To: George Papadopoulos who wrote (7502 ) 11/16/1998 9:21:00 PM From: Dayuhan Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 9980
George, I read the Stratfor pieces, but I don't think they should be accepted as gospel truth. For one thing, they often seem a bit alarmist, perhaps natural in an organization which feels obliged to produce a daily "red alert". I take particular issue with the following:Saddam is in control of events. He can create crises. He can abort crises. The very geometry of the relationship is asymmetric. The U.S. cannot deliver a decisive blow against Saddam, nor can it disengage. This means that Saddam can control U.S. behavior." This is truth, but not whole truth. Saddam also cannot deliver a decisive blow, nor can he disengage. Nor can he accomplish any of his political or economic goals. To observe that US behavior is affected by Saddam's actions and reactions is one thing, to leap to the conclusion that Saddam can control US behavior is quite another. If Saddam could control the US, the sanctions would have been lifted long ago, and nobody would be discussing arms inspections. It might be more accurate to describe the situation as a standoff which neither side is able to unilaterally resolve. This is difficult to accept for the US, which is accustomed to being able to resolve situations unilaterally, but it does not mean that the US is being dominated. I also do not believe that the US decision not to occupy Iraq was based on the horror of seeing Iraqi soldiers killed. The idea that the US could have gone in, removed Saddam, walked away, and watched a decent, democratic, government emerge is absurd. An extended occupation of Iraqi cities would have been a security nightmare; urban guerilla warfare, with snipers, carbombs, etc. would have inevitably involved heavy casualties among Americans and civilians. A new government could have taken months or years to form, and the composition of that government could have become an item of serious conflict between the US and allied Arab states. An American occupation of a Muslim country would have been difficult for Arab allies to justify supporting, giving radical minorities in Saudi Arabia and other states an issue to use against moderate regimes. A decision was made to extract cleanly and hope for - and presumably encourage - the emergence of anti-Saddam factions that might make a credible alternative. With hindsight, this may seem to have been the wrong decision. At the time, with the information available then, it was, I think, the right one. I'm not even sure that it was wrong with hindsight. I would rather see us keep a few ships in the gulf and dump a few missiles on him now and then than watch us sink into a Vietnam-style quagmire with dire regional implications. JMO, obviously. Steve