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Strategies & Market Trends : 2026 TeoTwawKi ... 2032 Darkest Interregnum -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: elmatador who wrote (139024)2/7/2018 2:10:15 PM
From: TobagoJack  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 217549
 
it would appear that both you and alex are denigrating this thread w/ intent to disrupt, is that correct take on your own intended role?



To: elmatador who wrote (139024)2/8/2018 3:53:45 PM
From: TobagoJack  Respond to of 217549
 
in the mean time, watch & brief, published by forbe's, which elroy may deem as communist china united front organisation, but per stratfor, the anti-everything non-MAGA site, fake news or not, but much to do w/ teotwawki and d.i.

forbes.com

The Coming Tech War With China
Feb 7, 2018 @ 11:56 AM
This article was originally published at Stratfor.com.

By Matthew Bey

China's growing technological prowess will be a source of increasing worry for the United States.Artificial intelligence will be a critical area of competition between the two countries because it has applications in military as well as civilian life -- and will likely revolutionize both.Because of China's sheer size, its tech sector could give Silicon Valley a run for its money in terms of market share if it even comes close to producing the same technologies.The United States is already in the middle of its next great war -- even if it's only just starting to realize it. In the latest National Security Strategy, the White House highlighted China's growing technological prowess as a threat to U.S. economic and military might. The Asian powerhouse has taken on a leading role in several critical emerging technologies. Five years ago, by contrast, it was widely perceived as an imitator in technology, not an innovator.

As hard as it may be for Washington to admit, China is catching up in the tech race. The question now is whether tech firms in the United States, a country that embraces private enterprise and a free economy, will be able to keep up with their Chinese counterparts' breakthroughs.

The Disruptive Power of Dual-Use TechnologyChinese President Xi Jinping has made developing his country's technological capabilities a key priority, not only to wean China from its dependence on foreign technology but also to turn it into a leader in innovation. And sure enough, China is gaining ground on its rivals in the tech realm. The country has chalked up an array of impressive achievements over the past few years, including its developments in hypersonic missiles, human gene editing trials and quantum satellites. Of the many emerging technologies China is helping to advance, though, artificial intelligence is perhaps the most significant -- for Beijing as well as its adversaries.

Google CEO Sundar Pichai recently posited that the advent of AI was "more profound than ... (that of) electricity or fire." If he oversold the development, he did so only slightly. AI may well be the most important technological advancement of our lifetime. What makes it so critical is that, much like aerospace technology or the internet before it, AI will have applications in military as well as civilian life -- and will likely revolutionize both.

In the civilian world alone, AI has practically unlimited uses. The technology already helps power smartphone applications such as visual and audio recognition software and digital personal assistants. As global data collection rates continue to grow exponentially, AI algorithms will inevitably have to take over processing and managing the glut of information. AI will also transform the medical industry, diagnosing and treating various illnesses -- to say nothing of the other white-collar jobs the technology will eventually complement or supersede.

The military applications, meanwhile, will be no less impressive. In 2016 an algorithm running on a Raspberry Pi -- a $35 computer that fits in the palm of your hand -- beat a retired U.S. Air Force colonel every time in a series of simulated dogfights. The computer, moreover, showed no sign of fatigue over time, unlike its human competitor. As AI continues to evolve, it will doubtless work its way onto the battlefield, driving tanks, ships and perhaps even robotic soldiers. The technology's potential for rapid data processing and analysis could give troops on the front lines a more complete picture than ever before of their enemy's position and activities. AI will probably find more applications in asymmetric warfare, too. Islamic State militants in Iraq and Syria have used drones to deliver explosives to their targets, while Houthi rebels in Yemen have deployed unmanned vessels to carry waterborne improvised explosive devices. For now, these vehicles are operated by remote control, but in time, they could give way to autonomous technology.

An Eye on AIThe possibilities of AI aren't lost on the Chinese president. In a feat of meticulous blocking, two influential books on the subject stood on the bookshelf behind Xi during his annual televised New Year's Eve address. Weeks earlier, China's Ministry of Industry and Information Technology released a three-year development plan for AI, part of a larger initiative launched in July 2017 that includes specific goals for such technologies as artificial neural network processing chips, intelligent robots, automated vehicles, intelligent medical diagnosis, intelligent drones and machine translation. China's Ministry of Science and Technology announced in November 2017 that it had formed a sort of dream team made up of the biggest Chinese tech firms -- Baidu, Alibaba and Tencent -- to lead the country's AI development alongside voice recognition software developer iFlytek. Each of these companies is hard at work cultivating the learning algorithms and hardware, and gathering the data, necessary to build a wide range of functional AI platforms. Baidu, for instance, has started developing open-source programs, such as the autonomous driving platform Apollo, to collect as much data as possible.

Nor is the importance of AI lost on the U.S. Department of Defense. Like his predecessor, Ash Carter, Secretary of Defense James Mattis supports the Pentagon's Defense Innovation Unit Experimental (DIUx), despite calls from Republican lawmakers to roll the project into the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. DIUx, headquartered in Silicon Valley, aims to ensure that the military can quickly adapt and integrate innovations that come out of California's tech hub. To that end, it awarded tech firm C3 IoT a contract late last year to develop an AI platform for the Air Force to predict when aircraft and equipment need maintenance.

In the quest to hone its AI capabilities, the Defense Department hasn't lost sight of China's own progress with the technology. The country's sheer size sets it apart from other tech innovators such as South Korea or Japan; China could scale up its rapidly increasing tech abilities and use them against the United States in a way that not even Russia has managed. With that in mind, Mattis made China's rise in tech a centerpiece of his National Defense Strategy, highlighting the U.S. government's need to strengthen ties with emerging tech companies, including AI startups.

(Stratfor)

Chinese Research and Development Is Growing Fast

A Space Race for the 21st CenturyToday's mad dash for AI isn't the first technology race the United States has run. During the Cold War, the country vied against the Soviet Union to develop a variety of aerospace, nuclear and computing innovations. Washington emerged victorious from that contest; though the Soviet Union focused its efforts almost exclusively on military applications, it lacked the research and development capacity of the United States. The size of its critical industries enabled the United States to outstrip the Soviet Union in military technology while still diverting some of its attention and resources to consumer products.

Like the Soviet Union, China is interested more in national security and defense than it is in the commercial sector. The difference lies in China's size and in its economy.

The country's immensity could make it a more even match for the United States in terms of developing and adopting emerging technologies. Given that the country's population exceeds 1.3 billion people -- and that data privacy is a low priority for Beijing -- China offers its AI companies a big leg-up over their U.S. competitors by giving them access to a huge pool of data. Furthermore, unlike the tightly controlled Soviet economy that hindered innovation, China's hybrid economy offers individuals and companies incentive to push the boundaries in tech development. The country's model of capitalism isn't one of control, though Western media often portray Chinese tech firms as dependent on Beijing to subsidize and direct their activities. Instead, the central government outlines areas in which it would like companies to operate and provides incentives to encourage competition. AI is one of those areas, and China's tech giants are eager to outpace one another in the field. Aware that it missed the boat with smartphone technology, Baidu, for instance, has set its sights on AI as its opportunity to get an advantage over Tencent, Alibaba and Huawei.

For now, China lags behind the United States in the tech race, especially in semiconductor development. As the gap between them narrows, however, the United States will be forced to respond. The challenge for Washington will be that, unlike earlier dual-use technologies, AI applications will immediately have profound implications for the consumer electronics market. And because the Chinese and U.S. economies are highly integrated with each other, China's achievements even in the commercial sector pose a serious threat to the United States. The question for the United States isn't so much whether China can surpass it in the race to harness emerging technologies; it's how close the Asian country will come to doing so. China is large enough that its tech sector could give Silicon Valley a run for its money in terms of market share if it even comes close to producing the same technologies. For that reason, many U.S. tech firms are trying to withhold some of their advancements from defense applications in hopes of maintaining a competitive edge in the commercial sphere.

Building a StrategyOnce upon a time the United States could rest easy in the knowledge that no other country could match its combination of physical size and technological ability. Now China can. As a result, the current U.S. administration is working to develop a more robust response to the United States' budding rival. The White House's investigations into China's intellectual property policies, calls for greater scrutiny of its foreign investment activities and even proposals to nationalize the fifth generation wireless protocol, or 5G, network are all initial attempts to counter the country's rise in technology. So far, though, these initiatives have only provoked backlash in the United States.

Forging a comprehensive strategy against China will become all the more important for Washington as time goes by. The dizzying pace and unpredictable trajectory of innovation compels tech companies to constantly broaden their horizons or else jeopardize their competitiveness. But as the same firms expand their services into more and more industries, they risk running afoul of U.S. antitrust laws. The more companies such as Google, Amazon and Apple Inc. grow, the bigger the targets on their backs become. Antitrust investigations and busts in the United States, in turn, could give Chinese companies a prime opportunity to catch up to their competition.

This article was originally published by Stratfor Worldview, a leading geopolitical intelligence platform and advisory firm based in Austin, Texas.



To: elmatador who wrote (139024)2/15/2018 8:13:10 PM
From: TobagoJack  Respond to of 217549
 
it is all about the fund flow, and far less to do w/ valuation
whether fund flow going in or out of sovereign bond into corporate bonds and/or equity, and
whether away iron sand / soya / bananas or towards diligence / studious / thrift

today brazil has as much merit as ... let me see ... russia, saudi arabia, mexico, europe, and australia, and the dark green is indicated for only very few places



in the mean time we de-camped freedom hong kong for the lunar new year workation, and again in penang to engage w/ the kids grandparents who spends 1/2 time here given weather and ambiance and such

before de-camping w/ civilisation, whilst still at the airport, i stocked up, before the next wave of global inflation hits, and drives all towards teotwawki / d.i.

cheers, healthy and happy year 4716 to you and yours, tj








To: elmatador who wrote (139024)2/15/2018 10:33:22 PM
From: TobagoJack  Respond to of 217549
 
re <<copying>>

it turns out china invented dogs

weekinchina.com

Chinese dogs: an overview

We look at the histories of China’s main dog breedsWe look at the histories of China’s main dog breeds



Chowchow

Recent studies indicate that dogs first split from wolves and evolved into Canis lupus familiaris in China. Most of the world’s oldest breeds are in fact Chinese – even if some aren’t globally recognised as such. Here is a list of the breeds – recognised and unrecognised – that have Chinese origins:

The Tang Dog

The origins of the Tang Dog are lost in the mists of time. Indeed if recent research from the Institute of Zoology in Kunming is correct it might be the world’s first domestic dog – having evolved from the grey wolf some 33,000 years ago in southern China. Tangs got their name from the Tang Dynasty (618-907) when China’s trading with the rest of the world began to surge. That’s when owners started to distinguish that the dogs they had at home were uniquely Chinese breeds. As a side note, the Chinese word for a Chinatown is ‘Tang People’s Street’, because that was the period of history when many Chinese began to appear in other countries.

Tangs are not formally recognised as a breed but the Chinese Kennel Union issues a guide to their appearance: a dense coat, a ‘wedge shaped mouth’, brown or black colouring with white flecks, a crinkled forehead and almond-shaped eyes. They are about 50cm tall at the shoulder and weigh about 20 kilos. China’s first emperor Qin Shi Huangdi is said to have owned one.



Shar Pei

The Chowchow and the Shar Pei

At first glance these two dogs don’t appear related. The first is known for its thick fur and black tongue, and the second for its short hair and facial folds. But these two recognised breeds were both bred from the Tang – the Shar Pei for warmer climates and fighting, and the Chowchow for colder weather and herding.

Chowchows began appearing in Europe in the 1800s. Famous examples include Jofi – a cinnamon coloured female who used to sit in on Sigmund Freud’s psychoanalysis sessions. Shar Peis didn’t become popular outside China till much later. Up till 1949 they were still kept and bred as fighting dogs in southern China. But the incoming Communist Party government banned dog fighting pits and imposed taxes on the animals. Supporters of the breed in Hong Kong began smuggling animals out. About 200 Shar Peis were sent to the US in 1973. The breed’s name means Sand Skin in reference to its short, rough fur.

The Xian Hound or Xi Gou

Another ancient breed, the Xian hound looks a lot like a Saluki or Persian greyhound. They are a sight hound which means they chase and capture their prey. Like other sight hounds they function best on open, flat land. They are usually found on the loess plateau in Shaanxi. Their numbers have dwindled as the government has restricted peoples’ right to hunt. Skeletons belonging to this type of dog have been found in royal graves, often wearing precious collars. The Tang Dynasty mausoleum at Qianling in Shaanxi also contains murals depicting what appear to be Xian hounds. The China Kennel Union classifies them as ‘rare’ and is trying to bring the breed back.



Kunming Wolf Dog

The Kunming Wolf Dog and the Laizhou Red

The Kunming Wolf Dog and the Laizhou Red are far newer creations, bred from German shepherds and other, regional wolf dogs.

The Kunming was formally recognised in 1988 and today is widely used by the Chinese police and military.

The Laizhou – which is also mixed with the Great Dane – was first created in Shandong in the 1970s. Its deep russet fur led some dealers to rename it the Red Soviet dog to help boost sales. In this era it was the dog to own and prices rose above Rmb10,000 per animal. But as opening and reform deepened and an influx of other breeds became available the Laizhou quickly fell out of favour. Sadly, many of the dogs were sold for meat. The China Kennel Union is (again) trying to restore interest in the breed.



Chongqing Dog

The Chongqing or Chuandong hound

This fearless, muscular guard dog has been around since at least the Han Dynasty (206 BC – 220 AD) because clay figurines depicting the breed have been found in tombs from that period. Specific to the southwestern province of Sichuan, its coat is the colour of the spicy red chilli peppers so widely used in the local cuisine. Other distinguishing features include a broad face, a short muzzle, upright triangular ears and a thin muscular tail known as a bamboo tail. Its overall physique is similar to a Pitbull’s. The breed began receiving protection in the 1970s but their numbers are still small. The Chongqing Dog Club estimates there are only 200 left.



Shi Tzu

Shi Tzu, Lhasa Apsos, Pekingese, Tibetan Spaniels, Imperials, Pugs and the Japanese Chin

Now we come to China’s toy dogs – the largest category of recognised breeds. They are all related, but which breed came first is sometimes a bone of contention.

Often a Tibetan breed has very close relations to an inland Chinese breed or breeds. The first pairing is Lhasa Apsos and Shi Tzu or Chrysanthemum dogs. Lhasas were bred in Tibet to be a companion animal for monks. The word “apso” means bearded and they have long hair and a droopy ‘moustache’. They were bred but were never sold and only ever given away as gifts. Genetic studies show Lhasas are most closely related to Shi Tzu, whose name means lion dog. In fact in Chinese the Lhasa, the Shi Tzu and the Pekingese have all been referred to as “lion dogs”.

The Shi Tzu appears to have been introduced to inland China from Tibet during the Tang Dynasty. By the seventeenth century they were royal dogs at the Manchu court in Beijing.



Lhasa Apsos

Lhasas began arriving in Europe in the mid-1800s. Shi Tzus, which are small and slightly flatter-nosed than Lhasas, didn’t arrive till the 1930s.

Today some international kennel clubs also recognise a miniature version of the Shi Tzu called the Imperial.



Pekingese

The third component to this story is the Pekingese – a long haired, snub-nosed lap dog beloved of Chinese royals going right back to Qin Shi Huangdi. Some suggest the Shi Tzu was created by mixing Pekingese with Lhasa Apsos. But as ever there is no clarity. Just like the two other breeds, Pekingese were kept by royalty and it was a crime for ordinary people to keep or raise them. Pekingese are also called “sleeve dogs” because nobles used to carry them round in their wide sleeves to help keep warm.



Japanese Chin

That brings us to the Tibetan Spaniel and Japanese Chin. The first thing to say is that the Tibetan Spaniel is not a spaniel in the true sense, they evolved much later. And despite its name, the Japanese Chin originated in China – but later became the dog of Japanese royalty. The German academic Ludwig von Schulmuth maintains these two dogs and the Pekingese evolved from the ‘Gobi Desert Kitchen Midden Dog’, a scavenger, which evolved into the ‘Small Soft-Coated Drop-Eared Hunting Dog’. Recent genetic studies appear to back that up.



Pug

Lastly, the Pug. Its origins are unclear and it arrived in Europe at least 300 years before the other Chinese breeds – perhaps suggesting Pugs were considered less valuable than the other royal dogs. However, the snub nosed lap dogs have a long lineage with similar dogs being mentioned as far back as 220 BC. Their English name comes from the Latin word for “clenched fist” – probably a reference to their foreshortened faces. In 1572 pugs became the official dog of the House of Orange. A Pug travelled with William and Mary when they left the Netherlands to accept the throne of England in 1688.

The Xiasi Quan

White, wire-haired, medium-sized and stockily built, the Xiasi looks a lot like a pale Shar Pei with longer fur. They are native to Guizhou where they have been raised by the Miao ethnic minority for thousands of years. Their colouring is particularly distinctive – they always have cream or white fur and a pale pink nose. There are currently only 270 pure bred Xiasi left.



Chinese Crested

Chinese Crested

This is where it get particularly controversial, because the Chinese Crested probably has it origins in Africa or Central America. While the China Kennel Union doesn’t claim it as a Chinese breed, world kennel club organisation the Fédération Cynologique Internationale does list China as the dog’s country of origin. Other explanations for why the largely hairless canine is called “Chinese” is that the quiff of fur on its head looks like an official headdress from the Qing Dynasty.



Tibetan Terrier

Tibetan Terrier

The Tibetan Terrier is also a misnomer. Though they are about the size of terriers – medium bodied – and shaggy. They are again much older. They are called Tsang Apso in Tibetan and were given the name Tibetan Terrier by European travelers. They are considered excellent companion dogs and they were used for retrieving things on mountains, being smaller than Tibetan Mastiffs and bigger than a Tibetan Spaniel.



Tibetan Mastiff

Tibetan Mastiff

There was a time, not too long ago, when Tibetan Mastiffs were the most expensive dogs in the world. In 2011 a coal baron from northern China spent more than Rmb10 million ($1.27 million) on an 11 month-old called Hong Dong or Big Splash.

But much of the demand was speculative – people buying them as investments and status symbols, not as pets. As the bubble burst, tens of thousands of these large, often aggressive animals have been sold for meat or released onto the streets. The problem is at its worst in areas such as Qinghai province, where Buddhist beliefs mean locals prefer not to kill the animals. As a result over 80,000 dogs are roaming free looking for food.

A documentary called Abandoned Tibetan Mastiff released last year shows people being bitten and older residents saying they fear going for walks because they fear being attacked – the dogs are often abandoned near monasteries because it is believed the monks will take care of them. In late 2016, one stray killed an eight year-old girl in Nagqian County as she left the house to use the outside bathroom. The Mastiffs also attack livestock – including yaks – and local wildlife such as snow leopards.

Life in the wild is a long way from their heyday during the Mastiff boom, when prize specimens would be fed delicacies such as a sea cucumber and abalone in an apparent bid to make them more valuable.

Because the dogs were valued for their heft, many were fed steroids and some were given plastic surgery to separate their skin from facial muscles so their cheeks would look more saggy – another coveted feature. Of course the Mastiff – one of the world’s oldest and hardiest dogs – is used to living outside. For thousands of years Tibetan nomads have used them to guard their herds against wolves. But as the nomadic way of life comes to an end there’s less and less call for these strong, fearless and incredibly independent animals.

© ChinTell Ltd. All rights reserved.

Brought to you by HSBC.



To: elmatador who wrote (139024)2/24/2018 12:00:15 AM
From: TobagoJack  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 217549
 
Does the below article chime well w/ your take ?

theguardian.com

China’s great leap forward in science
Philip BallSun 18 Feb 2018 09.00 GMT
I first met Xiaogang Peng in the summer of 1992 at Jilin University in Changchun, in the remote north-east of China, where he was a postgraduate student in the department of chemistry. He told me that his dream was to get a place at a top American lab. Now, Xiaogang was evidently smart and hard-working – but so, as far as I could see, were most Chinese science students. I wished him well, but couldn’t help thinking he’d set himself a massive challenge.

Fast forward four years to when, as an editor at Nature, I publish a paper on nanotechnology from world-leading chemists at the University of California at Berkeley. Among them was Xiaogang. That 1996 paper now appears in a 10-volume compendium of the all-time best of Nature papers being published in translation in China.

I watched Xiaogang go on to forge a solid career in the US, as in 2005 he became a tenured professor at the University of Arkansas. But when I recently had reason to get in touch with Xiaogang again, I discovered that he had moved back to China and is now at Zhejiang University in Hangzhou – one of the country’s foremost academic institutions.

For Xiaogang, it seems that America was no longer the only land of opportunity. These days, Chinese scientists stand at least as good a chance of making a global impact on science from within China itself.

The economic rise of China has been accompanied by a waxing of its scientific prowess. In January, the United States National Science Foundation reported that the number of scientific publications from China in 2016 outnumbered those from the US for the first time: 426,000 versus 409,000. Sceptics might say that it’s about quality, not quantity. But the patronising old idea that China, like the rest of east Asia, can imitate but not innovate is certainly false now. In several scientific fields, China is starting to set the pace for others to follow. On my tour of Chinese labs in 1992, only those I saw at the flagship Peking University looked comparable to what you might find at a good university in the west. Today the resources available to China’s top scientists are enviable to many of their western counterparts. Whereas once the best Chinese scientists would pack their bags for greener pastures abroad, today it’s common for Chinese postdoctoral researchers to get experience in a leading lab in the west and then head home where the Chinese government will help them set up a lab that will eclipse their western competitors.

There is always a certain fraction of talented, innovative people. China has the advantage of having lots of people

Many have been lured back by the Thousand Talents Plan, in which scientists aged under 55 (whether Chinese citizens or not) are given full-time positions at prestigious universities and institutes, with larger than normal salaries and resources. “ Deng Xiaoping sent many Chinese students and scholars out of China to developed countries 30 to 40 years ago, and now it is time for them to come back,” says George Fu Gao of the Institute of Microbiology of the Chinese Academy of Sciences in Beijing – who himself gained a PhD at Oxford before studying at Harvard.

“The startup packages for researchers in good universities in China can be significantly higher than Hong Kong universities can offer,” says Che Ting Chan, a physicist at the Hong Kong University of Science & Technology in what was previously China’s affluent and westernised neighbour. “They provide more lab space and can help settle the spouse.” That, he notes ruefully, “makes recruiting young faculty staff increasingly challenging here.” Other well-off east Asian countries, such as Singapore and South Korea, are feeling the competition too.

The Chinese authorities are pursuing scientific dominance with systematic resolve. The annual expenditure on research and development in China increased from 1995 to 2013 by a factor of more than 30, and reached $234bn in 2016. The number of international publications coming out of China has remained in step with this rise. “Money is plentiful to certain Chinese researchers, possibly more so than to their competitors, especially if it means gaining an edge,” says stem-cell biologist Robin Lovell-Badge of the Francis Crick Institute in London.

The ultimate aim is to develop a homegrown, innovative research environment, says Mu-Ming Poo of the Institute of Neuroscience of the Chinese Academy of Sciences in Shanghai. “The government is beginning to recognise that big investment and recruitment of talent from abroad are not sufficient. We need to build infrastructure and mechanisms that facilitate innovation within China.” That’s not easy, and won’t happen fast. “Officially, government leaders say that taking risks is allowed, but the system of evaluating scientists and projects, and the philosophy and methods of instruction in university curricula, aren’t compatible with this policy.”

China’s strength also comes down to sheer numbers, though. “There is always a certain fraction of talented people who are innovative,” says Chan. “China has the advantage of having a lot of people.”

One of the more controversial ways Chinese institutions encourage their researchers to publish high-profile papers is to offer cash incentives. One study found that on average a paper in Nature or Science could earn the author a bonus of almost $44,000 in 2016. The highest prize on offer was as much as $165,000 for a single paper, up to 20 times a typical university professor’s annual salary.

According to quantum physicist Jian-Wei Pan of the University of Science and Technology in Hefei, as a relative latecomer to the global scientific stage, China needs such incentives as a way of maintaining enthusiasm. Chan adds that “the rewarding system is transparent, and the expectation of the senior administration is clearly spelled out. Most of my friends in China don’t see this as a problem – many feel that any formula, even if it’s simple and naive, is better than no formula.”

But could it not tempt researchers to cheat – fabricate or cherrypick results so that they can claim a dramatic discovery? The 2016 study of cash incentives also reported a rise in plagiarism, ghostwritten papers and other dishonest attempts to get published. Poo says that, whatever the case, the practice of cash incentives is not widespread. “Only a few low-level research institutions are doing this, not the Chinese Academy of Sciences or top universities,” he says. He thinks that problems with scientific misconduct and fraud in China have more to do with poor quality control or lack of punitive measures.

However, the pattern seems clear, and is worth heeding by other nations: despite China’s reputation for authoritarian and hierarchical rule, in science the approach seems to be to ensure that top researchers are well supported with funding and resources, and then to leave them to get on with it.

Pair bonding: cloned baby macaques Zhong Zhong and Hua Hua at the Chinese Academy of Sciences last month. Photograph: Xinhua/Barcroft ImagesCloning, embryology and virology The recent news that a laboratory in Shanghai has succeeded in cloning macaque monkeys made world headlines not just because of the impressive scientific feat but because of the implications for humans. While mammals from sheep (Dolly in 1997) to pigs, dogs and cows have been cloned before, primates have been a problem. Mu-Ming Poo and his colleagues cracked the problem by treating the monkey eggs into which the genetic material of the cloned individual had been placed with a cocktail of molecules that awaken the genes needed to promote development into an embryo. The Chinese team has so far only produced healthy baby monkeys by cloning cells taken from other monkey foetuses, not from adult monkeys. But Poo tells me: “I think cloning using adult cells will be accomplished soon, probably within one year.”

Such experiments on our close evolutionary relatives raise ethical concerns, all the more so because there were many failures: only two live births out of 79 attempts. Nonetheless, the work makes human reproductive cloning look more feasible in principle. And despite the ethical issues surrounding such research (many countries ban it, including the UK), the magnitude and cost of the work already undertaken reinforces a sense that if China sets its sights on a particular scientific or technological target, nothing will get in its way.

It’s with good reason Poo asserts that China has become a world leader in stem-cell science and regenerative medicine. Researchers at Sun Yat-sen University in Guangzhou created similar surprise and alarm when in 2015 they announced the first use of high-precision gene-editing in a human embryo – not for reproductive medicine but to examine the viability of the technique to edit a disease-causing gene variant, using IVF embryos that could not develop further. That work was refused publication in the leading journals Nature and Science on ethical grounds, although related work has now been licensed and conducted in the UK. “Genome biology has been well supported in China for some time, with huge investment in genome sequencing projects,” says Lovell-Badge.

There’s perhaps a temptation to ascribe some of China’s dominance here to a looser regulatory environment, but Lovell-Badge says that may not be the case. “Work on pigs and macaques is much easier and cheaper to do in China than in Europe and the US – it’s not necessarily anything to do with animal research ethics,” he says. “The best scientists want their work to be accepted in the west, so many have been trained by western scientists and their facilities designed with guidance from the west. But it is wrong to say that there are no restrictions. There may not be strict laws or even regulations, but there are strict guidelines – and if these are not followed, the consequences can be severe to the scientists involved.”

China is taking great strides in other areas of biological science too. The waves of deadly bird flu that have afflicted the country annually since it was first detected in 2013 supply a very urgent need for research in virology. Chinese researchers had already learnt a lot about viral epidemics, says George Gao, after the outbreak of the particularly virulent form of influenza that caused SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome) in 2002-3, originating in Guangzhou.

Gao’s work has focused on understanding how ‘zoonotic’ viruses like bird flu, which cross from animals to humans, are transmitted across species. He has also looked at the structures and molecular mechanisms of the SARS, Ebola, Zika and MERS (Middle East respiratory syndrome) viruses, all of which potentially pose global threats. The government has invested heavily in this field, he says, but he has no illusions that China still has some catching up to do. “In my opinion we are yet far behind US science in general. And we need a better system to encourage businesses to develop basic research.”

The quantum internetIn January, Chinese researchers announced that they had sent data securely encrypted using the rules of quantum mechanics via satellite to Vienna in Austria – a demonstration of the potential of a “quantum internet” that Dutch quantum physicist Ronald Hanson of the Technical University of Delft describes to me as “a milestone towards future quantum networks”.

Quantum information technologies harness the counterintuitive principles of quantum physics to do things with information that are impossible with the 1s and 0s of binary code in today’s devices. Quantum computers can, for some tasks, operate faster and with more computational resources than ordinary computers, while a quantum telecommunications network – the quantum internet – could employ data-encryption methods that are rendered tamper-proof by the fundamental quantum laws of nature. The principles of so-called quantum cryptography were worked out in the 1980s, but applying them to information encoded in light signals for long-distance transmission is an immense technical challenge.

China’s approach here again exemplifies its can-do mentality. The government has begun to install a fibre-optic network for quantum telecommunication stretching from Shanghai to Beijing. But for longer-distance transmission optical fibres are no good because the light signal eventually gets too dim as it passes along the fibre. Instead signals must be through the air, using lasers to connect orbiting satellites with ground stations. In 2016 China initiated an international project called Quantum Experiments at Space Scale (Quess) and launched a satellite designed for quantum data handling, called Micius after the romanised name of the ancient Chinese philosopher Mozi.

The satellite work is being led by Jian-Wei Pan, who studied for his PhD in Vienna under Anton Zeilinger, one of the foremost scientists in the field of quantum information science. With that pedigree, Pan could have had his pick of jobs in the field, but in 2001 he chose to return to China. In 2009 he oversaw the task of constructing a “quantum communication hotline” for the military parade on the 60th anniversary of the Chinese communist state, and in 2012 he won the prestigious biennial International Quantum Communication award.

Pan’s success in getting this technology up and running feels almost inexorable. Last year his team in Hefei drew more hyperventilating headlines by demonstrating the first “teleportation” of quantum objects (photons or “particles” of light) from the ground-based observatory at Ngari in Tibet to Micius, up to 1,400km away. The feat is not quite as science-fictional as it sounds – quantum teleportation, unlike the Star Trekversion, does not involve any transmission of matter – but it could be an important trick for quantum telecommunications. The team also reported transmission of the “key” used for quantum encryption of signals between ground stations in China and Micius.

The latest advance was to get such keys all the way from Beijing to Vienna. This meant sending a laser signal with the quantum information from the Xinglong observatory near Beijing to Micius as it passed over China, and then having Micius communicate another such message with a station in Graz as it traversed the night sky over Austria. The link-up between Xinglong and Beijing, and between Graz and Vienna, was made along local fibre-optic networks. In this way, a video conference held between the Chinese Academy of Sciences in Beijing and the Austrian Academy of Sciences (of which Zeilinger is president) in Vienna was conducted with the robust security of quantum encryption – a striking harbinger of what a quantum internet might provide.

Pan says that the key to the remarkable success of Quess so far is coordination and collaboration within the immense pool of talent that China possesses. “When researchers [in different disciplines] undertake joint research, they can truly innovate,”, he says.

Acquiring skills abroad is still important for Chinese researchers, says Pan, and will be for some time. But increasingly it’s working the other way around too. “In my laboratory there are quite a few foreign students from developed countries, and some of them are even learning Chinese”, he says.

The Long March 2F carrier rocket, carrying China’s Shenzhou-11 manned spacecraft, takes off from a launch pad in Jiuquan, Gansu Province, China, October 2016. Photograph: How Hwee Young/EPASpaceIn China no goal seems too big – not even the sky is the limit. In June the Chinese space agency plans to launch a lunar space mission to deliver a satellite that will guide a rocket in 2019 to the far (“dark”) side of the moon, bearing a robotic lander vehicle. The satellite link is essential for relaying data from the rover back to Earth. It’s all part of a campaign aiming at a manned moon mission in the 2030s. China is already regarded as a serious contender with the US, Europe and Russia for predominance in space, although so far it has shown enthusiasm for collaborating with Europe. It has launched two prototype unmanned space stations in its Tiangong programme, a prelude to Tiangong-3, which, if launched in the early 2020s, will support a crew of three – potentially including astronauts from other UN member nations. China has even discussed building a moon base with the European Space Agency.

Despite this apparently collaborative spirit, China’s space ambitions evoke the pioneering maritime voyages of Zheng He in the 15th century, which some historians today regard as a way of asserting the “soft power” and heavenly rule of the Ming emperor. Nothing like Zheng He’s “treasure ships” had ever been seen on the oceans before: they dwarfed the vessels in which Europeans like Vasco da Gama explored the world. Many are now wondering whether, in science and technology, those times are returning.

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