 20,000 + Americans deaths.

We won the war on the battlefield but lost it back home on the college campuses and in the city streets.



To: combjelly who wrote (346880)8/15/2007 5:56:02 PM
From: goldworldnet  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 1574679
 
The Measure of a Nation

April 15, 2004 marked the return to an old strategy by a new enemy. If the democracies of the world could not be defeated in battle, al Qaeda would use the carrot and stick approach to bring down Western civilization using the fear of further megaterror while capitalizing on the anti-war sentiment in Europe and the United States to undermine popular support for America's war on terrorism.

On that day, Osama Bin Laden released a high quality 7-minute videotape through al Jazeera TV that offered a truce with America's European allies provided that they refrained from attacking "Muslim countries" including "intervening in their affairs." The tape attempted to make the case that Israel's assassination of the spiritual leader of Hamas (Sheik Ahmed Yassin) on March 22, 2004 and America's attempt to "make billions of dollars in profit" in Iraq through major corporations like Halliburton, demonstrated a "narrow personal interest and subservience to the White House gang...What happened on September 11 and March 11 was your goods delivered back to you," he said.

He referred to the 2004 electoral defeat of the center-right, staunchly anti-terrorist government of Spain as a " positive development." That defeat occurred three days after the Madrid bombings and was widely viewed as a strategic victory for terrorism. While European leaders quickly rejected the not-so-blatant strategy, the tape nevertheless represented a new effort by al Qaeda to capitalize on political dissent in America and Europe (to the American enterprise in Iraq) by using negative propaganda, hidden threats and presumptive awards. Bin Laden referred to demonstrations in Europe as "positive interaction" and mentioned "opinion polls, which indicated that most European peoples want peace."

For many that recall the Vietnam era, this approach is deja vu. In a recent article in the Washington Times, Arnaud de Borchgrave noted that during the Vietnam War, General Giap relied on the American peace movement to weaken American resolve. That had the effect of turning an American military victory into a political defeat. Former North Vietnamese General Staff officer Bui Tin once said that the peace movement was "essential to our strategy." In America, the open support of Hanoi by Jane Fonda, former Attorney General Ramsey Clark (now head of International ANSWER, which coordinates the largest protests) and others "gave us confidence that we should hold on in the face of battlefield reverses," Bui Tin said. "Through dissent and protest," the US "lost the ability to mobilize a will to win."

As a result, the surprise 1968 Tet Offensive (which involved suicidal attacks by the Viet Cong in some 70 cities and towns, and 30 other strategic objectives simultaneously) turned the political tide of the war against America and eventually led to the protest movement that (in turn) led to the American defeat in Vietnam. From a military perspective, it is important to note that the Tet Offensive was a singularly unmitigated disaster both for Hanoi and for its Viet Cong troops in South Vietnam. Not one of the objectives of the Viet Cong in that Offensive was achieved. Yet, it proved to be a major turning point in the war.

Being the first major "television war," Americans watched the carnage in horror and concluded (incorrectly) that it was a military disaster for America. One of America's most trusted newsmen, CBS's Walter Cronkite, even appeared for a standup piece with distant fires as a backdrop. Donning a helmet, Cronkite declared the war lost. Eugene McCarthy carried New Hampshire and Bobbie Kennedy stepped forward to challenge the policies of an already distraught President. Six weeks later, Lyndon Johnson, in the midst of national protest, announced that he would not seek re-election. His ratings had plummeted to 30 percent after Tet. Approval of his handling of the war had dropped to 20 percent. He had concluded that the war was unwinnable.

In the end, American support for the Vietnam War faded. Giap admitted in his memoirs that news media reporting of the war and the antiwar demonstrations that ensued in America surprised him. Instead of negotiating what he called a "conditional surrender," Giap said they would now go the limit because America's resolve was weakening and the possibility of complete victory was within Hanoi's grasp.

Bui Tin, who served on the general staff of the North Vietnamese army, received South Vietnam's unconditional surrender on April 30, 1975. In an interview with the Wall Street Journal after his retirement, he made clear that the antiwar movement in the United States (which led to the collapse of political will in Washington) was "essential to our strategy."

These lessons have not been lost to a new era of Islamic fascists for we can see the implications arising, once again, in Iraq. America can win the war in Iraq. The question is whether we will lose the war here at home as we did during Vietnam. The terrorist opponents of a new Iraq are cleverly playing to American fears of another Vietnam and our media and some of our elected representatives are unwittingly buying into the strategy.

With each attack on the President, with our constant self-flagellation over Abu Ghraib and Fallujah, our enemies become more emboldened and see discord and division in America not as an exercise of democratic dissent but as a sign of weakness and lack of resolve. Critics fail to recognize how such attacks are perceived by Iraqis watching the Arab media while American soldiers are risking their lives to liberate Iraq and to create a new Middle East.

We do have a grave problem in this country, but it is not the plan for Iraq nor the architects of the Bush Doctrine. In somber tones, the American media constantly assures us that the worst is yet to come; that body bags should determine American foreign policy, and that Iraq is a "quagmire." Coverage of our effort to stabilize and democratize Iraq is being treated like a national affliction. Using cheap criticism, pious moralizing and election year politicking, defeatism is smothering all reason, all perspective, any sense of balance - and so success in the Iraqi war is not assessed in terms of years (as it was during World War II), but in terms of a few months.

With such an attitude, American resolve would never have survived the loss of 6,000 American soldiers on Omaha Beach on June 6, 1944. In fact, this generation would never have made it to Omaha Beach. We would have held back on Operation Overlord pending congressional hearings to determine what went wrong and who was to blame for the Pearl Harbor disaster or for the Japanese internment. We would still be apologizing for the death of civilians caused by the carpet bombing of strategic towns in France prior to D-Day, and no doubt, we would have recalled General Eisenhower to explain his harsh treatment of Axis prisoners even as the Nazis plotted their future conquest of the world.

We live in a world where one Filipino captive on TV can determine the policy of an entire nation, where one bombing in Madrid can alter an election. We have moved centuries away from understanding how Londoners who survived the Blitz won a war or how Americans who endured Saipan, Gualdalcanal, Iwo Jima and Okinawa defeated the Japanese Empire. Today, we want success, but only if it is painless (and the bar keeps getting lower with each passing day).

The terrorists are counting on this, and they know that the media can deliver for them. Each time an American dies on an Iraqi battlefield, it is portrayed like an American Division being destroyed, and each American bomb that goes astray is treated like another Dresden. I miss the spirit of Roosevelt, Truman and Kennedy and I fear for a nation that doesn't understand why.

President Clinton wrote an instructive editorial in the Washington Post in early 2004 that spoke of his failure to act on the Rwandan genocide. He lamented that "We did not act quickly enough after the killing began. We should not have allowed the refugee camps to become a safe haven for the killers." Clinton continued that his hope was that "the international community will continue to learn from our mistakes in Rwanda in 1994. We need to improve our intelligence-gathering capabilities, increase the speed with which international intervention can be undertaken and muster the global political will required to respond to the threat of genocide wherever it may occur." It is that spirit that has been forgotten by many of those whom we have chosen to govern us.

Historical forces are in play here. Unless I missed it, I have not yet heard the Iraqi people demand that Saddam Hussein or his cronies be returned to power. There are grounds for hope. One year after the invasion of Iraq, Saddam Hussein is gone; a decent interim Iraqi government is poised to assume sovereignty over the country; the devastating level of casualties that was predicted at the outset of the war never materialized; the security situation (though inexcusably bad) appears to be improving; Muqtada al-Sadr is now marginalized; and the Shia center is holding - there is nothing approaching civil war.

And earlier this month, the new prime minister, Iyad Alawi, expressed his gratitude to the United States for liberating his country, confirmed that it would be "a major disaster" for the US to leave, and privately said that to win the war "it is necessary to kill the enemy," so it's unlikely he will constrain US forces excessively after he assumes power.

Today, Iraq has become the crucible for another epic struggle - the global war on terrorism. As Ronald Reagan reminded us twenty years ago in memorializing the sacrifices made by Americans on D-Day - "They had faith that what they were doing was right, faith that they fought for all humanity, faith that a just God would grant them mercy on this beachhead or on the next. Those who fought here and others who died here knew that there was a profound moral difference between the use of force for liberation and the use of force for conquest. We had come to liberate Europe, not to conquer it, and you and those others never doubted your cause."

At the American cemetery behind St. Mere-Eglise, high above the sea at Colleville-sur-Mer almost 9,000 crosses and Stars of David stand in perfect rows on immaculate lawns. But there is something more. There are over 10,400 Americans resting in the World War II cemetery at St. Avold in the Lorraine - more dead than at the Normandy cemetery. No sitting American president has ever visited that graveyard. It's time. As Victor Davis Hanson once wrote: "The inscriptions at American graveyards admonish the visitor to remember sacrifice, courage, and freedom; they assume somebody bad once started a war to hurt the weak, only to fail when somebody better stopped them." I don't think those asleep at St. Avold or the tens of thousands sleeping under their white marble crosses in Belgium, France, and Luxembourg from the Meuse-Argonne to Hamm would be pleased to hear that we fought the Nazis and Japanese fascists the "wrong way" or that we should have relied on more education, better mutual understanding and "getting our message across." There are some things in this world that cannot be negotiated.

Those who lie silently in these places determined, in their time, that they would set a continent free and support the cause of freedom knowing that it was both right and just to do so. If we can maintain our sanity a little while longer, and accept that we have made some mistakes in Iraq; if we can learn from our errors and press on without undermining the morale of our military and the cause that brought us to this foreign battleground, Iraq will become another signal moment in human history. It will become everything the barbarians fear most - a free, powerful and prosperous Arab nation, stable and (if we continue to press our cause) at peace, in time, with its neighbors. And America will have achieved an honorable thing at another critical moment in world history - something that would have been impossible without the same resolve, the same courage, the same sense of national purpose, and the same support that carried our Greatest Generation to victory.

Sleep in peace. In your sacrifice, you have given us our freedom. We will not forget.

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To: combjelly who wrote (346880)8/15/2007 5:58:49 PM
From: longnshort  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 1574679
 
True, North Vietnamese regular army forces and the Viet Cong guerrillas attacked Saigon and most provincial capitals, briefly overrunning some. But except in the old imperial city of Hue, these communist occupations were principally measured in hours. When Tet was over, Hanoi had gained exactly zero territory and lost thousands of troops. The North Vietnamese Army suffered severe losses. The Viet Cong were never again a significant factor in the war. It was one of the most lopsided military defeats in history - for the communists, that is. But U.S. news stories harped on earlier expectations of light at the end of the tunnel. Those expectations may indeed have been too rosy, especially given the decision not to prosecute the war to win, as was well within our capabilities. But that doesn't alter the facts: the United States and its allies won decisively, and any honest reporting of Tet must be in that context. Victory should have been the lead to the story. But most coverage dwelled on how this was more than the commu­nists had been expected to do, as if there were any doubt that they could temporarily grab some territory if they were willing to virtually commit suicide.



To: combjelly who wrote (346880)8/15/2007 6:01:19 PM
From: longnshort  Respond to of 1574679
 
Another battle that lasted through and beyond Tet also deserves mention for what some perceived as a historical parallel. As James Griffiths, a veteran of the 11th Armored Cavalry, notes in his book "Vietnam Insights," gloomy media depictions were not limited to the Saigon area but also occurred at the northern Marine base at Khe Sanh during Tet. Bob Young of ABC and Walter Cronkite of CBS linked the victorious general of Dien Bien Phu, Vo Nguyen Giap, to the siege at Khe Sanh, and Time put him on its cover. It was as if Giap's presence would cause a Marine defeat at Khe Sanh to be a foregone conclusion. Newsweek jumped on the antiwar bandwag­on with its March 18, 1968, issue. Using the Khe Sanh ammo dump explosion as its cover, it failed to let readers know that the incident had occurred two months earlier, concluding, "Though the U.S. dilemma at Khe Sanh is particu­larly acute, it is not unique. It simply reflects in microcosm the entire U.S. military position in Vietnam. U.S. strategy up to this point has been a failure."

William Jayne, a Marine veteran of Khe Sanh said, "The North Vietnamese never mounted a determined ground offensive against us." Sadly almost 200 Americans died there, but compare that to the 14,000 enemy death count. However, neither battle provided the dramatic impact of two photographs.