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Strategies & Market Trends : Investment in Russia and Eastern Europe -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: Real Man who wrote (884)1/7/1999 11:10:00 PM
From: CIMA  Respond to of 1301
 
Russia's Bitter Pill

Summary:

* With Russia busy restoring its empire and the European Union
and NATO hesitant to accept the Baltic states as members, Estonia
has let it be known that it does not plan to capitulate to Moscow
-- at least not without a fight.

Analysis:

The Estonian Defense Ministry announced on January 5, 1998 that
it could mobilize and arm 80,000 reservists in case of war.
Although the commander of the Estonian Defense Forces, Lieutenant
General Johannes Kert, told the BNS news agency that he did not
foresee an immediate threat to Estonian security, the obvious
potential aggressor is neighboring Russia. After gaining
independence from Russia seven years ago, relations between the
two countries can at best be described as tense.

In a bid to distance itself even further from Moscow, Estonia is
hoping to be admitted into the European Union, the World Trade
Organization, and NATO. Speaking last month on Estonian
television, Prime Minister Mart Siiman said that 60 percent of
the plan to achieve integration into the EU had been completed,
and the rest would be finished in 1999. Defense Minister Andrus
Oovel published an article in the newspaper Postimees on January
6, in which he called for increasing defense spending from 1.2
percent of GDP to 2 percent of GDP. Oovel said this would be a
"very strong political signal and proof" that Estonia should be
"seriously viewed as NATO's partner."

Despite the Estonian government's expression of optimism on
joining either of these two organizations, the chance of this
actually occurring is slim at best. Estonia is one of six
countries, with the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, Slovenia and
Cyprus, being considered as candidates for admittance into the
EU. However, it appears that EU expansion may not happen as
quickly as originally thought, if at all. German Foreign Minister
Joschka Fischer, who assumed the EU presidency on January 1, told
Agence France Presse on January 7 that the EU must solve current
difficulties before expanding. German Chancellor Gerhard
Schroeder echoed Fischer's concern in an interview with the
German magazine Der Spiegel. "If, during the German presidency,
we do not manage to put the financial questions in order for
possible enlargement, then the date of the enlargement will be
put back," Schroeder said last Monday. Estonia faces the same
problems of EU integration as that of Slovakia, which we
discussed in yesterday's GIU.

On the other hand, Estonia's chance of being admitted into NATO
is not nearly as rosy as that of Slovakia. While Slovakia's
admission rounds out an important line of defense for NATO,
Estonia poses NATO with a new strategic problem. Even though
former-Warsaw Pact countries Poland, Hungary, and the Czech
Republic are due to be invited to join NATO this spring, it is
doubtful that Estonia will be included. Furthermore, including
Estonia, or any of the Baltic republics for that matter, in NATO
would be a sure-fire way of provoking an immediate and heated
reaction from Moscow. Russia views the Baltic region as very
important to its security, and Estonia as a NATO member would be
a dagger thrust at St. Petersburg.

While Russia and Belarus have reunited and other former Soviet
republics, such as Ukraine and Kazakhstan, seem soon to return to
the fold, Estonia is not ready to capitulate peacefully. Estonia
knows that it is only a matter of time before Russia begins
asserting pressure to assimilate it as well. Estonia's pursuit of
membership in the EU and NATO is one attempt to stave off that
process. Despite the announcement that Estonia can mobilize
80,000 reservists in the event of war, Estonia is well aware that
it could not hold out indefinitely against an aggressor. But in
the words of Lt. Gen. Kert, regarding Estonia's ability to defend
itself, "In principle, it is possible to swallow up Estonia, but
this will be very painful for the hypothetical enemy."

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To: Real Man who wrote (884)1/11/1999 9:31:00 AM
From: CIMA  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 1301
 
1/11/99 - Report: Bonn Angered About Russian Debt-Rescheduling Plans

<Picture>

Frankfurt-Jan. 11-FWN--Germany is not happy with mounting pressure it faces to annul old debts owed by the Russian government but inherited from the Soviet period, according to a report today in the German newspaper Handelsblatt.

Russia"s western creditors--governments, multinational financial institutions and banks--are currently engaged in negotiations on who will get the currency reserves left for debt servicing in 1999 after last year"s rouble debacle.

To service its debt commitments this year, Russia will need $17 billion. At best, it will be able to pay a total of $9 billion, the newspaper reported. The Russian central bank on Sunday confirmed its gold and currency reserves have fallen 20% during the past year to just $12.2 billion.

To the annoyance of Bonn, Washington is pushing for amnesty on all debt inherited by the government of the Russian Federation from the USSR. The debt had been rescheduled at the start of the 1990s under an agreement between the then-Soviet government and the so-called Paris Club of western creditor states.

Initial moves on debt amnesty have been taken by U.S. Deputy Secretary of State for foreign affairs Strobe Talbot and Lawrence Summers, Deputy Secretary of State for finance, according to leaked reports from Russian sources on Sunday.

According to the sources, Washington is pushing for the Russian government to give priority to servicing debt Russia contracted on its own account with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank and foreign governments. Debt servicing inherited from the USSR should take second place, the United States is reportedly arguing.

The United States has practically no old debt owed to it from the Soviet period. If debts contracted by the USSR are taken into account, however, Germany emerges by far as Russia"s largest single creditor. At DM25 billion, credits issued by Germany accounted for half the old USSR debt. Since the USSR was dissolved at the end of 1991, Germany"s exposure has risen by a further DM30 billion.

In 1999, the Russian government is due to pay a total $6.4 billion against debts inherited from the USSR. Of this, $4.5 billion is due to go to the Paris Club and $1.9 billion to the London Club of western banks. Lack of funds has already led it to default on a $362 million interest payment to the London Club on USSR-contracted debt. The payment was due at the end of 1998.

German banks stress the need to comprehensively restructure Russia"s private-sector debts. On top of the $17 billion needed in 1999 to service debts contracted with foreign governments, some $16 billion will be needed to service foreign debt incurred by Russian banks and private- sector businesses, the Handelsblatt reported.

With a total $145 billion owed to foreign states, Russia"s average annual debt-servicing level during the next 10 years will come in at $15 billion. One-third of foreign debt servicing payments by the Russian government during the next three years will be made to international organizations such as the IMF, the report said.



To: Real Man who wrote (884)1/18/1999 11:17:00 AM
From: Jim Fraser  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 1301
 
Is Yeltsin going to kick the bucket in '99?

Sure looks that way to me. Not a well man.



To: Real Man who wrote (884)1/27/1999 10:30:00 PM
From: CIMA  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 1301
 
IMF will not Aid Ukraine, Loan to Russia Unlikely

Summary

A scandal has erupted in Moscow over the discovery that, despite
Deputy Prime Minister Yuri Maslyukov's assertions to the
contrary, the IMF delegation in Moscow has no intention of
negotiating a resumption of IMF loans to Russia. This should be
no surprise, even within Moscow, but at the same time, an IMF
mission to Kiev recommended against resuming loans to Ukraine.
While abandonment of Ukraine may make economic sense, it
effectively forces Kiev into Moscow's arms -- a strategically
dangerous move for the West.

Analysis

The IMF mission that ended its visit to Ukraine on January 26 did
not recommend the granting a new monthly loan to effect the
resumption of the three-year aid package of $2.2 billion to the
country. The IMF, which froze aid to Ukraine in November 1998,
said Kiev was lagging in implementing economic and other reform
measures. Without the loan, Ukraine will probably fail to pay
its debts in 1999 to foreign creditors and will experience
increased inflation.

Like Ukraine, Russia's prospects for receiving renewed financial
support from the IMF are slim. The arrival of the IMF mission to
Moscow last week had been accompanied by optimistic statements by
Russian officials -- primarily by Deputy Prime Minister Yuri
Maslyukov -- regarding the possibility of an agreement with the
fund. Given the highly unrealistic economic program proposed for
1999 by Yevgeni Primakov's cabinet, we believe that it is very
unlikely that the IMF will approve new loan to Russia. And,
considering the fact that relations between Moscow and Washington
are at their lowest point since the end of the Cold War, this
does not surprise us.

What is surprising, however, is the IMF's attitude towards
Russia's southern neighbor -- Ukraine. By denying support to
Kiev, the IMF is making Ukraine extremely vulnerable to both
economic and political pressure. The IMF froze its three-year
aid package program to Ukraine, approved in September 1998, only
two months later, due to Kiev's inefficient tax collection system
and lack of progress in implementing reforms. Prior to
suspending the aid, IMF delivered $335 million of its original
loan to Ukraine. Since November, several rounds of talks between
the Ukrainian government and the IMF have taken place, but as of
today, the Fund has not changed its stance on the future
financial help.

Ukraine is now on a brink of financial collapse. The country's
foreign debt is $11.5 billion, of which $1.17 billion has to be
paid this year to foreign creditors and $670 million to the IMF.
The foreign reserve of the National Bank of Ukraine is reported
at only $1 billion, and there is a high probability that Ukraine
may face a severe economic crisis this year without help from
foreign financial institutions. The IMF is aware of this
situation, as well as of the fact that Ukraine has been slow to
realize economic progress because of the negative impact of the
financial crisis in Russia. What is important to recognize is
the consequences of IMF policies for the Ukraine: they amount to
leaving Ukraine with only one option, specifically seeking relief
by acquiescing in Russia's expanding sphere of economic and
political influence.

In the meantime, a political scandal is coming to a head in
Moscow, a scandal that involves First Deputy Yuri Maslyukov's
false statements regarding the progress the Russian government
was making with the IMF. The Russian newspaper Nezavisimaya
Gazeta wrote on January 26 that Maslyukov misled Prime Minister,
Communist Party, and the Russian people about the possibility of
getting a new loan of $ 4.3 billion as an extension of the old
IMF aid program. The newspaper has charged that "it is a bluff
on Maslyukov's part to raise the status of the IMF mission to
that of a negotiating delegation" when in fact "the mission has
no business other than compiling a quarterly report about the
state of the Russian economy, which the IMF does regularly in
conformity with point four of its Charter." The newspaper wrote
that it remained skeptical about the possibility that Russia
would receive a new loan from the IMF, and quoted "reliable
sources" to the effect that a draft presidential decree has been
issued to dismiss Maslyukov from his post. The Kremlin later
denied the report. And Maslyukov then blamed Russia's previous
reformist leaders for obstructing the present talks with the IMF.

Indeed, the indications that the IMF does not plan to grant
Russia another loan any time soon are numerous. Last week,
French Economics and Finance Minister Dominique Strauss-Kahn
reinforced impressions of the IMF's likely position when he told
a press conference in Moscow that the Russian 1999 budget was the
main reason why the IMF has been reluctant to grant a new loan.
This loan is critical in that it would secure debt relief for
Russia from the Paris Club group of creditors. On January 24,
Deputy Managing Director of the IMF Stanley Fisher said that the
new Russian economic program had no chances for success.
Moreover, he said, 1998 loan given to Russia had not been used to
help implement the reform strategy it was originally intended to
support. On January 27, German business daily Handelsblatt
quoted an IMF spokesman as saying that the fund has frozen all
further payments to Russia under the $ 22.6 billion aid program
designed last year. The IMF specifically disapproved of the
Russian government's inclusion of the IMF loan in its state
budget without specifying, in its new economic program, ways for
cutting budget deficit and curtailing inflation. The spokesman
said that as of this moment there is no timetable set for
starting new IMF negotiations with Moscow.

Confirmation of these reports may be found in the fact that the
planned January 28 meeting between Maslyukov and head of the IMF
mission to Russia, Jorge Marquez Ruarte, had been canceled a day
before it was to begin. According to the secretary of Anton
Surikov, Russia's First Deputy Premier, "there is no subject for
a talk yet." Clearly, the current Russian government can not
count on continued backing from Western financial institutions.
This is a painful realization for Primakov's administration,
which came to power once the previous pro-reform government was
sacked last summer. Primakov's government apparently believed
that help from the West would continue despite it having
jettisoned a reformist agenda.

It appears to us that the West is effectively abandoning Ukraine.
This certainly makes a great deal of economic sense. It does
not, however, make a great deal of strategic sense. We are now
at an interesting crossroads. The West has been treating the
former Soviet Union in primarily economic terms, and has left the
management of relations, to a great extent, to the IMF and other
primarily economic institutions. Economic rationality and
strategic rationality are two different things. Indeed, they are
sometimes contradictory things. Economists are controlling the
West's relation to Ukraine when, in fact, the issue should pass
into the hands of the national security specialists. This hand-
off is not taking place. Denying Ukraine aid makes economic
sense, but carries tremendous geopolitical dangers. It is
absolutely crucial that the West resume cooperation with Kiev,
especially if it breaks its relationship with Moscow.

___________________________________________________

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or send your name, organization, position, mailing
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alert@stratfor.com
___________________________________________________

STRATFOR, Inc.
504 Lavaca, Suite 1100
Austin, TX 78701
Phone: 512-583-5000
Fax: 512-583-5025
Internet: stratfor.com
Email: info@stratfor.com