Silicon Investor (SI) -- The First Internet Community

STOCKTALK

We've detected that you're using an ad content blocking browser plug-in or feature. Ads provide a critical source of revenue to the continued operation of Silicon Investor. We ask that you disable ad blocking while on Silicon Investor in the best interests of our community. If you are not using an ad blocker but are still receiving this message, make sure your browser's tracking protection is set to the 'standard' level.

Politics : Politics for Pros- moderated -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: KLP who wrote (221040)	9/25/2007 5:16:55 AM
From: unclewest	Read Replies (2) \| Respond to of 793963

I hadn't realized the Generals took out the SF....That makes no sense.... WHY? I'm certainly not doubting you, but simply asking why? Was that a military decision, or a political one? You ask good questions...who are you gathering Intel for? The West Point cabal believes the wins should belong to them. Conventional LT Gen Dale Daily was assigned to Afghanistan after SF initially secured the problem. He immediately called for conventional troops to take over saying, "This is the last time Special Forces get out in front." Later he visited Ft Bragg and announced SF are housekeepers. Let that sink in. I believe the reason is based on the fact that those generals are untrained in SF skills, thay could not pass SF assessment and selection much less the Q course, and therefore will never be able to command SF units. Now that unconventional/asymmetrical/irregular warfare is getting so much money they will do anything to get in to increase their power base even if it means denigrating one of our nation's most important strategic capabilities. And one more question....For every fighting soldier we have in theater, how many others does it take to support him/her? And I am assuming these numbers are included in the total fighting strength of our soldiers....right? If for instance, the ratio is 1 soldier with 3 others to support...then out of 100,000, we would really have only 25,000 to do the fighting ...?? In conventional wars the ratio hovers around 7:1. It should be lower now because contractors have taken over some support functions. I don't know the exact ratio in Iraq. In a briefing I recently attended, I jotted down some numbers and later calculated the USSOCOM ratio is around 13:1. That is ridiculous. An SF Group is <1:1 and all the groups are included in USSOCOM's numbers. That makes SOCOM one big fat (supersized) Headquarters and it shows. With five years under General Brown, they certainly missed the boat in this war. The constant tinkering with SF by conventional land warfare thinkers is having what may become disastrous effects on SF. I am convinced that what we really need to do to preserve and keep our SF assets intact is create a separate SF/UW command. This would enable SF to manage their own destiny and remain a major player in our armed forces.

To: KLP who wrote (221040)	9/26/2007 5:42:30 AM
From: unclewest	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 793963

Was that a military decision, or a political one? K, So far in our discussion we have focused on our current wars. I've oriented my answers to your questions to define problems with and address solutions for them Looking forward a completely different solution is required. I am fond of saying - we cannot afford to another Iraq like we are doing this Iraq. Our Army needs to be reorganized. We are not set up properly to conduct substantial low-intensity warfare. I visualize 2 necessary steps. 1. We must retain a land campaign capability. That includes Infantry, Armor, Artillery and appropriate air and sea assets. 2. We must expand our Unconventional Warfare capability. To accomplish this will require constructing/establishing a new paradigm of military organization. We need a separate Special Forces Command at the 4-star level. Preferably one like TRADOC that reports directly to congress. Currently Special Forces are mismanaged by conventionally trained generals. SF must be able to control their own destiny. The way to do that is to separate them from the conventional army. We must eliminate the ability of a conventional general to pressing court-martial charges against an ODA Commander and Team Sergeant for finding, fixing, and killing America's enemies. And we must eliminate the ability of SOCOM to redirect funds that have been allocated to SF. Another effective solution will be to create a separate service. It could be organized similar to the Coast Guard or the OSS. All must recognize that Special Forces is a national strategic capability that was task organized long ago by forward thinking men in preparation for today's battlefields. We are in real danger of reorganizing that capability out of the army and we cannot allow that to happen. Our conventional army does not understand nor is it good at irregular warfare. In the 1950s less than dozen ODAs had Laos under control and retained control until Laos was declared neutral. In the early 1960s SF inserted 207 ODAs into S Vietnam. They controlled the entire country and were successfully building security and leadership from the bottom up - which is the only proven effective way to do it. Then McNamara and LBJ yielded to conventional generals who wanted to get into the war. Our force blew up to 570,000, casualties skyrocketed; China and Russia got involved; the viet cong were easily able to recruit; and we lost. Our conventional generals use very expensive, kintetic warfare techniques in an attempt to obtain fast results by overwhelming enemy forces. And they use those same techniques in a counterinsurgency environment. Military History is saturated with examples of this failing. We are doing it again because some generals convinced Rumsfeld and W that GPS guided munitions would create a shock and awe effect that would result in a quick victory. Like many failed generals before them, they all believe that enough kinetic techniques will prevail. That is what Petreaus is all about too. His surge is just another way to increase the lethality of the battlefield our troops are on. It is our original shock and awe clothed differently. Measured by any metric, the low-intensity SF solution offers a much higher rate of success at a much lower cost. It takes longer. But would you rather suffer fewer casualties, spend a fraction of the money and prevail, or apply numerous and expensive shock and awe treatments and fail? I am reminded of the old saying, "If you want it bad, you will get it bad." uw

To: KLP who wrote (221040)	9/26/2007 5:51:28 AM
From: unclewest	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 793963

Here is another viewpoint - Mirandizing the Enemy For today’s lesson in “How to Lose a War,” let’s consider the case of Japanese Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto in World War II and compare it to the case of Nawab Buntangyar in what some consider to be World War III today. But first, consider this all-too-common report in the New York Times this week out of Nad Ali, Afghanistan: “A suicide bomber wrapped in explosives walked into a crowded government building…and blew himself up, killing at least seven people, four of them police officers. Six people were wounded.” OK, back to the lesson. Admiral Yamamoto commanded the Japanese Navy and led the sneak attack on Pearl Harbor. He was, as the lawyers put it today, an “enemy combatant.” Then, on a spring afternoon in 1943, Admiral Yamamoto decided to take a leisurely inspection tour of the South Pacific in a transport plane. U.S. forces learned of Yamamoto’s exact itinerary, intercepted his plane and blew him out of the sky. Note that Yamamoto was merely on an inspection tour and not engaged in hostile activities directed at the American pilots who intercepted him. He posed no “imminent threat” to the American pilots. Therefore, according to some rather bizarre interpretations of today’s rules of engagement, the American pilots should have tried to force Yamamoto’s plane to land and capture him rather than shoot him down. And the pilot who was credited with nailing Yamamoto should have been tried for murder instead of being awarded the Navy Cross. Asinine, right? Right. Absolutely absurd. Which brings us to Nawab Buntangyar. Mr. Buntangyar had been designated an “enemy combatant” in the Afghanistan war theater for organizing suicide and roadside bomb attacks like the one in Nad Ali described above. He was, for all intents and purposes, an officer in the enemy’s corps, not a foot soldier. As such, Buntangyar was declared an “enemy combatant” and was “vetted as a target” by American commanders which, according to the New York Times, “meant he could be legally killed once he was positively identified.” Similarly to Yamamoto, U.S. forces learned of Buntangyar’s itinerary last October and endeavored to take him out of the game - permanently. Buntangyar was lured out of his village hideout and into the open where a Special Forces team was waiting. He was positively identified by Afghan police on the scene. So Capt. Dave Staffel gave Master Sgt. Troy Anderson, reportedly 100 yards away from Buntangyar, the green light. BLAM!! Right between the eyes. Bye-bye, Nawab. Hello, 72 virgins. Think about this for minute, folks. Our man Sgt. Anderson, under the pressure of a wartime operation, nails the bad guy from the length of a football field right in the melon with one shot. No American casualties. No civilian causalities. Not even any property damage, other than maybe a dry-cleaning bill or two for the guys standing next to Nawab at the time. Compare this to the enemy’s suicide bombings. Naturally, Staffel, Anderson and the entire 7-man Green Beret team involved in the mission were warmly clasped on their backs and congratulated for a job well done, right? Wrong. In June, Lt. Gen. Frank H. Kearney charged the pair of Green Berets with premeditated murder in the incident. What makes this persecution – er, prosecution even more outrageous is that Kearney brought the charges after not one, but two military investigations cleared the Green Berets in the incident, concluding the shooting was “justifiable homicide.” Is this any way to fight a war? The shooting was cleared, twice, so why is Lt. Gen. “CYA” Kearney continuing to persecute - er, prosecute these military professionals who did the job they were trained to do and asked to do by their country? What kind of message does this persecution – er, prosecution send to our boots on the ground in Afghanistan and Iraq? I mean, if we’re not going to let our soldiers kill the enemy, then why the hell are they there? Who’s running this “war” anyway? The commanders in the field or the lawyers back home? If it’s the lawyers, and men like Capt. Staffel and Sgt. Anderson have to read Johnny Jihadi his Miranda rights instead of plinking him in the noggin with a bullet, then the war is over. We lost. Bring the boys home. Posted on September 22nd, 2007 by Chuck Muth